Gujarat High Court
Mayaben Surendrabhai Kodnani vs State Of Gujarat & on 29 January, 2013
Author: K.M.Thaker
Bench: K.M.Thaker
MAYABEN SURENDRABHAI KODNANI....Applicant(s)V/SSTATE OF GUJARAT R/SCR.A/134/2013 CAV ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 134 of 2013 With SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 135 of 2013 With SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 136 of 2013 ================================================================
MAYABEN SURENDRABHAI KODNANI....Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT &
1....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance:
MR ND NANAVATI, SR. COUNSEL, WITH MR HARDIK A DAVE, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 MR AY KOGJE, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2 MR JM PANCHAL SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER Date : 29/01/2013 COMMON CAV ORDER The petitioners in the above mentioned three petitions have challenged common order dated 11.1.2013 passed by the learned Designated Judge, SIT Courts, Ahmedabad below Exh.1030, Exh.1031 and Exh.1032 in Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 with allied matters.
1.1 Besides challenging the said common order, the petitioners in the said three petitions have also prayed, inter alia, that :-
12(a) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to admit the petition.
(b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of and in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, for setting aside the Order dated 11th January 2013 passed by Ld. Designated Judge, Naroda Gam Case, SIT Courts, Ahmedabad below Exhibit-1032 Application in Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 with allied Sessions Cases ( Annexure B).
This Hon'ble Court be pleased to transfer Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 with allied Sessions Cases to any other appropriate Court in the interest of justice or This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass appropriate Order directing the trial of Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 with allied Sessions Cases be conducted by a Court presided over by any Judicial Officer other then present Presiding Officer.
(d) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay, further proceedings of Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 with allied Sessions Cases pending admission and till final disposal of this Petition.
2. The relief prayed for by the petitioners in the said three petitions are similar and common and same learned Senior Counsel has appeared for all the petitioners in the said three petitions and has made similar and common submissions for and on behalf of the petitioners and common contentions have been raised on behalf of the petitioners. Likewise, for respondent Nos.1 and 2, same learned advocates have appeared in all three petitions and they have also made similar and common submissions for the respondents in the said three petitions. Therefore, all the three petitions are decided by this common order.
2.1 For sake of convenience and also having regard to the fact that the learned counsel for both the sides have referred to the memo of petitions and annexures and other material on record of the first petition, i.e. Special Criminal Application No.134 of 2013, for all purposes, including the purpose of reproducing the relief prayed for by the petitioners, record of Special Criminal Application No.134 of 2013 is taken into consideration.
3. It is submitted that the petitioners are accused persons in Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 (Naroda Gam Case), which is presently pending before the Designated Judge (Naroda Gam Case), SIT Courts, Ahmedabad.
3.1 During the pendency of the said Sessions Case No.203 of 2009, all three petitioners submitted almost similar applications being Exh.1030, Exh.1031 and Exh.1032 and prayed, inter alia, that to uphold the impartiality and dignity of Justice and to make appear that Justice is being done, Presiding Officer of this Hon'ble Court may not take up this matter for Trial in the interest of Justice and do the needful.
3.2 The said applications have been disallowed by the learned Court by common order which is impugned by the three accused persons (who preferred the three applications being Exh.1030, Exh.1031 and Exh.1032) in the three petitions.
3.3 The petitioners claimed in the applications (being Exh.1030, Exh.1031 and Exh.1032) that the same learned Judge (who presided over the trial in) had conducted trial of another/previous Sessions Case i.e. Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 with allied matters arising from FIR being CR No.I-100 of 2002 wherein also present petitioners were accused persons and they have been convicted by the same learned Judge and since some of the witnesses and some evidence in the said previous sessions case and present case are common, they apprehend that they may not get a fair and impartial trial before the learned Court where the proceedings of Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 with allied matters are pending.
3.4 It was also claimed that while deciding the said previous case, being Sessions Case No.235 of 2009, by judgment of conviction dated 29.8.2010 and order of sentence dated 31.8.2010, the learned Judge has made observations on certain factual aspects and therefore, the petitioners apprehend that the learned Judge is pre-determined on such aspects as a result of which, their defence will be prejudiced at the trial which will tend to cause prejudice to the petitioners. In one of the said three applications (viz. Exh. 1030, Exh.1031 and Exh.1032), the petitioners contended, inter alia, that:-
(2) Ld. Presiding Officer of this Hon'ble Court had also conducted the Trial of Sessions Case No.235 of 2009 and allied Sessions Cases arising from the F.I.R. being C R No. I 100 of 2002 registered before Naroda Police Station, wherein Applicant/Accused was Accused No.37 and was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for 28 years under various sections of Indian Penal Code.
(4) From the above reproduced portions from the Judgment, it clearly appears that Presiding Officer of this Hon'ble Court has already expressed a view on a question of alleged presence of the Applicant/Accused at the alleged time and place of offence in present Sessions Case.
(5) In such circumstances Applicant/Accused apprehends that it would not be possible for Presiding Officer of this Hon'ble Court to take a different view of the matter, which would cause serious prejudice to the defense of the Applicant/Accused. With this well founded apprehension Applicant/Accused will not be able to defend her case properly, which would cause further prejudice to the Applicant/Accused.
It is well accepted and settled position that Justice must not only be done but must also appear to have been done. Under these circumstances, if Presiding Officer of this Hon'ble Court conducts Trial of above numbered Sessions Case, defense of the Applicant/Accused will be jeopardized and Justice will not appear to have been done.
3.5 On such premise, the petitioners prayed in the said applications that the learned Judge should recuse herself and should declare the case Not Before Me .
3.6 It is not in dispute that the petitioners, who are the accused persons in present Sessions Case No.203 of 2009, which is presently pending before the learned Judge in which the impugned order has been passed, were also accused persons in the said previous case being Sessions Case No.235 of 2009 which came to be decided by the same learned Judge vide judgment dated 29/31.8.2010 and the petitioners have been convicted in the said case and Appeal(s) against the said judgment is pending in High Court.
