Madras High Court
M.Thangavel vs The Deputy Commissioner Of Labour on 27 August, 2013
Author: M.Venugopal
Bench: M.Venugopal
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated:27.08.2013 Coram THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL W.P.No.2042 of 2010 and M.P.No.2 of 2010 M.Thangavel ... Petitioner Vs. 1.The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem 7. 2.Vijayakumari 3.Minor S.Shanthakumari 4.Minor Santoshkumari 5.Minor S.Satoshkumar 6.K.Veerappan 7.Sevathammal ... Respondents PRAYER: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records of the 1st Respondent pertaining to his order dated 30.07.2009 passed in I.A.No.285 of 2008 in W.C.No.315 of 2005 and quash the same and consequently direct the 1st Respondent herein to afford adequate opportunity to the Petitioner for letting in oral and documentary evidence and thereafter decide the case on merits. For Petitioner : Mr.G.Arul Murugan For 1st Respondent : Mr.R.Lakshmi Narayanan Additional Govt. Pleader For Respondents 2 & 5 : Mr.K.Thiruvengadam For 6th Respondent : Dismissed vide Court order dt.11.1.12 For 7th Respondent : Served ORDER
The Petitioner has preferred the present Writ Petition praying for issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus in calling for the records of the 1st Respondent relating to an order dated 30.07.2009 made in I.A.No.285 of 2008 in W.C.No.315 of 2005 and to quash the same. Further, he has sought for issuance of a direction to the 1st Respondent to afford adequate opportunity to him for letting in oral and documentary evidence and thereafter to decide the case on merits.
2.The 1st Respondent/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, while passing the impugned order in I.A.No.285 of 2008 in W.C.No.315 of 2005, on 30.07.2009, has, inter alia, observed that 'Even though ample opportunities have been provided to the Respondent's side to produce witnesses and failed, the averments made in his reply statement was taken as his side arguments and in view of the fact that Award was passed on merits, the request of the Petitioner in Interlocutory Application has been negatived and dismissed'.
3.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urges before this Court that the impugned order of the 1st Respondent dated 30.07.2009 in dismissing the I.A.No.285 of 2008 [filed by the Writ Petitioner] is an arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in the eye of law.
4.It is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the 1st Respondent passed an Exparte Award on 30.06.2008 without notice to the Petitioner after the claim petition was dismissed for default, which is illegal and liable to be quashed.
5.According to the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the 1st Respondent/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem is insisted upon the Writ Petitioner (Respondent in W.C.No.315 of 2005 to deposit huge amount as per the Exparte Award. When it is the case of the Petitioner that the deceased Saravanan was never employed in his field and also that there was no employer and employee relationship between the parties.
6.Conversely, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents 2 to 7 (Legal Heirs of deceased Saravanan) that the deceased Saravanan was employed by the Writ Petitioner in his turmeric field (Respondent in W.C.No.315 of 2005) to pick turmeric on a daily wage of Rs.150/- and that the Petitioner in paragraphs 3 and 4 of his affidavit in the Writ Petition had falsely averred that several people come to the poramboke Government land in the early morning for consuming toddy etc. and that on 10.03.2005, Saravanan seems to had consumed toddy and after that in an inebriated condition came to the well of the Petitioner land for drinking water. Further, due to drowsiness, he did some mischief in the motor as a result of which he got electrocuted and fell down etc.
7.The Learned Counsel for the Respondents 2 to 7 submits that ample opportunities were given for cross examining the witness viz., P.W.2, but that was not availed of by the Writ Petitioner therefore, the Exparte Award was passed on 30.06.2008.
8.The Learned Counsel for the Respondents 2 to 7 denies the averment made by the Petitioner (Respondent in W.C.No.315 of 2005) in para 8 of the Writ Petition to the effect that the Petitioner along with his counsel was present at Dharmapuri Camp in Assistant Labour Office at about 11.45 A.M. where the case fixed for hearing on 07.03.2008 and since neither the Respondents 2 to 7 nor their Advocate were present for the hearing and the 1st Respondent was pleased to dismiss the claim petition (W.C.No.315 of 2005) for default and thereafter, the Petitioner's Advocate and himself returned to their place.
