Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
Javid Ahmad Mir vs Union Territory Of J&K And Another on 27 October, 2020
Author: Tashi Rabstan
Bench: Tashi Rabstan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
AT SRINAGAR
(Through Video Conference from Jammu)
...
WP (Crl) no.645/2019
c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019
WP(Crl) no.649/2020
Reserved on: 05.10.2020
Pronounced on: 27.10.2020
Javid Ahmad Mir
Mohd. Amin Bhat
Tasaduq Shafi Sheikh @ Sanju
.......... Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. M. Ayoub Bhat, Advocate
in WP(Crl) Nos.645 & 646/2019
Mr. Arshid Ahmad Wani, Advocate in
WP(Crl) No.649/2019
Versus
Union Territory of J&K and another
Union Territory of J&K and another
Union Territory of J&K and others
.......... Respondent(s)
Through: Mr B. A. Dar, Sr. AAG
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE TASHI RABSTAN, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
1. Considering submission of learned counsels for petitioners that instant writ petitions relate to same subject-matter inasmuch as impugned detention orders emerge from same FIR and detenus had been arrested in connection with same FIR and on same date, this Court by orders dated 17th August 2020 and 27th August 2020, directed their clubbing and consequently heard and reserved them on 8th October 2020.
2. In writ petition, bearing WP(Crl) no.645/2020, challenge is thrown to Detention Order no.DIVCOM-"K"/101/2019 dated 14th November 2019, (for short "detention order no.1"), issued by Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir - respondent no.2 (for brevity "detaining authority"), placing Javid Ahmad Mir son of Mohammad Akber Mir son-
2 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020in-law of Ghulam Nabi Bhat resident of Larkipora, Padgampora, Awantipora District Pulwama (for short hereinafter called as "detenu no.1") under preventive detention, with a view to preventing him from committing any of the acts within the meaning of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. 2.1. Similarly, in second writ petition, being WP(Crl) no.646/2019, Detention Order no. DIVCOM-"K"/102/2019 dated 14th November 2019 (for brief "detention order no.2"), placing Mohammad Amin Bhat son of Ghulam Mohammad Bhat resident of Larkipora Padgampora Tehsil Awantipora District Pulwama, (for succinctness hereinafter referred as "detenu no.2") is assailed on the grounds tailored therein. 2.2. And in third writ petition, diarised and registered as WP(Crl) no.649/2020, Detention Order no. DIVCOM-"K"/103/2019 dated 14th November 2019 (for short detention order no.3), issued by Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir - respondent no.2, by which Tasaduq Shafi Sheikh Alias Sanju son of Late Mohammad Shafi Sheikh resident of Kathi Darwaza, Mohalla Mum Khan, Rainawari, Srinagar District Srinagar (for brevity "detenu no.3") is under challenge.
3. Reply in all the three writ petitions has been filed by respondent no.2.
4. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. I have gone through the detention record made available by learned counsel for respondents.
5. Prior to adverting to case in hand, it would be apt to say that right of personal liberty is most precious right, guaranteed under the Constitution. It has been held to be transcendental, inalienable and available to a person independent of the Constitution. A person is not to be deprived of his personal liberty, except in accordance with procedures established under law and the procedure as laid down, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR SC 597, is to be just and fair. The personal liberty may be curtailed, where a person faces a criminal charge or is convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment. Where a person is facing trial on a criminal charge and is temporarily deprived of his 3 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 personal liberty owing to criminal charge framed against him, he has an opportunity to defend himself and to be acquitted of the charge in case prosecution fails to bring home his guilt. Where such a person is convicted of offence, he still has satisfaction of having been given adequate opportunity to contest the charge and also adduce evidence in his defence.
5.1. It is to be seen that framers of the Constitution of India have incorporated Article 22 in the Constitution of India, aiming at leaving room for placing a person under preventive detention without a formal charge and trial and without such a person held guilty of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment by a competent court. Its aim and object is to save society from activities that are likely to deprive a large number of people of their right to life and personal liberty. In such a case, it would be dangerous for the people at large, to wait and watch as by the time ordinary law is set into motion, the person, having dangerous designs, would execute his plans, exposing general public to risk and causing colossal damage to life and property. It is, for that reason, necessary to take preventive measures and prevent a person bent upon to perpetrate mischief from translating his ideas into action. Article 22 Constitution of India, therefore, leaves scope for enactment of preventive detention laws. 5.2. The essential concept of preventive detention is that detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done, but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is satisfaction of the Executive of a reasonable probability of likelihood of detenu acting in a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. It is pertinent to mention here that preventive detention means detention of a person without trial in such circumstances that the evidence in possession of the authority is not sufficient to make a legal charge or to secure conviction of detenu by legal proof, but may still be sufficient to justify his detention. [Sasthi Chowdhary v. State of W.B. (1972) 3 SCC 826].