3.7 The said three applications submitted by the petitioners were opposed by present respondent Nos.1 and 2, who had filed their respective replies/written submissions. The respondents contended, inter alia, that merely because the learned Judge has decided the previous case wherein also present petitioners were accused persons, it cannot be assumed or apprehended that present case will be conducted with any bias or pre-determined view. The respondents contended that the apprehension expressed in the applications, during hearing before the learned Judge, were baseless and without any justification. The respondents also contended that the Designated Court is specially designated in view of the directions passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court and as per the orders, the trial is required to be decided expeditiously. The respondents also contended that the applications would not be maintainable in view of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court and subsequent notifications issued by the High Court and also for the reason that there is no provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure {hereinafter referred to as the Code } under which such applications can be maintained by the accused persons. The respondents contended before the learned Judge that there was no basis, reasons or justification for such applications and the same may not be accepted.
3.8 After hearing the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners accused persons and learned advocates for the respondents and after considering the applications and other material on record, the learned Judge passed the order dated 14.1.2013 below Exh.1030, 1031 and 1032 and rejected the said applications. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners accused persons have challenged the order in present petitions.
3.9 In present petitions, the petitioners (i.e. said three applicants accused persons) have also prayed for transfer of the Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 with allied cases to any other Court or the trial of the said case/s may be presided by any other learned Judge.
4. Mr. N.D.Nanavati, learned Senior Counsel, has appeared with Mr. H.A.Dave, learned advocate, for the petitioners accused persons, Mr. Panchal, learned counsel, has appeared as Special Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 State and Mr. Kogje, learned advocate, has appeared for the respondent No.2 Special Investigating Team ( SIT for short), in all the three matters.
5. Mr. Nanavati, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners have reasonable apprehension that there will be element of bias and their defence will be prejudiced and jeopardized and that therefore, the accused persons submitted the applications and requested the learned Court that the learned Judge may recuse herself. He submitted that the apprehension is reasonable and not baseless and if the request made by the petitioners is accepted, no prejudice will be caused to the prosecution or any other party. He also submitted that the applications have not been submitted with a view to avoid or obstruct or delay the trial. He contended that justice not only should be done, but also should appear to have been done and that therefore, when petitioners have reasonable apprehension, the accused persons are justified in submitting such applications. Mr. Nanavati, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, also submitted that the accused persons declared before the learned Judge that:-
b) It is clarified at the outset that the applicants have personally no distrust in this Court, there is absolutely no attempt to allege about any personal or other bias against this Hon'ble Court, but, the submission is based on the aspect of judicial propriety.
h) It was re-emphasized that there is no intention in the mind of the applicants to question the overall impartiality and integrity of this Court. It was urged to send the recusal report and to return the matter to the Hon'ble The Chief Justice of Gujarat.
5.1 Mr. Nanavati, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, relied on the decision in the case between Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.
[AIR 1987 SC 2386(1)] and on the decision in the case between State of W.B. & Ors. v. Shivananda Pathak & Ors.
[AIR 1998 SC 2050] and the decision in the case between Abdul Raoof @ Raoof Abdul Kader Shaikh v. State of Gujarat [2002 (4) GLR 3252]. He tendered on record a compilation of the observations from the previous judgment in Sessions Case No.235 of 2009 decided by the same learned Judge to demonstrate that the learned Judge has made certain observations and recorded certain conclusions with reference to present petitioners and also with reference to evidence and witness (of said other/previous case) which are common in the pending sessions case and therefore, it would not be possible for same learned Judge to reach/record contrary conclusion, which justify the petitioners' apprehension. He submitted that the said observations also give out that the petitioners' apprehension is justified that there would be pre-determination and element of bias. Mr. Nanavati, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the approach of the learned Judge in assessing reasonable apprehension of petitioners is not proper.
He even submitted the length of the order and number of reasons recorded in present order is indicative of the insistence by the learned Judge to hold on to the matter and for that purpose, the learned Judge appears to have searched for more and more reasons. He specifically referred to the evidence related to sting operation and the witness who was examined in previous case in connection with the said sting operation and submitted that the said evidence and the said witness would be common in present case and since the learned Judge has already recorded views and conclusions with regard to the said evidence in previous case, the trial in present case would be mere formality and the outcome is a foregone conclusion. According to the petitioners, the pendency of appeal against the previous judgment passed by the learned Judge is also likely to cause prejudice. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Nanavati, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, relied on the decision in the case between Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors. [AIR 1987 SC 2386(1)].
Mr. Nanavati, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners also relied on the decision in the case between Abdul Raoof @ Raoof Abdul Kader Shaikh v. State of Gujarat [2002 (4) GLR 3252]. Mr. Nanavati, learned Senior Counsel, also relied on the decision in the case between State of W.B. & Ors. v. Shivananda Pathak & Ors. [AIR 1998 SC 2050].
6. Mr. Panchal, learned Special Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 State, opposed the petitions and submitted, inter alia, that the original applications before the learned Judge were not maintainable and therefore, present petitions are also not maintainable. On this count, he submitted that whether the matters should be taken up and heard or not, is a matter to be decided by the concerned learned Judge and neither the accused nor the complainant prosecution can even request the learned Judge to pass order declaring that the matters will not be heard by him or her or that the learned Judge should recuse himself from hearing the case. He also submitted that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code under which such request can be made. He submitted that the applicants did not prefer applications seeking transfer of proceedings and had not prayed for transfer of proceedings, but what was demanded was that the learned Judge should recuse herself from conducting the trial of Sessions Case No.203 of 2009. Such applications, being not maintainable, the petitions are not maintainable and therefore, the same should not be entertained. Learned Special Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 - State relied on the provision under Section 407 of the Code and submitted that the only request which can be made to the appropriate Court is for transfer of cases and therefore also, present proceedings are not maintainable. He also relied on the provisions contained under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act so as to contend that there is always presumption that judicial and official acts are performed regularly and such presumption can be rebutted only at the stage of evidence and that therefore, the applicants petitioners are not justified in raising contention contrary to the presumption under Section 114(e) of the Act, at this stage, i.e. without rebutting the said presumption by proper evidence. Learned counsel, Mr. Panchal, read the entire order passed by the learned Judge and submitted that there is no error in the order and that therefore, there is no justification for interfering with the said order in exercise of limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code.
