Delhi District Court
Mangilal Rikhabchand Huf vs M/S Poonam Backliwal on 17 November, 2025
IN THE COURT OF CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE,
SHAHDARA DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS, NEW
DELHI
Presided By : Sh. Mohit Sharma
RC ARC 38/23
In the matter of :-
Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF
1852, Hardyal Street, Cheerakhana,
Delhi-110006.
Through its Karta
Mr. Mahendra Kumar S/o Rikhab Chand,
R/o C/58, Safdarjung Development Area,
New Delhi. .......Petitioner
Versus
M/s Poonam Backliwal
Through its Proprietor Mr. Ajay Backliwal
5, Sunder Nagar Market,
New Delhi. .......Respondent
ORDER ON LEAVE TO DEFEND APPLICATION
1. This order shall decide the question whether the respondent be granted leave to contest the present application under clause (e) of proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as DRC Act).
2. The present eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner against the respondent for vacation of the tenanted premises, i.e. entire ground floor of shop bearing no. 5, admeasuring 1350 sq. ft., having a front of 22 sq. ft., Block No. 171, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi-110003, as shown in the RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 1 of 77 site plan annexed with the petition (hereinafter referred to as 'tenanted premises'), on the ground of bonafide requirement under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the DRC Act').
CASE OF THE PETITIONER
3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) constituted by the late Mr. Mangi Lal, and has been involved in the jewellery business for over 150 years. After the death of Mr. Mangi Lal, the affairs of the HUF were taken over by his son, late Mr. Rikhab Chand, who died on 12.12.1987, leaving behind two sons, Mr. Mahender Kumar and late Mr. Rajender Kumar. It is the case of the petitioner that Mr. Rajender Kumar passed away on 27.07.2019 and Mrs. Sushila Devi w/o Mr. Mahender Kumar passed away on 02.10.2022. Since they died, the HUF consists of the following co-parceners and is managed by Mr. Mahender Kumar as Karta:
1) Mr. Mahender Kumar, Karta, (aged about 88 years) s/o late Mr. Rikhab Chand:
a. Mr. Amit Jain (aged about 46 years) s/o Mr. Mahender Kumar
i). Ms. Kashvi Jain (aged about 14 years) d/o Mr. Amit Jain
ii). Ms. Mishika Jain (aged about 8 years) d/o Mr. Amit Jain b. Mrs. Chandra Jain (married daughter of Mr. Mahender Kumar, aged about 60 years) w/o Mr. Ashok Jain c. Mrs. Vandana Kochar (married daughter of Mr. Mahender Kumar, aged about 57 years) w/o Mr. Manoj Kochar d. Mrs. Mamta Kochar (married daughter of Mr. Mahender Kumar, aged about 54 years) w/o Mr. Vishal Kochar RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 2 of 77 e. The late Mrs. Anu Bhandari (married daughter of Mr. Mahender Kumar and deceased on 30.09.2009) w/o the late Mr. Rajkumar Bhandari)
2) Branch of the late Mr. Rajender Kumar (expired on 27.07.2019), s/o late Mr. Rikhab Chand a. Mrs. Sneh Lata (aged about 80 years) w/o late Mr. Rajender Kumar b. Mr. Komal Jain (aged about 59 years) s/o late Mr. Rajender Kumar
i). Mr. Shaurya Jain (aged about 28 years) s/o Mr. Komal Jain c. Mrs. Rakhi Jain (married daughter of Mr. Rajender Kumar, aged about 52 years) w/o another Mr. Komal Jain
4. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner HUF is the owner of the tenanted premises, a prime commercial property situated in one of the most exclusive markets in India. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent was put in possession of the tenanted premises on rent by the petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest, namely, Ms. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in the year 1964 and the respondent has been enjoying the same for over 55 years. It is the case of the petitioner that before the institution of the present eviction petition, the respondent had been paying a paltry rent of Rs. 457/- which too has not been paid regularly, whereas the market rent as on date of filing of the present petition is more than Rs. 6 Lakhs per month. It is the case of the petitioner that after applying the terms of escalation as per Section 6A of the Act, the monthly rent had been increased w.e.f. 01.04.2021 and the monthly rent payable is Rs. 552/- per month, which too has not been paid.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 3 of 775. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner HUF purchased the tenanted premises in 2001 from Ms. Parbhat Kumari Sharma with the intention of utilizing the tenanted premises for expansion of the existing business for the benefit of the next generation of the petitioner HUF's family. At the time of acquisition in 2001, the petitioner HUF did not have the need and therefore, the petitioner HUF did not seek eviction of the respondent from the tenanted premises for almost 15 years.
6. It is the case of the petitioner that as the younger members of the petitioner HUF started growing up, there was a bona fide requirement to settle them and therefore, the petitioner HUF was constrained to issue a legal notice dated 05.11.2016 to the respondent to vacate the tenanted premises, which was duly served on 09.11.2016. At that time, as mentioned in the legal notice, the petitioner HUF intended to settle one of it's younger co-parceners, namely Mr. Shaurya Jain, then aged 21, son of Mr. Komal Jain and grandson of the late Mr. Rajender Kumar, who intended to set up a restaurant in the tenanted premises. However, no reply to the aforesaid legal notice was received.
7. It is the case of the petitioner that in the year 2018, when the members of the petitioner HUF expanded and the third generation of the family reached adulthood, and the petitioner HUF recognized that the respondent had no intent to vacate the tenanted premises, the petitioner HUF was constrained to prefer an eviction petition bearing RC ARC No. 09/2018 titled as "Mangi Lal Rikhab Chand HUF v. M/s Poonam Backliwal"
under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, praying for the eviction RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 4 of 77 of the respondent from the tenanted premises. It is the case of the petitioner that on 27.07.2019, during the pendency of the eviction petition, one of the senior members of the petitioner HUF, namely Mr. Rajender Kumar, passed away and upon his demise, there was a further change in the requirements and dynamics of the petitioner HUF. It is the case of the petitioner that as several years had elapsed since the issuance of the legal notice dated 05.11.2016 and the institution of eviction petition bearing RC ARC No. 09/2018, the bonafide needs and requirements of petitioner HUF changed with the passing of time. It is the case of the petitioner that upon late Mr. Rajender Kumar's passing, familial tensions cropped and it was felt that the only premises available to petitioner HUF for it's business needs, namely, shop no. 3, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi, consisting of three floors (first floor measuring 1,000 sq. ft., second floor measuring 1,350 sq. ft., and third floor measuring 1,350 sq. ft.) (hereinafter referred to as "shop no. 3"), was not sufficient to accommodate all the members of petitioner HUF involved in the jewellery business, as a result of which, on 09.01.2020, the petitioner HUF preferred an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend the eviction petition, to include, inter alia, the following grounds:
"C. That in due course of time the family members of the Hindu Undivided Family have increased and the young next generation are required to be settled in their respective businesses for which the assets of the family HUF are required for bona fide need... ...The petitioner HUF bonafidely requires the tenancy premises for the business needs and requirements of its members since the only shop premises currently available to the petitioner HUF for the bonafide business needs of its members is only one shop, shop no. 3, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi, and the same is not sufficient to accommodate all the members of the petitioner HUF. The petitioner HUF and its members have no other alternative suitable premises available for their bonafide business needs. The petitioner HUF very kindly submits that the RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 5 of 77 tenancy premises, being shop no. 5, Ground Floor, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi (tenancy premises), had been purchased by the petitioner HUF in 2001 with the subject that in the future, when the family members of the petitioner HUF grow up, then the aforesaid tenancy premises may be required to settle them in the business activities as part of growth and expansion. In a very reasonable manner, the tenancy premises required bonafidely by the petitioner HUF to settle its members and, respectively, the heirs of Shri Mahender Kumar and Late Shri Rajender Kumar, namely, Shri Amit Jain s/o Shri Mahender Kumar in one of the shops and Shri Komal Jain s/o Late Shri Rajender Kumar in the other shop. Out of the two shops, i.e., the shop currently available with the members bearing shop no. 3 in the same market and shop no. 5 (tenancy premises) situated very close in the same market D.... Besides the bonafide requirement of Shri Shaurya Jain s/o Shri Komal Jain for starting the restaurant business in the tenancy premises, the petitioner HUF, even otherwise, requires the tenancy premises for bonafide purposes to set up the precious stones and jewellery business in the said tenancy premises for members being the children of Shri Mahender Kumar (Karta) and children of Late Shri Rajender Kumar to carry, grow, and expand their business activities since the only one shop available with them is not sufficient to accommodate all the members of petitioner HUF."
8. It is the case of the petitioner that the Ld. Rent Controller, vide order dated 13.01.2022, rejected the application of the petitioner HUF under Order VI Rule 17 on the ground that it sought to urge a separate cause of action. Thereafter, the petitioner HUF approached the Hon'ble High Court in RC Revision No. 41 of 2022 against the order dated 13.01.2022 and the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 19.04.2023 granted liberty to the petitioner HUF to file a fresh eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act in the following terms:
"4. In view of the submissions made by the petitioner, the present petition is dismissed as withdrawn, reserving liberty to the petitioner to avail his remedies, in accordance with law. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
5. In the event the petitioner files a fresh eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the same shall be decided, in accordance with law."RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 6 of 77
9. It is the case of the petitioner that in terms of the liberty granted by the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 19.04.2023, the petitioner HUF requested permission to withdraw the eviction petition bearing RC ARC No. 09/2018 with liberty to file a fresh eviction petition and in view of the statement made by the petitioner's counsel, the Ld. Rent Controller vide order dated 24.04.2023, was pleased to dispose of eviction petition bearing RC ARC No. 09/2018 with liberty to file a fresh petition in the following terms:
"Hence, when petition is being withdrawn on the grounds of all facts not disclosed on record, and not for existing cause of action/bonafide requirement, being satisfied, liberty cannot be withheld from the petitioner to pursue their remedy afresh as per law. Hence, objections of counsel for respondent are not tenable. Therefore, in view of the statement of counsel for petitioner recorded today, the present petition stands disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition in accordance with law."
10. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has accordingly preferred the instant petition to place on record all facts which clearly disclose a bonafide need to use the tenanted premises for the growing needs of the future generations of the petitioner HUF. It is the case of the petitioner that in particular, there is a bonafide requirement to accommodate Mr. Komal Jain s/o late Mr. Rajender Kumar, along with his heirs in the tenanted premises to expand the family business of precious stones and jewellery of the petitioner HUF after the demise of Mr. Rajender Kumar. It is the case of the petitioner that the only premises available to the petitioner HUF for the bonafide business needs of it's members is shop no. 3, which is also not owned by the petitioner HUF, and which is not sufficient to accommodate all the members of the petitioner HUF. It is the case of the petitioner RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 7 of 77 that Mr. Amit Jain s/o Mr. Mahender Kumar and Mr. Komal Jain together are already conducting the family jewellery business on the ground floor of the said shop. Further, the first floor is used for the entertainment of customers apart from executive and accounting work and the recently constructed second floor is used for storage purposes. It is the case of the petitioner that sufficient space is not available at shop no. 3 to accommodate all the members of petitioner no. 3 involved in the jewellery business. It is the case of the petitioner that competitors such as Leela Jewelers, Mayur Jewelers, Jagan Nath Hem Chand, Bharany's, JH Jewelers, and BN Jewels also located in the same market in Sunder Nagar, usually operate out of shops covering more than 4,050 sq. ft. over three floors, i.e. 1,350 sq. ft. per floor.
11. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner HUF owns a part of the property No. 1852, Hardyal Street, Cheerakhana, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "Cheerakhana property"), which already has several tenants and is not suitable for the bonafide requirement of the petitioner HUF. It is the case of the petitioner that the said property is not suitable for the store fronts required for jewellery/retail businesses. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner HUF even offered to provide the respondent with equal space in the said property as that of the tenanted premises, if it suits their needs, as an alternative accommodation for vacating the tenanted premises, however, the respondent did not accept the offer.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 8 of 7712. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent has acknowledged the petitioner HUF as it's landlord since 2001 and has been making rent payments to the petitioner HUF from time to time. Hence, the landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner HUF and respondent is an admitted fact on record.
On the above stated grounds, a prayer is made for eviction of the respondent from the tenanted premises.
