Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. vs Chilla Ramarao And Ors. on 1 October, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(6)ALD299, 2003(1)ALT508, 2003 A I H C 147, (2002) 6 ANDHLD 299 (2003) 1 ANDH LT 508, (2003) 1 ANDH LT 508
JUDGMENT S.R. Nayak, J.
1. This writ appeal preferred by the Government of Andhra Pradesh; the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records; the Collector, Visakhapatnam District and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam, the appellants 1 to 4 respectively, is directed against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated 29.8.2000 in Writ Petition No. 4174 of 1999. The above writ petition was filed by the respondents herein assailing the validity of the Government Order G.O. Ms. No. 793 Revenue (JA) Department, dated 13.10.1998. The learned Judge by the impugned order has set aside the said order of the Government.
2. The dispute arises under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estate Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act') and relates to grant of ground rent patta in favour of the writ petitioners by the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records by his order dated 26.5.1982 in respect of an extent of Ac.3.50 cts. in T.S.No. 52/1-B1, Visakhapatnam Municipality. The said order of the Commissioner was set aside in revisional jurisdiction by the Government vide G.O. Ms. No. 793, dated 13.10.1998 and the said revisional order of the Government was set aside by the learned single Judge.
3. The background facts as stated by the writ petitioners leading to the filing of the writ petition be noted briefly as under The writ petitioners are the descendants of late Nidrabangi Ramaswamy and Chilla Ramulu. N. Ramaswamy and Ch. Ramulu purchased Ac.13.25 from the land holders of Peda Waltair Estates under two instruments dated 12.05.1874 and 28.02.1883. Thereafterwards, N. Ramaswamy mortgaged a part of his land by registered deed dated 9.7.1919 in favour of one P.Appadu. Similarly, Ch.Ramulu also mortgaged a part of his land by registered mortgage deed dated 13.8.1919 to discharge debts for family necessities. Both of them subsequently sold Ac.6.75 in favour of M/s. L.Shahukar and Agarchand under a registered deed dated 2.6.1922. The recitals of these registered documents refer to earlier documents of purchase of land by them. M/s. M Ramaswamy and Ch.Ramulu also sold land admeasuring Ac.3.00 and Ac.3.50 in two parcels to several persons for house-sites. The purchasers had constructed houses long ago after obtaining necessary permissions and sanctions from the Government authorities and concerned local bodies. Sale deed dated 2.6.1922 recites about mutation in town survey records thereby proving identity of the land. Town survey was conducted in 1922 and the land purchased by the ancestors of the petitioners were covered by T.S.No. 52/1-81, Visakhapatnam and the petitioners have been paying non-agricultural tax on demand to the then Visakhapatnam Municipality Town survey records disclose that the writ petitioners are the original owners. When the matter stood thus, an application was filed by N.Ramaswamy and Ch. Laxma Reddy before the 2nd appellant, the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records under Section 19 of the Act for grant o'f ground rent patta. The Commissioner granted ground rent patta by his order dated 26.5.1982 in respect of Ac.3.5 in T.S.No. 52/1-B1, Block 4, Waltair Wards-2, Visakhapatnam, after hearing the petitioners and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam. A claim for grant of ground rent patta for the same land was also made by one P. Narsingrao Reddy and his claim was rejected by the Commissioner by his order dated 27.4.1981 for want of evidence to prove the title. Later, the said P.Narsingrao Reddy filed a civil suit O.S.No. 28 of 1979 on the file of the Principal Sub-Court, Visakhapatnam for declaration of title against the petitioners and the said suit was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 28.9.1994 holding the writ petitioners are the owners of the land. Later, some other persons connected with the said P.Narsingrao Reddy filed W.P. No. 3093 of 1987 questioning the order of the Commissioner granting ground rent patta in favour of the writ petitioners by his orders dated 26.5.1982 and the said writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 22.7.1987. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam, was a party to the said writ petition and the order made by this Court in W.P.No. 3093 of 1987 was allowed to become final. When the matter stood thus, the 4th appellant-Mandal Revenue Officer filed revision before the Government of Andhra Pradesh after a lapse of 9 years and more and the Government of Andhra Pradesh set aside the order of the Commissioner dated 26.5.1982 by its order G.O. Ms. No. 793, dated 13.10.1998.