4 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/20205.3. While the object of punitive detention is to punish a person for what he has done, the object of preventive detention is not to punish an individual for any wrong done by him, but curtailing his liberty with a view to preventing him from committing certain injurious activities in future. Whereas punitive incarceration is after trial on the allegations made against a person, preventive detention is without trial into the allegations made against him. [Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. (1975) 3 SCC 198]. 5.4. Preventive justice requires an action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. The compulsions of primordial need to maintain order in society, without which enjoyment of all rights, including the right of personal liberty would lose all their meaning, are the true justifications for the laws of preventive detention. This justification has been described as a "jurisdiction of suspicion" and the compulsions to preserve the values of freedom of a democratic society and social order, sometimes merit the curtailment of individual liberty. [State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (2008) 3 SCC 613] 5.4. To lose our Country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law, said Thomas Jefferson, would be to lose the law, absurdly sacrificing the end to the means. [Union of India v. Yumnam Anand M., (2007) 10 SCC 190; R. v. Holliday, 1917 AC 260; Ayya v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 374] 5.5. Long back, an eminent thinker and author, Sophocles, had to say: "Law can never be enforced unless fear supports them." Though this statement was made centuries back, yet it has its relevance, in a way, with enormous vigour, in today's society as well. Every right-thinking citizen is duty bound to show esteem to law for having an orderly, civilized and peaceful society. It has to be kept in mind that law is antagonistic to any type of disarray. It is completely xenophobic of anarchy. If anyone breaks law, he has to face the wrath of law, contingent on the concept of proportionality that the law recognizes. It can never be forgotten that the purpose of criminal law legislated by competent legislatures, subject to judicial scrutiny within constitutionally established parameters, is to 5 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 protect collective interest and save every individual that forms a constituent of the collective from unwarranted hazards. [Vide: State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182].
5.6. It is worthwhile to mention here that it is sometimes said in a conceited and uncivilised manner that law cannot bind individual actions that are perceived as flaws by large body of people, but truth is and has to be that when law withstands test of Constitutional scrutiny in a democracy, individual notions are to be ignored. At times certain activities, wrongdoings, assume more accent and gravity depending upon the nature and impact of such deleterious activities on the society. It is neither to be guided by a sense of sentimentality nor to be governed by prejudices.
5.7. Acts or activities of an individual or a group of individuals, prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of peace and public order or poses threat to the health and welfare of people or have deleterious effect on the national economy and have magnitude of across-the-board disfigurement of societies. No Court should tune out such activities, being won over by passion of mercy. It is an obligation of the Court to constantly remind itself the right of society is never maltreated or marginalised by doings, an individual or set of individuals propagate and carry out.
6. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 13 of the Act of 1978, guarantee safeguard to detenu to be informed, as soon as may be, of grounds on which order of detention is made, which led to subjective satisfaction of detaining authority and also to be afforded earliest opportunity of making representation against order of detention. Detenu is to be furnished with sufficient particulars enabling him to make a representation, which on being considered, may obtain relief to him. 6.1. In the present case, strenuous submission made by learned counsels for petitioners is that the material, relied upon by detaining authority for issuance of impugned orders of detention, has not been furnished to detenus. Their further submission is that grounds of detention are vague 6 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 and sketchy. They contend that detenus were already in custody of police when impugned orders of detention were passed and they were not informed of their detention and were not even provided the material on which detention orders were passed, thereby violating procedural safeguards as envisaged under law. Impugned orders of detention are said to have not been confirmed by competent authority. 6.2. In view of submissions made by learned counsels for petitioners, it would be in the fitness of things to have analysation of the Act of 1988. It is designed to provide for detention in certain cases for the purpose of preventing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and for matters connected therewith. Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances poses a serious threat to health and welfare of people and activities of persons engaged in such illicit traffic have a deleterious effect on national economy. Having regard to persons, by whom and manner in which such activities are organised and carried on and having regard to the fact that in certain areas, which are highly vulnerable to illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, such activities of a considerable magnitude are clandestinely organised and carried on, and it is necessary for effective prevention of such activities to provide for detention of persons concerned in any manner therewith.
6.3. The acts, indulged in by persons, who act in concert with other persons and quite often such activities have far reaching ramification on our younger generation. These acts are preceded by a good amount of planning and organisation by the set of people. They are not like ordinary law and order crimes. If, however, in any given case a single act is found to be not sufficient to sustain the order of detention that may well be quashed, but it cannot be stated as a principle that one single act cannot constitute the basis for detention. On the contrary, it does. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be multiplicity of grounds for making or sustaining an order of detention. The said views and principles have 7 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Gautam Jain v. Union of India another AIR 2017 SC 230.