CASE OF THE RESPONDENT
13. Summons were served upon the respondent, who appeared and filed leave to defend application taking following grounds:-
a) The petitioners are not the owners of the premises. The documents filed by the petitioner clearly show that the petitioner is merely a rent collector and nothing more than that. The petitioner has placed on record documents, which, on their very face, disentitle the petitioner from claiming ownership of the premises. In order to show that the petitioner is the owner of the premises in question, the petitioner has filed a Gift Deed, purported to have been executed by the original owner of the property, namely, Smt. Santosh Surana w/o Shri Anant Raj Surana. A bare perusal of the said document shows the falsity of the case set up by the petitioner regarding ownership of the property. The Gift Deed, even if it is presumed to have been executed by Smt. Santosh Surana, clearly vests a very limited right in favor of Smt. Prabhat Sharma, as much as the Gift Deed is purported to have been executed for the purpose of Smt. Prabhat Sharma upbringing, educating, and keeping up her two minor children, namely, Sh. Shakti Sharma and Sh. Vinod Sharma. It is further revealed from RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 9 of 77 the said Gift Deed that the donor placed a specific bar on Smt. Prabhat Sharma, as much as she was barred from selling or otherwise transferring the property in any manner whatsoever, except for the benefit of the aforementioned children. The said Gift Deed specifically states that the owner of the above-mentioned property shall be the owner of the above-mentioned property. Apparently, Smt. Prabhat Sharma could not be the owner of the property except for the purpose of using it's rents and profits for the welfare of the minors Vinod Sharma and Shakti Sharma. However, a bare perusal of the Agreement of Sale stated to have been executed by Smt. Prabhat Sharma, though not admitted as such by the respondent/tenant, shows that it has nowhere been stated that the sale agreement is being executed for the benefit of the two children namely Sh. Shakti Sharma and Sh. Vinod Sharma. It is the case of the respondent that in view of a specific bar having been placed upon Smt. Prabhat Sharma, barring her from selling or otherwise transferring the property except for the benefit of the said two children, it was incumbent upon Smt. Prabhat Sharma to approach a Court of Law seeking permission to sell the property which has been vested in her solely for the purpose of the welfare of the said two minors, but apparently, no such step has been taken or is projected to have been taken by either Smt. Prabhat Sharma or by the present petitioners for the purpose of the alleged sale of the property.
b) The said Agreement of Sale in no manner transfers the property in favor of the present petitioners. Firstly, it is RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 10 of 77 treated as a Transfer Deed; it did require registration of the document, which apparently has not been done. The document in the circumstances inspires no confidence and cannot be evidence of transfer or sale. It is otherwise inadmissible as evidence. Further, a bare reading of the alleged Agreement of Sale shows that even the requirements envisaged by the said document have not been complied with. The sale consideration of Rs.
4,50,000/-, which was to be paid at the time of registration of the document has nowhere been shown to have been paid. So, despite the alleged signing of the alleged sale agreement, there was no evidence of the sale consideration having been actually paid. No document in this respect has been placed on record. Apparently, there is no sale of the property in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent. Pertinently, it appears that the document in question has not been signed by Smt. Prabhat Sharma. It would be seen that while accepting the said Gift Deed, Smt. Prabhat Sharma signed in English. However, the documents projected to be the sale documents are signed in Hindi and are signed in such a manner that it appears that the signatory is a well-educated person fluent in handwriting, which Smt. Prabhat Sharma was not. In the like manner, the two Powers of Attorney, one special and the other general, stated to have been executed by Smt. Prabhat Sharma appointing Shri Rajinder Kumar do not inspire much confidence. It is the case of the respondent that a bare perusal of the two Powers of Attorney, one special and the other general, shows that Sh. Rajinder RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 11 of 77 Kumar or, for that matter, the Petitioner HUF (if at all it is an HUF) was assigned the task of collecting rent from the tenant. Even otherwise, because of a bar having been placed on Smt. Prabhat Sharma, barring her from transferring the property to anyone except for the benefit of the two children, would bring down the reading of the said documents as meant for the person to collect rent only. Therefore, the Petitioner HUF or Sh. Rajinder Kumar could be treated only as rent collectors and neither landlords nor owners of the property in question. In any case, with the death of Sh. Rajinder Kumar, the powers given to him have come to an end. Despite the passage of such a long time, the sale could not be affected. This in itself casts a doubt on the veracity and authenticity of the transaction. For all purposes, Smt. Prabhat Sharma or Sh. Vinod Kumar and Sh. Shakti Kumar continue to be owners of the property.
c) Prior to the filing of the earlier petition for eviction by the petitioner against the respondent being RC/ARC No. 09/2018, the two beneficiaries under the stated Gift Deed namely Sh. Shakti Sharma and Sh. Vinod Sharma sent a legal notice in May, 1979 to Smt. Prabhat Sharma through their Advocate seeking rendition of accounts in respect of rents received by Smt. Prabhat Sharma in respect of the property in question. A copy of the said communication was received by the father of the respondent Mr. Poonam Backliwal on 18.05.1979. A bare reading of the said communication would show that Smt. Prabhat Sharma had only a limited interest in the property in question which RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 12 of 77 she could not transfer and that the real beneficiaries of the property had questioned her right to even continue receiving rent. Pertinently, even prior to that, Shri Anant Raj Surana, who was the rent collector when the property was with Smt. Santosh Surana, but who continued to be the rent collector even for Smt. Prabhat Sharma, wrote a communication to Shri Poonam Chand Backliwal on 03.01.1970 that henceforth, the rent should be paid to Sh. Vinod Sharma, son of Smt. Prabhat Sharma stating that Sh. Vinod Sharma is a major and looking after the affairs of the family. It was demanded that a cheque for the shop rent should be made out in the name of Sh. Vinod Sharma as of 01.02.1970. Thus, seen from any angle, the petitioner HUF is not the owner of the property in question.
d) The petitioner is not a duly constituted HUF. While filing eviction petition no. 09/2018, the petitioners did not provide any names of the constituents of the HUF except for Mahinder Kumar, Rajinder Kumar, and Shaurya Jain. The tenant/respondent raised an objection in this regard and categorically stated that the constitution of the stated HUF was not being disclosed and for that reason, the petition was not maintainable. Despite such an objection, the names of the constituents of the HUF were not disclosed. As an afterthought, the petitioner sought leave to amend the petition for eviction, filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC in eviction petition no. 9/2018 and sought to introduce names purporting to be constituents of the HUF. This was done for the purpose of projecting the need for the premises for the stated constituents of the RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 13 of 77 HUF. The tenant contested the said application and vide order dated 13.01.2022, the said application was rejected by the Court. The petitioner filed a revision petition against the said order before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. The respondent contested the said petition and ultimately, vide order dated 19.04.2023, the said revision petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The present petition, and the facts regarding the constitution of the petitioner HUF and the requirement of the petitioners which existed at the time of the filing of eviction petition No. 9/2018, cannot be permitted to be agitated or set up all over again. The present petition, in so far as it makes a narration of the same facts that had either been made in the petition for eviction, or in the application filed under order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the petition, is not maintainable and is barred under the principles of Order II Rule 2 CPC.
e) There is a blatant and malafide concealment made by the petitioner regarding the space available to the petitioner for business purposes. Firstly, the accommodation available to the petitioner at Shop No.3 has not been disclosed. It has not been shown as to how many rooms, cabins, halls etc. are in existence on the ground floor, first floor as well as second floor of the said property. Had the same been disclosed, it would have been clear that the present petition is malafide. Besides the first, second and third floors of Shop No.3, the petitioner or it's constituents are in possession of the ground floor as well. The petitioner has concealed the same with malafide intentions. The number RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 14 of 77 of cabins and halls on each floor of the said property has not been disclosed. Secondly, the petitioner has concealed that the petitioner is having huge accommodation at the Cheerakhana property. The petitioner's plea that the same is not suitable for the petitioner cannot be taken as such and it has to be valued on the touchstone of reasonableness.
f) The petitioner has concealed that right from the year 1857, the petitioner is having it's business of jewellery and allied items at the said address in Cheerakhana, Delhi. The petitioner has failed to disclose the total accommodation available to the petitioner at the said address in Cheerakhana, Delhi. The petitioner has failed to disclose how many halls, or rooms worth being used as showrooms, are abutting the street of the said building. It has further not been disclosed as to which portion of the property is occupied by tenants. It has further not been disclosed as to whether any portion of the property is being used for non- residential purposes.
g) The Cheerakhana property in question is entirely occupied by the petitioner and there are no tenants therein. Only a caretaker of the property lives in a small portion of the said property. The petitioner has failed to disclose, with malafide intentions, that the said property is in fact being used as a workshop where jewellery is crafted, created, stored, and then put into the showcases for sale in that very building. This concealment is fatal to the case set up by the petitioner.
h) The petitioner has failed to disclose that it has an outlet in RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 15 of 77 Tokyo, Japan, where crafted and created jewellery is put for sale.
i) The petition for eviction is otherwise far fetched and eviction is sought for people alleged to be constituents of the HUF, whose ages in the petition have been mentioned as 14 years, 8 years, 80 years, etc. Besides, the requirement sought to be projected is in respect of ladies who are in fact homemakers and have never involved themselves in any business whatsoever. Sh. Mahender Kumar, stated to be Karta of the petitioner HUF is admittedly confined to his house, having become weak at the age of 88 years. Ms. Kashvi Jain, daughter of Sh. Amit Jain is 14 years old and a student and cannot be expected to join the petitioner's business. Ms. Mishika Jain is projected to be 8 years old and, apparently, is a child and is a student. Mrs. Chandra Jain, daughter of Sh. Mahender Kumar is a housewife and has never ventured out for the purpose of doing business. Ms. Vandana Kochar and Ms. Mamta Kochar, daughters of Sh. Mahender Kumar, are also homemakers and have nothing to do with any business, much less a specialized jewellery business. Surprisingly, mention is made of a deceased daughter of Sh. Mahender Kumar, whose husband is stated to have died. The respondent understands that none of the daughters of Sh. Mahender Kumar lives in Delhi. Mrs. Sneh Lata, wife of the late Sh. Rajender Kumar is also a homemaker and has nothing to do with the business. Mr. Komal Jain is doing his business at Shop No. 3 of which he individually is a co-owner. Pertinently, this fact has been deliberately concealed from the Court. Mr. RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 16 of 77 Shaurya Jain, son of Mr. Komal Jain, is apparently not interested in doing jewellery business as much as the previous eviction petition bearing No. 9/2018 was filed specifically for his requirement of setting up a world-class restaurant/eating house. Mrs. Rakhi Jain, married daughter of Sh. Rajinder Kumar has been described as married to another Sh. Komal Jain who is having his vast jewellery business under the name of M/s. K.K. Jewellers. Even in the said business of M/s. K.K. Jewellers, Mrs. Rakhi Jain is neither involved nor interested in taking part.
j) It is claimed that the bonafide requirement is to accommodate Sh. Komal Jain in the tenanted premises with his heirs for the purpose of expanding the family business. As admitted by the petitioner, the only persons working at Shop no. 3 are Komal Jain and Amit Jain, son of Sh. Mahender Kumar. No other member of the family is currently conducting the said jewellery business or has been doing so at any time prior to the filing of this eviction petition.
k) The petitioner has given a dishonest description of the accommodation available to some other jewellers. By showing accommodation available to other jewellers in the market, the petitioner wishes to establish that the jewellery business requires more accommodation and for that reason, the premises already available with the petitioner are not sufficient.
l) The eviction petition filed by the petitioner is otherwise not maintainable, as much as to mislead the Court as well as the respondent. The address of Sh. Mahender Kumar, RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 17 of 77 stated to be the Karta of the petitioner has been deliberately wrongly given in the petition. It is stated that there is no property having a description as C-58, Safdarjung Development Area, New Delhi 110016.
m) The petitioner has projected to show that a proper sale deed could not be executed in respect of the property in question for one reason or another. It is stated that had there been an actual sale of the property by Smt. Prabhat Sharma in favor of the stated HUF, there would have been a proper sale deed in as much as there was no bar to the execution of such a sale deed at any time. Pertinently, the family or some of it's constituents own another property in the said market itself. It is 22, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi, which is occupied at present by HDFC Bank. There is a regular sale deed in respect of the aforementioned property in favor of either the petitioner or in favor of any or all of it's constituents. As such, it cannot be taken that there was any difficulty in getting the sale deed executed. The Sale Deed was not executed because, in fact, it was not a sale transaction and the petitioner was appointed only as a rent collector.
n) The petitioner has stated in the petition that the respondent is irregular in the payment of rent. Firstly, it is stated that the agreed rent between the parties is Rs. 457/- per month. The said rent has not been increased in any manner whatsoever. There could not be any increase under Section 6A of the DRC Act, since the procedure for enhancement of rent as prescribed in the DRC Act has never been followed. The rent stands at Rs. 457/- per month. The RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 18 of 77 entire rent up to August 31, 2023 is paid. The petitioner has acted with malafide intentions throughout. Whenever rent cheques were tendered to the petitioner, the petitioner refused to accept them. All communications addressed to the petitioner at their address were returned. If any communication containing a cheque regarding the rent of the premises was received by the petitioner, the cheque was never deposited in the bank despite the tenant requesting the petitioner to do the same. In these circumstances, the respondent had absolutely no alternative but to send the rent by bank transfer to the petitioner's bank.
o) Sh. Mangi Lal, Sh. Rikhab Chand, Sh. Mahender Kumar and Sh. Rajinder Kumar have all along been carrying on their business from the Cheerakhana property. No member of the petitioner's family has used the said property for residential purposes. The said property has always been used for commercial purposes for running the petitioner's business, and the non-mentioning of it, or non-mentioning of the accommodation available in the said property, is malafide and fatal to the petitioner's case.
p) So far as the powers of attorney given by Smt. Prabhat Sharma to Sh. Rajinder Kumar are concerned, apparently, they have lived their lives. With the demise of Sh. Rajinder Kumar, the Powers of Attorney have become useless and cannot be used in any manner whatsoever. Further, since the Powers of Attorney were without consideration, the same could never be evidence of sale. The Power of Attorney is shown to have been witnessed by Sh. Shakti RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 19 of 77 Kumar. The signatures of Sh. Shakti Kumar have been forged on the said Power of Attorney. As mentioned above, Sh. Shakti Kumar along with Sh. Vinod Kumar had served a notice upon the petitioner through their counsel Sh. Kanwal Narayan demanding payment of rent to them. Apparently, it is inconceivable that Mr. Shakti Kumar would have witnessed the Power of Attorney.