4. The petitioners being aggrieved by the said Government Order filed WP No. 4174 of 1999 in this Court contending that (i) the conditions laid down under Section 19 of the Act are fulfilled by the writ petitioners; (ii) the Government of Andhra Pradesh ought not to have straightaway set aside the order of the Commissioner dated 26.5.1982 without notice to the petitioners; (iii) the delay of 9 years 2 months 7 days in filing the revision was ignored by the Government as if there was no delay at all in filing the revision; (iv) no notice was issued to the petitioners regarding delay and in fact no order was passed by the Government condoning the delay and the Government straightaway allowed the revision after 16 long years unsettling settled and vested rights of the writ petitioners; (v) the documents on which the Commissioner had placed reliance for his order were completely ignored; (vi) The findings recorded by the Civil Court in its judgment dated 28.9.1994 in O.S.No. 28 of 1979 were also ignored; (vii) the Government has placed reliance on Settlement Fair Adangal which is admittedly a post-abolition record and that document is not relevant record; (viii) the 4th appellant-Mandal Revenue Officer did not disclose the fact of dismissal of WP No. 3093 of 1987 filed after five years by some other aggrieved parties against the orders of the 2nd appellant dated 26.5.1982, though the Mandal Revenue Officer was a party to that writ petition; (ix) the statements made in the sworn affidavit filed before the Government are misleading and false; (x) M/s. Chilla Laxman died on 22.4,1985 and Chilla Desi Reddy died on 3.11.1989 and the Mandal Revenue Officer in his revision filed before the Government in the year 1991 impleaded those dead persons as party-respondents and, therefore, the revision should have been dismissed in limine by the Government and there was total non-application of mind on the part of the State Government in allowing the revision filed by the 4th appellant- Mandal Revenue Officer.
5. Opposing the writ petition, appellants 3 and 4 herein filed counter affidavit contending that the land in Sy. No. 52/1 B is classified as Government poramboke and after abolition of the estate under the Act, the land vested in the Government. It was contended that the order of the Commissioner granting ground rent patta in favour of the writ petitioners by his order dated 26.5.1982 was contrary to Section 19 of the Act and the writ petitioners utterly failed to produce any document and evidence to establish that the land in question was sold prior to 1.7.1945. It was also contended that the mere payment of tax in respect of the land in question would not confer any title on the writ petitioners and that the property tax might have been collected from the petitioners under mistaken impression or identity and, therefore, the petitioners cannot take advantage of that fact.
6. The learned single Judge agreeing with the contentions raised by the petitioners and rejecting the contentions of the Government allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned Government order by declaring that the order of the Government is not sustainable in law and on merits. The learned single Judge has also held that the several statements made by the Mandal Revenue Officer in the sworn affidavit filed in support of the writ petitions are ex facie false and misleading.
7. The contentions of the learned Advocate-General appearing for the appellants are : (i) that the registered sale deed dated 2.6.1922 which was relied by the writ petitioners in support of their case does not mention Sy.No. 52/1B and similarly, the plan appended to that document is also silent about the Survey Number. It merely shows some boundaries; (ii) the mere payment of tax does not confer any right or title on the writ petitioners in respect of the subject land; (iii) the extent of the land mentioned in the document dated 2.6.1922 does not tally with the physical boundaries of the site now claimed; (iv) the boundaries in the said document do not show that it adjoins the portion of the land retained by the vendors; (v) since it is the case of the writ petitioners that after alternating the land covered by the document dated 2.6.1922 the vendors retained a portion of the land and that land was the subject matter of enquiry under Section 19 of the Act, it should have figured as one of the boundaries of the alienated land; (vi) the said sale deed dated 2.6.1922 does not show that the land covered by the deed as well as the land said to have been retained by the vendors are non-agricultural land and on the contrary the said sale deed mentions that the land sold was tope/garden land i.e., agricultural land and, therefore, that document does not lend any support to the petitioners' case that Section 19 requirements are satisfied; (vii) there is nothing on record to show that the predecessor-in-interest of writ petitioners have purchased the land from the land holders; (viii) the land holders of the Peda Waltair Estates were the Rajas of Vizianagaram District and thereafterwards, Musalikanti as sub-estate holders. The Peda Waltair Estate was taken over from Musalikanti family under the Act and compensation paid to them and, therefore, the writ petitioners are not the land holders; (ix) the recitals in 1922 sale deed speak about deduction of interest under two instruments dated 12.5.1874 and 28.2.1883 and these documents are not described as sale deeds nor there is any indication of the details of the prior owners; (x) the learned single Judge in setting aside the Government order has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; (xi) the learned Judge has seriously erred in law in equating the revisional jurisdiction of the Government to that of the Civil Court under Section 115, CPC and he ought to have seen that the Government in exercise of its revisional power under Section 19 of the Act could go into the questions of law, questions of fact as well as propriety and could pass appropriate orders.