6.4. Subsection (e) of Section 2 of the Act of 1988 provides that "illicit traffic", in relation to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, means: (i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant; (ii) cultivating the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; (iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or transhipment, of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; (iv) dealing in any activities in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances other than those provided in sub-clauses (i) to (iii); or (v) handling or letting any premises for the carrying on of any of the activities referred to in sub- clauses (i) to (iv), other than those permitted under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), or any rule or order made, or any condition of any licence, term or authorisation issued, thereunder and includes: (1) financing, directly or indirectly, any of the aforementioned activities; (2) abetting or conspiring in the furtherance of or in support of doing any of the aforementioned activities; and (3) harbouring persons engaged in any of the aforementioned activities. 6.5. Section 3 of the Act of 1988 provides that the Central Government or a State Government, or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person, including a foreigner, that, with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Section 4 of the Act of 1988 provides that a detention order may be executed at 8 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 any place in India in the manner provided for execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
6.6. In the present case, as is gatherable from detention records produced by Mr B. A. Dar, learned Sr. AAG, representing respondents, impugned orders of detention have been approved by the Government vide Orders no.Home/PB-V/382 of 2019 dated 19.12.2019 vis-à-vis detention order no.1; no.Home/PB-V/413 of 2019 dated 30.12.2019 qua detention order no.2; and no.Home/PB-V/414 of 2019 dated 30.12.2019 concerning detention order no.3. It also appears from the record that the case referred to Advisory Board for opinion as provided under clause (b) of Section 9 of the Act of 1988. The Advisory Board vide its opinions/reports dated 16.12.2019 has observed that there is sufficient cause for detention of detenu. By abovementioned approval, detention of detenus for a period of one year has been directed.
6.7. In such circumstances, it becomes obvious that detaining authority had, immediately upon issuing impugned detention orders, reported the fact thereabout to the Government and Government approved impugned detention orders. Thus, there is no naysaying that provisions of the Act of 1988, have been strictly complied with by respondents.
7. It is not impertinent to mention that where a person has been detained in pursuance of detention order under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act of 1988, which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and resultantly, such an order, as is provided in Section 6 of the Act of 1988, shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are: vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference to remaining ground or grounds and make order of detention.
9 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/20208. Given Statutory and Constitutional requirements and procedures to be followed by respondents in the present case, I thought it apt to go through detention records in all three cases, produced by Mr B.A.Dar, learned Sr. AAG. Those, inter alia, comprise of Execution Reports and Receipts of Grounds of Detention. Perusal whereof unmasks that detenus have been furnished impugned detention orders, grounds of detention, communications to make representation(s), dossier and the other material relied upon by detaining authority. ASI Gh. Mohiudin No.53/Awt of police station Awantipora has executed detention warrants. Execution Reports and Receipt of Grounds of Detention also divulge that all that has been furnished to detenus has been read over and explained to detenus in Urdu/Kashmiri language, which they understood fully and they were also informed to make a representation against their detention.
8.1. Apropos to make mention here that Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India casts a dual obligation on the detaining authority, viz.:
(i) To communicate grounds of detention to the detenu at the earliest;
(ii) To afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order which implies the duty to consider and decide the representation when made, as soon as possible.
8.2. The Supreme Court has reiterated that communication means bringing home to detenu effective knowledge of facts and grounds on which order of detention is based. In the present case, as is evident from Execution Report as also Receipt of Grounds of Detention that grounds of detention have been furnished to detenu and explained to him in Urdu/Kashmiri language. He, however, did not opt to file representation against his detention.
8.3. The Constitution has guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention. It has also, by way of limitations upon the freedom of personal liberty, recognised right of the State to legislate for preventive detention, subject to certain safeguards in favour of detained person, as laid down 10 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 in Clauses (4) & (5) of Article 22. One of those safeguards is that detained person has a right to be communicated the grounds on which order of detention has been made against him, in order that he may be able to make his representation against detention order. In the circumstances of instant case, it has been shown that detenus had opportunity, which the law contemplates in their favour, for making effective representation against their detention. Detenus, however, did not avail of said opportunity.
8.4. In that view of matter, contention in petitions on hand that detenus were not furnished the material relied upon by detaining authority to make representation against their detention while passing impugned detention orders, is specious.
9. Section 9 of the Act of 1988 provides constitution of one or more Advisory Boards, to be comprised of a Chairman and two other persons. It also envisages that appropriate Government shall, within five weeks from the date of detention of a person under a detention order, make a reference in respect thereof to Advisory Board to enable it to make the report. Advisory Board, to which a reference is made, shall after considering reference and materials placed before it and after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose through appropriate Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard in person, after hearing him in person, prepare its report specifying in a separate paragraph thereof its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned and submit the same within eleven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. In the event Advisory Board reports that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for detention of a person, appropriate Government can confirm detention order and continue detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit and in every case where Advisory Board reports that there is, in its opinion, no sufficient cause 11 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 for detention of the person concerned, appropriate Government shall revoke detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 9.1. In the present case detention records, on perusal, would reveal that Advisory Board vide its order Report/Opinion dated 16.12.2019, has conveyed that grounds of detention formulated by detaining authority are sufficiently supported by dossier/material and that grounds of detention and other relevant material were furnished to detenus at the time of taking them into detention and that detenus were also informed about their right of making representation against their detention. However, no representation was made by detenus and, therefore, there was no rebuttal to the grounds of detention formulated by detaining authority. The report of Advisory Board also reveals that all the requirements contemplated under the Act of 1988, have been complied with and no error of law or procedure, to invalidate detention, have been committed by detaining authority and as an outcome thereof, the detention is in conformity with the principles as enshrined under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the Act of 1988. The Advisory Board has opined that there is sufficient cause for detention of detenus under Section 3 of the Act of 1988, with a view to preventing them from committing any of the acts as contemplated in the Act of 1988. 9.2. It is also noticeable from detention records that Advisory Board transmitted its Report to the Government with respect to detenus for further action. Upon receipt thereof, the Government, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act of 1988, confirmed detention order and directed lodgement of all three detenus in District Jail, Baramulla. So, there is strict compliance of provisions of the Act of 1988.
