Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rahish Mohammad Qureshi And Others vs State Of M.P. And Others on 1 May, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2001(1)MPHT123
ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. The controversy involved and the questions raised in both the aforesaid writ petitions are identical and on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, these writ petitions are being disposed of by a common order.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Govt. Advocate representing the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 on advance notice and have carefully perused the record.
3. The petitioners feels aggrieved by the order dated 5-4-2000 passed by the Commissioner, Gwalior in compliance of the directions issued by this Court in its judgment and order dated 22-12-1999 of the Division Bench disposing of W.P. No. 1678/98 (Smt. Arti Bhatnagar and others Vs. State of M.P. and others) and the connected Writ Petition No. 1477/98 (Man Singh and others Vs. State of M.P. and others).
4. It may be noticed that the select list in question had been challenged on various grounds including the ground that the Selection Committee while preparing the said select list had acted in an arbitrary manner ignoring all the requisite criteria which had to be taken into account. In the garb of awarding the marks to the candidates for their performance in the interview, the select list had been prepared awarding inflated marks to push up the candidates who had got poor marks for their educational qualifications or awarding deflated marks to pull down the candidates who had got higher marks for their educational qualification without adopting the common eligibility criteria for all the candidates and further totally ignoring the reservation policy which had to be strictly adhered to.
5. It is not in dispute that the members of the Selection Committee which had assessed the merit of the petitioners pursuant to the orders passed by the Collector, the Competent Authority, had re-assessed the performance of the candidates on the defects being pointed out to the members of the Selection Committee and the same Committee realising its mistakes after affording opportunity to the concerned candidates, had corrected the original select list with the result that about 72 candidates whose names had appeared in the first select list stood deleted and substituted by other candidates considering their merit. The select list had to be prepared strictly on merit taking into account various variable factors stipulated in the Rule 5 (9) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997. This select list under the statutory provisions was challengeable before the Competent Authority.
6. Taking into consideration the various submissions made by the present petitioners this Court for the reasons recorded in its judgment and order dated 22-12-1999 in W.P. No. 1678/98 (supra) had directed the Commissioner to consider the claim of the aggrieved persons whose names had been deleted from the final select list.
7. The petitioners have urged that they had not been given the reasonable opportunity of being heard by the respondent-authority. In this connection, suffice it to say that in the impugned order passed by the Commissioner it has been specifically indicated that the concerned parties had been afforded the opportunity of hearing and their arguments had been heard. In this connection, the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1249, may be noticed which are as under :
"....... Matters of judicial record arc unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. "Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation". (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran Vs. Subramanian, AIR 1926 PC 136). We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in Court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhusudan Vs. Chandrabati, AIR 1917 PC 30). That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the mater must necessarily end there..."
8. It may be noticed further that the observations of the Commissioner have to be taken to represent the correct state of affairs especially when there is nothing to indicate that any such grievance had been made by the petitioners before the Commissioner as indicated by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra).
9. During the pendency of the writ petitions, the petitioners have filed applications being I.A. No. 3491/2000 and I.A. No. 3490/2000 asserting that in the second interview the candidates who had secured less marks in the qualifying Higher Secondary Examination were given more marks in the interview with the result that the names of the petitioners were deleted from the select list. This obviously indicates that the same Selection Committee realising its mistakes had rectified the select list which had resulted in elimination of the less meritorious candidates including the petitioners whose names had been placed in the said select list ignoring the meritorious candidates.
10. In the aforesaid connection, it may be noticed that Rule 9 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997, indicates the manner prescribed for the assessment of the candidates by the Committee. 60% of the marks were to be allotted on the basis of the marks obtained in the qualifying examination and out of the remaining 40% marks 25% marks were to be allotted for the teaching experience etc. and 15% of marks for the oral test/interview wherein various aspects as indicated in Rule 9 (i) (c) of the aforesaid Rules had to be taken into account. The select list was to be prepared on the basis of the aforesaid assessment in order of merit and the appointments from the select list were to be made in accordance with the roster prescribed by the State Government.
11. It may also he noticed that the matter in regard to the inherent glaring defects vitiating the select list had been thoroughly gone into not only by the Competent Authority but the same Selection Committee after the defects going to the root of the matter had been brought to its notice. This matter was again examined by the Commissioner. The findings returned against the petitioners by the Selection Committee, the Competent Authority and the Commissioner does not require to be disturbed.
12. It may be observed in the aforesaid connection that ordinarily it is not appropriate in the proceedings of the present nature to act as a super selection committee. I must, however, hasten to add that in a situation where either a vital procedural irregularity or any other major defect going to the root of the matter vitiating the selection process or the preparation of the select list is found to have been established, this Court cannot shirk in discharg-
ing its responsibility in undoing of the wrong coming to the rescue of the aggrieved person. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, no such defect could be established which may warrant any interference.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously urged that the select list stands vitiated on account of the erroneous implementation of the provisions relating to the reservation and accommodation of the reserved category candidates in the select list prepared for the unreserved category candidates.