REBUTTAL BY THE PETITIONER
14. Reply to the leave to defend application was filed by the petitioner, wherein the petitioner has denied the averments made by the respondent in the leave to defend application. It is the case of the petitioner that it is only the petitioner which is the sole and absolute owner of the premises in question and the respondent having been attorned as a tenant by the petitioner HUF and thereafter, paying rent since past more than 23 years till date, is estopped under law to challenge the title of the petitioner on any ground whatsoever, in view of Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act. Even otherwise, there is no fault or lacunae in the Gift Deed dated 19.12.1955 executed in favour of predecessor-in-interest, i.e., Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma, who in turn has sold the tenanted premises to the petitioner by virtue of an Agreement to Sell, registered GPA, registered SPA, registered Will, Possession Letter & Receipt, etc., all dated 10.04.2001, which documents were normal and routine documents for sale/purchase of the property at the relevant time in Delhi. It is the case of the petitioner that the contentions made by the respondent in para 3 of his affidavit thereby frivolously raising defects in the Gift Deed and falsely claiming disentitlement of Smt. Prabhat Kumari RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 20 of 77 Sharma to sell the subject property to the petitioner, in view of some clauses contained in the said Gift Deed, are untenable. It is the case of the petitioner that plain and simple reading of alleged embargo so created on the sale, transfer, or disposal of the property by Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma was limited to her sons attaining the age of majority only and not thereafter. The sons of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma namely Shri Shakti Sharma and Shri Vinod Sharma were aged about 51 years and 50 years respectively at the time of transfer of title by Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in favour of the petitioner. It is denied that the Gift Deed placed a blanket bar on Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma from selling, transferring, or disposing off the said property. The clauses of the Gift Deed depicts that the bar if any created was for a limited period i.e., till her sons attained the age of majority. As such, the contention made by the respondent to the effect that Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma could not be the owner of the property, is contrary to the intent and purport of the said registered Gift Deed dated 19.12.1955 itself. It is denied that the sale agreement & other documents including the Will so executed by Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in favour of the petitioner does not transfer the property in favour of the petitioner or the said documents cannot be considered as evidence for transfer of sale or are inadmissible in evidence. The recital of Agreement of Sale dated 10.04.2001 especially paras 14, 16, & 17 coupled with registered GPA & registered Will leaves no scope for any doubt that the said property was duly transferred by Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in favour of the petitioner. Even in the Agreement of Sale dated 10.04.2001, there is a clear reference of payment of the entire sale consideration of Rs. 4,50,000/- vide RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 21 of 77 Pay Order No. 003653 dated 09.04.2001 drawn on ICICI Bank, Green Park Extension, New Delhi and thus, the contention by the respondent to the effect that said consideration has not been paid, is unfounded. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that in the registered Gift Deed, Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma has signed in English, while in the sale documents she has signed in Hindi, such sale documents in favour of the petitioner cannot be questioned especially when the same are registered. Bare perusal of signatures of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma on the Gift Deed will show that she has signed after cutting and it clearly portrays that it was not convenient for her to sign in English. It is the case of the petitioner that an application for water connection dated 18.05.1982 in respect of tenanted premises filed with the Water Department, MCD duly bears her signature in Hindi which itself nullifies the false suspicion being tried to be raised by the respondent. It is the case of the petitioner that the sale documents which bear the signatures of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in Hindi are registered and are duly witnessed by as many as three witnesses including her son, Shri Shakti Sharma. It is the case of the petitioner that the contention by the respondent to the effect that signatures of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in Hindi appears to be the signatures of a well-educated person is again incorrect as the manner of signing clearly shows that the same have been appended after some efforts by the signatory and nowhere appears to be the signature of a well-educated person, as falsely claimed by the respondent. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that the General Power of Attorney & Special Power of Attorney are duly registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, which coupled with the Agreement to Sell & registered Will clearly RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 22 of 77 show the consideration and thus, in view of Section 202 of Indian Contract Act, the subject property was duly sold for consideration by Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in favour of the petitioner. As such, by no stretch of imagination, the Karta of the petitioner could be considered as only a Rent Collector and not the owner. It is further submitted that the death of Shri Rajender Kumar does not make any difference, as the GPA executed was with consideration as detailed above. Even Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma who had executed the registered Will dated 10.04.2001 in favour of the petitioner had also expired on 08.01.2004 at Sahibabad, Uttar Pradesh, thereby giving absolute title and ownership of the subject property to the petitioner. The said registered Will dated 10.04.2001 has been duly witnessed by three witnesses including the son of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma and has not been challenged by any one. In view of such state of affairs, the contention of the respondent that Shri Shakti Sharma & Shri Vinod Sharma continue to be the owners of the property, has no legal force at all. In fact, Shri Shakti Sharma (son of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma) vide Declaration dated 28.12.2018, followed by another Affidavit cum Declaration dated 15.11.2023 has reiterated that there is no dispute in regard to the transfer of the said property by his mother in favour of the petitioner and it is only the petitioner which is the sole & absolute owner of the property in question since 10.04.2001. Shri Shakti Sharma has also confirmed that neither he nor his brother namely Shri Vinod Kumar have any right, title, or interest in the said property /shop situated on ground floor, admeasuring 1350 sq. Ft. Plot No. 5, Block No. 171, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi. In view of such Declaration & Affidavit cum Declaration, the RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 23 of 77 frivolous attempt being made by the respondent to raise dispute in regard to the ownership of the subject property stands falsified to the hilt and the reliance by the respondent on the Legal Notice of May, 1979 issued on behalf of Shri Shakti Sharma & Shri Vinod Sharma to Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma (their mother) is irrelevant and inconsequential in view of the said Declaration & Affidavit cum Declaration. Even otherwise, the respondent to whom copy of such Legal Notice was also sent, has miserably failed to aver and place on record the reply dated 23.05.1979 given by him through Advocate to Shri Shakti Sharma & Shri Vinod Sharma. In the said Reply dt. 23.05.1979, the respondent has stated as under: -
"The said M/s. Poonam Backliwal are occupying the said premises as tenants under the said Shrimati Prabhat Sharma and in law they are bound to pay rent to her only.
Your allegations that the gift in favour of the said Shrimati Prabhat Sharma was made for the benefit of your clients Shri Shakti Sharma and Shri Vinod Sharma are neither within the knowledge of my client nor do they admit the correctness thereof. In any case, this is between your clients and the said Shrimati Prabhat Sharma to settle their disputes and accounts, if any, and my client's Firm has no liability or responsibility in this matter."
15. It is the case of the petitioner that bare perusal of the said reply shows beyond doubt that the respondent even in the year 1979 had accepted Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma as sole & absolute owner and landlady. The respondent at the relevant time had also clearly expressed that it shall continue to pay the rent to Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma only and has nothing to do with any inter se dispute, if any. The respondent having taken a clear stand at the relevant time, has deliberately suppressed the said admission from this Court and has now taken a stand contrary to his earlier stand and has frivolously gone to the extent of challenging the title/ownership of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 24 of 77 despite fully knowing that the respondent is not entitled to do so in the present facts of the case and documents on record and above all, in view of law settled in this regard. Furthermore, reference to the letter dated 03.01.1970 by the respondent is irrelevant and inconsequential in view of the clear stand taken by the respondent vide its reply dated 23.05.1979. In view of the Declaration dated 28.12.2018, followed by the Affidavit cum Declaration dated 15.11.2023, both executed by Shri Shakti Sharma, s/o Late Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma, there is no dispute at all with respect to ownership of the petitioner (erstwhile owner).
16. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner alongwith the eviction petition has filed a family tree of the petitioner HUF. Merely because of the fact that in the earlier Eviction Petition No. 9/2018 filed by the petitioner HUF, all the names of constituents of HUF were not mentioned, it does not mean that mentioning their names in the present petition is an after-thought. In fact, the respondent has been frivolously denying the existence of Petitioner HUF though the respondent has duly attorned and has been paying the rentals to the petitioner HUF only after 10.04.2001. Petitioner HUF has been an income tax assessee since ages and has it's PAN as AAAHM2153C. As such, any contention by the respondent thereby challenging the existence of HUF is baseless and has no force of law.
17. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that eviction petition no. 9/2018 was filed to meet the bonafide need of Shri Shaurya Jain, S/o. Shri Komal Jain, grandson of Shri Rajendra Kumar. Merely because of the fact that the amendment application was dismissed, it does not ipso facto mean that the petitioner has put forth names of all the constituents of HUF in the present petition RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 25 of 77 illegally and unlawfully. Even the present eviction petition has been filed for the bonafide requirement of members of HUF including Shri Shaurya Jain who has been and continues to be the member of the petitioner HUF. It is the case of the petitioner that the revision petition bearing no. 41/2022, preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 13.01.2022 passed by Ld. SCJ/RC South East Saket, New Delhi, was withdrawn in terms of order dated 19.04.2023 passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. Thereafter, vide order dated 24.04.2023, the petitioner withdrew the said eviction petition no. 9/2018 with liberty to file a fresh eviction petition in accordance with law. It is the case of the petitioner that the contention of the respondent that the present petition is hit by provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC is untenable as merely mentioning the names of all the members of HUF in the present petition does not ipso facto change the nature of the petition nor the relief sought in the present petition. The relief sought in both the petitions is same. i.e., eviction of the respondent-tenant from the premises in question to meet the bonafide need of the members of Petitioner HUF including that of Shri Shaurya Jain. The original constituent members of the HUF as the name suggests were Shri Mangi Lal being the father and Shri Rikhab Chand being the son and with growth of the family by birth of many children, the said HUF expanded. Fact of the matter remains that the relief as sought in the eviction petition no. 9/2018 on the grounds so mentioned in the earlier petition has been reiterated in the present petition and thus, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the present petition is barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC. The order dated 24.04.2023 passed by Ld. Rent Controller is clear, unambiguous, and totally demolishes the false claim of the respondent of the alleged applicability of Order II Rule 2 CPC in the present petition. Since the bonafide necessity is a continuing cause of RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 26 of 77 action and withdrawal of previous petition does not mean or imply extinguishment of bonafide need, the withdrawal of the previous petition cannot operate as res-judicata or make the present Petition barred by any provision of law including Order II Rule 2 CPC. Mere dismissal of miscelleneous application in the previous petition does not prevent the petitioner from filing the present petition with the narration of facts disclosing the names of all the members of the said HUF to elaborate it's contentions and such elaborated pleas neither changes the cause of action nor the relief sought nor the grounds on which such relief is sought.
18. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that it is denied that there is any malafide concealment by the petitioner in respect of space available at premises No. 3, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner in the present petition has clearly stated that Shop No. 3 is not owned by the petitioner HUF and thus, the question of showing the number of rooms, cabins etc., on the First & Second Floor was never relevant or required. It is further submitted that in the present eviction petition, the petitioner has clearly specified that Shri Amit Jain (S/o. Shri Mahender Kumar) & Shri Komal Jain (S/o. Late Shir Rajendra Kumar) are using the ground floor of the said shop for carrying on their own business of jewellery. First floor of said property is being used for entertainment of customers besides handling the executive and accounts works while the second floor is being used for storage purposes only. It is further submitted that there is no third floor in the said shop/premises No. 3, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi and thus, the question of concealment does not arise. It is the case of the petitioner that the business being carried out by Shri Amit Jain & Shri Komal Jain from the said shop does not fulfill the bonafide RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 27 of 77 requirements of the members of the petitioner, in particular Mr. Shaurya Jain. Mr. Shaurya Jain intends to start his business of exclusive and high-end jewellery to cater to a special class of clientele. There is no space in shop No. 3 for commencement of such business. Even otherwise, a clear averment has also been made by the petitioner that the said shop No. 3 is not available with the petitioner to accommodate the other members of the petitioner. It is further denied that the petitioner has concealed any facts about the property No. 1852, Hardayal Street, Cheera Khana, Delhi-110006. It is the case of the petitioner that the said property is not suitable for opening a Jewellery Store & Retail Business for fulfilling the requirement of the petitioner HUF. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has also offered to give equal space to the respondent in the said property as an alternate accommodation for shifting his business to the said property and non-acceptance of said offer by the respondent itself shows that the said property at Cheera Khana is not suitable for retail business. Even otherwise, no comparison can be made in regards to the tenanted premises which is situated at Sunder Nagar Market with the property situated at Cheera Khana, Delhi-110006. It is denied that the entire property situated at Cheera Khana, Delhi is in possession & occupation of the petitioner or there are no tenants and only a Caretaker lives in a small portion of the said property. It is the case of the petitioner that major portion of the ground floor of the said property is occupied by tenants while the first floor & second floor are residential in nature and the hall situated at the ground floor is allowed to be used by the petitioner occasionally to organize family functions of Jain cults only, that too gratuitously (free of charges). The basement of said property is only for the purposes of storage. No portion of the said property is being used as a workshop for crafting, creating, and storing jewellery or for RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 28 of 77 showcasing the jewellery for sale. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has no outlet at all in Tokyo, Japan. The petitioner does not own any outlet in Japan, or anywhere else in the world.
19. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that the contention made by the respondent to the effect that elderly members of HUF or lady members of HUF are not expected to join the business of petitioner, is not only a self created thought at the end of the respondent, but also has no sanctity too. The respondent by deliberately highlighting the names and ages of the constituted members cannot create disputed question of fact of alleged non- requirement of the premises, especially when the petitioner in the eviction petition has explained that the bonafide requirement is to meet the growing needs of future generation of the HUF. Immediate bonafide requirement for one of the adult members, namely Shri Shaurya Jain has been mentioned and the petitioner has clearly stated that Mr. Komal Jain cannot accommodate his son at Shop No. 3 wherefrom he is doing his business with other person and there is no place available in the said shop to accommodate the members of the petitioner including Mr. Shaurya Jain for establishing his/their business. The contention made by the respondent to the effect that Mr. Shaurya Jain is not interested in doing jewellery business is a myth and cannot be presumed merely on the ground that in previous Eviction Petition No 9/2018, the bonafide need of Sh. Shaurya Jain was for a restaurant. It is the case of the petitioner that the bonafide requirement is a continuing cause of action and does not vanish with the change in the business intended to be carried out. The dynamics of business change with time. The petitioner and its members including Shri Shaurya Jain have considered that doing a business in which the family is well versed is a better and RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 29 of 77 fruitful option rather than venturing into a new type of business in which none of the members of petitioner HUF have any past experience. Mr. Shaurya Jain is a Gemologist, has backing of members of the Petitioner and thus, opening a showroom of Jewellery & precious stones from the tenanted premises is the best and most viable option for success. The respondent cannot dispute the genuineness of the bonafide requirement of the petitioner simply because of the fact that the bonafide need of the petitioner in the present petition is different from previous petition especially when due to death of senior member of the petitioner, Sh. Rajender Kumar, the petitioner HUF decided to settle its members i.e. Sh. Mahender Kumar and his son in one shop i.e., shop No. 3 while heir of Sh. Rajender Kumar i.e., Sh. Komal Jain and his son Sh. Shaurya Jain in other shop i.e., shop in question.
20. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that the contention by the respondent to the effect that Shri Komal Jain has concealed the fact of doing business from Shop No. 3 is again incorrect. It is the case of the petitioner that necessary averments of the business being carried out by Shri Komal Jain with Shri Amit Jain have been duly disclosed in the eviction petition itself. The fact of the matter remains that the petitioner requires the premises in question for its constituted members, in particular for Mr. Shaurya Jain. Mr. Shaurya Jain is the son of Shri Komal Jain who is carrying on the business with another person namely Shri Amit Jain from Shop No. 3. Shop No. 3 is not owned by the petitioner HUF and the said shop is neither vacant nor suitable to accommodate Shri Shaurya Jain to establish his business of jewellery. Furthermore, the respondent cannot decide that the requirement of the premises in question is not bonafide simply because no member of the petitioner has participated in the RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 30 of 77 family business till date. This contention of the respondent is devoid of any merits as it is a settled principle of law that the tenant is not to dictate or decide the requirement of the premises and manner of doing business by the landlord. The decision to do business of high end Jewellery & precious stones by Shaurya Jain along with his father from the tenanted premises is to avoid any dispute amongst the petitioner constituents. After death of Sh Rajender Kumar on 27.07.2019, the petitioner HUF has decided to operate and expand business from separate showrooms to avoid any dispute amongst the constituent members in future considering the needs of other constituents of Petitioner HUF. Accordingly the previous petition was withdrawn with liberty and the present petition has been filed to fulfill the bonafide needs which is most genuine and not a wishful desire.
21. It is further the case of the petitioner that the contention made by the respondent of different jewelers using lesser areas besides being false is irrelevant as the respondent being a tenant cannot dictate as to how and in what manner the members of the petitioner have to do the work and how much area shall be sufficient for fulfilling such bonafide requirement. It is the case of the petitioner that the manner of carrying out the business by different traders is different and no hard & fast rule with respect to the requirement of the area can be fastened or considered as appropriate area for starting such business. The petitioner in its petition for such reason has clearly stated that other Jewelers are usually operating from approximate 1350 sq.ft per floor and even if it is assumed that someone is operating from lesser space, that does not mean that the requirement of petitioner for 1350 sq.ft is not bonafide or genuine.
22. It is further the case of the petitioner that it is denied that RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 31 of 77 the address of Karta of petitioner has deliberately been wrongly given in the petition & memo of parties. It is the case of the petitioner that there is a typographical mistake in the address as mentioned in the petition, memo of parties as well as in para 3A of the petition which can be made out from the verification clause wherein the correct address, i.e., "C/5/38, Safdarjung Development Area, New Delhi-110016" has been correctly mentioned. Moreover, even in the documents filed alongwith the petition inter alia Property Tax Receipts and Legal Notice dated 05.11.2016, the address of the Karta of the petitioner is correctly mentioned.
23. It is further the case of the petitioner that it is denied that Shri Mangi Lal, Shri Rikhab Chand, Shri Mahender Kumar & Shri Rajender Kumar have been carrying on their business from property at Cheera Khana or for such alleged reason, it cannot be said that the said property is not suitable for the business of the petitioner. It is further denied that the property situated at Cheera Khana always has been used for commercial purposes by the petitioner for running its business and alleged availability of accommodation in the said property is fatal to the case of the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that the major part of the ground floor portion of the said property is under the occupation of different old tenants who are still in occupation of the said premises and carrying on their small businesses therefrom. The property at Cheera Khana by no stretch of imagination can be considered as a reasonable suitable alternate accommodation for opening a Retail Store of Jewellery & Precious Stones, specially when the said property has no clear access, is in dilapidated condition and by no stretch of imagination can command footfall & clientele which Sunder Nagar premises can command. The proximity of other jewelers at Sunder Nagar and its development RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 32 of 77 to attract the special niche of clients has reached pinnacle which Cheera Khana premises can never command. In fact, the petitioner in the petition itself has offered the portion of premises at Cheera Khana having an equal area to the respondent in lieu of the vacation of the premises in question; and reiterates the said offer, if according to the respondent, the said property at Cheera Khana is conducive for opening and running a Jewellery Showroom.
24. It is denied that the Power of Attorney executed in favour of Shri Rajender Kumar has been rendered infructuous and useless. It is the case of the petitioner that transfer of the property has been effected as the said GPA was for consideration as is evident from Agreement to Sell and receipt and was irrevocable. It is further submitted that by virtue of registered Will executed by the erstwhile owner Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma, the petitioner has become the owner of said property, as she has expired way back on 08.01.2004. It is the case of the petitioner that probate of Will in Delhi is not necessary and no dispute has been raised by the Legal Heirs of Smt. Prabhat Kumari till date. The so-called dispute tried to be raised by respondent on the basis of the claim so allegedly made by the sons of Smt. Prabhat Kumari (when she was alive) also stands nullified in view of the two Declarations filed on record alongwith the video clippings contained in a Pen Drive showing the execution of such Affidavit Cum Declaration by Sh. Shakti Sharma, S/o. Late Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma, before a Notary Public. It is denied that the signature of Shri Shakti Sharma on the Power of Attorney as a witness is forged and fabricated. It is the case of the petitioner that the signatures of Shri Shakti Sharma are not only appearing on the registered Power of Attorney, but also on other documents including Agreement to Sell, registered Will, Possession RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 33 of 77 Certificate, etc. There is presumption of genuineness of the registered document and the same cannot be questioned on mere assumptions. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that the contention of serving of notice by Shri Shakti Sharma & Shri Vinod Sharma, through their counsel to the petitioner is incorrect as no such like notice was ever issued to the petitioner by anyone. On the contrary, the petitioner itself has filed on record copy of one undated Legal Notice which was stated to have been issued to Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma, the erstwhile owner, with copy to the respondent. However, the respondent has deliberately suppressed the reply dated 23.05.1979 so given by it/ him in response to the said Notice, copy of which is now being filed on record by the petitioner. Needless to mention, in the said reply dated 23.05.1979, the respondent has clearly acknowledged the right, title, and interest of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma qua the premises in question. To add to it, the Declaration dated 28.12.2018, followed by another Affidavit cum Declaration dated 15.11.2023 filed on record alongwith the present reply, leave no scope for any doubt that it was Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma only who was the sole erstwhile owner of the said property and she transferred the said property by virtue of the set of documents, referred above in favour of the petitioner, pursuant to which attornment of respondent by the petitioner has also been effected and thus, the principle of estoppel bars the respondent to question the title of the petitioner in view of Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act.
25. Rejoinder has been filed by the respondent, wherein the respondent has denied the contentions made by the petitioners in reply to leave to defend application and reiterated the averments as mentioned in the leave to defend application.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 34 of 77ARGUMENTS AND CASE-LAWS
26. I have heard the Ld. Counsel for the both the parties and gone through the material on record carefully. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made on behalf of both the parties.
27. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has filed a compilation of judgments along with an index specifying the paragraphs relied upon and the ratio of each decision. The said judgments have been carefully perused. Ld. Counsel for the respondent has also filed several judgments and written arguments/rebuttal arguments which have been carefully perused.
28. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submits that the present petition filed by the Petitioner is not maintainable in law and raises several triable issues which cannot be decided without recording of evidence. It is submitted at the outset that the Petitioner has failed to establish ownership of the premises in question. The documents relied upon by the Petitioner, namely the Agreement to Sell, General and Special Powers of Attorney, Will and Receipt, do not constitute valid documents of title in law. They do not form part of a single and consistent transaction, nor do they inspire confidence. None of the Powers of Attorney refer to the Agreement to Sell, nor do they indicate that they were executed to complete such sale. On the contrary, one Power of Attorney even confers authority to enter into an Agreement to Sell, which is wholly inconsistent with the case that a sale had already taken place. These discrepancies clearly show that the petitioner has no ownership rights in the suit property and is, at RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 35 of 77 best, a rent collector. The well-settled principle that a tenant cannot challenge the landlord's title cannot apply where the alleged title itself is in serious doubt and arises from defective and inconsistent documents. The learned counsel further argued that the very constitution of the Petitioner-HUF is doubtful and has been deliberately manipulated. It is pointed out that neither Komal Jain nor Amit Jain are coparceners or members of the Petitioner-HUF. No material has been placed on record to establish that they were ever inducted as members, nor has it been stated when or on what terms Shri Shaurya Jain was inducted. Reliance was placed on the Petitioner's own notice dated 5 November 2016, which vaguely referred to "inducted members" of the HUF without identifying them. In the previous eviction petition, being Eviction Petition No. 9/2018, only Mahender Kumar (Karta), Rajender Kumar and Shaurya Jain were shown as members of the HUF. Komal Jain and Amit Jain were never described as such. The sudden inclusion of their names in the present petition is clearly a contrived exercise intended to create a false plea of bona fide requirement. These inconsistencies themselves raise triable issues which can only be determined through evidence. It is further submitted that the petitioner has deliberately concealed the existence of substantial accommodation available with it at 3, Sunder Nagar Market, C-58 Safdarjung Development Area, and 1852 Hardial Street, Cheera Khana, Delhi. The plea that the Safdarjung address was a "typographical error" is untenable, as the same address appears repeatedly in various documents, affidavits, and pleadings filed by the Petitioner at different times. Such repetition cannot be brushed aside as an inadvertent error and indicates a deliberate RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 36 of 77 attempt to mislead the Court. The Respondent contends that these premises are available to the Petitioner for its business purposes, but have been suppressed to fabricate an appearance of need. Regarding the Cheera Khana property, counsel submitted that the Petitioner's statement that the said premises are not suitable for jewellery business is false and mala fide. The Petitioner's family has admittedly been conducting the jewellery trade from those premises for over 125 years; to now claim that the premises are unfit for display or expansion of the same business is wholly unbelievable. The photographs and site plan filed by the Petitioner are self-serving documents prepared unilaterally by the Petitioner, and cannot be accepted without being proved through evidence. Even the site plan is inconsistent with the pleadings-- the petition refers to property No. 1850, whereas the site plan depicts Nos. 1841 to 1853--demonstrating concealment of the actual extent of property held by the Petitioner. These matters can only be adjudicated through a full trial. Learned counsel further submitted that the petition is barred by estoppel and by the principle of res judicata. The Petitioner had previously filed Eviction Petition No. 9/2018 under the same provisions, on the ground that Shri Shaurya Jain required the premises to start a restaurant. The said petition was withdrawn only after the learned Rent Controller rejected the Petitioner's amendment application on 13 January 2022. Despite this, the Petitioner has now filed the present petition setting up those very grounds, which is impermissible. The Petitioner is thus estopped from raising in the present proceedings what was disallowed or abandoned earlier. The filing of the present petition immediately after withdrawal of the earlier one exposes the Petitioner's mala fides and renders the RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 37 of 77 present proceedings an abuse of process. The counsel submitted that the alleged bona fide requirement pleaded by the Petitioner is neither genuine nor credible. The Petitioner has shifted its stand completely--from claiming in 2018 that the premises were required for a restaurant business by Shri Shaurya Jain, to now claiming they are needed for expansion of the family jewellery business by Komal Jain and Amit Jain. Such a sudden change of story within a short span clearly shows that the requirement is concocted. The plea that other jewellers in Sunder Nagar have larger spaces is irrelevant. The Petitioner already possesses multiple floors at 3, Sunder Nagar Market, including a ground floor and other upper floors, all of which are being used for the same business. The averment that the area mentioned in the petition is a "typographical error" is again an afterthought meant to cover up false statements made on oath. The so-called comparison with other jewellers is misleading and does not establish any genuine necessity.