9.3. In the present case, Advisory Board has furnished its Report, opining disclosure of sufficient cause for detention of detenus with a view to preventing detenus from committing any of the acts within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act of 1988.
12 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/20209.4. In view of above, it is made clear here that this Court cannot go into the question whether on merits detaining authority was justified to make detention orders or to continue it, as if sitting on appeal. Thus, this Court cannot interfere on the ground that in view of the fact that times have changed, further detention would be unjustified. That is for the Government and Advisory Board to consider. Reference in this regard is made to Bhim Sen v. State of Punjab, AIR 1951 SC 481; Gopalan A.K. v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27; Shibbanlal Saksena v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 17; Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC; Sheoraj Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1975 SC 1143; and Ram Bali Rajbhar v. State of W.B. AIR 1975 SC 623.
10. Learned counsels for petitioners have also stated that the allegations/ grounds of detention are vague and the instances and cases mentioned in grounds of detention have no nexus with detenu. It is his submission that there is no live link between the order of detention and object, sought to be achieved, because implication of detenus in criminal offence would suggest that these offences can be de dealt with under provisions of criminal law and if at all detenus would be found involved in offences after a full-dress trial before criminal court, law will take its own course and, therefore, substantive law would have been sufficient to deal with offences, detenus are charged with, and, thus, preventive detentions are not justified inasmuch as detenus were in police custody at the time of passing of detention order.
10.1. It would be appropriate to note that with the evolution of mankind from primitive stage to the stage of social welfare State, administration of criminal law assumed great importance. As long as human beings were God-fearing and had faith that their actions were being watched by the Almighty, need for administration of criminal justice was not felt. However, with the passage of time and people becoming more materialistic, a section of society consisting of misguided and disgruntled human beings lost faith in the Almighty and started thinking that their actions could not be seen by anybody. These misguided persons 13 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 indulged in criminal activities that led to necessity for administration of criminal justice. Moreover, activities to be termed as criminal activities have also undergone change with the passage of time. What was regarded not harmful fifty years ago has become the greatest evil of the day in view of changed circumstances, new researches, new thinking and modern way of life.
10.2. The present case relates to illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs. The drug problem is a serious threat to public health, safety and well-being of humanity. Our global society is facing serious consequences of drug abuse and it undermines the socio-economic and political stability and sustainable development. Besides, it also distorts health and fabric of society and it is considered to be originator for petty offences as well as heinous crimes, like smuggling of arms and ammunition and money laundering. Involvement of various terrorist groups and syndicates in drug trafficking leads to threat to the national security and sovereignty of States by way of Narco-terrorism. Drug trafficking and abuse has continued its significant toll on valuable human lives and productive years of many persons around the globe. With the growth and development of world economy, drug traffickers are also seamlessly trafficking various type of drugs from one corner to other ensuring availability of contrabands for vulnerable segment of society who fall into trap of drug peddlers and traffickers. Due to India's close proximity with major opium growing areas of the region, India is facing serious menace of drug trafficking and as a spill-over effect, drug abuse especially among the youth is a matter of concern for us. 10.3. Our Constitution framers had visualised danger of misuse of such type of substances and therefore, made it part of directives issued to the State. The Directive Principles, which are part of our Constitution, lay down that the State shall make endeavours to bring about the prohibition of substances injurious for health except for medicinal and scientific purposes. In recent years, India has been facing a problem of transit traffic in illicit drugs. The spill over from such traffic has caused 14 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 tribulations of abuse and addiction. This trend has created an illicit demand for drugs within the country.
10.4. The illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances poses a serious threat to the health and welfare of the people and activities of persons engaged in such illicit traffic have a deleterious effect on the national economy as well. Having regard to the persons by whom and the manner in which such activities are organised and carried on, and having regard to the fact that in certain areas which are highly vulnerable to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, such activities of a considerable magnitude are clandestinely organised and carried on, it is necessary for the effective prevention of such activities to provide for detention of persons concerned in any manner therewith.
10.5. Reverting back to the case in hand. Grounds of detentions unmask that detenus on 4th September 2019 were arrested by police station Awantipora during a Naka checking at Padgampora when they (all three detenus) were travelling in a vehicle (Innova) bearing Registration no.DL8CZ/8094 and 24 sticks of Charas and one white coloured bag containing Heroin were recovered from the vehicle and accordingly, a case FIR no.112/2019 under Section 8/18, 8/20 read with Section 29 of NDPS Act at police station Awantipora, was registered. 10.6. It is also mentioned in grounds of detention that reports received from field agencies are suggestive of the fact that detenus have been clandestinely started dealing in illegal business of Narcotics and in order to carry out this illegal trade, they are exploiting immature minds of younger generation by making them dependent on drugs and to make them habitual addicts. Detenus are also said to have been supplying drugs against hefty amounts to immature youth, which in turn has exposed them to different kinds of immoral and illegal tendencies and as such resort to thefts and other illegal activities so as to purchase drugs from detenus. The drug mafia of which detenus are stated to be active members, are hell bent upon to spoil life and career of younger 15 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 generation by selling drugs to them. Detenus' designs and conduct are to lure teen aged youth and school going children into menace of drugs. 10.7. It is also mentioned in grounds of detention that FSL report bearing no.1063C&T dated 29th October 2019 suggests that Chars and Diacetyl Morphine (Heroin) were detected.