8. Sri Venkatramana, who appeared for the respondents-writ petitioners, on the other hand, supported the order of the learned single Judge and reiterated the same contentions-urged before the learned single Judge. Besides, Sri Venkatramana contended that the learned single Judge has dealt with all the issues including the nature of the land whether agricultural or non-agricultural and also meticulously reviewed the order passed by the Commissioner dated 26 5.1982 and found that the order of the Commissioner is well justified and is based on evidence and, therefore, he held that the Government ought not to have interfered with that order in its revisional power.
9. Having regard to the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, the question for our consideration is whether any ground is made out arid Justification is shown by the appellants to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. In our considered opinion, the State Government ought to have dismissed the revision filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer in limine for more than one reason. The order made by the Commissioner as far back as on 26.5.1982 was assailed in the revision after prolonged delay of 9 years 2 months 7 days on 1.8.1991 purported to be under Section 11 of the Act The Governor of Andhra Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 67 read with Section 19 of the Act framed the rules and the same were published vide G.O. Ms. No. 704, Revenue Department 19th May, 1965. Under Rule 4 of these Rules, a revision lies to the Government against an order made by the Board of Revenue (now the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records). Rule 1 of the said rules provides that any order passed by the Board of Revenue or the Commissioner, as the case may be under Section 19 of the Act "shall be subject to revision by the Government." Rule 4 of these Rules reads as follows:
"4. Every revision petition to the Government shall bear a Court fee lable of value of Rs. 2/- and shall be presented within 60 days from the date of the order of the Board of Revenue accompanied by a duly authenticated copy thereof."
No provision of the Act or any rule framed thereunder conferring power on the Government to condone delay in the event of an aggrieved person filing revision under Rule 4 beyond the limitation of 60 days was brought to our notice, by the learned Counsel. The learned Advocate-General made available to us the original records of the case. Pagination of the original record is done by pencil. Pages 1 and 2 is the Memorandum of Original Revision Petition filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh through Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam. It does not bear any date. But on page (1) of the Memorandum, there is an endorsement which reads as follows :
"Urgent. PI. put up.
J.A. (Sd/-) 1.8.1991"
Also, there is a seal of the Government which also bears date 1,8.1991. Therefore, it is quite clear that revision was presented by the Mandal Revenue Officer before the Government on 1.8.1991. Thus, there was a delay of 9 years 2 months 7 days in presenting the revision petition from the date of the impugned order i.e., 26.5.1982. At pages 5 and 7 of the original records, we find an affidavit of Adabala Radha Krishna Murthy, S/o Satyanarayana, the then Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam on a stamp paper of Rs. 5/- denomination sworn to by him on 27.7.1991 before the Huzur Sheristadar (Tahsildar), Collector's Office, Visakhapamam. In this affidavit, the Mandal Revenue Officer requested the Government to condone delay in preferring the revision petition and to hear the revision on merits. The affidavit reads as follows :
"AFFIDAVIT I, Adabala Radha Krishna Murthy S/o Satyanarayana aged 54 years, working as Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as follows :-
1. I am the petitioner herein and also in the main revision petition as such I am acquainted with the facts.
2. I am advised that there are strong grounds for the main revision petition being allowed.
3. The Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records, A.P., Hyderabad passed orders dated 26.5.1982 holding that the respondent herein is entitled to patta under Section 18(4) of the Estate Abolition Act.
4. After the orders were passed by the Commissioner, Survey, Settlements and Land Records, a writ petition was filed in the High Court in a bona fide belief that a writ petition lies. The High Court held the view that the revision petition lies before the Government.
5. After the judgment of the High Court was received in the Office necessary administrative Sanction was allowed and the file was sent to Special Government Pleader at Hyderabad for drafting the revision petition is drafted and filed.
6. I submit that the delay in filing the revision petition before the Government is due to bona fide prosecution of the case in wrong, forms and completing necessary formalities and not deliberates.
7. I submit if the filing of revision petition is not condoned, vast extent of public property is likely to be lost.
8. It is therefore, just and necessary that the delay in filing revision petition be condoned in the interest of justice and the revision petition be heard on merits.