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondent further contended that if Komal Jain is not a constituent of the HUF, the petition filed under his signature is legally defective and non-maintainable. The affidavit filed by Komal Jain in support of the petition does not even state that he is acting as a member or coparcener of the HUF. The documents relied upon by the Petitioner, such as PAN Cards, assessment orders, rateable value records, and property- tax receipts, are all self-serving documents that prove nothing without corroboration. These documents only reflect the information supplied by the assessee itself and cannot, without evidence, establish ownership or bona fide requirement. Counsel RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 38 of 77 further argued that the conduct of the Petitioner throughout shows lack of bona fides and the presence of malice. Whenever confronted with inconsistencies or concealments, the Petitioner conveniently calls them "typographical errors." The earlier eviction petition was withdrawn after amendment was refused; yet the Petitioner has reintroduced the same facts through this fresh petition, showing a deliberate intention to overreach the process of law. The repeated suppression of material information, the contradictions in pleadings, and the inconsistent versions regarding need all point to the petition being mala fide, fabricated and an attempt to secure eviction by misleading the Court. In view of the above submissions, learned counsel for the Respondent submits that the present petition discloses several substantial and triable issues -- including (i) the Petitioner's ownership and title; (ii) the actual constitution and membership of the Petitioner-HUF; (iii) concealment of material facts and properties; (iv) the genuineness of the alleged bona fide requirement; (v) the bar of estoppel and res judicata due to earlier proceedings; and (vi) the mala fide conduct of the Petitioner. These issues can be determined only after full evidence is led and cross-examination permitted. Hence, at this stage, the Respondent is entitled to unconditional leave to defend.
30. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Precision Steel & Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, (1982) 3 SCC 270, wherein it was held that at the stage of considering leave to defend under Section 25B(5), the Controller is required to confine himself to the landlord's RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 39 of 77 petition and the tenant's affidavit, and determine only whether the affidavit discloses facts which, if true, would disentitle the landlord to eviction. It is not necessary for the tenant to prove these facts at this stage. The Court has clarified that a mini trial is impermissible. Reliance is further placed on Jamna Devi v. Kude Ram, (1997) 11 SCC 644, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whenever the tenant's affidavit discloses facts that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order, it becomes the duty of the Controller to grant leave to contest. The Hon'ble Court specifically rejected the approach of holding a full-fledged inquiry at the leave stage. Ld. Counsel also places reliance on Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand, (1983) 1 SCC 301, to submit that the only test for grant of leave is whether the affidavit raises a triable issue. The tenant is not required to establish the ultimate success of his defence; it is sufficient that the defence is bona fide and not frivolous. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that denial of leave at this stage amounts to depriving the tenant of a fair opportunity to contest the eviction. Ld. Counsel further relies upon Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that while the summary procedure under Chapter III-A ensures expeditious disposal, it cannot result in denial of a fair hearing. Where serious disputed questions of fact are raised by the tenant, the Controller must grant leave to contest rather than summarily evict the tenant. Support is also drawn from the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand (2014), where refusal of leave was set aside as the tenant had raised bona fide disputes concerning the landlord's ownership and availability of other accommodation. The Hon'ble RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 40 of 77 Court held that denial of leave in such circumstances would amount to denial of opportunity to test the landlord's bona fides. In light of the above settled position of law, it is submitted that the Controller is bound to grant leave to defend when the tenant's affidavit raises triable issues of fact touching upon the bona fides of the landlord's requirement or availability of alternate accommodation.
FINDINGS AND DECISION
31. In a bona fide necessity eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, three aspects are required to be seen by the court for decreeing the eviction petition. Firstly, there must be a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the landlord must be the owner of the tenanted premises. Second aspect which is to be seen is whether the landlord requires the tenanted premises for his bonafide need and/or the need of his family members. Thirdly, it has to be seen whether the landlord has an alternative suitable accommodation.
32. It is now well settled that a triable issue has to emanate from the pleadings of the parties; which can be from the application seeking leave to defend, reply to the application to the leave to defend; and the eviction petition. It is also now well settled that while deciding the question of the grant of leave, the Controller is not required to conduct a full fledged trial and should only see that if the affidavit of the tenant raises any triable point, the decision on which may disentitle the landlord from recovering possession of the premises.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 41 of 7733. Now coming to the facts of the present case under consideration.
OBJECTIONS TO THE MAINTAINABILITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT EVICTION PETITION
34. The order dated 31.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the Revision Petition RC.REV 159/2023 filed by the respondent against the order of the Ld. Rent Controller allowing the petitioner to withdraw the first eviction petition with liberty to file afresh is reproduced below for reference:
"1. The present Petition has been filed by the Petitioner/Tenant impugning the Order dated 24.04.2023 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller, South East, Saket Courts, New Delhi, in Eviction Petition No. RC/ARC/9/2018 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Impugned Order'].
1.1 By the Impugned Order, the Respondent/Landlord was permitted to withdraw his Eviction Petition filed qua the eviction of the Petitioner/Tenant from the premises at Ground Floor, Shop No. 5, Block No. 171, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi [hereinafter referred to as 'the demised Premises'].
2. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/Tenant submits that prior thereto, the Respondent/Landlord had approached this Court by way of an earlier Revision Petition, impugning Order dated 13.01.2022, rejecting an amendment Application filed by the Respondent/Landlord before the Trial Court, whereby amendments were sought to be made in Eviction Petition No. RC/ARC/9/2018. [hereinafter referred to as 'the said Eviction Petition'].
2.1 By its Order dated 19.04.2023, the predecessor Bench of this Court had permitted the Respondent/Landlord to withdraw its Revision Petition, as follows:
"1. This revision petition has been filed assailing the order dated 13.01.2022 passed by SCJ acting as Rent Controller, South East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi („Trial Court‟), in RC ARC 9/18, whereby the application filed by the Petitioner under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC has been dismissed.
2. The learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner seeks liberty to withdraw the present revision petition. He states that the Petitioner RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 42 of 77 herein, in addition, also intends to withdraw the eviction petition bearing RC ARC No. 9/18, pending before the Rent Controller.
3. He further seeks liberty to file a fresh eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ('DRC Act').
4. In view of the submissions made by the Petitioner, the present petition is dismissed as withdrawn reserving liberty to the Petitioner to avail his remedies, in accordance with law. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
5. In the event the Petitioner files a fresh eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the same shall be decided, in accordance with law."
3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/Tenant, Mr. K.K. Bhuchar, submits that, thereafter, by the Impugned Order the said Eviction Petition was withdrawn by the Respondent/Landlord. 3.1 Mr. Bhuchar submits that by the Impugned Order, the Trial Court has directed disposal of the said Eviction Petition in view of the statement of learned Counsel for the Respondent/Landlord, albeit, with liberty to the Respondent/Landlord to file a fresh Eviction Petition in accordance with law as follows:
"I am counsel for the petitioner in the present petition. On instructions of the petitioner, I wish to withdraw the present petition as all facts are not brought on record in this case and hence, liberty may also be granted to file afresh in accordance with law. It is, therefore, requested to kindly dispose off the present petition as withdrawn."
4. Mr. Bhuchar submits that this withdrawal of the said Eviction Petition was not a withdrawal simpliciter as is envisaged by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as 'CPC'], but a withdrawal with the liberty to file a fresh Eviction Petition.
4.1 Mr. Bhuchar further submits that the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 of CPC provide for an unqualified withdrawal. However, since the withdrawal of the Eviction Petition by the Respondent/Landlord was not a simpliciter withdrawal, the liberty granted under the Impugned Order may come in the way of any objection(s), raised by the Petitioner/Tenant, as and when a fresh Eviction Petition is filed by the Respondent/Landlord.
4.2 Reference is also made to the fact that the Respondent/Landlord had previously attempted to amend the said Eviction petition by introducing several new facts, grounds and prayers. However, these amendments were rejected by the Trial Court by a detailed order dated RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 43 of 77 13.01.2022. It is, therefore, submitted that the Respondent/Landlord should not be permitted to contravene the order rejecting the amendment and, in this circuitous manner, get to include those facts/grounds/prayers which were previously rejected by the order dated 13.01.2022 of the Trial Court. 4.3 Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Tenant submits that he would be satisfied if directions are passed to enable him to take all the aforesaid objections in any fresh Eviction Petition filed by the Respondent/landlord.
5. This Court finds that neither the Impugned Order or order of this Court dated 19.04.2023, creates a bar on the Petitioner/Tenant taking any objection(s).
6 Accordingly, the present Petition is disposed of directing that the Impugned Order should not be construed so as to limit the objections qua maintainability and admissibility that the Petitioner/Tenant may have, in the event that a fresh Eviction Petition is filed by the Respondent/Landlord.
7. All rights and contentions of the parties are left open to be adjudicated before the Trial Court.
8. The Petition and the pending Applications filed are closed."
35. In view of the above-mentioned orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, the objections of the respondent qua maintainability and admissibility of the present fresh Eviction Petition filed by the petitioner have to be decided by this Court.
36. The objections of the respondent to the present eviction petition are twofold. The first objection is that the petitioner cannot be permitted to incorporate the details of the members of the petitioner HUF in the fresh/second/present eviction petition which were not disclosed in the first eviction petition in view of dismissal of the amendment application of the petitioner to achieve the same purpose in the first/previous/withdrawn eviction petition. The second objection is that the present eviction petition is barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC since the petitioner RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 44 of 77 cannot be permitted to file a fresh eviction petition on the basis of the same requirement which existed earlier at the time of filing the first eviction petition.
37. The petitioner has rebutted these objections by averring that the petitioner cannot be precluded from including the complete details of the members of the petitioner HUF even if the petitioner could not disclose the same in the first petition and the amendment application of the petitioner to include the complete details of HUF members and add another bona fide requirement was dismissed by the Court. It is the case of the petitioner that the contention of the respondent that the present petition is hit by provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC is untenable as merely mentioning the names of all the members of HUF in the present petition does not change the nature of the petition nor the relief sought in the present petition. The relief sought in both the petitions is the same. i.e., eviction of the respondent-tenant from the premises in question to meet the bonafide need of the members of Petitioner HUF including that of Shri Shaurya Jain.
38. Ld. Counsel for the respondent has laid strong emphasis on these objections during the course of his arguments. Ld. Counsel had argued that the petitioner cannot be allowed to circumvent the proceedings and achieve the same objective which he failed to achieve in the first eviction petition on account of dismissal of his amendment application. To rebut the same, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the amendment application of the petitioner in the first eviction petition was rejected since the Court was of the view that the petitioner intends to add a separate RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 45 of 77 cause of action in the petition by pleading need for opening jewellery business in the tenanted premises in addition to the originally pleaded need of running a restaurant. Ld. Counsel has argued that a bona fide need under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act is a continuing cause of action, the petitioner cannot be disallowed to cure the defects qua disclosure of complete facts made in the first eviction petition for which liberty was sought to withdraw and file a fresh eviction petition and there is no bar in law to withdrawing an eviction petition and filing a fresh eviction petition for the bona fide need of the landlord. Ld. Counsel has argued that the bar of Order II Rule 2 CPC and Order XXIII CPC do not apply to the petitions under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act in view of Section 25B of the DRC Act.
39. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. R. Narayan Swamy vs. B. Francis Jagan, Civil Appeal No. 8080 of 2001, decided on 29.11.2001, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalip Kumar Bakshi vs. Vivek Khurana & Anr., 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1934, and the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Panna Lal vs. Neelam Chopra, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2801, to argue that the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of theDRC Act constitutes a recurring and continuous cause of action, and such requirement of the landlord cannot be said to be exhausted or concluded by the filing, withdrawal or dismissal of any previous petition. It is submitted that the need of the landlord for the premises is a matter of personal circumstances and evolves with time, and as such the genuineness of the requirement has to be adjudged with RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 46 of 77 reference to the state of affairs prevailing on the date of filing of the present petition. Ld. Counsel further submits that the earlier proceedings, even if withdrawn without seeking formal liberty or dismissed for technical or non substantive reasons, do not operate as res judicata or estoppel, since the cause of action for bona fide requirement is not a fixed or concluded right but is capable of arising afresh upon a change or continuation of need. It is contended that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to bar against subsequent suits, such as Order 2 Rule 2 CPC and Order 23 Rule 1(4) CPC, have no application to rent control proceedings, as the Rent Controller is required to follow the special procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, which is in the nature of summary proceedings of a Small Causes Court. It is therefore the submission of the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that the present petition is maintainable in law and that the petitioner is entitled to establish his bona fide requirement afresh on the basis of the present set of facts and circumstances.