10.8. Grounds of detention also reveal that consignment seized from possession of detenus clearly shows that detenu are fully involved in the said illegal trade with conscious mind, in an organised manner which is great threat for sustaining values of the society and therefore, this aspect poses a serious threat to health, wealth and welfare of the people especially young generation. Detenus activities are also stated to have deleterious effect on National and State Economy.
11. It has been insisted by learned counsels for petitioners during course of advancing arguments that power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation and it may or may not relate to an offence. The basis of detention is satisfaction of Executive on a reasonable probability of likelihood of detenus acting in a manner similar to their past acts and prevent detenus from doing the same.
12. It is contended by respondents that detenus have been involved in illegal business of narcotics and, therefore, while taking into account those activities of detenus it was thought imperative and necessary to detain detenus inasmuch as preventing detenus from indulging in the said activities is not with an object of punishing them for something detenus have done but to prevent them from doing it. Reference of FIR in grounds of detention reflects and manifests awareness of detaining authority qua conduct and activities of detenus that detenus have indulged in. Impugned order of detention has been passed by detaining authority as a precautionary measure based on a reasonable prognosis of future behaviour of detenus based on their past conduct in light of surrounding circumstances much probability emerged, warranting detention of detenus.
16 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/202012.1. It may not be out of place to mention here that grounds of detention are definite, proximate and free from any ambiguity. Detenus have been informed with sufficient clarity what actually weighed with Detaining Authority while passing detention orders. Detaining Authority has narrated facts and figures that made it to exercise its powers under Section 3 of the Act of 1988, and record subjective satisfaction that detenus were required to be placed under preventive detention in order to prevent detenu from committing any of the acts within the meaning of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. 12.2. In such circumstances, suffice it to say that there had been material before detaining authority to come to a conclusion and hence, it cannot be said that subjective satisfaction of detaining authority was wrongly arrived at or grounds of detention are self-contradictory or vague. The role of detenus has been specifically described.
12.3. Even otherwise it is settled law that this Court in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution has limited scope to scrutinizing whether detention orders have been passed on the material placed before it, it cannot go further and examine sufficiency of material. [Vide: State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya, (1981) 4 SCC 216]. This Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of detaining authority and cannot substitute its own opinion over that of detaining authority when grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant. [See: State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35] 12.4. This Court can only examine grounds disclosed by the Government in order to see whether they are relevant to the object which the legislation has in view, that is, to prevent a detenu from engaging in activities which has potential threat to younger generation and school going children. [See: Union of India v. Arvind Shergill (2000) 7 SCC 601; Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipura, (2010) 9 SCC; and Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2012) 4 SCC 699] 12.5. It may not be impertinent to mention here that the Supreme Court, in a series of judgements, has held that even one prejudicial act can be treated 17 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 as sufficient for forming requisite satisfaction for detaining a person. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be, made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention and an order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. Discharge or acquittal of a person will not preclude detaining authority from issuing a detention order. In this regard the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha's case (supra), while considering various facets concerning preventive detention, has observed:
"32. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be, made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.
33. Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The authorities are different. The nature of proceedings is different. In a prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past act. In preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu.
34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many. The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B., Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B.; Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan and Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U. P., (1974) 4 SCC 573, which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under 18 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances."
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. (1974) 4 SCC 135, has said that while ordinarily-speaking one act may not be sufficient to form requisite satisfaction, there is no such invariable rule and that in a given case "one act may suffice". That was a case of wagon- breaking and given the nature of the Act, it was held therein that "one act is sufficient". The same principle was reiterated in the case of Anil Dely v. State of W.B. (1974) 4 SCC 514. It was only a case of theft of railway signal material. Here too "one act was held to be sufficient". Similarly, in Israil S K v. District Magistrate of West Dinajpur (1975) 3 SCC 292 and Dharua Kanu v. State of W.B. (1975) 3 SCC 527, single act of theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fish- plates respectively, was held sufficient to sustain the order of detention. In Saraswathi Seshagiri v. State of Kerala (1982) 2 SCC 310, a case arising under a single act, viz. attempt to export a huge amount of Indian currency was held sufficient. In short, the principle appears to be this:
"Though ordinarily one act may not be held sufficient to sustain an order of detention, one act may sustain an order of detention if the act is of such a nature as to indicate that it is an organised act or a manifestation of organised activity." The gravity and nature of the act is also relevant. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. That is the reason why single acts of wagon-breaking, theft of signal material, theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway 19 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 fish-plates were held sufficient by the Supreme Court. Similarly, where the person tried to export huge amount of Indian currency to a foreign country in a planned and premeditated manner, as in the present case detenus have been apprehended in the activities of illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, it was held that such a single act warrants an inference that detenus will repeat their activity in future and, therefore, their detention is necessary to prevent them from indulging in such prejudicial activity.