9.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner brings it to the notice of this Court that the death of deceased Saravanan was registered as case in Crime No.174 of 2005 as per Section 174 of Cr.P.C. by the Harur Police. Later, the case was altered from Section 174 Cr.P.C. into that of under Section 304 A of I.P.C. Since no final report was filed in the case and inasmuch as the Petitioner was not involved in the accident, the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking direction for change of investigation from the hands of police authorities to C.B.C.I.D.
10.The main grievance of the Petitioner is that only because of the absence of Respondents 2 to 7 and their Advocate on the date of hearing on 07.03.2008 at about 11.45 a.m., the case W.C.No.315 of 2005 was dismissed for default in open Court and therefore, he and his counsel returned to their place.
11.Moreover, it is the plea of the Writ Petitioner that his side witnesses were ready and he was in possession of documents like chitta, adangal, paper publication extract and F.I.R. copies and other documents. In fact, the Petitioner averred in para 9 of the affidavit in the Writ Petition that the 1st Respondent informed that it was not necessary as the claim petition was dismissed.
12.That apart, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner (1st Respondent in W.C.No.315 of 2005) proceeds to submit that Petitioner to his shock received a registered post on 11.10.2008 which contained an Exparte Award dated 30.06.2008 passed by the 1st Respondent. Immediately he contacted his counsel and got in touch with the office of the 1st Respondent. On enquiry, the Petitioner was informed that in the afternoon of 07.03.2008, the Learned Counsel on the side of Respondents 2 to 7 (Claimants in W.C.) had appeared and that the matter was taken on file by restoring the petition without any notice to him.
13.It is to be pointed out that the Writ Petitioner (Respondent in W.C.No.315 of 2005) as Petitioner before the 1st Respondent/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem filed I.A.No.285 of 2008 (filed under Order IX Rule 13 of Civil Procedure Code read with Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924) praying for passing of an order to set aside the Exparte Award dated 30.06.2008 passed against him etc.
14.On perusal of records by this Court, it transpires that the Claimants (Petitioners in W.C.No.315 of 2005) made an endorsement on the petition in I.A.No.285 of 2008 on 20.10.2008 to the following effect 'Taken Notice is opposed. This petition is not maintainable. Pray time for counter. Notice of hearing may be given'.
15.A scrutiny of the entire records in W.C.No.315 of 2005 on the file of Respondents by this Court shows that there was nothing to indicate whether counter was filed by the Respondents 2 to 7 for I.A.No.285 of 2008. Equally, the records in W.C.No.315 of 2005 were conspicuously silent as to whether time was sought for filing counter on behalf of the Respondents 2 to 7 in respect of I.A.No.285 of 2008 and turned down by the 1st Respondent. As such, it is to be presumed that no counter was filed to I.A.No.285 of 2008 (before the 1st Respondent) by Respondents 2 to 7.
16.Apart from the above, when the Writ Petitioner has made categorical averments in his affidavit in I.A.No.285 of 2008 in W.C.No.315 of 2005 to the effect that on 07.03.2008 when he was present along with his counsel, the Respondents/Petitioners witness and their counsel were absent and when the case was called, he was informed that the above case was dismissed for default due to non appearance of the Respondents 2 to 7 etc. and further, the Exparte order copy dated 30.06.2008 was served on him by registered post on 11.10.2008, there were not controverted or dealt with by the 1st Respondent while passing the impugned order in I.A.No.285 of 2008 in W.C.No.315 of 2005 dated 30.06.2008 rejecting the petition to set aside the Exparte order dated 30.06.2008 (i.e. Exparte Award dated 30.06.2008).
17.In this connection, this Court makes a significant mention that the Respondents 2 to 7 (as Legal Representatives of deceased Saravanan), in their W.C.No.315 of 2005 on the file of the 1st Respondent, made a claim of Rs.6,00,000/- for the death of Saravanan. The deceased Saravanan is the husband of the 2nd Respondent and other 3 to 7 Respondents are his minor children. Their specific case in the claim petition is that for the past three years, the deceased Saravanan was performing agricultural work under the Writ Petitioner (Respondent in W.C.) on a daily wage of Rs.150/- and Rs.4,500/- per month was given a salary by the Writ Petitioner.