Sd/-Deponent Sworn and signed before me after the contents to be true on this 27th day of July, 1991.
Sd/-22.7.1991 Gazetted Officer Huzur Sheristadar (Tahsildar) Collector's Office, Visakhapatnam."
As could be seen from the averments in the affidavit, the only explanation offered by the Mandal Revenue Officer in seeking condonation of more 9 years 7 days delay excluding 60 days permitted under Rule 4 referred to above, is that after the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records, passed the order on 26.5.1982, a writ petition was filed in this Court in a bona fide belief against that order, but, the High Court held that the revision petition could lie to the Government. That is what is stated in para (4). Paragraphs (5) and (6) of the affidavit, refer to the Mandal Revenue Officer seeking administrative sanction from the Government and performing other formalities in order to prefer revision petition before the Government, Further, he also stated that the delay caused was neither deliberate nor intentional. After the presentation of the revision petition on 1.8.1991, as could be seen from the proceedings sheet available in original records, it appears that the opinion of the Government Pleader was sought with regard to the maintainability of the revision and the Government Pleader opined that revision petition was not maintainable and, therefore, it was liable to be dismissed. To that effect, an endorsement is found in the proceedings sheet dated 7.11.1991. However, subsequently, by order dated 16.11,1991, the revision petition was admitted. The reason to admit is stated in the proceedings sheet dated 14.11.1991. It reads as follows:
"As per the direction of the HC in its order dated 7.11.1987 (sic 27.11.1987)."
The procedure adopted by the Government in entertaining the revision filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer and in admitting the same completely ignoring admittedly more than 9 years delay and that too without notice to the respondents is indeed quite curious as well as startling. The procedure adopted by the Government, if we may say so, was despotic and it seems that the Government thought that it was not bound by Rule of law, even when it exercised statutory, quasi-judicial power. It is trite that the power conferred on the Government under Rule 4 framed by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred by Section 19 of the Act is a quasi-judicial power and the Government being a donee of the power has to exercise that power strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Since there was enormous delay of 9 years and more in presenting the revision petition by the Mandal Revenue Officer, the Government ought not to have admitted the revision without issuing notice to the respondents and without giving them an opportunity to contest the application. That is one serious lapse. It is relevant to notice that the cause shown by the Mandal Revenue Officer in para (4) of the affidavit to explain the delay is totally false and misleading. What was impugned before the Government is the order of the Commissioner dated 26.5.1982. The averments made in para (4) of the affidavit gives an impression that against the said order of the Commissioner, a writ petition was filed in this Court. The Mandal Revenue Officer did not disclose the writ petition number filed in this Court against the said order. He also did not disclose the date of filing of the writ petition and date of disposal of the writ petition. A copy of the order made by the High Court on 27.11.1987 in W.P.No. 8159 of 1984 filed against one V. Subba Rao is placed before us at page 47 of the yellow Paper Book filed in the writ appeal. It reads as follows :
"It is against the order of the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records, A.P., Hyderabad the petitioner approached this Court. At that time there was no revisional jurisdiction of the State Government. Subsequently a Full Bench of this Court gave a decision that there will revisional jurisdiction powers to the State Government. The petitioner can approach the Government. Accordingly the writ petition is disposed of. No costs. Advocate's Fee : Rs. 100/-".
As could be seen from the above order, WP No. 8159 of 1984 was filed by the then Tahsildar, Visakhapatnam against the order of the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records, in File No. V3/245/75, dated 6.11.1981 and not against the order of the Commissioner dated 26.5.1982 made in favour of the respondents herein under Section 19 of the Act granting ground rent patta. Before the learned single Judge nor before us, any evidence was placed to show that the Mandal Revenue Officer in fact had filed a writ petition against the order of the Commissioner dated 26.5.1982 and that was disposed of by this Court directing him to avail of remedy by way of revision before the Government. The averments made in para (4) of the affidavit are not only false, but they are also bereft of relevant details. The Mandal Revenue Officer was guilty of stating falsehood and misleading the quasi-judicial authority like the Government. On that ground itself, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. An application under Article 226 or Article 32 would be refused without a hearing on the merits or a rule nisi discharged, if it appears to the reviewing Court that the applicant has made a deliberate concealment of material facts, with a view to mislead the Court. Before coming to this conclusion, however, a careful examination would be made of the facts as they are and as they have been made in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit. It is well established that where the applicant makes a clear misrepresentation as to material facts, the Court may dismiss the petition at any stage on that ground, even revoking a rule nisi which may have been issued on the basis of the facts so stated by the petitioner. In that regard reliance can be placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka, , Indian Sugar Refineries v. Union of India, (1968) SC dated 12-3-1968, Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P., , Maganlal v. Municipal Corporation, , State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery, , Vijay v. State of Haryana, .