14. One more submission was made during course of advancing the arguments that criminal prosecution could not be evaded or short- circuited by ready resort to preventive detention and power of detention could not be used to subvert, supplant or substitute punitive law of land. It has also been urged that no material has been disclosed by detaining authority in grounds of detention to establish existence of any exceptional reasons justifying recourse to preventive detention inasmuch as implication of detenus in criminal offence(s) would suggest that these offences could be dealt with under the provisions of criminal law and if at all detenus would be found involved in the offence(s) after a full-dress trial before criminal court, the law would take its own course, and in absence of such reasons before detaining authority, it was not competent to detaining authority to make orders of detention sidestepping criminal prosecution. This argument completely overlooks the fact that the object of making an order of detention is preventive while object of a criminal prosecution is punitive. Even if a criminal prosecution fails and an order of detention is then made, it would not invalidate order of detention, because, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Subharta v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 3 SCC 250, "the purpose of preventive detention being different from conviction and punishment and subjective satisfaction being necessary in the former while proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the latter", the order of detention would not be bad merely because criminal prosecution has failed. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court in that case that "the Act creates in the authority 20 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 concerned a new jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention on their subjective satisfaction on grounds of suspicion of commission in future of acts prejudicial to the community in general. This jurisdiction is different from that of judicial trial in courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would therefore not operate as a bar to a detention order or render it mala fide". If the failure of criminal prosecution can be no bar to the making of an order of detention, a fortiori mere fact that a criminal prosecution can be instituted cannot operate as a bar against making of an order of detention. If an order of detention is made only in order to bypass a criminal prosecution which may be irksome because of inconvenience of proving guilt in a court of law, it would certainly be an abuse of power of preventive detention and detention order would be bad. But if object of making order of detention is to prevent commission in future of activities, injurious to community, it would be a perfectly legitimate exercise of power to make order of detention. The Court would have to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine on which side of line detention order falls. The order of detention was plainly and indubitably with a view to preventing detenu from continuing with the prejudicial activities.
15. In the above background, it would be apt to refer to the observations made by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, AIR 1951 SC 157 . Paragraph 5 of judgement lays law on the point, which is profitable to be reproduced infra:
"5. It has to be borne in mind that the legislation in question is not an emergency legislation. The powers of preventive detention under this Act of 1950 are in addition to those contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, where preventive detention is followed by an inquiry or trial. By its very nature, preventive detention is aimed at preventing the commission of an offence or preventing the detained person from achieving a certain end. The authority making the order therefore cannot always be in possession of full detailed information when it passes the order and the information in its possession may fall far short of legal proof of any specific offence, although it may be indicative of a strong probability of the impending commission of a prejudicial act. Section a of the Preventive Detention Act therefore requires that the Central 21 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 Government or the State Government must be satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to (1) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (2) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or (8) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community ......... it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. According to the wording of section 3, therefore, before the Government can pass an order of preventive detention it must be satisfied with respect to the individual person that his activities are directed against one or other of the three objects mentioned in the section, and that the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to prevent him from acting in such a manner. The wording of the section thus clearly shows that it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government on the point which alone is necessary to be established. It is significant that while the objects intended to be defeated are mentioned, the different methods, acts or omissions by which that can be done are not mentioned, as it is not humanly possible to give such an exhaustive list. The satisfaction of the Government however must be based on some grounds. There can be no satisfaction if there are no grounds for the same. There may be a divergence of opinion as to whether certain grounds are sufficient to bring about the satisfaction required by the section. One person may think one way, another the other way. If, therefore, the grounds on which it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government was satisfied are such as a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with the objects which were to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fides cannot be challenged in a court. Whether in a particular case the grounds are sufficient or not, according to the opinion of any person or body other than the Central Government or the State Government, is ruled out by the wording of the section. It is not for the court to sit in the place of the Central Government or the State Government and try to deter- mine if it would have come to the same conclusion as the Central or the State Government. As has been generally observed, this is a matter for the subjective decision of the Government and that cannot be substituted by an objective test in a court of law. Such detention orders are passed on information and materials which may not be strictly admissible as evidence under the Evidence Act in a court, but which the law, taking into consideration the needs and exigencies of administration, has allowed to be considered sufficient for the subjective decision of the Government."
