Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gwalior Dugdha Sangh Sahkari Maryadit ... vs Narendra Pal Singh Rana And Ors. on 27 September, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(5)MPHT562
JUDGMENT Chandresh Bhushan, J.
1. This order shall also govern the disposal of L.P.A. No. 90/2002, (Gwalior Dugdha Sangh Sahkari Maryadit and Anr. v. Dinesh Kumar Sharma and Ors.).
2. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal of his writ petition, to quash the order dated 28-8-2000 of M.P.S. Co-operative Tribunal confirming the finding of the First Appellate Court regarding limitation in respect to the application of respondent No. 1, and it's order of remand of the case for further trial to the Dy. Registrar, the petitioner society has preferred this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Nagpur.
3. Facts in brief are that the respondent No. 1, who was an employee of the petitioner co-operative society had filed a writ in the High Court, challenging his transfer to Ambikapur, which was allowed and leave to appeal against that order, was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Subsequently, after rejection of his claim under Industrial Disputes Act, by the Labour Court, he had filed an application before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gwalior on 7-10-1998 along with the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, for wages of the period from 3-10-1992 to 15-3-1994, i.e., the date on which, he was relieved under the above referred order of his transfer and till the date, he was taken back on duty after the order of his transfer was quashed by this Court. The respondent No. 1, in his application had mentioned that it was an application referring the dispute under Section 55 of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred as to 'the Act'). The learned Dy. Registrar, after hearing the parties, held that the application of respondent No. 1, was barred by limitation. On appeal, the Appellate Court, held that it was not barred by limitation and remanded the case back to Dy. Registrar. In second appeal, the order of First Appellate Court, was maintained, thereafter, the appellants challenging the orders of Appellate Court moved a writ petition under Article 226 as well 227 of the Constitution of India, which was dismissed, vide impugned order.
4. It is contended on behalf of appellants, relying upon the decision rendered in the case of Ramjati Sharma v. M.P. Co-operative Societies and Ors., reported in 2001 (2) MPJR 359, that there was no provision for extension of limitation prescribed under Section 55 of the Act and as the Act does not provide for application of provisions of Section 5 or 14 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation so provided could not be extended. It was also contended by learned Counsel for the appellants that learned Single Judge has wrongly treated the dispute raised by respondent No. 1, before Dy. Registrar as a dispute, also falling under Section 64 of the Act, wherein, the period of limitation provided was six years and that therefore, dispute raised by respondent No. 1, was not time barred.
5. As far as the first contention is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil, Aboobacker, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 5, has observed that where any special law prescribes the period of limitation for filing any appeal or application etc., and in the absence of any provision of limitation under the limitation Act for such application/appeal etc., the period of limitation provided under the Special Act, must be treated to be different from that under the Limitation Act and as a consequence, Section 5 of Limitation Act, will be automatically attracted to such applications or appeal in the absence of any express contrary provision under the Special Act. In this respect, it was argued by learned Counsel for appellants that the law as laid down in this case could not be applied to the present case as in the present case, the limitation prescribed was for reference of a dispute to be decided by the Registrar or Dy. Registrar and not for moving an application of any kind.
6. After hearing both the sides, we are of the opinion that this argument advanced by the learned Sr. Counsel for the appellants cannot be upheld because, no such distinction between a reference of a dispute under Section 55 of the Act and an application referred to by Hon'ble Apex Court, in the said case of Mukri Gopalan (supra) can be drawn. A reference under Section 55 of the Act, is to be made normally by moving an application. The proforma prescribed for referring a dispute under Section 64 has the title "application regarding reference of a dispute". Similarly, reference of a dispute to the Dy. Registrar, under Sub-section 55 (2) was also to be made by an application referring the dispute". Thus, the Court has ample power under Section 5 of Limitation Act to extend the period of limitation provided under Sub-section (5) of the Limitation Act. The decision of learned Single Judge, in the case of Ramjati Sharma (supra), relied upon by the appellants, was not applicable to the facts of the present case as in that case, the question regarding extension of period of limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was neither raised nor considered. Consideration of the application under Section 14 of Limitation Act, and also under Section 5 of Limitation Act, was justified.
7. In view of the above position, even if, the dispute referred by respondent No. 1, was being considered as one only under Section 55 of the Act and not under Section 64 of the Act, the impugned order of dismissal of petition, need not be interfered with. However, so far as the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the appellants that the words "terms and conditions for employment of a society", used in Sub-section (1) of Section 64 of the Act, which were included by amendment of 1954 alongwith the amendment in Section 47-A of the Act, referred only to the employment of a society by another society, cannot be upheld in view of the decision of Apex Court in the case of R.C. Tiwari v. M.P. State Co-operative Marketing Federation and Ors., reported in 1997 (5) SCC 125, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court, has specifically observed in regard to power under Section 64 of the Act that the provision was very wide and comprehensive. Therefore, it cannot be restricted to the dispute relating to the condition of employment of a society by any society. User of the words "past or present servant" in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 64 of the Act, also supports to the conclusion that the dispute contemplated under Section 64 included the dispute relating to the terms and conditions of employment of a society, raised by employees of that society.
8. In view of the above, final order of dismissal of writ petition by learned Single Judge, calls for no interference and this appeal is therefore, devoid of merit and is dismissed accordingly.