10. Secondly, even assuming that the reference made by the Mandal Revenue Officer in para (4) of the affidavit to a writ order made by this Court is relatable to the order of this Court dated 27.11.1987 in W.P. No. 8159 of 1984, even then, there was absolutely no explanation for the delay caused between 27.11.1987 and 1.8.1991. The explanation offered in paras (5) and (6) is as vague as it could be and it could hardly constitute sufficient cause to condone the enormous delay of 9 years and more. The avowed object of limitation is that the sword of uncertainty should not be kept hanging on the head of a litigant for indeterminate period and the parties should be able to get the result of the litigation without there being any uncertainty. Absolutely, there are no sufficient grounds to condone the enormous delay which is more than nine (9) years. The State and its authorities cannot be treated on a different pedestal than the ordinary litigant in the matter of condonation of delay. The liberal indulgence shown by the Courts towards Government and its authorities in the matter of condonation of delay in instituting legal actions in some cases cannot be stretched too far to unsettle the settled matters. Further, the affidavit of the Mandal Revenue Officer is curiously quite silent about how the proposal to file the revision before the Government was processed at various levels of the Government and other concerned authorities. No dates are forthcoming from the affidavit. Therefore, there is no scope for testing/ verifying the truth of the statement made in the affidavit. Further, the statement made in para (6) of the affidavit is also ex facie totally false. There is nothing to show that the Mandal Revenue Officer had, on wrong advice, filed writ petition in this Court against the order of the Commissioner dated 26.5.1982 and this Court disposed of that writ petition directing the Mandal Revenue Officer to prefer Revision before the Government.
11. Although the Government did not issue any notice to the respondents with regard to the condonation of delay in preferring the revision and straightaway entertained the revision petition by admitting it, as could, be seen from page (245) of the original records, the respondents in their written brief contended that the revision was presented "after the lapse of nearly 10 years three months" and, therefore, liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. When that was the position, quite curiously, even while passing the final order, the State Government did not at all refer or much less consider the question of delay in preferring the revision petition in its order.
12. Further, this Court in Machireddy Eswari Bai and Ors. v. Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records, WP No. 8093 of 1987, dated 22-7-1987, filed against the very same impugned order of the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records dated 26.5.1982, held-
"The order impugned in this writ petition was passed by the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records, A.P. Hyderabad in the year 1982. More than 5 years have elapsed from the date of the impugned order, and this Court cannot interfere with the same. The writ petition is without merit and it is accordingly dismissed."
Therefore, the Government could not have taken a contrary view than the one taken by this Court in the above writ petition and ignored 9 years 2 months and 7 days delay in preferring the revision petition.
13. It is well settled that even where no limitation is prescribed to exercise the revisional power, the Courts have held that such revisional power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In K. Venkat Reddy v. Director of Settlements, 1975 (1) APLJ 111, a Division Bench of this Court has considered the contention that the revisional power conferred on the Director of Settlements can be exercised only within a reasonable time and that the said power exercised after a long lapse of 7 years from the date of ground pattas to the appellants therein cannot be said to have been exercised within a reasonable period and held:
"The only limitations to which the power is subject are that the revisional authority should not trench upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Act, or the rules to other authorities and should not ignore, the limitations inherent in the exercise of those powers.