16. What emerges from the above, is that preventive detention is aimed at preventing prejudicial activities or preventing detained person from achieving a certain end. The authority making the order, therefore, cannot always be in possession of full detailed information when it passes order of detention and information, in its possession, may fall far short of legal proof of any specific offence, although it may be indicative of a strong probability of impending commission of a prejudicial act. Preventive Detention Acts, therefore, require that the Government must 22 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 be satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any prejudicial manner prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of public order or maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community or posing threat to the health and welfare of people or having deleterious effect on national economy, it is necessary so to do make an order directing that such person be detained. The Prevention Detention Acts, therefore, imply that the Government can pass an order of preventive detention; it must be satisfied with respect to the individual person that his activities are directed against objects mentioned in the Acts and that detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to prevent him from acting in such a manner. Thus, it clearly shows that it is the satisfaction of Government on the point which alone is necessary to be established. It is significant that while the objects intended to be defeated are mentioned, different methods, acts or omissions by which that can be done are not mentioned as it is not humanly possible to give such an exhaustive list. The satisfaction of the Government, however, must be based on some grounds. There can be no satisfaction if there are no grounds for the same. There may be a divergence of opinion as to whether certain grounds are sufficient to bring about the satisfaction required by the Act. It also emerges from above quoted judgement that one person may think one way, another the other way. If, therefore, grounds on which it is stated that the Government was satisfied, are such as a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with the objects which were to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fides cannot be challenged in a court. Whether in a particular case, grounds are sufficient or not, according to the opinion of any person or body other than the Government, is ruled out by the language of the Act. It is not for the Court to sit in the place of the Government and try to determine, if it would have come to same conclusion as Government. As has been generally observed, this is a matter for subjective decision of the Government and that cannot be 23 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 substituted by an objective test in a court of law. Such detention orders, the Supreme Court has said, are passed on information and materials which may not be strictly admissible as evidence under the Evidence Act in a court, but which the law, taking into consideration, needs and exigencies of administration, has allowed to be considered sufficient for subjective decision of the Government.
17. In light of aforesaid position of law settled by the Six-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, way back in the year 1951, the scope of looking into the manner in which subjective satisfaction is arrived at by detaining authority, is limited. This Court, while examining the material, which is made basis of subjective satisfaction of detaining authority, would not act as a 'court of appeal' and find fault with the satisfaction on the ground that on the basis of material before detaining authority, another view was possible.
18. There was another submission that grounds of detention are verbatim of dossier. As clearly mentioned elsewhere in this judgement, this Court, while examining the material which is made basis of subjective satisfaction of detaining authority, would not act as a court of appeal and find fault with satisfaction on ground that on the basis of material before detaining authority another view was possible. Such being the scope of enquiry in this aspect. Grounds of detention are not replica of dossier. The sponsoring authority has not only supplied the material, viz. dossier, containing gist of the activities of the detenu but has also supplied the material in the shape of FIR. All this material was before detaining authority when it arrived at subjective satisfaction that activities of the detenus were posing serious threat to the health and welfare of people and have deleterious effect on the national economy and, therefore, it was necessary for effective prevention of such activities to provide for detention of detenus.
19. The contention of learned counsels for petitioners that failure on the part of detaining authority to provide translated copies of documents relied upon in grounds of detention vitiates the detention, is too fallacious to be 24 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 accepted. Detenu nos.1&2 are illiterate persons, and detenu no.3 has done his Graduation in the year 1996. The document, relied upon in grounds of detention, viz. FIR, is in Urdu. In addition to that, grounds of detention have been well explained to detenus in the language they understand but they never demanded translated copies of any of the documents forming part of grounds of detention. Insofar as detenu no.3 is concerned, he could have understood English language, besides Urdu and could have made a representation, which he, however, did not. Thus, even on the facts, petitioners' contention has no impetus or force. Otherwise also, from relevant provisions of the Act of 1988, dealing with preventive detention, read with the Constitutional mandate under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India, I do not find that such requirement is mandatory and failure on part of detaining authority to supply translated copies in all cases, vitiates detention. This may be so if there is a specific request from detenu to supply such copies in a language he understands and then there is failure on the part of detaining authority to respond. Nothing of the sort has happened in instant case. It is also not demonstrated before this Court as to how this omission on the part of detaining authority has violated rights of detenus to make any effective representation, more so when detenus chose not to make representation(s) either to detaining authority or to the Government. Detenus had an option to appear before Advisory Board and make such a submission before it but detenus have chosen not to do so. In such circumstances, submissions of learned counsel for petitioners are wholly unacceptable and thus, rejected.
20. The Supreme Court in Abdul Latief Abdul Wahab Sheikh V. B.K. Jha, 1987 (2) SCC 22 has in unequivocal terms made it clear that it is only the procedural requirements, which are the only safeguards available to detenu, that is to be followed and complied with as the Court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of detaining authority. In the present case, the procedural requirements/safeguards have been followed and complied with by respondents in letter and spirit.
25 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/202021. Personal liberty is one of the most cherished freedoms, perhaps more important than the other freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. It was for this reason that the Founding Fathers enacted the safeguards in Article 22 in the Constitution so as to limit the power of the State to detain a person without trial, which may otherwise pass the test of Article 21, by humanising the harsh authority over individual liberty. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, the drastic power to detain a person without trial for security of the State or maintenance of public order or preventing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and combatting abuse of such drugs and substances which pose threat to the health and welfare of people or have deleterious effect on the national economy must be strictly construed. However, where individual liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the State or maintenance of public order or poses threat to the health and welfare of people or have deleterious effect on the national economy, then the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation. These observations have been made by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India and others (2000) 3 SCC 409 and followed in The Secretary to Government, Public (Law and Order-F) and another v. Nabila and another, (2015) 12 SCC 127 .