18.In their Claim Petition No.315 of 2005, the Respondents 2 to 7 had clearly averred that on 10.03.2005 at 8.00 a.m. when Saravanan was engaged in Agricultural work, for the purpose of drinking water, he drank water from the water tank situated in the Writ Petitioner's (Respondent's) own agricultural well where motor electric pumpset was fixed and at that time, he placed his hands on iron rope and while he attempted to drink water with his hands, the electricity on the rope came in touch with the iron rope as a result of which he got electrocuted and died on the spot. One Prabhu, who was with the deceased, at that time made an endeavour to catch hold of him and while doing so, the electricity passed on to the Saravanan's body and after coming to know of that, he stopped the electric motor. Thereafter, one Thangaraman, Murugan and Saravanan's father who were working in the agricultural land belonging to the Writ Petitioner (Respondent in W.C.) all joined and took Saravanan's body to Harur Government Hospital and the doctors informed at the hospital that Saravanan died of electrocution.
19.In the counter filed by the Writ Petitioner (as Respondent to W.C.No.315 of 2005), it was pleaded that the deceased Saravanan was never employed by him and that a definite stand was taken that the deceased on 10.03.2005 at about 7.30 a.m. in a drunken state of mind crossed the Writ Petitioner's land and while so, he went near the pumpset and attempted to do some mischief in the motor shed and received electrical shock etc.
20.Further, it was also stated on behalf of the Writ Petitioner that he filed W.P.No.12110 of 2005 before this Court to transfer the case from the Harur Police Station to C.B.C.I.D, Chennai and it was clear from the reply, investigation and report of the police, the deceased Saravanan was not employed under the Petitioner in his field as alleged in W.C.No.315 of 2005. In short, the stand of the Petitioner is that he was not responsible in any manner for the electrocution and the resultant death of deceased Saravanan.
21.It is to be remembered that as per Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, there must be a casual connection between the accident and the employment of the deceased which should be established on his side viz., by his Legal Representatives. The onus of proof rests on the side of workman to establish that the accident in question arose out of employment as well as in the course of employment. This may be inferred when the facts proved justify the inference or in the alternative the same may be established by a direct evidence. However, an inference drawn on circumstances would include a prudent and reasonable man to draw it, as opined by this Court.
22.If the deceased employee met with his death while he was proceeding to his place of work and the death had occurred during the course of employment, then, an employee is liable for compensation as per decision of the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited V. S. Poomalai, 1995 (1) LLJ 378 (Madras). It cannot be gainsaid that the liability of an employer arises since the injury is caused and not at any subsequent occasion and it cannot be suspended as per decision in State of Punjab and others V. Vidya Devi and others, 1990-II-LLN-579 (P & H).
23.At this stage, this Court cites the following decisions, to promote substantial cause of Justice:
(a)In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Roshan Deen V. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 100, it is held that 'The legislative mandate to protect the rights of the workman cannot be bypassed in exercise of supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India'.
(b)In the decision Minerals and Chemicals V. Thevan, 1991-(Vol.39)-II-LLN-951, it is held that 'The suit for compensation due to death of workman employed in a quarry is maintainable and Section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 does not take away from Civil Court the jurisdiction to give relief in tort but the scheme of the Act is to provide alternative remedy for certain classes of persons under certain circumstances'.
Further, in the aforesaid decision at page 952, it is, inter alia, held as follows:
"The alternative remedy available to a workman under the common law is more advantageous in view of the ceiling put to compensation under Section 4 of the Act. If it is advantageous to the injured workman or the dependants of a deceased workman to claim more than what is provided for in Section 4 of the Act, there is no bar in seeking the remedy in a civil court for damages in tort. The provisions of the Act do not in any way exclude the jurisdiction of civil court in such cases. The Workmen's Compensation Act, which is a special statute, does not derogate from the Fatal Accidents Act, which also is a special statute, without express words of abrogation. There is no provision in Section 19 of the Act which abrogates the rights arising under the Fatal Accidents Act. The civil court has, therefore, jurisdiction to entertain the claim for compensation."
24.A mere reading of the ingredients of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (Now the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 with effect from 18.01.2010) latently and patently points out that the High Court can interfere, if a party is able to prove that the findings are perverse in the sense that either of the findings or without any material on record or its totally opposed to the material on record as per decision T.S.Prabhu V. Bhavan Poojari, 2003-LLR-162 (Kant.)
25.In the decision General Manager, C.C. Limited V. Bhin Yadav, 2003-LLR-574 (Jhar), it is held that 'Section 30 of the Act very clearly provides that the award of Commissioner passed under the above Act can be challenged in appeal where substantial questions of law which involved'.