6.1 Mr. Panchal, learned Special Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 State, then, referred to the Notification issued by the High Court appointing the learned Judge as Designated Judge/Court for hearing the said Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 and allied matters, in view of the directions by the Hon'ble Apex Court and it is not out of her choice or preference the learned Judge has taken-up the case and that therefore, the learned Judge is right and justified in not accepting the petitioners' request.
6.2 Mr. Panchal, learned Special Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 State, submitted that each case is decided in light of the evidence on record and therefore, the petitioners are not justified in claiming that since the learned Judge has decided the previous case in which they were accused, the same learned Judge should not decide present case or that since some of the evidence or some of the witnesses in present case are likely to be common, the learned Judge should recuse herself and not conduct the trial.
6.3 On this count, Mr. Panchal, learned Special Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 State, submitted that it was categorically brought to the notice of the learned Court that so far as the evidence and witnesses related to the sting operation is concerned, the said evidence or witnesses are not to be cited or relied on by the prosecution against accused Nos. 57 and 20 whereas the third accused-applicant, i.e. accused No. 23, has not raised the plea on the ground of sting operation and that therefore, the petitioners' submissions on the ground that some witnesses and evidence would be common, the learned Judge should not conduct the trial, is not justified.
7. In support of his submission, Mr. Panchal, learned Special Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 State, has relied on the decision in the case between Dr. P.A.Varghese v. State of Kerala & Ors. [1985 Cri.L.J. 861].
8. I have heard learned Senior Counsel and learned advocates at length during the prolonged hearing which concluded around 4.15 p.m. on 21.1.2013. I have also considered the material on record of the petitions.
9. According to the petitioners, two complaints / FIRs were lodged and upon submission of final report / charge-sheet, they culminated into Sessions Case No.235 of 2009 (CR No.100/2002) and 203 of 2009 (CR No.98/2002).
9.1 The Hon'ble Apex Court vide orders dated 26.3.2008 and 1.5.2009 directed that the trial of the said and such other cases (related to riots) should be conducted by the Senior Learned Judge(s) to be designated by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 placed the said aspects on record in their reply to the said three applications being Exh.1030, Exh.1031 and Exh.1032, which read thus (relevant portion is extracted) :-
2 The submissions made in the paragraph (1) to (6) in the application are rebutted as follows:
A. That in Writ Petition (Crl.) 109 of 2003, the National Human Rights Commission Vs. State of Gujarat & Others, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India vide its order dated 21.11.2003 stayed the trial of nine offences that took place in Gujarat State after the killing of kar-sevaks travelling in Sabarmati Express train at Godhra railway station, including trial of Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 and Others, arising out of offence registered at Naroda PS vide I CR No.98/02. By order dated 26.3.2006, Hon'ble Supreme Court had directed the Gujarat Government to constitute a five members Special Investigation Team (in short the 'SIT') to undertake inquiry/investigation including further investigation in these nine cases. By order dated 01.05.2009 in the abovementioned Writ Petition, Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to remove the stay in the trial of these cases. Regarding appointment of judicial officers for presiding over trial of these nine cases, in the same order it was directed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that
42. .....
It is essential that in riot cases and cases involving communal factors the trials should be held expeditiously. Therefore, we request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Gujarat High Court to designate court(s) in each district where the trial of the concerned cases are to be held. The Designated Courts shall take up the cases in question.
.......
46. The following directions are given presently.
.......
(iv) It is imperative, considering the nature and sensitivity of these nominated cases, and the history of the entire litigation, that senior judicial officers be appointed so that these trials can be concluded as soon as possible and in the most satisfactory manner. In order to ensure that all concerned have the highest degree of confidence in the system being put in place, it would be advisable if the Chief Justice of the High Court of Gujarat selects the judicial officers to be so nominated.
9.2 It can be seen from the above quoted details that in pursuance of the order by the Hon'ble Apex Court, Hon'ble the Chief Justice designated learned Judges to conduct the cases/trials. Initially, the learned Judge (before whom the three applications were submitted and who has passed the impugned order below the said applications) was designated to conduct the trial in Sessions Case No.235 of 2009 (Naroda Patiya Case) and another learned Judge was designated to conduct the sessions case in question, i.e. Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 (Naroda Gam Case).
9.3 The learned Sessions Judge (before whom the said three applications were submitted and who passed the impugned order) conducted and decided the said other Sessions Case No.235 of 2009 (i.e. Naroda Patiya Case wherein present petitioners were accused persons) vide judgment of conviction dated 29.8.2012 and order of sentence dated 31.8.2012 whereby present petitioners (being accused Nos.37, 18 and 20 in the said/decided Sessions Case No.235 of 2009, i.e. Naroda Patiya Case), have been convicted. In present Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 also the petitioners are accused Nos.57, 23 and 20. Differently put, the accused Nos.37, 18 and 20 in the said previous/decided Sessions Case No.235 of 2009 are accused Nos.57, 23 and 20 in present pending Sessions Case No.203 of 2009.
9.4 The learned Judge who was originally designated to preside over present sessions case has been elevated, and the learned Judge, who is now designated by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to conduct the trial of Sessions Case No.203 of 2009 (Naroda Gam Case), is the same learned Judge, who tried said previous Sessions Case No.235 of 2009 (Naroda Patiya Case). The notification designating the learned Judge came to be issued on 30.11.2012 whereas the petitioners submitted the above mentioned three applications being Exh.1030, Exh.1031 and Exh.1032 (below which the impugned order is passed) on or around 20/21.12.2010.
9.5 Until the said applications came to be submitted on or around 20/21.12.2012, the learned Judge had, on her own volition and choice, neither recused herself from conducting the trial of the said case (after the notification appointing her as designated Judge was issued) nor the learned Judge had indicated that she would not want to conduct the trial.
9.6 At this stage, it may also be mentioned that the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and learned Special Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 State and learned counsel for the respondent No.2 SIT have submitted that most of the trial (of about 171 PWs) is actually completed and now, evidence of only about 14 PWs is to be recorded.