40. In the present case, the petitioner has placed reliance on the legal position that the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act constitutes a recurring cause of action and is capable of arising and re-arising with the change of circumstances of the landlord. The requirement of the landlord to use the tenanted premises for his own bona fide need cannot be treated as exhausted or concluded merely because an earlier eviction petition on the same ground was withdrawn or did not result in eviction. The determination of bona fide requirement is always to be undertaken with reference to the facts and RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 47 of 77 circumstances existing on the date of filing of the present petition. Therefore, any prior proceedings, whether withdrawn or dismissed on technical grounds or without adjudication on merits, do not bar the landlord from maintaining a fresh petition if the need continues or has revived. Further, the proceedings before the Rent Controller are governed by the special procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and not by the provisions of the CPC in their entirety. Consequently, the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC and Order 23 Rule 1(4) CPC does not apply to petitions under Section 14(1)(e) and withdrawal of an earlier petition does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition. The principle of res judicata is also not attracted in the absence of any final adjudication on the genuineness of need in the earlier proceeding, or where there has been a change in the circumstances of the landlord. Thus, the objection of the respondent regarding maintainability of the present petition is without substance and cannot be accepted.
41. The Court is of the view that merely because all constituent members of the HUF were not mentioned in the earlier petition does not invalidate the present petition and the petitioner cannot be barred from disclosing all the constituent members of the petitioner HUF in the present petition. A petitioner seeking eviction for bona fide need cannot be forever blocked from rectifying the omission of facts made in the previously filed and withdrawn eviction petition. If such plea of the respondent is accepted, then the petitioner will never be able to file a bona fide eviction petition disclosing all the member of the HUF which cannot be said to be the intention or purpose of the rent control laws. The present petition has been filed after RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 48 of 77 liberty granted by the Hon'ble High Court and the Ld. Rent Controller and the earlier petition was withdrawn without any adjudication on merits. In view of the position of law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Panna Lal v. Neelam Chopra, the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC and Order 23 Rule 1(4) CPC is not attracted to the proceedings under Section 14(1)
(e) of the DRC Act. Accordingly, the above-mentioned objections of the respondent are dismissed being untenable in law and it is held that the present eviction petition in maintainable and admissible in law.
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP AND OWNERSHIP
42. The case of the petitioner is that the original owner of the tenanted premises Smt. Santosh Surana executed a gift deed in favour of Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma for the tenanted premises who became the owner thereof and subsequently sold the same to the petitioner for consideration by way of Agreement to Sell, registered General and Special Power of Attorney, Will, Possession Letter and Receipt dated 10.04.2001. The respondent was a tenant under Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma and subsequently, started paying rent to the petitioner. The respondent has taken a ground that the petitioner is not the owner of the tenanted premises and merely a rent collector. The respondent has questioned the authority of the predecessor of the petitioner Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma to transfer the ownership of the tenanted premises to the petitioner. The respondent has also questioned the ownership of the petitioner over the tenanted premises on the ground that the transfer documents executed by the previous owner in favour of the petitioner suffer from RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 49 of 77 material defects. The petitioner has countered this ground by averring that firstly, the title documents of the previous owner as well as the petitioner are valid in law and secondly, the respondent is estopped from denying the title of the petitioner since the respondent has been paying rent to the petitioner for many years.
43. It was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as 'Abhishek Gupta v. Shashi Kumar Shukla, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4290 as following:
"27. Even otherwise, it is the settled principle in law that a tenant cannot challenge the title of the owner/landlord, and there is an estoppel in this regard, in terms of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri. Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath [(1976) 4 SCC 184], observed that, in a suit for eviction by the landlord, the tenant is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord as per Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Similarly, in Tej Bhan Madan v. II Additional District Judge [(1988) 3 SCC 137], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"9. The law as to the estoppel of a tenant under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is a recognition and statutory assimilation, of the equitable principles underlying estoppel in relation to tenants. The section is not exhaustive of the law of estoppel. The section, inter alia, predicates that no tenant of immovable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, the permitted to deny the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of tenancy, title to such property."
44. It was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as 'Rajender Kumar Sharma v. Leela Wati, (2008) 155 DLT 383' as following:
"12. It is settled law that for the purpose of Section 14(1)
(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more than a tenant. In this case, the landlady had placed on record the documents by which she became owner. The atornment given by the erstwhile landlord in her favour as RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 50 of 77 well as an admission made by the tenant by filing petition under Section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act acknowledging the landlordship of landlday. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the ARC regarding ownership and relationship of landlord and tenant were based on sound legal position and the cogent material before it."
45. It was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as 'Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi, (2009) 157 DLT 450' as following:
"7. It is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be considered as the owner, howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly. I, therefore, find that there was no infirmity in the order of learned ARC in this respect. As far as letting purpose is concerned, in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead by LRs. v. U.O.I., (2008) 5 SCC 287, this ground is not available to the petitioner."
46. It was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as 'Bharat Bhushan Vij v. Arti Teckchandani, (2008) 153 DLT 247' as following:
"4. The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises was let out by a person and after his death, the premises has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the tenant RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 51 of 77 has any doubt as to who was the owner of the premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner after the death of the original owner. Where no interpleader suit is filed by the tenant and the tenant continues in possession after death of the original owner without demur and without raising an objection against the person, who claims to have inherited the property under the Will, he later on cannot challenge the ownership of such a person. It is not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the deceased landlord. If a landlord is able to show that there is a testament in his/her favour, he/she is deemed to have discharged his/her burden of proving the ownership under the Act. If the tenant takes a frivolous objection about ownership, such an objection cannot be entertained unless the tenant comes forward as to who was the landlord/owner of the premises and to whom he has been paying rent after the death of the original owner.
5. This Court in Ram Chander v. Ram Pyari, 109 (2004) DLT 388 : 2004 (72) DRJ 545 and Plashchemicals Company v. Ashit Chadha, 114 (2004) DLT 408 : 2004 (76) DRJ 654 have laid down the law that it was not for the tenant to challenge the Will of the landlord and any such challenge made by the tenant is a baseless and frivolous challenge. I, therefore, consider that even if the learned Additional Rent Controller did not dwell upon this point, such a challenge made by the tenant would not result into non suiting the landlord. Moreover, the evidence led by the landlady in this case makes it clear that she inherited the property, in question, on the basis of Will left by her father in law. There is no other person who has claimed ownership over the property and this objection was raised just for the sake of raising objection."
47. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that once the respondent has attorned to the petitioner as landlord by acknowledging him and by payment of rent to him, the respondent is estopped from challenging the title of the petitioner to the tenanted premises in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance is placed on Smt. Anar Devi vs. Nathu Ram, (1994 Supp (1) SCC 414), wherein it was held that a tenant, having once accepted a person as landlord, is subsequently precluded from denying that landlord's title at the RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 52 of 77 time of eviction. Ld. Counsel further places reliance on Bismillah Be (Dead) by LRs vs. Majeed Shah, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1429, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a tenant is estopped from questioning the derivative title of the landlord once attornment has taken place. It is also submitted, relying on Apollo Zipper India Ltd. vs. W. Newman & Co. Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine SC 429, that attornment, whether express or implied, operates to affirm continuity of tenancy and estops the tenant from subsequently disputing the ownership of the landlord. Ld. Counsel additionally relies on Mohd. Ilyas and Anr. vs. Mohd. Adil and Ors., ILR (1994) II Delhi 15, to contend that attornment by the tenant signifies acknowledgment of the new landlord and thereafter the tenant cannot be permitted to challenge the proprietary interest of the landlord. In support of the legal meaning of "ownership" under Section 14(1)(e), reliance is placed on Rajender Kumar Sharma vs. Leela Wati, (2008) 155 DLT 383, to argue that in proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, the landlord is not required to prove absolute ownership as in a title suit. To the same effect, reliance is placed on Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi, (2009) 157 DLT 450, which reiterates that the landlord only needs to show that he has a title better than that of the tenant, and perfection of title is not required. Further, reliance is placed on Puran Chand Aggarwal vs. Lekh Raj, MANU/DE/0932/2014, where the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that it is sufficient for the landlord to show that he is receiving rent on his own behalf and therefore qualifies as owner for the purposes of Section 14(1)(e). Ld. Counsel also refers to Pushpa Bajaj vs. Jugal, 101 (2002) DLT 36, and Sanjay Singh vs. Corporate Warranties Pvt. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine SC RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 53 of 77 3535, to submit that in landlord-tenant litigation, the question of title to the immovable property is irrelevant, as the landlord- tenant relationship is the only relevant inquiry for the purposes of eviction and ownership in the context of the DRC Act means a person who has a higher right than the tenant. Lastly, reliance is placed on State of A.P. & Ors. vs. D. Raghukul Pershad (D) by LRs & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5822 of 2012, which clarifies that the relief of eviction is not based upon proof of perfect ownership but upon the subsistence of a landlord-tenant relationship. On the strength of these judgments, it is contended that the respondent having accepted the petitioner as landlord cannot now be permitted to dispute his title, and the relationship of landlord and tenant stands clearly established for the purposes of the present petition.
48. It is a settled position of law that a tenant is estopped from denying the title of the landlord under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and thus, in a bona fide eviction petition, a tenant- respondent cannot question the imperfectness of the title of the petitioner-landlord. It is also a settled position of law that once a respondent alleged to be a tenant by the petitioner-landlord admits paying rent to the petitioner-landlord, the said respondent shall be deemed to be a tenant on the basis of his admission qua payment of rent to the petitioner. It is also a settled position of law that for the purpose of a bona fide eviction petition, the petitioner-landlord need not have a perfect title for being considered as an owner of the tenanted premises and the landlord only needs to be something more than a tenant.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 54 of 7749. It is pertinent to note that the respondent has admitted paying rent for the tenanted premises to the previous owner Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma and subsequently to the petitioner after purchase of the tenanted premises by the petitioner. Once the respondent has admitted paying rent to the previous owner, the respondent is deemed to have admitted Smt. Prabhat Kumari Sharma as his landlord and cannot question her title documents. Thus, the objections made by the respondent qua the allleged defects in the gift deed of Smt. Prabhat Kumari stand rejected being impermissible in law since it is not open to a tenant to question the title documents of his landlord and the said gift deed can be open to a challenge by the donor or the interested parties only. Further, since the respondent has admitted paying rent to the petitioner, the respondent is deemed to have admitted the petitioner as his landlord and the objections made by the respondent to the defects in the title documents of the petitioner and lack of a sale deed stand rejected being impermissible in law. The ground taken by the respondent that the petitioner is merely a rent collector is rejected since the respondent has not explained the reason for payment of rent to the petitioner if the respondent did not consider the petitioner as his landlord. The respondent could have directly paid rent to the person whom he considered to be his landlord instead of paying the rent to the petitioner. Such payment of rent to the petitioner amounts to attornment of the new landlord by the tenant. The respondent now claims that the sons of previous owner Mrs. Prabhat Kumari Sharma are the present owners of the tenanted premises, however, the respondent did not start paying rent to the sons of Mrs. Prabhat Kumari Sharma despite receiving a written communication dated RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 55 of 77 03.01.1970 from Sh. Anant Raj Surana, who was the rent collector qua the tenanted premises for Smt. Santosh Surana as well as Smt. Prabhat Sharma conveying that henceforth, the rent should be paid to Sh. Vinod Sharma, son of Smt. Prabhat Sharma stating that Sh. Vinod Sharma is a major and looking after the affairs of the family. The respondent did not take any steps to start paying rent to the sons of Smt. Prabhat Sharma after the sale of the tenanted premises to the petitioner in 2001 or after death of Smt. Prabhat Sharma in 2004 or after filing of the first eviction petition in 2018 or after withdrawal of the first eviction petition in 2023 or even after filing of the present eviction petition. The respondent claims that Sh. Rajinder Kumar could be treated only as rent collector on the basis of the SPA and GPA executed by Smt. Prabhat Sharma in his favour and with the death of Sh. Rajinder Kumar, the powers given to him have come to an end which means that the sons of Smt. Prabhat Sharma are the present owners of the tenanted premises. However, the respondent did not take any steps to start paying rent to the sons of Smt. Prabhat Sharma after the death of Sh. Rajinder Kumar in 2019 and continued paying rent to the petitioner HUF only. The petitioner filed the first eviction petition on the strength of the same chain of documents claiming landlord-tenant relationship and ownership of the tenanted premises and such claim and documents of the petitioner came into the knowledge of the respondent while contesting the first eviction petition. Despite that, the respondent continued paying rent to the petitioner only and did not take any steps to start paying rent to the persons claimed by the respondent to be the actual owner of the tenanted premises. Now the respondent is taking a totally contrary stand.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 56 of 77There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was receiving rent from the respondent for the benefit of someone else. The earlier landlord of the respondent had transferred the ownership of the tenanted premises to the petitioner and the petitioner would be considered as the landlord of the existing tenant of the previous owner (respondent) without any need of attornment by the said tenant. The contention of the respondent that the petitioner is merely a rent collector and the rule of estoppel applicable to a tenant u/s. 116 Evidence Act will not apply to the respondent is found to be a meritless and self-serving averment contrary to the settled position of law and stands rejected accordingly.