26.In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi V. Rajat Vidyarthi, (2009) 3 Supreme Court Cases 287 at special page 293, it is held that 'when findings are based on no evidence and/or relevant admissible evidence is not taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence is taken into consideration, a finding on fact, reiterated, may give rise to substantial question of law'.
27.In the decision Chintapalli Lakshma Rayudu V. Dasari Narayana Rao and others, 2001 (2) An.W.R. 432 (A.P.), it is held that 'Normally matter should be decided on merits and party should be given opportunity to contest the matter'.
28.It is to be pertinently pointed out that the only provisions as regards the filing of Appeal against the orders passed by the Workmen's Compensation Authority is enshrined under Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act. As per Clause (a) of Section 30(1) of the Act an appeal lies to High Court from the orders of the Commissioner awarding compensation. As such, without any doubt one can come to a safe conclusion that if an order awarding compensation was passed by the Workmen's Compensation Authority and subsequently, if an application was filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of Civil Procedure Code praying for setting aside that order on the basis that the Writ Petitioner (Respondent in W.C.) was set Exparte without any justification and if the said application was dismissed, the only course open to a litigant/party is to prefer an Appeal against the order awarding compensation as contemplated under Section 30(1)(a) of the Act.
29.However, in the decision Praveen Industries V. Banawar Singh, 1990-I-L.L.N.-915, it is held that 'No appeal can be filed against an order dismissing the application for setting aside the Exparte order as there is no provision for filing such an appeal under Section 30 of the Act and under Rule 41, the provisions of Order 43, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code are not made applicable'.
30.In the decision Mahendra Kumar V. Real Frb. Autonagar, 1998 ACJ 232 (AP), it is held that 'The order passed by Commissioner awarding compensation is not appealable because it does not fall under any of categories of orders specified in Section 30 (1) of the Act'.
31.Moreover, in the Division Bench decision in Randhir Verma V. National Insurance Company and others, 2004-(Vol.1)-ACC-255 (Himachal Pradesh High Court), it is held that 'The Petitioner had not challenged that part of the order passed by Commissioner relating to compensation awarded or interest. What was challenged by the Petitioner was only that part of order whereby instead of fastening liability on Insurance Company liability was fastened upon the Petitioner and it was held that as the remedy was apparently out side the scope of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. As such, the only remedy available to the Petitioner was to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court by awarding aforesaid part of the award under Article 226 of the Constitution'.
32.More importantly, this Court, to prevent an aberration of Justice, recalls the decision in Uttam Chand Gangwal V. Commissioner, WCC Act, Ajmer and Others, 2008-III-ACC-562 (Rajesthan) wherein, it is observed that 'An Exparte order was sought to be set aside on the ground that the Petitioner was not working as Manager and not responsible for payment of compensation. Application was filed for modification. Admittedly, there was no power of review of award and it was held that no inference was required with an award which did not suffer from any illegality apparent on the face of record'. Also, in the aforesaid decision, it is held that 'When applying principles of Civil Procedure Code, the Commissioner may proceed otherwise than in accordance with other provisions, if interest of parties was not prejudiced'.
33.At this juncture, this Court aptly extracts Rule 41 of the Employee's Compensation Rules, 1924 (Earlier Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923) which runs as follows:
"41.Certain provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to apply:- Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or these Rules the following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, namely, those contained in Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX; Order XIII, Rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII and Order XXIII, Rules 1 and 2, shall apply to proceedings before Commissioners, insofar as they may be applicable thereto:
Provided that:-
(a) for the purpose of facilitating the application of the said provisions the Commissioner may construe them with such alterations not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper to adapt them to the matter before him;
(b) the Commissioner may, for sufficient reasons, proceed otherwise than in accordance with the said provisions if he is satisfied that the interests of the parties will not thereby be prejudiced."
34.From the aforesaid Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924, it is lucidly clear that Order IX of Civil Procedure Code will apply to a proceeding before Commissioner in so far as it may applicable. Further, at the risk of repetition, it is to be made mention of that the Commissioner while applying the principles of Civil Procedure Code may proceed otherwise than in accordance with other provisions, if the interest of the parties was not prejudiced.
35.The words 'Substantial Question of Law' as employed in proviso to Section 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act has wider construction than Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code as per decision (2004) 97 Civil Law Times 144, at page 147 (Orissa). Even granting relief on incomplete pleadings raises substantial question of law as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganapati Madhav Sawant (Dead) through His LRs. V. Dattur Madhav Sawant, (2008) 3 Supreme Court Cases 183 at special page 184.