10. In the aforesaid background the petitioners submitted the said three applications and claimed that the learned Judge should recuse herself from conducting the trial.
10.1 Now, on rejection of the said applications by impugned common order, the petitioners have preferred present petitions and, while challenging the said common order, they have also prayed that the trial of sessions case No.203 of 2009 may be transferred to any other learned Judge (this request was not made and this relief was not prayed for in the said three applications i.e. Exh.1030, Exh.1031 and Exh.1032. Thus, this Court is required (a) to examine the common order dated 11.1.2013 and to (b) consider the request for transfer of Sessions Case to any other Court.
10.2 While considering and examining the said demand by the petitioners, it is relevant to keep in focus that no one i.e. neither the accused nor the complainant/prosecution can be allowed to avoid or select a learned Judge for conducting a case/trial or forum shopping and/or to pressurize a learned Judge in guise of reasonable apprehension .
10.3 In order to claim and demonstrate that a fair and impartial trial can not be had and that therefore, order under Section 407 may be passed, expression of mere apprehension (i.e. apprehension without something more and something substantial) would not be enough. It should be satisfactorily shown that the apprehension is real, reasonable, genuine and bonafide and not imaginary or unwarranted and unjustified or motivated by some other intention.
11. So far as the petitioners' demand that the learned Judge should recuse herself is concerned, it is only the learned Judge who presides over the case who can take such decision (i.e. to recuse from the proceedings or not) and neither the accused nor the complainant/prosecution has any right in Law, under the provisions in the Code, to make such demand. The learned advocates for respondents No.1 and 2 are justified in contending that there is no provision in the Code conferring any right either on the accused or complainant/prosecution on the strength of which such demand can be made. The provision in the Code provide a remedy option to make request for transfer of a criminal case and that too in those situations and for such reasons as are contemplated under Section 407 of the Code.
11.1 On this count, it is relevant to note that the learned Judge has not indicated that she intends to recuse herself and/or of her own volition and choice she has not recused herself from conducting the trial.
11.2 Besides this, in light of the special facts of present case, the learned Judge could not have independently exercised such discretion, since the learned Judge is specially designated by the Hon ble the Chief Justice pursuant to the orders by the Hon ble Apex Court.
11.3 By the impugned common order, the learned Judge has rejected the applications for the reasons recorded in the order. The learned Judge has, inter alia, observed that :-
........In these applications also, the applicant-accused have come out with the case that three of the accused remains same who were sentenced by this court in the previous case. In the same way, one prosecution witness, Shri Ashish Khaitan is also to be examined in this case who was examined in the previous case. In light of the principle laid down in the Judgment mentioned herein below, these applications cannot be entertained. It is clear that no reasonable person can infer bias on the grounds mentioned in the applications. It is more than clear that whatever was opined by this Court in the previous Judgement was essential for fair and proper disposal of the previous case.
8. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the humble but firm view that it is not just, proper, reasonable and prudent in the facts and circumstances of this case to endorse 'Not before me' or to not take up the proceeding before this Court. In the same way, no case is also made out to send any report of recusal to Hon'ble the Chief Justice. These applications therefore need to be rejected with following final order.
11.4 In the impugned order, the learned Judge has dealt with the grounds on which the petitioners' request that the learned Judge should recuse herself from hearing the case, was based. The learned Judge has noted that when any personal or other bias against the Court is not alleged and when the petitioners also claim that they do not question the impartiality and integrity of the Court, then, in absence of any material to justify the claim of reasonable apprehension, the request made by the petitioners do not deserve to be granted merely because some evidence and witnesses are likely to be common. Learned Judge has also recorded that since the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has specially Designated the Court to conduct the trial, the Court does not have jurisdiction to pass order, such as prayed for by the petitioners.
12. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the learned Judge has not considered the reasons and grounds in light of which the request was made in right perspective. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that for same reasons, the petitioners' request for transfer of case deserves to be granted.
12.1 The reasons factors in light of which the request to recuse was made and the reasons on account of which the request for transfer of the Sessions Case to any other Court is made are common, hence, the said aspect is addressed together so as to avoid repetition.
12.2 According to the petitioners, the same learned Judge convicted the petitioners in previous/decided sessions case (i.e. sessions case No.235 of 2009) and some of the witnesses and evidence are common in this and previous case. The petitioners also claim that while deciding the previous case the learned Judge has recorded certain observations, views and conclusions; and that therefore, it would not be possible for the same learned Judge to take different view. The request for transferring the case to any other Court is also made for the same reasons and on same grounds.
12.3 Now, so far as the contention on the ground that the learned Judge presiding over present trial is the same as in the previous case; is concerned, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the learned Judge is specially designated by the Hon ble the Chief Justice.
12.4 Moreover, in discharge of his or her duties a learned Judge may be required to deal with and decide cases where one of the parties or the witnesses or evidence in two different cases may be same or common. It may also happen that one of the two cases may be decided first and incidentally (but in view of the evidence on record of that case) the result might go against the party which is common in both cases. If in given case/s such situation and circumstances obtain and arise then the party common in both cases cannot, automatically or mechanically (without something more, without something tangible and concrete and substantial) raise apprehension about predetermination and such party cannot, mechanically claim that since the same learned Judge is going to decide his second/subsequent case, his interest and defence will be jeopardised or will be prejudiced or that the learned Judge will not reach or will not able to reach different conclusion.
12.5 Any objection or opposition by a party to the proceedings against conduct of the trial by the same learned Judge who presided over another/previous trial concerning same party cannot be readily and easily accepted and entertained in absence of any material or incidence which may demonstrate and reflect any lapse or irregularity or impropriety in the conduct of the learned Judge and/or conduct of the proceedings by the learned Judge.
12.6 It has emerged (from the material available on record) that at this stage, the petitioners have not shown any material and have not alleged or cited any instance about the conduct of the learned Judge and/or about the conduct of the proceedings of sessions Case No.203 of 2009 and allied cases or about any observations made and/or any order passed by learned Judge in present proceedings which could demonstrate and/or which could lead to inference about any bias or state of predetermination on part of learned Judge and/or which could justify petitioners' apprehension.