22. Liberty of an individual has to be subordinated, within reasonable bounds, to the good of the people. The framers of the Constitution were conscious of the practical need of preventive detention with a view to striking a just and delicate balance between need and necessity to preserve individual liberty and personal freedom on the one hand, and security and safety of the country and interest of the society on the other hand. Security of the State, maintenance of public order and services essential to the community, prevention of smuggling and black- marketing activities, or illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances posing threat to the health and welfare of people or have deleterious effect on the national economy, etcetera, demand effective 26 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 safeguards in the larger interests of sustenance of a peaceful democratic way of life.
23. In considering and interpreting preventive detention laws, the Courts ought to show greatest concern and solitude in upholding and safeguarding the fundamental right of liberty of the citizen, however, without forgetting the historical background in which the necessity--an unhappy necessity--was felt by the makers of the Constitution in incorporating provisions of preventive detention in the Constitution itself. While verily it is the duty of the Court to safeguard against any encroachment on life and liberty of individuals, at the same time the authorities, who have responsibility to discharge functions vested in them under law of the country, should not be impeded or interfered with without justification. [See: State of W.B. v. Ashok Dey, (1972) 1 SCC 199; Bhut Nath Mete v. State of W.B., (1974) 1 SCC 645; ADM v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521; A. K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271; Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 746; Kamarunnisa v. Union of India and another, (1991) 1 SCC 128; Veeramani v. State of T.N. (1994) 2 SCC 337; Union of India v. Paul Manickam and another, (2003) 8 SCC 342; and Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur and others, (2012) 7 SCC 181]
24. Observing that aim of preventive detention is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept and to prevent him from doing so, the Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Kumra Goyal v. Union of India and others, (2005) 8 SCC 276, and ingeminated in Union of India and another v. Dimple Happy Dhakad, AIR 2019 SC 3428, has held that an order of detention is not a curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action, avowed object of which being to prevent antisocial and subversive elements from imperilling welfare of the country or security of the nation or from disturbing public tranquillity or from indulging in smuggling activities or from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, posing threat to the health and welfare of people or have deleterious effect on the national economy, 27 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/2020 etc. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The authorities on the subject have consistently taken the view that preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it, and to prevent him from doing so.
25. To sum up, a law of preventive detention is not invalid because it prescribes no objective standard for ordering preventive detention, and leaves the matter to subjective satisfaction of the Executive. The reason for this view is that preventive detention is not punitive but preventive and is resorted to with a view to prevent a person from committing activities regarded as prejudicial to certain objects that the law of preventive detention seeks to prescribe. Preventive detention is, thus, based on suspicion or anticipation and not on proof. Responsibility for security of State, or maintenance of public order, or essential services and supplies, or the health and welfare of people, rests on the Executive and it must, therefore, have necessary powers to order preventive detention. Having said that, subjective satisfaction of a detaining authority to detain a person or not, is not open to objective assessment by a Court. A Court is not a proper forum to scrutinise merits of administrative decision to detain a person. The Court cannot substitute its own satisfaction for that of the authority concerned and decide whether its satisfaction was reasonable or proper, or whether in the circumstances of the matter, the person concerned should have been detained or not. It is often said and held that the Courts do not even go into the question whether the facts mentioned in grounds of detention are correct or false. The reason for the rule is that to decide this, evidence may have to be taken by the courts and that is not the policy of law of preventive detention. This matter lies within the competence of Advisory Board. While saying so, this Court does not sit in appeal over decision of detaining authority and cannot substitute its own opinion over that of detaining authority when grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant.
28 WP (Crl) no.645/2019 c/w WP(Crl) no.646/2019 WP(Crl) no.649/202025.1. It is apposite to mention that our Constitution undoubtedly guarantees various freedoms and personal liberty to all persons in our Republic. However, it should be kept in mind by one and all that the constitutional guarantee of such freedoms and liberty is not meant to be abused and misused so as to endanger and threaten the very foundation of the pattern of our free society in which the guaranteed democratic freedom and personal liberty is designed to grow and flourish. The larger interests of our multi-religious nation as a whole and cause of preserving and securing to every person guaranteed freedom peremptorily demand reasonable restrictions on prejudicial activities of individuals, which undoubtedly jeopardise rightful freedoms of rest of the society. Main object of Preventive Detention is security of the State, maintenance of public order or preventing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and combating abuse of such drugs and substances, which pose threat to health and welfare of people or have deleterious effect on national economy, and larger interests of sustenance of peaceful democratic way of life.
26. For the foregoing discussion, the petitions sans any merit and are, accordingly, dismissed.
27. Registry to return detention records to learned counsel for respondents.
( Tashi Rabstan ) Judge Srinagar 27.10.2020 Ajaz Ahmad, PS Whether approved for reporting? Yes AJAZ AHMAD 2020.10.27 15:15 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document