50. The petitioner has filed sufficient documents to show himself as an owner of the tenanted premises in the context of Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act. The petitioner has placed on record an agreement to sell executed by Mrs. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in favour of the petitioner as well as a Will made by Mrs. Prabhat Kumari Sharma in favour of the petitioner. It is not the requirement under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act that a landlord needs to have a sale deed in order to be considered as an owner of a tenanted premises. The petitioner also has a Will executed by the previous owner in his favour and the previous owner having expired, the said Will would make the petitioner the owner of the tenanted premises and the Will executed by the previous owner in favour of the petitioner cannot be questioned by the respondent since a tenant cannot challenge the Will of a successor landlord after death of the original landlord. Further, the said Will has not been challenged by the successors of Mrs. RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 57 of 77 Prabhat Kumari Sharma as per the material available on record. The petitioner has sufficient documents to show ownership of the tenanted premises as required under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act even if the SPA and GPA filed by the petitioner and objected to by the respondent are not considered by the Court.
51. Therefore, in the light of the pleadings of the parties and other material placed before this court, in so far as the purpose of clause (e) of sub- section (1) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 is concerned, the petitioner is found to be the owner of the tenanted premises and it is also found that there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT
52. The petitioner has pleaded that it's bonafide requirement is to accommodate Shri Komal Jain in the tenanted premises with his heirs for the purpose of expanding the family business. The petitioner has filed the family tree of the petitioner HUF to show the heirs of Shri Komal Jain. The petitioner has further pleaded in the reply to the leave to defend application that the immediate bonafide requirement is of Sh. Shaurya Jain, son of Sh. Komal Jain (both being members of the petitioner HUF) and even the earlier eviction petition was filed for the bona fide requirement of Sh. Shaurya Jain only. Sh. Shaurya Jain is stated to be a gemologist who wants to open a showroom of jewellery & precious stones from the tenanted premises.
53. The respondent has contested the bona fide requirement pleaded by the petitioner on the ground that eviction is sought for people alleged to be constituents of the HUF, whose ages in the RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 58 of 77 petition have been mentioned as 14 years, 8 years, 80 years, etc and that some of them are ladies who are homemakers and have never involved themselves in any business whatsoever. It is the case of the respondent that such members are unlikely/ incapable of doing business on account of their very young/old age or being housewives or student. The respondent has contested the intention of Sh. Shaurya Jain to run a jewellery business from the tenanted premises on the ground that the earlier eviction petition was filed with the requirement of setting up a restaurant by Sh. Shaurya Jain.
54. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., VIII (1998) SLT 374 to submit that it is a settled law that the Court must presume the bona requirement of the landlord and upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, V (2001) SLT 195 to submit that the landlord is only required to show that the requirement of the tenanted premises is a bona fide requirement and not merely a whimsical or fanciful desire by him.
55. It was observed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as Sarwan Dass Bange v. Ram Parkash, 2010 IV AD (Delhi) 252 quoting the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778 as following:
"It was held that the legislative intent is of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation; a special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created; if there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 59 of 77 right of restoration of possession; the landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own residence only. It was held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine; the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant unless his need is bona fide-no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under this Section, would approach the Court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. It was further held that this inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona fide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine. The tenant is required to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence if available to prove his plea in the affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord; a mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine."
56. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment titled as Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 as following:
"The crux of the ground envisaged in Clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 60 of 77
57. It was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as John Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dr. Surinder Singh, 135 (2006) Delhi Law Times 265 as following:
"The conspectus of the aforesaid judgments shows that the broad principles have been set down of the requirement of a landlord not being a mere whim or fanciful but that it should be a genuine need of the landlord. It is only then that the requirement can be said to be bona fide within the meaning of under Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act. This would naturally require all the necessary matrix in terms of the factual averments and the evidence to be adduced in that behalf. Simultaneously it has to be kept in mind that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and a tenant cannot dictate the terms on which the landlord should live. The bona fide requirement of the landlord would also depend on his financial status and his standard of living. The ARC found in favor of the landlord/owner and thus what has to be considered is whether there is any illegality or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and not to sit as an appellate court though the scope of scrutiny in a rent revision would be more than a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
58. It is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. On the point of bonafide requirement, it has been clearly pleaded and supported by affidavits by the petitioner that the tenanted premises is required for setting up a showroom for precious stones and jewellery by Mr. Shaurya Jain, who is a qualified gemologist and member of the petitioner HUF. Merely because the earlier eviction petition was filed for his intention to open a restaurant does not defeat the current requirement, which has evolved over time. It is well settled that the nature of business or it's change over time does not vitiate the bonafide nature of the requirement so long as it is genuine. The pleadings of the respondent do not cast any doubt on the genuineness of the intention of Sh. Shaurya RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 61 of 77 Jain to open a precious stones and jewellery business in the tenanted premises or show that the requirement is merely a desire by him. Sh. Shaurya Jain is a gemologist who wants to run a precious stones & jewellery business from the tenanted premises. The qualifications and experience of Sh. Shaurya Jain are already suitable for the intended business. The mandate of the law is also to presume the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The objection of the respondent regarding the inability of some of the members of petitioner HUF to be able to run a business is rejected in view of the pleadings of the petitioner to the effect that the immediate bona fide requirement is of Sh. Shaurya Jain. Respondent has been unable to raise any ground supported with cogent material to show that the necessity of the petitioner's members in not bona fide. Accordingly, there is no triable issue emanating from the pleadings of the parties regarding the bonafide need of the members of the petitioner to start a business from the tenanted premises.
ALTERNATE SUITABLE ACCOMMODATION
59. It is the case of the petitioner that the only premises available to the petitioner HUF for the bonafide business needs of it's members is Shop no. 3 Sunder Nagar market, which is also not owned by the petitioner HUF, and which is not sufficient to accommodate all the members of the petitioner HUF. It is the case of the petitioner that Mr. Amit Jain s/o Mr. Mahender Kumar and Mr. Komal Jain together are already conducting the family jewellery business on the ground floor of the said shop. Further, the first floor is used for the entertainment of customers apart from executive and accounting work and the second floor is used RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 62 of 77 for storage purposes. It is further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner HUF owns a part of the property No. 1852, Hardyal Street, Cheerakhana, Delhi which already has several tenants and is not suitable for the bonafide requirement of the petitioner HUF. It is the case of the petitioner that the said property is not suitable for the store fronts required for jewellery/retail businesses. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner HUF even offered to provide the respondent with equal space in the said property as that of the tenanted premises, if it suits their needs, as an alternative accommodation for vacating the tenanted premises, however, the respondent did not accept the offer.
60. It is the case of the respondent that there is concealment made by the petitioner regarding the space available to the petitioner for business purposes. The accommodation available to the petitioner at Shop No. 3, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi has not been disclosed. It has not been shown as to how many rooms, cabins, etc. are in existence on the ground floor, first floor as well as second floor of the said property. Besides the first, second and third floors of property bearing 3, Sunder Nagar Market, the petitioner or its constituents are in possession of the ground floor as well which the petitioner has concealed. Secondly, the petitioner has concealed that the petitioner is having huge accommodation at 1852, Hardyal Street, Cheerakhana, Delhi and the petitioner's plea that the same is not suitable for the petitioner cannot be taken as such and it has to be evaluated on the touchstone of reasonableness. The Petitioner has failed to disclose the total accommodation available to the petitioner at the said address in Cheerakhana, Delhi. The RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 63 of 77 Petitioner has failed to disclose how many halls, or rooms worth being used as showrooms, are abutting the street of the said building. It has further not been disclosed as to which portion of the property a tenant lives in. It has further not been disclosed as to whether any portion of the property is being used for non- residential purposes. It is averred that the property in question is entirely occupied by the petitioner, there are no tenants therein and only a caretaker of the property lives in a small portion of the said property. The Petitioner has failed to disclose that the said property is in fact being used as a workshop where jewellery is crafted, created, stored, and then put into the showcases for sale in that very building. This concealment is fatal to the case set up by the Petitioner. The petitioner has given a dishonest description of the accommodation available to some other jewellers. By showing accommodation available to other jewellers in the market, the petitioner wishes to establish that the jewellery business requires more accommodation and for that reason, the premises already available with the petitioner are not sufficient.
61. The petitioner has rebutted the averments of the respondent by way of reply to the leave to defend application and averred that the Shop No. 3 is not owned by the petitioner HUF and the said shop is neither vacant nor suitable to accommodate Sh. Shaurya Jain to establish his business of jewellery. It is averred that Sh. Shaurya Jain along with his father wants to do business of high end jewellery & precious stones from the tenanted premises since after death of Sh. Rajender Kumar on 27.07.2019, the petitioner HUF has decided to operate and expand business from separate showrooms to avoid any dispute RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 64 of 77 amongst the constituent members in future considering the needs of other constituents of Petitioner HUF. It is further averred by the petitioner that the contention made by the respondent of different jewelers using lesser areas is irrelevant as the respondent being a tenant cannot dictate as to how and in what manner the members of the petitioner have to do the work and how much area shall be sufficient for fulfilling such bonafide requirement. It is the case of the petitioner that the manner of carrying out the business by different traders is different and no hard & fast rule with respect to the requirement of the area can be fastened or considered as appropriate area for starting such business. Regarding the Cheerakhana property, it is averred by the petitioner that the major part of the ground floor portion of the said property is under the occupation of different old tenants who are still in occupation of the said premises, the property at Cheera Khana by no stretch of imagination can be considered as a reasonable suitable alternate accommodation for opening a retail Store of Jewellery & Precious Stones since the said property has no clear access, is in dilapidated condition and by no stretch of imagination can command footfall & clientele which Sunder Nagar premises can command. It is averred that the proximity of other jewellers at Sunder Nagar and it's development to attract the special niche of clients has reached pinnacle which Cheerakhana premises can never command. It is also averred that the petitioner in the petition itself has offered the portion of premises at Cheerakhana having an equal area to the respondent in lieu of the vacation of the premises in question; and reiterates the said offer, if according to the respondent, the said property at Cheera Khana is conducive for opening and RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 65 of 77 running a jewellery showroom. The petitioner has filed the site plan of the Cheerakhana property and the rent receipts issued to the tenants in occupation of the said property.
62. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar v. Prem Machinery & Co., I (2000) SLT 211 to submit that it is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter and upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balwant Singh v. Susharshan Kumar, I (2021) SLT 570 to submit that it is not for the tenant to dictate how much space is adequate for the proposed business venture or to suggest that the available space with the landlord will be adequate and the adequacy or otherwise of the space available with the landlord for the business in mind is not for the tenant to dictate.
63. It was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as Rajender Kumar Sharma v. Leela Wati, (2008) 155 DLT 383 as following:
"10. Section 25-B was inserted by the legislature in Delhi Rent Control Act as a special provision for eviction of the tenants in respect of specified category of cases as provided therein. Where a landlord seeks eviction on the basis of bonafide necessity, a summary procedure is provided and tenant has to seek leave to defend disclosing such facts which dis-entitled the landlord from seeking eviction. Where a tenant pleads, in leave to defend preposterous prepositions and makes such averments which are palpably false and the landlord in his reply affidavit to leave to defend is able to show to the ARC that all facts stated in leave to defend, were palpably false, ARC is not precluded from considering the falsity of such facts on the basis of material placed by the landlord before it. If the tenant in its leave to defend pleads that landlord RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 66 of 77 was owner of another premises with which landlord had nothing to do, mere filing of affidavit is not sufficient. The tenant has to place before the learned ARC such documents which show that the landlord was owner of that premises. If no such document is placed on record by the tenant, the learned ARC is not required to consider the ownership of the landlord of such a premises. If the leave is granted on mere assertions that landlord was owner of the premises, of which he is not then in every case the tenant would get leave by just naming any premises with which landlord has no concern. In the present case, the landlady has specifically shown that the premises about which tenant made allegations that she was co-owner, did not belong to her and she placed on record documents showing that she had no share in the premises and premises was a house of 50 square yards in occupation of 22 adult persons among others whose names appeared in the Voter list. There is no reason why the learned ARC should not considered these documents. Similarly tenant falsely alleged that the landlady was owner of the second floor of the premises in question without placing on record any documents regarding ownership of second floor by the landlady. The landlady had a right to show to the ARC at a very first stage that the second floor was not owned by her, but owned by someone else.
11. The tenant in this case denied relationship of landlord and tenant and the ownership of the landlady despite the fact that it had admitted this relationship by filing two petitions under Section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act. Where a tenant denies ownership of landlord, he is obliged to disclose who was owner/landlord and to whom rent was being paid. The tenant made preposterous claims in respect of accommodation available with the landlady and included in this the areas which were not owned and not in possession of the landlady. He included second floor of the property which was owned by some other person and was in possession of other person. He included adjoining property which was not owned by landlady and was owned by other persons. Thus, the affidavit filed by the tenant was shown to be false by the landlady on the basis of documents placed by it. No Rent Controller is supposed to grant leave to defend to the tenant on the basis of a false affidavit and false averments and assertions. Such affidavit should be out rightly rejected by the Rent Controller. Only those averments in the affidavit are to be considered by the Rent Controller which have same substance in it and are supported by some material. Mere assertions made by a tenant in respect of landlord's ownership of other buildings and in respect alternate accommodation are not to be considered sufficient for grant of leave to defend. If this is allowed, the whole purpose of Section 25-B shall stand RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 67 of 77 defeated and any tenant can file a false affidavit and drag a case for years together in evidence defeating the very purpose of the statute. The Rent Controller is thus not precluded from considering the material placed before it by the landlord in response to leave to defend to show that the tenant's assertions and averments were totally false."