12.7 Under the circumstances, in absence of such material (i.e. any details or material which could demonstrate and justify even prima facie - the petitioners' apprehension) and merely because some part of evidence in previous case and present case is common, the demand that the learned designated Judge should recuse herself or that the sessions case may be transferred to any other Court cannot be maintained and the trial need not be transferred from specially designated learned Judge to another Court.
12.8 Thus, in view of the aforesaid reasons and aspects, the opposition objection against conduct of proceedings by same learned Judge is not supported by cogent, tangible material, hence, the said objection opposition should fail and cannot be accepted. More particularly, because the petitioners have stipulated and declared that they do not have any personal distrust in the Court and they also do not allege other bias and they do not question overall impartiality and integrity of Court, but the demand or opposition is based on the aspect of propriety.
12.9 As regards the contention on ground of common witnesses and/or common evidence, it is relevant to mention that, in present sessions case No.203 of 2009 and allied cases, the learned Judge would be obliged to examine, consider and analyze the evidence and facts which may be made available on record of the case and such evidence would include evidence in rebuttal which may be new and/or more and/or different than the evidence available on record of previous case. The conclusion in present sessions case will have to be reached in light of the set of evidence (including rebuttal evidence) which may be made available on record of present sessions case. Thus, without something more, something substantial and concrete and in absence of any material (from proceedings of present case) which may justify the apprehension, the contention on ground of common witness/evidence does not support the challenge against the common order and/or does not justify the petitioners' demand.
12.10 Moreover, the learned advocates for the respondents have submitted that in all there are 82 accused persons in present case and out of 82 accused persons only 5 accused persons are common (in present case and in the decided / previous sessions case) and out of the said 5 common accused persons, 3 accused persons have been convicted and sentenced by the learned Judge whereas 2 accused persons were granted benefit of doubt in the said decided / previous case. It is also submitted by learned counsel for respondents that out of 171 PWs evidence of most of the PWs have been recorded and oral evidence of only about 14 PWs is to be recorded now and out of about 171 PWs only some witnesses/evidence are common.
13. It is true that the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners read out various observations (actually a compilation of extracts of observations from the judgment passed by the learned Judge in the decided/previous case is placed on record) made by the learned Judge in the judgment of the decided/previous case, however, merely because a learned Judge, while deciding a case recorded his observations and conclusion, then that factor alone (i.e. without something more and something substantial) would not, ordinarily, be sufficient to preclude a learned Judge from deciding another similar case concerning same party.
14. So far as the aspect of common witnesses / evidence is concerned, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has placed much emphasis on the evidence related to sting operation and the witness who was examined (in connection with the string operation) during the trial of the previous case. On this count, it would be appropriate to take into consideration below quoted extract from the impugned common order:-
(K-1) This Court has not discussed, described and/or decided on participation or involvement of any of the accused being tried in this case. Much emphasis has been supplied by the Learned Sr. Counsel for the application of A-57, by submitting that the oral testimony of PW Ashish Khaitan (yet to be examined) and the C.D., D.V.D., etc. which may be produced through the said P.W., the case be not tried by the Court.
These all are related to sting operation.
Learned Sp.P.P. has fairly stated that, in this case through the string operation there isno involvement of A-57 or A-20. Shri Ashish Khaitan and related F.S.L. Officer, etc. are the only common PWs who are admittedly not to be examined qua A-57 and A-20 in the case. In no case, the production of C.D. or D.V.D., commonness of which has been vehemently argued by the Learned Sr. Counsel, can be deciding factors. The involvement of the accused in the D.V.D. or C.D. or say incriminating material in it are the deciding factors.
In the humble opinion of this Court, when Learned Sp.P.P. clarifies of no involvement of the referred accused, the apprehension has no base.
The submission that because in the previous case judicial op0inion on deposition of Mr. Khaitan is formed, it is improper to conduct this trial by the same judge has no merits as judicial opinion qua the facts and evidence of that previous case alone has been formed which is not applicable to this case. There, also the apprehension is found baseless.
A-23 has not put up any case in relation to the sting operation, common PWs, etc. before this Court.
(emphasis supplied) The said aspect particularly the submission and stipulation by learned Special Prosecutor before the learned Judge brings out that the evidence related to sting operation and the witness related to the said evidence is not to be examined in present sessions case qua Accused Nos.57 and 20. The learned Judge has then mentioned that Accused No. 23 has not put up any case on that basis. The learned Judge has therefore, observed that on this count, the apprehension does not have any base.
In this context, it appears appropriate at this stage to also take note of the below quoted observations by the learned Judge in the impugned order :-
...........There cannot be comparison of two cases and each case is to be decided on its own merits, hence there is no question of having any bias by deciding any previous case in which the common accused was tried....
(K-2) while appreciating the evidence in this case, the Court has to decide many aspects, its individual effect and its collective effect keeping in mind merits of this case. This exercise, which would be the only source to decide role of th respective accused if any, in the commission of offence is yet to be done in this case. The deciding factors are evidence marshaled in this case, fact and circumstances of this case and not any line, opinion or part of the judgment in the previous case........
Moreover, the role of the trial Court in assessing the evidence is to evaluate it in context of the case, consistency of other PW, manner of assault based on the quality of the testimony, material to impeach testimony of the PWs, availability of corroboration to medical and other evidence, the effect of improvement, exaggeration, discrepancy, identity of the accused, previous enmity, number of accused, number of victim, the effect of omission and contradiction and ultimately separation of chaff from the grain.
(5) This Court is of the opinion that each case is being decided on several factors including merits and demerits of the facts, circumstances, oral and documentary evidence on record. There is no likelihood that a trained judicial mind would be governed by any kind of pride and prejudice, likes and dislikes. While disposing of the case, one needs to express oneself and necessary observation during the discussions are being passed and that when it is essential for the proper disposal of the case, the Judges have duty to do so which in any case is part of judicial process, but the qualities which every judicial officer gains by judicial experience, judicial discipline and by developing a habit of fair and proper disposal of the cases helps every Judge to discharge one s obligation properly. It is not possible that any Judge would be governed by any opinion expressed in any previous case because the said opinion has always been given with reference to merits, effects, circumstances, evidence of that case and the same cannot be applicable to the case on hand.