14. In A. Konda Rao v. Government of A.P. represented by the District Collector, Srikakulam, 1981 (II) APLJ 158 = 1981 (2) ALT 280 (DB), the appellants therein were granted pattas under the provisions of the Act in the years 1959 and 1960 by the Settlement Officer after an enquiry under the provisions of the Act and the grant of pattas stood unchallenged for number of years. When the orders of the Settlement Officer granting pattas to the appellants therein under the Act which became final and remained unchallenged for number of years, were sought to be disturbed in exercise of the suo motu revisional powers conferred on the Director of Settlements under Section 5(2) of the Act, tbe Division Bench, dealing with the. question whether the Director of Settlements was justified in exercising the suo motu revisional power conferred under Section 5(2) of the Act, held -
"There can be no doubt that where no period of limitation is prescribed by the Act or the Rules made thereunder for the exercise of the suo motu power of revision, the exercise of the power cannot be impugned on the ground that it is barred by limitation. No period of limitation can be imposed otherwise than by statute or the rules made thereunder But, nonetheless, merely because power is vested in an authority to revise the orders of the subordinate authorities suo motu, as observed by our learned Brother Jeevan Reddy, J., in the order under appeal, "the power has to be exercised within a reasonable time." In our view in cases where no period of limitation is prescribed under the statute or the rules made thereunder for exercise of revisional powers suo motu, the question for consideration is not whether the exercise of the power is barred by limitation - for in the absence of a period of limitation prescribed under the Act, the question of bar of limitation cannot arise - it is a question of the reasonable period of limitation within which that power should be exercised where the question is one exercising that power within a reasonable time and what is reasonable period would undoubtedly be dependant upon the facts and circumstances of each case."
15. The Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others, , held that although there is no period of limitation is prescribed under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, the power of the Commissioner to revise under Section 65 of the said Act must be exercised within a reasonable time and the question whether the Commissioner has sought to revise the order under Section 65 within a reasonable time or not must be determined by the facts of individual case and nature of the order which is being revised. The Apex Court in para (11) of the judgment held as under:
"The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable, time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised."
16. Another Division Bench of this Court in S.P. Dharma Reddy v. Director of Settlements, A.P., Hyderabad, WA No. 1521 of 1988, held that exercise of revisional power by the Director of Settlements under section 5(2) of the Act after a lapse of 27 years from the date of grant of patta is unreasonable and oppressive. Recently, another Division Bench of this Court in P. Mangamma v. Women's Coop, Housing Society Limited, 1995 (3) ALD 594 (DB), speaking through one of us (S.R. Nayak, J), held that the action of the District Collector in invoking the suo motu revisional power under Section 166-B of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-F, after a lapse of 31 years from the date of assignment of the land is unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of fair-play in action.
17. Therefore, in the light of the above decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court, what is required to be seen is whether it could be said that the Government exercised the revisional power within a reasonable period having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case. As noticed above, the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records passed the order as far back as on 26.5.1982 granting ground rent pattas to the respondents and the Mandal Revenue Officer presented the revision petition after a long lapse of 9 years 2 months and 7 days on 1,8.1991 impleading dead persons and without making appropriate application for condoning the delay in preferring the appeals. Further, though the revision petition was presented before the Government on 1.8.1991 by the Mandal Revenue Officer, the Government kept the proceedings pending for large number of years without deciding the same within a reasonable time and without any justification and it disposed of the revision petition only on 13.10.1998, more than 7 years after the presentation of the revision petition. The resultant position is that the Government in exercise of its revisional power chose to set at naught the order of the Commissioner passed as far back as on 26.5.1982, that is to say, after a long lapse of 16 years 4 months. This length of time, by no stretch of imagination, could be regarded as a small period to be ignored. Added to this, it is specifically pleaded by the respondents that the land, in different parcels, were sold to several persons as house-sites and the purchasers had constructed houses long back after obtaining lay-out sanctions and permissions from the Governmental and statutory authorities resulting in creation of rights of third parties. Looking from that angle also, it was totally unreasonable for the State Government to entertain the revision petition filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer after a lapse of 9 years 2 months and 7 days. It was similarly unjustified on the part of the Government to keep the proceedings pending on its file for large number of years and to dispose of the same only on 13.10.1998 after a lapse of 7 years after filing of the revision-petition, cumulatively, therefore, we hold that the exercise of the revisional power by the State Government is totally unreasonable and arbitrary.