64. It was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as Viran Wali v. Kuldeep Rai Kochhar, (2010) 174 DLT 328 as following:
"38. The concept of alternate accommodation means that accommodation which is "reasonable suitable" for the landlord. As to alternative accommodation disentitling the landlord to the relief of possession, it has been held time and again that it must be reasonably equivalent as regards suitability in respect to the accommodation he was claiming. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. As long as the landlord is able to establish that he in good faith and genuinely wishes to occupy the premises in possession of the tenant and that good faith or genuineness is of a reasonable man, it would not be open to the Controller to weigh the claim of the landlord in a fine scale and that the viability of the other accommodation will have also to be considered from the stand-point of a reasonable landlord. It is further to be observed that the law does not require the landlord to sacrifice his own comforts and requirements merely on the ground that the premises is with a tenant and for deciding whether or not the alternative accommodation available to the landlord is suitable or not, the social customs, conventions and habits, usage and practices of the society cannot be completely ruled out and termed as irrelevant. The problem had to be approached from the point of view of a reasonable man and not that of a whimsical landlord."
65. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhupinder Singh Bawa Versus Asha Devi (2016) 10 SCC 209 held that a tenant cannot dictate as to how else a landlord can adjust himself. The Hon'ble RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 68 of 77 Supreme Court in Anil Bajaj & another v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610 held it is for the landlord to choose the place of business more suitable to him and he has complete freedom in the matter. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd (1998) 8 SCC 119 held that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and it is neither open to the tenant nor to the Court to dictate to him with regard to his requirement and utilisation and it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.
A). Shop No.3, Sunder Nagar Market
66. The petitioner has specifically pleaded that Shop No. 3, Sunder Nagar Market is not owned by the petitioner and is already occupied for running the jewellery business by two HUF members, and that there is no space to accommodate any new entrant. The respondent has pleaded that the said property has 04 floors instead of 03 floors as pleaded by the petitioner. However, the respondent has not filed any supporting material to support this averment. The photograph of Shop No.3 as well as site plan filed by the petitioner show only three floors in the property. No counter photograph has been filed by the respondent. Further, the respondent has not rebutted the averment of the petitioner to the effect that the Shop No.3 is not owned by the petitioner. Since the Shop No.3, Sunder Nagar is not owned by the petitioner, there is no question of considering the same as an alternate accommodation under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. Further, the petitioner has sufficiently explained as to how all the 03 floors of Shop No.3 are being used for running of business by the members of the petitioner HUF and there is no cogent material RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 69 of 77 on record to show that any portion of the said property is vacant. As per the settled position of law, a tenant cannot dictate to the landlord to adjust in the space available to the landlord instead of seeking eviction of the tenant for his bonafide need. Accordingly, the Shop No.3, Sunder Nagar Market cannot be considered to be an alternate suitable accommodation available with the petitioner.
B). Cheerakhna property
67. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the property at 1852, Hardyal Street, Cheerakhana, Delhi is unsuitable for high-end retail jewellery business owing to its location, lack of frontage and commercial viability and that the petitioner has even offered that premises to the respondent as alternate accommodation, to which no response has been given by the respondent. Ld. Counsel for the respondent has laid significant emphasis on his argument that it is a triable issue as to whether the Cheerakhana property is vacant/suitable or not and that this contention cannot be decided without a trial.
68. It is the settled position of law that mere assertions made by a tenant in respect of alternate accommodation are not to be considered sufficient for grant of leave to defend, the alternative accommodation must be reasonably equivalent as regards suitability in respect to the tenanted premises, the court would not thrust it's own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need and the viability of the other accommodation has to be considered from the stand- point of a reasonable landlord.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 70 of 7769. Applying the above referred principles, it is held that the property at Cheerkhana situated at Old Delhi cannot be treated as a comparable premises to the tenanted premises which is a shop situated at Sunder Nagar Market. The petitioner has filed the photographs of the Cheerakhana property and pleaded that the same is in a dilapidated state and has no proper access and frontage required for opening a high-end jewellery store. Ld. Counsel for the respondent has argued that the petitioner has taken photographs of the Cheerakhana property from convenient angles to support his averment and it requires a trial to establish that the property is not suitable. However, it is noted that no counter photographs of the Cheerakhana property and it's vicinity have been filed by the respondent to show that the same is a suitable property for the intended business of the petitioner or that the averments of the petitioner regarding the property are incorrect. Sunder Nagar Market in New Delhi presents a completely different character, scale, and commercial environment when compared with Cheerkhana, Chandni Chowk Market in Old Delhi. Sunder Nagar is an upscale, planned, and significantly quieter commercial area oriented towards premium retail. In contrast, Chandni Chowk in Old Delhi is one of the oldest, busiest, and most densely packed commercial markets in the country. It is characterized by extremely high pedestrian concentration, narrow and congested lanes, heavy movement of rickshaws, carts, and delivery vehicles, and constant commercial bustle throughout the day. Shops are typically smaller, closely packed, and often housed in old structures. Noise levels, crowd density, and daily logistical movement are significantly higher, creating a vibrant but chaotic commercial environment. Thus, RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 71 of 77 while Sunder Nagar Market is a premium, low-density, quiet, boutique-style commercial area catering to a niche clientele, Chandni Chowk is a traditional, high-density, fast-paced commercial hub with intense daily trade activity, wholesale operations, and a socio-economic diversity not comparable with Sunder Nagar. The two markets differ completely in ambience, scale of commerce, commercial nature, customer profile, spatial planning, and overall business environment. The bona fide requirement of Mr. Shaurya Jain is to run a high end jewellery and precious stones business for which Sunder Nagar Market premises is pleaded by the petitioner to be suitable and the Cheerakhana property is pleaded to be unsuitable. The averments of the petitioner in this regard are accepted in view of the difference in the two markets and the specific requirement of the petitioner. The assertion of the petitioner that the Cheerakhana property is not suitable for it's intended business is also corroborated by the non-acceptance by the respondent of the proposal of the petitioner to the respondent to take equivalent space in the Cheerakhana property as that of the tenanted premises in lieu of vacating the tenanted premises. The respondent did not respond to this offer in the pleadings and even during the course of arguments. A landlord possesses the choice to determine his specific requirements and exercises complete freedom in this matter which cannot be questioned by the Court. In view of the above discussion, the Cheerakhana property is held not to be suitable alternative premises for satisfying the bona fide need of the petitioner. Thus, the argument of the respondent that there is concealment of alternate accommodation by the petitioner is hereby rejected.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 72 of 7770. Accordingly, no triable issue is raised in the present petition regarding availability of suitable alternative accommodation with the petitioner to satisfy it's bonafide need.
71. The grounds raised by the respondent that the address of Shri Mahender Kumar, stated to be the Karta of the petitioner has been wrongly given in the petition and that the petitioner has failed to disclose that it has an outlet in Tokyo, Japan, where crafted and created jewellery is put for sale are rejected since they have no bearing on the ingredients under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
STATUS OF PETITIONER AS AN HUF
72. The respondent has raised a ground in the leave to defend application that the petitioner is not a duly constituted HUF and while filing the earlier eviction petition, the petitioner did not provide any names of the constituents of the HUF except for Mahinder Kumar, Rajinder Kumar, and Shaurya Jain. Ld. Counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that neither Komal Jain nor Amit Jain Jain are co-parceners or members of the petitioner-HUF and no material has been placed on record to establish that they were ever inducted as members, nor has it been stated when or on what terms Sh. Shaurya Jain was inducted. Ld. Counsel for the respondent has strongly argued that it needs a trial to determine whether Sh. Komal Jain and Sh. Shaurya Jain are natural or inducted members of the petitioner HUF. At this juncture, it is noted that these specific grounds were not taken by the respondent in the leave to defend application wherein it is only stated that the petitioner is not a duly RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 73 of 77 constituted HUF. However, this ground and the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the respondent on this ground have been dealt with below.
73. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the respondent cannot be permitted to deny the existence of petitioner HUF since the respondent has duly attorned and has been paying the rent to the petitioner HUF after 10.04.2001 and the rent receipts were being issued in the name of the petitioner HUF. It is further submitted that the petitioner HUF has been an income tax assessee since long and has it's PAN as AAAHM2153C and the contention by the respondent challenging the existence of petitioner HUF is baseless and has no force of law. Ld. counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner constitutes a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) within the meaning of Section 2(31) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and is, therefore, assessable as a separate entity for the purpose of taxation. It is submitted that under Hindu Law, an HUF is a family consisting of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. It is further submitted that it is a matter of status, not of contract, and cannot be created by agreement between parties; it comes into existence automatically by operation of law in a Hindu family. It is further submitted that even Jain and Sikh families, though not governed by Hindu Law, are treated as HUFs under the Act. It is further submitted that for an HUF to be recognized as a separate assessable entity, two essential conditions must be satisfied: firstly, there must be a coparcenary, that is, a group of persons who are lineal descendants having RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 74 of 77 joint rights in ancestral property; and secondly, there must exist joint family property consisting of ancestral property or property acquired with the aid of ancestral property or voluntarily transferred by members to the common pool. It is further submitted that the term "ancestral property" refers to property inherited by a Hindu male from any of his three immediate male ancestors--his father, grandfather, or great-grandfather--and property inherited from any other relation does not constitute ancestral property. Accordingly, income derived from such ancestral property is taxable as income of the HUF and not as the individual income of any coparcener. It is further submitted that families such as those of a widow and her sons, a husband and wife, two widows of deceased brothers, uncle and nephew, or mother and son can all constitute an HUF for assessment purposes. It is further submitted that property inherited by any legal heir in the capacity of a descendant retains the character of HUF property. Therefore, it is submitted that the income derived from the ancestral and joint family properties in the present case rightfully belongs to the HUF, which stands as a distinct taxable person under the Income-tax Act, and the assessment ought to be made in its name.
74. On the aspect of constitution of the HUF, the petitioner has placed on record it's family tree and PAN, and has shown long- standing tax filings as a HUF. The respondent has only made bald averment of denying the family tree of the petitioner and that the petitioner is not a duly constituted HUF and made no material averments regarding any of the members being not part of the family tree or a lineal descendant of the original HUF members RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 75 of 77 or giving any reasons for claiming the petitioner not be a duly constituted HUF. It is not the case of the respondent that Sh. Komal Jain and Sh. Shaurya Jain are not the descendants/next generation of the original HUF member Sh. Rikhabchand. The petitioner has clearly pleaded and also shown through a family tree chart that the Sh. Shaurya Jain is the son of Sh. Komal Jain who is the son of Sh. Rajender Kumar s/o. Sh. Rikhab Chand and Sh. Amit Jain is the son of Sh. Mahender Kumar s/o. Sh. Rikhab Chand. The line of succession in the petitioner HUF is clearly shown in the family tree. An HUF is a family consisting of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and a person becomes a member of the HUF automatically by virtue of being born in the family. It has not been pleaded by the respondent that Sh. Komal Jain is not the son of Mr. Rajender Kumar or that Sh. Shaurya Jain is not the son of Sh. Komal Jain or that Sh. Amit Jain is not the son of Mr. Mahender Kumar. Both Sh. Komal Jain and Amit Jain as well as Sh. Shaurya Jain are linear descendants of the original HUF member Sh. Rikhab Chand and accordingly, no doubt is being created regarding them being the natural members of the petitioner HUF. The respondent's objections on this count being unsubstantiated stand rejected. The respondent has been paying rent to the petitioner HUF with the rent receipts being issued in the name of the petitioner HUF and the bald averment of the respondent that the petitioner is not an HUF without any cogent material cannot be accepted. Accordingly, this ground taken by the respondent in the leave to defend application stands rejected.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 76 of 7775. In view of above discussion and the documents filed by the parties, this court is of the considered view that there is no triable issue between the parties which entitles the respondent for leave to contest the present application for eviction. The application for leave to contest is without merit and the same is dismissed.
76. As an off shoot of the dismissal of the application for leave to contest made by the respondent, the petitioner is found entitled to recover the possession of property i.e. entire ground floor of shop bearing no. 5, admeasuring 1350 sq. ft., having a front of 22 sq. ft., Block No. 171, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi-110003, as shown in the site plan annexed with the application for eviction.
77. The application for eviction is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. In view of the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 this order for recovery of possession of premises shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of six months from this date.
Announced in the Open Court Digitally signed
on 17.11.2025 MOHIT by MOHIT
SHARMA
SHARMA Date: 2025.11.17
16:42:09 +0530
(Mohit Sharma)
CJM, Shahdara
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
The Then:
Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller
South East, Saket Courts,
New Delhi.
RC ARC 38/23 Mangilal Rikhabchand HUF Vs. M/s Poonam Backliwal Page 77 of 77