The above quoted observations by the learned Judge in the impugned common order reflect and give out that the learned Judge seems to be conscious of the duty and obligation of a Judge i.e. to be fair and impartial and to remain detached from and unaffected by the material or facts or evidence which was considered while deciding the previous case and to not import the said facts / evidence, views, observations or conclusions in analyzing the evidence and material on record of the subsequent case though one of the parties in the subsequent litigation may be same and when some evidence / witnesses may also turn out to be common as in the previous case.
15. In this context, it would be relevant to mention that when a learned Judge/a Court makes observations and records conclusion while deciding a case then such observations and conclusions are based on several factors e.g. the material on record of that case, the analysis of facts of the case and evidence available on record of that case and attention is also paid to the reason for which particular evidence was placed on record and the object for which a particular witness was examined and the demeanor of the witness, as well as the relevance of the evidence in that particular case, and also the availability or absence of rebuttal evidence in that particular case, the discrepancy in the evidence / deposition of the same witness or the discrepancy in the evidence/deposition of different witnesses of same side, corroboration, if any, availability of any impeaching evidence against the witness or the material, independent medical or foreignsic evidence, the omissions and contradictions, etc. and not merely on any ipsi-dixit or personal views or fancy of the learned Judge. The extent and quality of evidence in the subsequent case would be the governing factor for the learned Judge in reaching the conclusion in subsequent case. The differences in the extent and quality of evidence between the set of evidence available on record of previous case and subsequent case would be noticed and given due weightage and consideration by the concerned learned Judge while deciding the subsequent case. Actually judges are obliged and ordained to decide the cases in the said manner.
15.1 Under the circumstances in absence of any concrete material it cannot be easily and lightly and casually presumed that a learned Judge would fail to follow what he or she is obliged and ordained to do.
15.2 Therefore, the party who is common in the two cases would not be justified in mechanically and automatically (i.e. without placing on record any substantial and cogent material or concrete base so as to demonstrate that the apprehension is real and genuine) claiming that he has apprehension that he will not get fair and impartial trial or his case or defence would be jeopardized.
At this stage, reference may be made to the decision by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case between R. Viswanathan & Ors. v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid since deceased & Ors.
[AIR 1963 SC 1] as under:-
49. Mr. Balakrishanaiya, it is true, did hear the appeals sitting with Chief Justice Paramsbivayya. It is the plaintiffs' case that after hearing arguments for over a fortnight, Mr. Balakrishanaiya suggested that the parties should compromise the dispute. Mr. Balakrishanaiya has denied this statement ; be stated that the parties themselves decided to negotiate a compromise. Even if it be true that be suggested that the possibility of a compromise of the dispute be explored, bias on his part from that suggestion cannot be inferred. It is also true that sitting with Kandaswami Pillai, J., on March 15,1949, he declined to order an enquiry into the compromise set up by the plaintiffs on the ground that to record the compromise would "result in the entire intention of the testator being completely negatived."
Assuming that the order was, in law, incorrect-on that question we cannot express any opinion-the making of this order will not justify an inference of bais on the part of Mr.Balakrishanaiya. It was also alleged against him that he bad never "disguised his hatred"
of the "widow and children of Ramalingam" and had "openly declared it by his frequent observations and interruptions in the course of the plaintiffs' counsel's arguments" (vide affidavit field in June 1950, in the proceedings in this Court for a writ of prohibition). It was further alleged in the affidavit of Vishwanath dated April 7, 1949, that Mr. Balakrishanaiya had from the beginning become ,"openly hostile and his hostility had become pronounced after the retirement of Chief Justice Paramshivayya." In the course of his cross-examination Mr. Balakrishatiaiya denied the suggestion that he was hostile to the members of "the plaintiffs' family". As no enquiry was permitted to be made on these matters by the order of Rajagopalan, J., evidently all the material evidence is not before the Court. Vishwanath in his evidence has not spoken about the statements alleged to have been made by Mr. Balakrishanaiya from which bias may be inferred. We are unable to hold, therefore, on the plea of the plaintiffs that the conduct of Mr. Balakrishanaiya at the hearing of the appeal sitting with Kandaswami Pillai, J., supports the plea that he was biassed. The contention that after the plaintiffs had informed the Court Mr. Balakrishanaiya was to be examined as a witness in the compromise petition, the latter should not have set in the Fall Bench has, in our judgment, no substance. The application for recording the compromise was disposed of on March 15, 1949, and the Court without enquiring into the truth or otherwise of the compromise set up, declined to permit such a compromise to be made a decree of the Court of the sole ground that it was "contrary to the intention of the testator." There could, thereafter, be no scope for any enquiry into the truth of the plea set up by the plaintiffs about the compromise between them and the executors.
50. It would have been more consonant with justice if the application for recording a compromise was posted for hearing before a Bench of which Mr. Balakrishanaiya was not a member especially when the plaintiffs formally ;objected to him, but from the circumstance that of the bench as constituted he was a member, an inference of bias cannot be raised. Even according to Vishwanath, Mr. Balakrishanaiya stated that he was "sitting for hearing the appeals" with Kandaswami Pillai, J., because he was so directed by the Chief Justice, and that Mr. Balakrishanaiya gave Vishawanath liberty to move the Chief Justice for an order for constituting another Bench. Vishwanath says that he did go to see the Chief Justice but the Chief Justice ordered him out of his Chamber
122. Next was the allegation of friendship between Medappa, C.J., and A. Wajid and Manaji Rao. Manaji Rao faded out as an executor, and took hardly any interest in his duties as such, and cannot, therefore, be said to have been a potent factor to interest Medappa, C. J. In support of his allegation that Medappa, C. J., and A. Wajid were great friends, Viswanathan swore a few affidavits. A fairly long affidavit (No. 440 of 1950) in the High Court was reproduced in its entirety by Ramaswami, J., in his Judgment. Some other affidavits were sworn in this Court when certain proceedings for a writ of prohibition were started, and they were also read in the High Court and were read to us. Making a selection from these affidavits the allegations may be stated briefly as follows : Medappa, C. J., was the Chief Steward of the Bangalore Race Club and A. Wajid, his Secretary, that A. Wajid was visiting Medappa, C. J., at the latter's house when the probate case was going on and that they were great friends. It was also alleged that Chief Justice Medappa's attitude during the probate case was extremely hostile to the family, which was later reflected in the judgment of that case, and that Medappa, C. J., was extremely worth, when Viswanathan asked him not to sit on the Full Bench and the Chief Justice forced Viswanathan to disclose the name of the counsel who had advised the move and said that he would see what to do with him. All these allegations were denied by A. Wajid both in affidavits and in his oral testimony. Balakrishniah, J., was questioned about what happened in the Court and gave evasive replies.