36.Even a wrong application of law would amount to substantial question of law, in the considered opinion of this Court. Also that, this Court very relevantly points out that 'A firm finding of pure fact arrived at by the Commissioner cannot be interfered with in appeal' as per decision in Mossamt Motihari Devi V. Buideswari Prasad Chaurasia, AIR-1988-Patna 5.
37.It is to be borne in mind that there is no provision for an Appeal against an order refusing to award interest or penalty under Section 4-A of the Act as per decision in Krishna Bai V. Kishanlal and another, 1991-II-ACJ-615.
38.No wonder, Appeal is a statutory right as distinguished from a common right. Furthermore, the third proviso of Section 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is not opposed to Article 14 of the Constitution of India or violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as per the decision in Banto Bhaskar Rao V. Purna Suna and Others, 2003-I-LLJ-920 (Orissa).
39.A reading of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act unerringly point out that it is not only mandatory but statutory providing a right of appeal circumscribed by the condition of deposit of amount of compensation for the security of workman for good reasons. The Writ is no substitute for ordinary remedies. Moreover, the remedy of an Appeal provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act, is adequate and efficacious as per decision in Mariappan P. V. Deputy Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Pallayamkottai and another, 2002-I-Lab. L.J-598 (Madras).
40.It appears that the Writ Petitioner earlier projected I.A.No.285 of 2008 in W.C.No.315 of 2005 on the file of the 1st Respondent wherein he prayed for setting aside the order dated 27.10.2005 passed against him. He had assigned a reason that he developed sudden illness on 27.10.2005 (when the matter was posted for filing counter) and that had forbidden him to ensure his presence before the 1st Respondent for the purpose of filing counter to main case W.C.No.315 of 2005. Because of his absence on 27.10.2005, the 1st Respondent set him Exparte on 27.10.2005. Later, he filed a sworn affidavit on 20.10.2008 before the 1st Respondent/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem wherein he prayed for passing of an order by the 1st Respondent to set aside the Exparte Award dated 30.06.2008, for the reasons assigned by him in his affidavit.
41.A perusal of the contents of affidavit in paragraph 3 in I.A.No.285 of 2008 (filed by the Writ Petitioner) shows, inter alia, that one Sivaraj was examined as P.W.2 and chief proof affidavit was filed in this case and for cross examination, the matter was adjourned to and finally the case was posted on 07.03.2008. It is the categorical assertion of the Writ Petitioner (as Petitioner in I.A.No.285 of 2008 before the 1st Respondent) that he was present along with his counsel and the Respondents witness and their counsel were absent when the case was called and he was informed that the above case was dismissed for default due to the non appearance of the Respondents/ Petitioners and their counsel etc. Later, an Exparte Award dated 30.06.2008 was served on him by registered post on 11.10.2008. However, these averments of the Writ Petitioner are repudiated by the Learned Counsel for the Respondents 2 to 7 as false one.
42.Obviously, the Respondents 2 to 7 had not filed counter to I.A.No.285 of 2008 before the 1st Respondent, though they had taken notice to I.A.No.285 of 2008 and prayed time for filing of counter. Even otherwise, the 1st Respondent was perforced to pass the impugned order dated 30.07.2009 in I.A.No.285 of 2008 dismissing the Application, assigning the reasons that the Writ Petitioner was given ample opportunities and further, he failed to produce his side witness and therefore, the counter averments to W.C.No.305 of 2005 were taken as his arguments and since the Award dated 30.06.2009 was passed on merits, the application was dismissed.
43.At this stage, on going through the impugned order dated 30.07.2009 passed by the 1st Respondent, this Court is of the considered view that the 1st Respondent had not adverted to any of the averments made by the Writ Petitioner in para 3 of the affidavit in I.A.No.285 of 2008 and also he had not discussed the same by arriving at a conclusion as to whether they were true, incorrect or false one. In fact, the impugned order dated 30.07.2009 does not dealt with the categorical averments made by the Writ Petitioner in para 3 of the affidavit in I.A.No.285 of 2008 and also the last paragraph averments where he mentioned that an Exparte order copy dated 30.06.2008 was served on him by registered post on 11.10.2008 and further he was shocked to see the same. When it is the specific stand of the Petitioner before this Court that on receipt of the Exparte Award dated 30.06.2008, on 11.10.2008 through registered post, he contacted his counsel and went to the office of the 1st Respondent and he was informed that in the afternoon of 07.03.2008, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents had appeared and the matter was again taken on file, by restoring the petition without any notice to him, then, it is the duty of the 1st Respondent/Authority to apply his mind to the factum of averments made by the Writ Petitioner in I.A.No.285 of 2008 and to deal with the same in threadbare fashion in one way or other in the manner known to law and in accordance with law.