14. It may be noticed that in the present case all the petitioners were General Category candidates. The select list was to be prepared on the basis of the assessment of the merit adhering to the provisions contained in Rule 9 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997, and the appointments from the said select list were to be made in accordance with the roster prescribed by the State Government.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the candidates belonging to the reserved category could not be brought on the select list meant for the General Category candidates. In the present case, the select list meant for the General Category candidates shows that the names of several candidates belonging to the reserved category had been brought on the select list meant for the General Category candidates.
16. In support of his aforesaid submission, the learned counsel for the petitioners has heavily relied upon the observations made in a decision by this Court in the case of Ram Lakhan Dhakad Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, W.P. No. 1459/98, decided on 4-9-1998, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure P-6 to the writ petition.
17. A perusal of the aforesaid decision indicates that the ratio of the aforesaid decision cannot be said to be attracted at all in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It may be noticed in this connection that the controversy raised in the aforesaid writ petition had arisen at the stage of Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997.
18. The provision contained in Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules of 1997 provides that after scrutiny of the applications received, category-wise merit list of the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes and General Category was to be prepared on the basis of the marks obtained in the qualifying examination prescribed for the post and on the basis of the number of vacancies in each category, three times the number of vacancies to be filled in each category were to be called for interview or test according to the merit list. Such candidates who had worked for minimum one session in the school of Janpad Panchayat or Zila Panchayat were to be called for interview or test.
19. It may further be noticed that the stage of Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules is much anterior to the stage of selection and preparation of select list for offering appointments contemplated under Rule 9 (10) of the aforesaid Rules. The provision contained in Rule 9 (10) specifically provide that the appointment from the select list shall be made in accordance with the roster prescribed by the State Government under the Madhya Pradesh Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon, Anusuchit Jan Jatiyon Aur Anya Pichhada Vargon Ke Liye Arakshan) Adhiniyam, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1994).
20. In its decision in the case of Ram Lakhan Dhakad (supra), this Court had indicated that under the provisions of the Rules of 1994, granting of double benefit was sought to be avoided and at the stage of the proceedings of the Rule 7 of the Rules of 1997, there was no question of automatic transfer from the reserved category to the General Category. However, Rule 4 of Rules of 1994 clearly provides that in case a candidate belonging to reserved category as specified in sub-clause (2) of Rule 2 competes along with the General Category candidates and is selected on merits, in that eventuality he shall not be adjusted against the post reserved for such category. By virtue of Rule 4 sub-clause (4) of the Rules of 1994, the candidate who had secured percentage of marks above the cut off percentage of marks for the unreserved General Category candidates had to be automatically treated as transferred to the General Category in the event of selection. This is what has been done by the respondent-authority while preparing the select list and offering the appointments as envisaged under Rule 9 (10) of the Rules of 1997.
21. It may further be noticed that a Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Bhupinder Singh Sengar and others Vs. State of M.P. and another, W.P. No. 2140/97, decided on 5-4-1999 after taking into consideration various decisions of the Apex Court had indicated as follows :
"....... In case, any candidate be that women, be that S.C., ST., O.B.C., is selected in the merit then he/she cannot be denied the appointment on the basis of their merit just, because he/she belongs to a reserved quota. The reservation is only with as view to uplift this backward section of society and it is not meant to deny them their right to contest against general quota. If they were to contest against the reserved quota only then the whole purpose of reservation will loose its significance. The idea of reserving these post is that a candidate against these reserved post should come from this reserved category only. But, it would not mean that he will be deprived to compete against General Category. If he qualifies in General Category by his own merit then he cannot be denied the berth simply because he happens to belong to reserved category. The persons falling in these categories, have double benefits i.e., they can contest against general quota post as well as against the reserved post, if they come in merit on their own right, then they cannot be denied the appointment against the general seat. Their recruitment on merit is nothing to do with their reservation. Therefore, it is not unlikely that a candidate belonging to reserved quota, can find his berth on merit in general quota, that will not amount to exceeding 50% reservation. That candidate, who has come on merit in open competition, cannot be counted against a reserved seat and the number of reserved seats cannot be reduced on account of selection of that candidate on merit. In fact, the candidate, who comes on the basis of merit, comes after undergoing a fire of open test and simply because he falls in any of the reserved categories, he cannot be denied his seat amongst the general quota on merit. Against the reserved seats the candidates have to be assigned their placement on the basis of their merit in the quota,..."
22. In view of what has been indicated hereinabove the decision of this Court in case of Ram Lakhan Dhakad (supra) cannot come to the rescue of the petitioners and the convention noticed hereinabove urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not at all acceptable.
23. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances noticed by the Commissioner in the impugned order as well as the facts noticed in the order passed by the Collector, the correctness whereof could not be demonstrated to be against the record, no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out for any interference by this Court.
24. No other ground has been urged or pressed.
25. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances noticed hereinabove, no justifiable ground has been made out for any interference by this Court while exercising the extra-ordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
26. This writ petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed in limine.
27. Writ Petition dismissed.