123. The rule of law about judicial conduct is as strict, as it is old. No Judge can be considered to be competent to hear a case in which he is directly or indirectly interested. A proved interest in a Judge not disqualifies him but renders his judgment a nullity. There is yet another rule of judicial conduct which bears upon the hearing of case. In that, the Judge is expected to be serene and evenhanded, even though his patience may be sorely tried and the time of the Court appear to be wasted. This is based on the maxim which is often repeated that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. No litigant should leave the Court feeling reasonable that his case was not heard or considered on its merit. If he does, then justice, even though done in the case. fails in the doing of it.
124. Can we say that Medappa, C. J., was so interested as to be disqualified, or that he acted in a manner that his conduct in Court was a denial of justice ? Apart from the fact that A. Wajid denied familiarity, though not acquaintance with Medappa, C. J., there are no instances of undue leaning in favour of the executors. What happened in the case was engineered by Mr. Raju, as the letters of Viswanathan himself suggested. The family which did not know how to get on the right side of a father, however obdurate, acted in much the same way with the Court. Their conduct on and from the announcement of the Full Bench was calculated to exasperate and annoy any Judge, who held his own reputation dear. Of course, the more Medappa, C. J., showed irritation, the more Raju and his clients got publicity value, which they hoped to exploit with the Maharajah. In My opinion, the conduct of the sons of Visbwanathan was studied and designed to further their move for a different Bench. If we leave out of consideration the dissuading of Raju, as to which also there is no evidence, and the use of the estate car, about which also there is no evidence, there remains a vague allegation of deep friendship denied on the otherside and not proved otherwise by independent evidence. I say independent evidence, because the evidence of Puttaraja Urs, J., about the conversation between him and Medappa, C.J., about this case cannot be said to be disinterested because the witness had his own grievance against the Chief Justice, which be was ventilating to all and sundry. He even went to the length of reporting to the Chief Justice of India. I am not required to pronounce upon the truth or otherwise of Puttaraja Urs, J's personal aspersions on Medappa, C.J., but is it obvious that he cannot be regarded as a witness who can be trusted to have taken no sides. That leaves only the fact that Medippa, C. J., had heard and decided the probate case against the family. But I do not think that this circumstance was enough to disqualify him from sitting on a Bench to hear a case in which more evidence has been led. This happens frequently in all Courts.
125. The same conclusion is also reached, when one examines the allegations about the conduct of Balakrishniah, J. There too, the allegations are in, affidavits. These allegations are that Balakrishniah., J., made hostile remarks against the case of the sons of Ramalingam, while hearing the appeal with Kandaswami Pillai, J. If every remark of a Judge made from the Bench is to be construed as indicating prejudice, I am afraid most Judges will fail to pass the exacting test. In the course of arguments, Judges express opinions, tentatively formed, sometimes even strongly ; but that does not always mean that the case has been prejudged. An argu- ment in Court can never be effective if the Judges do not sometimes point out what appears to be the under lying fallacy in the apparent plausibility thereof, and any lawyer or litigant, who forms an apprehension on that score, cannot be said to be reasonably doing so. It has frequently been noticed that the objection of a Judge breaks down on a closer examination, and often enough, some Judges acknowledge publicly that they were mistaken. Of course, if the Judge unreasonably obstructs the flow of an argument or does not allow it to be raised, it may be said that there has been no fair hearing.
(emphasis supplied)
16. In present case, the petitioners have not pointed out any lapse or irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or in the conduct the learned Judge and any actual instance from or in connection with present proceedings demonstrating lack of fairness or impartiality which may land support to petitioners apprehension and convert mere apprehension into real, genuine and reasonable apprehension, is not pointed out.
On the contrary the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners reiterated the stand of petitioners (which is recorded by the learned Judge in the impugned order that,
b) It is clarified at the outset that the applicants have personally no distrust in this Court, there is absolutely no attempt to allege about any personal or other bias against this Hon'ble Court, but the submission is based on the aspect of judicial propriety.
h) It was re-emphasized that there is no intention in the mind of the applicants to question the overall impartiality and integrity of this Court. It was urged to send the recusal report and to return the matter to Hon ble the Chief Justice of Gujarat.
Thus, even according to the petitioners there is no personal distrust in the learned Judge and the petitioners have not alleged any personal or other bias and they do not believe or apprehend that the learned Judge has any personal or other bias against the petitioners and the petitioners also do not question or doubt overall impartiality and integrity of the learned Judge.
16.1 Thus, in present case, at this stage, there is no material on record to demonstrate and establish that the apprehension has sound base. In absence of any other cogent and substantial material demonstrating and reflecting any lapse or irregularity in the conduct of the learned Judge and/or in the conduct of proceedings by the learned Judge, it appears unjustified to accept the request to transfer the case to any other Court. It is also relevant that the learned Judge is specially designated Judge Court to conduct the said sessions case. In such circumstances and for the above mentioned reasons, the claim that since the learned Judge in present case is same and some of the evidence/witnesses are common and therefore, there is apprehension that they may not get fair trial, is, at this stage, and in absence of any substantial material, not capable to be real and reasonable apprehension.