44.However, on going through the impugned order dated 30.07.2009, this Court comes to an inevitable conclusion that the 1st Respondent had not followed necessary procedure. Even otherwise, when the P.W.2 was not cross examined on the side of the Writ Petitioner, the Award passed on 30.06.2008 is only an Exparte Award, in the considered opinion of this Court. Ordinarily, matters should be decided on merits and a litigant ought to be provided with sufficient opportunities to contest the matter. The term 'Sufficient Cause' under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code should be construed liberally to advance substantial cause of justice, notwithstanding the fact that the said term 'Sufficient Cause' is the pure question of fact, it cannot be ignored that 'Sufficient Cause' must be shown by a party for all stages of proceedings.
45.As far as the present case is concerned, the order passed by the 1st Respondent dated 30.07.2009, in the considered opinion of this Court, bristles with legal infirmities and in fact, the said order suffers from material irregularity and patent illegality in the eye of law, since the same does not advert to the averments of the Petitioner in paragraph 3 of the affidavit in I.A.No.285 of 2008 and dealing with them in an objective fashion.
46.Generally speaking, although Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act enjoins a party to file a statutory Appeal before the High Court under Section 30 (1) of the Act in respect of an order awarding compensation etc. unless substantial question of law is involved in the Appeal, yet, in the instant case, this Court very pertinently points out that no appeal can be filed by the Petitioner as against the order dated 30.07.2009 made in I.A.No.285 of 2008 passed by the 1st Respondent dismissing the application in view of the fact that there is no provision for filing of an appeal under Section 30 of the Act and also that under Rule 41 of the Employee's Compensation Rules, 1924, the ingredients of Order 43 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code would not apply. Therefore, the present Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner based on factual aspects placed before the 1st Respondent perfectly maintainable in law, since there is no alternative and adequate remedy of filing of the Appeal by him under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Moreover, the factual aspects raised in I.A.No.285 of 2008 and also the same being raised in the Writ Petition are all pure question of facts and these cannot be challenged by way of regular Appeal under Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. As such, this Court is constrained to interfere with the impugned order dated 30.07.2009 passed by the 1st Respondent, in the interest of justice and sets aside the same in furtherance of substantial cause of justice. Consequently, the Writ Petition succeeds.
47.In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The order passed by the 1st Respondent dated 30.07.2009 is hereby set aside by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Writ Petition. The 1st Respondent is directed to restore I.A.No.285 of 2008 to his file and further directed to pass orders afresh, by providing opportunities to the Respondents 2 to 7 to file counter to I.A.No.285 of 2008 within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Thereafter, it is open to the 1st Respondent to pass a fair, objective, a reasoned order on merits by assigning an outline of adequate/satisfactory process of reasoning, which is imperative with specific reference to the averments made by the respective parties in their pleadings in Interlocutory Application and meeting out the same, in furtherance of substantial cause of justice. Liberty is also granted to the respective parties to let in oral and documentary evidence (by marking documents) to substantiate their case in I.A.No.285 of 2008 and in this regard, the 1st Respondent shall permit them. In any event, the 1st Respondent is directed to dispose of I.A.No.285 of 2008 within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order and to report compliance before this Court without fail. Also, it is open to the respective parties to bring it to the notice of the 1st Respondent that this Court in M.P.No.2 of 2010 on 04.02.2010 had directed the Petitioner to deposit the amount of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the credit of W.C.No.315 of 2005 within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the said order. As and when the 1st Respondent passes the Award in W.C.No.315 of 2005 and if the said amount was already deposited by the Court, then, it may be taken into consideration and appropriate orders may be passed in the manner known to law and in accordance with law. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
27.08.2013 Index :Yes Internet :Yes Sgl To The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem 7.
M.VENUGOPAL,J.
Sgl ORDER IN W.P.No.2042 of 2010 27.08.2013