18. Similarly, we find another serious fatal flaw in the presentation of the revision petition by the Mandal Revenue Officer. In the Revision Petition presented on 1.8.1991 before the Government, M/s. Chilla Lakshmana Reddy S/o Chinnayya; Chilla Dasi Reddi S/o Appanna; Nidrabhangi Ramaswamy S/o Ramaswamy; Chilla Chinnayya Reddy S/o Appanna; Kolli Yellqiahmma D/o Ramulu; Chilia Ramarao S/o Ramulu were impleaded as respondents 1 to 6 respectively. But, it transpires that except the 3rd , 4th and 6th respondents, all other respondents had died long before the revision petition was presented on 1.8.1991. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam, Urban, himself, in his letter Re. No. 361/82-A, dated 19.4.1997 has stated that the 1st respondent died on 20.4.1985; the 2nd respondent on 3.11.1989; the 3rd respondent on 18.12.1992; 4th respondent on 5.5.1993. In the said letter of the Mandal Revenue Officer, addressed to the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, it is also stated that the 5th respondent also died, but the date of his death is not mentioned. The Mandal Revenue Officer vide the above letter requested the Government to take out notices to the legal representatives of the deceased respondents. This letter is dated 19.4.1997. Thus, it is quite clear that the very presentation of the revision petition was totally irregular and not in accordance with law and, therefore, the Government ought to have dismissed the revision petition in limine. Further, even after presenting the revision petition, the respondents 3 and 4 died in the year 1992 and 1993 respectively and since their legal representatives were not brought on record within the stipulated time, on that count also, the revision petition as against them should have been dismissed. So is the position with regard to the other respondents except respondent No. 6. The revision petition filed against the dead persons was not maintainable. The respondents in para (5) of their written brief submitted to the Government available at page 245 of the original records, specifically pleaded that most of the respondents among respondents 1 to 6 were dead by the date of filing of the revision petition and, therefore, the revision petition preferred against the dead persons is a nullity. It was also stated that the 1st respondent died on 20.4.1985; 2nd respondent on 3.4.1989; the 3rd respondent on 15.12.1992; the 4th respondent on 5.5.1993 and 5th respondent in the year 1993. Again, the Government did not at all consider the above substantive contention raised by the respondents in their written brief in the final order made by it. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the revision petition ought to have been dismissed both on the ground of limitation and delay as well as on the ground that the Mandal Revenue Officer filed the revision petition against the dead persons and also on the ground that he did not bring the legal representatives of the respondents who subsequently died after the presentation of the revision petition within the stipulated time of limitation and that the revision petition was abated against them. In that view of the matter, we should have straightaway proceeded to dismiss the appeal preferred by the Mandal Revenue Officer against the order of the learned single Judge. But, we do not propose to do that, because, we have heard the learned Advocate-General as well as Sri Venkatramana on merits of the case also for considerable time. On merit too, we do not find any case for the appellants.
19. The Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records, taking into account the registered documents dated 9.7.1919, 13.8.1919 and particularly the registered deed dated 2.6.1922 had held that the respondents-applicants had acquired title to the petition schedule land and they were in possession of the same long prior to 1.7.1945. Although, before the Commissioner, on behalf of the Mandal Revenue Officer, it was contended that the land in question was classified as Government Poramboke and noted as "vacant site", placing reliance on land revenue records, the Mandal Revenue Officer himself conceded that the Settlement Fair Adangal, on which reliance was placed, was a post-abolition record and, therefore, that record was irrelevant to determine the contentious issue. There is no and there cannot be any controversy that the Settlement Fair Adangal is undoubtedly a post-abolition record. Secondly, even in the post-abolition revenue record, as could be seen from the certified extract produced before us at page (50) of the blue paper book, the classification is recorded as "vacant site" and not as "Government poramboke" and, therefore, the assumption of the Government that in the post-abolition revenue record the petition schedule land is shown to be "Government pormboke" is not correct. Therefore, that record would not be of much help to the Mandal Revenue Officer to contest the case of the respondents-applicants that prior to 1.7.1945 they had acquired title to the property and they were "in possession of the same and, therefore, they are entitled to ground rent patta.
20. The respondents-applicants had filed sufficient materials before the Commissioner, Survey Settlement and Land Records as well as before the Government in support of their title. The recitals in the registered mortgage deeds dated 9.7.1919 and 13.8.1919 show that the land was purchased by the ancestors of the respondents on 12.5.1874 and 28.2.1883. The town survey records of 1922 also establish that the respondents are the owners of the lands. It is also a matter of record that the Visakhapatnam Municipality demanded non-agricultural land tax during the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 1949 and the tax demanded was paid by the respondents. Further, the Principal Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam in O.S.No. 28 of 1979 filed by Machireddi Eswaripai and others, after examining the survey records, documents and the evidence of the witnesses held that the writ petitioners who are the defendants in the suit are the title holders of the land. The Civil Court recorded its finding in the following words:
"Hence, I find that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their title and possession in the suit schedule property, I also find that the defendants have established their title and possession in the suit schedule property. I also find that the plaintiffs are not entitled for declaration and permanent injunction as prayed for."