17. At this stage, the decision on which the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners relied, need to be taken into consideration. As regards the decision in the case between State of W.B. & Ors. v. Shivananda Pathak & Ors. [AIR 1998 SC 2050] on which the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance is concerned, it may be mentioned that the said decision does not help the petitioners in the facts of present case because the observations by the Hon ble Apex Court in the said decision with reference to the question which the Hon ble Apex Court paused for consideration viz. Whether judicial obstinacy can be treated as a form of bias are made in light of the facts of the said case which are different from set of facts of present case. In the said case, the dispute regarding promotion to the post of Inspector of Minimum Wages, Inspector of Trade Unions other Inspectors, Investigators, etc. constituting West Bengal sub-ordinate Labour Service was under consideration in a writ petition. The decision by the learned Single Judge was carried in appeal before the Division Bench. The Division Bench allowed the appeal whereby the directions passed by learned Single Judge was substituted by fresh directions. Subsequently, in compliance of the fresh directions, the State promoted certain employees. After two years, the same persons (except couple of employees from the same group) who had filed the previous writ petition filed another petition praying that they may be paid arrears of salary and allowances in terms of the judgment by learned Single Judge in the said earlier writ petition. The said subsequent petition came to be decided by another learned Single Judge observing that, since the directions by the learned Single Judge in previous petition were modified by Division Bench, the authorities should comply the directions by Court of Appeal as also the learned Judge as modified by Court of Appeal. The said judgment in the subsequent writ petition was challenged before the Division Bench which, incidentally, comprised the learned Single Judge who had decided the first/previous writ petition. The Division Bench comprising the learned Judge who had decided the previous writ petition allowed the appeal. In this background, it was contended before the Hon ble Apex Court that the learned Single Judge who decided the first / previous petition, having expressed his views as learned Single Judge in the first writ petition should not have sat in the Division Bench to hear the appeal in the same matter between the same party though initiated in subsequent petition.
It was in background of such facts that the Apex Court made the observations on which the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners based reliance, i.e. the observations in paragraph 28 of the judgment, which read thus:-
28. If a judgment is over-ruled by the higher court, the judicial discipline required that the Judge whole judgment is over-ruled must submit to that judgment.
He cannot, in the same proceedings or in collateral proceedings between the same parties, re-write the over-ruled judgment. Even if it was a decision on a pure question of law which came to be over-ruled, it cannot be reiterated in the same proceedings at the subsequent stage by reason of the fact that the judgment of the higher court which has over-ruled that judgment, not only binds the parties to the proceedings but also the Judge who had earlier rendered that decision. That Judge may have his occasion to reiterate his dogmatic views on a particular question of common law or constitutional law in some other case but not in the same case. If it is done, it would be exhibitive of his bias in his own favour to satisfy his egoistic judicial obstinacy.
In view of said facts and for the reason explained in the judgment the Hon ble Apex Court observed that if a judgment is overruled by Higher Court then the learned Judge whose judgment is overruled must submit to the judgment of the Higher Court and he cannot either in the same proceedings or in collateral proceedings between the same parties re-write the overruled judgment.
In present case, the judgment in the previous / decided case is yet not overruled though appeal against the said judgment is pending in High Court.
Besides this, though some witnesses and evidence, as claimed by the petitioners are common in present case and the previous / decided case, it is not even their case that entire set of evidence and entire facts and all incidents and all victims/concerned persons /complainants are common. Therefore, in view of the difference in facts of present case and the facts of the cited decision by the Hon ble Apex Court, the said decision would not help the petitioners.
17.1 As regards the other decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners i.e. the decision in case of Abdul Raoof (supra), it is appropriate to note that though some of the facts and circumstances in the said decision and in present case appear to be similar, in view of absence (in the cited decision) of the peculiar fact of present case viz. that the learned Judge is specially designated by the Hon ble the Chief Justice pursuant to the directions and order by the Hon ble Apex Court, the said decision will not render assistance to the petitioners for supporting the relief prayed for by the petitioners.
17.2 So far as the decision in case of Rajit Thakur (supra) is concerned it is necessary to note the difference in facts of present case as against the facts in the cited decision inasmuch as in the said case, the mandatory condition and requirement prescribed by Section 130 of Indian Army Act, 1950 was not complied with.
In present case it is not the allegation that in previous case the learned Judge had not complied mandate of any provision of applicable law. In present proceedings also, any breach or non-compliance of any provision of law is not cited. True it is that while considering the claim made on ground of reasonable apprehension regard should be had to the state of mind of party but the apprehension in the mind of the party should be real, genuine, bonafide and it must have substantial and concrete base and the apprehension should not be imaginary or motivated by some intention or should not be a facade or ruse to avoid a particular learned Judge.
18. It is only on the ground that the same Judge has decided one case wherein they are convicted by the same Judge and some witnesses/evidence in the said case and in present case are common, the demand that the learned Judge should recuse herself was made and now further/alternative relief that the case should be transferred to any other Court or other learned Judge should preside over the trial, is made by the petitioners. However, as mentioned above any material, much less substantial and cogent material, to support and justify the apprehension is not placed on record and/or any incidence related to or arising from the conduct of the proceedings of the case and/or conduct of the learned Judge and/or observations or utterance by the learned Judge are also not placed before this Court. In the facts and circumstances of present case, the reasons urged by the petitioners do not, at this stage, and from the material on record, rise from the stature of mere apprehension and do not, in absence of any substantial supporting material, acquire status of real and reasonable apprehension.
On overall consideration of the facts of the case and as an upshot of the foregoing discussion and reasons, the petitions fail and do not deserve to be entertained. At this stage, any case for interference with the impugned order is not made out and the petitioners have not placed any substantial material to support and justify the request that the learned Judge should recuse from conducting the trial or that though the learned Judge is a specially Designated Court under the notification issued by the High Court in view of the order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice pursuant to the direction by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the said sessions case should be transferred to any other Court.
In the result, all three petitions are not entertained and they accordingly stand disposed of.
(K.M.THAKER, J.) kdc Page 29