The very same documents were filed before the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records and also before the Government by the writ petitioners, The Mandal Revenue Officer in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition, conceded that the land in question is non-agricultural land. Thus, there was sufficient materials before the Government to show the title of the writ petitioners as well as the classification of the land as non-agricultural land. It may be relevant to notice that this Court in K. Doraiswamy Reddy v. Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records, WP No. 7589 of 1979, dated 13-8-1982, dealing with a land adjoining the land in question held that the adjoining land is non-agricultural land.
21. The Government, in the impugned order, after referring to the rival contentions and the arguments of the parties, held as under: -
"After hearing the arguments of the both parties and perusal of the records, it has been found that, the land in question is classified as Government poramboke, and after the abolition of the Estates, the land vests in Government. It is also observed that the respondents have not produced any documentary evidence in support of their claim that they have purchased the land for their ancestors prior to 1.7-1945 through a valid sale deed. It is also found that there are valid grounds to agree with the contentions raised by the petitioner (Mandal Revenue Officer) and it is difficult to accept the contentions of the respondents in the absence of documentary evidence in support of their claim. Therefore, it has been decided by the Government that the orders passed by the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records in V.3/2942/ 82 dated 26.5.1982 are hereby set aside while allowing the R.P, filed by Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam in this regard."
22. Paragraph (8) is the only consideration part of the order. Although the writ petitioners produced number of relevant documents which have a bearing in the decision-making, the Government has not at all referred to muchless considered those documents. The order of the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records is set aside solely on the ground that the land in question is classified as Government Poramboke and after the abolition of the Estates under the Act, the land vested in the Government. The statement of the Government in para (8) of the order that the respondents, thereby meaning the writ petitioners, have not produced any documentary evidence in support of their claim that their ancestors acquired title to the land in question prior to 1.7.1945, is factually incorrect and reflects loudly non-application of mind on the part of the Government. The said finding of the Government, without due application of mind and without considering the relevant documents, is perverse. Further, the Government has failed to notice that the post-abolition record only discloses that the land in question is "vacant site" and not "Government poramboke". The Government ought not to have placed reliance on the post-abolition records. As pointed out supra, before the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records, the Mandal Revenue Officer himself stated, according to us quite correctly having regard to the facts of this case, that the post-abolition records are not relevant to determine the contentious issue. Therefore, the State Government was not justified in discrediting the entire substantive legal evidence produced by the writ petitioners only on the basis of the entry 'vacant site' in the post-abolition revenue record. However, the learned Advocate-General, placing reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ambika Prasad Thakur v. Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh and Ors., , contended that since the post-abolition revenue records show that the land in question is a 'vacant site' and, therefore, a Government poramboke, it should be deemed that the same state of thing existed both forwards and backwards, and such an inference may be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. It is true that in the above case, the Supreme Court held-
"...The question is whether such an inference should be drawn. Now, if a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may sometimes be drawn. The presumption of future continuance is noticed in Illustration (d) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In appropriate cases, an inference of continuity of a thing or state of things, backwards may be drawn under this section, though on this point the section does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has been recognised........that there is no rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of tilings backwards cannot be supported. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances."
In the present case, there is no justification to draw inference that the land in question is Government poramboke simply because it is classified as 'vacant site' in the post-abolition revenue records. Such inference is totally unwarranted having regard to the registered documents dated 9.7.1919, 13,8,1919 and 2.6.1922 and the judgment and decree dated 28.9.1994 in O.S.No. 28 of 1979. Therefore, it is not safe to assume that the state of things reflected in the post-abolition revenue record existed as on 1.7.1945 or prior to that date. Therefore, the learned single Judge is justified in holding that the Government has not considered the documents produced before the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records as well as the judgment of the civil Court filed by the writ petitioners before it. The substantive legal evidence produced by the writ petitioners before the Commissioner, the Government as well as before this Court clearly prove that the writ petitioners had acquired title to the land in question and they were in actual possession of the same long prior to 1.7.1945. There was absolutely no materials produced by the Mandal Revenue Officer to contradict the finding recorded by the Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records in his order dated 26.5,1982, The order passed by the Government, therefore, suffers from several errors apparent on its face. In that view of the matter, the learned single Judge was justified in setting aside the order of the Government and allowing the writ petition filed by the respondents herein. We do not find any substantive ground to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge.
23. The writ appeal is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed no order as to costs.