Bombay High Court
Nandkumar Natha vs State Of Maharashtra on 17 July, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1988CRILJ1313
JUDGMENT R.A. Jahagirdar, J.
1. The appellant, hereinafter referred to as "the accused", has been convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Satara of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code in Sessions Case No. 30 of 1983 by holding that the prosecution has proved that the accused did, on 25th November 1982, commit the murder of one Vimal Baburao Sawant by setting fire to her clothes after pouring kerosene over the same. The evidence brought on record in the case by the prosecution shows that the accused was having some intimate relationship with the deceased Vimal who was staying in a part of the house of one Sonabai, examined as P.W. 1. There are different shades of impressions among the different witnesses relating to the reaction of Sonabai to the intimacy that had developed between the accused and Vimal. It is, however, totally unnecessary for us to say anything more on that aspect of the prosecution case. It is enough forour purpose to mention what actually happened on 25th of November 1982.
2. At about 9.30 P.M. on 25th November 1982, Vimal, who was sleeping in her room, suddenly rushed out of the room in a burning condition. She came in a lane between the house of Sonabai and one Pratibha, the latter having been examined as P.W. 4. Vimal shouted that Nandya, meaning the accused, has set her on fire. Sonabai, frightened by the ghastly sight, immediately rushed with a bucket of water which she poured over the body of Vimal, Similar reaction was also shown by Pratibha (P.W. 4). Niwas is the son of Sonabai and he has been examined as P.W. 8. He was also present near the place of incident at that time. The accused was running away from the scene, but P.W. 8 Niwas was successful in chasing and bringing him back to the house of Sonabai. Vimal was thereafter taken in a rickshaw to hospital by Sonabai and Niwas along with the accused. Dr. Tamboli, examined as P.W. 9, received Vimal in the hospital and gave her treatment. The case being a medico-legal case, he immediately informed the police and also requested the police to arrange for recording a dying declaration. Abdul Latif Khan, a Special Executive Magistrate examined as P.W. No. 3, arrived in the hospital and after having been certified by Dr. Tamboli that Vimal was in a fit condition to give a statement, he proceeded to record the statement of Vimal in the ward where she had been admitted. The dying declaration recorded by P.W. 3 Abdul Khan is at Exhibit 21. The accused was taken into custody at the hospital itself. The statements of all the material witnesses were recorded on the same day, namely on 25th of November 1982.
3. Fortunately, the condition of Vimal did not deteriorate at least for some days and she lived up to the 11th of December 1982. Before that, however, she had developed a condition known as septicemia, This is caused by the burn injuries developing sepsis. Ultimately she died on account of septicemia on 11th of December 1982. Dr, Ahiwale, as P.W. 2, has conducted the post-mortem examination and he has given the opinion that Vimal died of septicemic shock due to burns. The post-mortem notes are at Exhibit 9.
4. It is on these facts that the accused was put up for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Witnesses, whose names we have already mentioned in the narration of the prosecution case, were examined. P.S.I. Patil, the investigating officer, was examined as P.W. 10. The learned Sessions Judge was sufficiently impressed by the testimony of these witnesses and the veracity of the dying declaration to convict the accused of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He proceeded to award the sentence of life imprisonment to the accused, which he did by his judgment and order dated 4th October 1983. It is this order of conviction and sentence which is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal.
5. Miss Sharma has assisted the Court by representing the accused having been requested to do so. She has challenged the conviction of the accused on the ground that despite the testimonies of the so-called eyewitnesses the prosecution case here must stand or fall on the acceptability or otherwise of the dying declaration (Exhibit 21) recorded by P.W. 3 Abdul Latif Khan. According to Miss Sharma, this dying declaration is of doubtful character because in the first place it has not been clearly established that Vimal was in a fit condition to give a statement and secondly it has not been established that this dying declaration is a free conscious and voluntary statement of Vimal. The suggestion is that the statement which was recorded by P.W. 3 Abdul Latif Khan was a tutored one. -This suggestion, says Miss Sharma, is based upon the evidence that at the time when this dying declaration was being recorded, P.W. 1 Sonabai and P.W. 8 Niwas were present. It is also in evidence, says Miss Sharma, that these two persons are inimically disposed towards the accused and nothing was simpler for them than to induce or persuade Vimal to involve the accused in the present crime. She has also assailed the testimonies of the three eyewitnesses by contending that there was neither opportunity nor occasion for them to witness the incident in such a manner as to suggest that the accused was involved in the crime and none else.
6. These are the submissions which have been urged in support of the appeal. We will examine them in the order in which Miss Sharma has put them before us. P.W. 3 Abdul Latif Khan, the Special Executive Magistrate who was requested to record the dying declaration by the police, arrived in the female ward of burn cases of the Satara General Hospital around 11 a.m. on 25th November 1982. Himself and Dr. Tamboli went near the bed of Vimal. Dr. Tamboli certified that Vimal was in a fit state of mind and body to give the dying declaration. It may also be stated that there is other evidence to show that this certification was made by Dr. Tamboli after the scribing of the dying declaration was complete. The Magistrate has stated that he recorded the statement given by Vimal in his own handwriting and he read over the same to Vimal and obtained her thumb impression thereon. He has also put his own signatures. The original dying declaration, copy of which had been given to the police, was kept in a sealed packet which was brought to the Court and taken on record after opening the seal.
7. In the cross-examination it was suggested to him that Vimal was not in a position to give a statement. He has, however, admitted that before recording the statement of Vimal he did not ask her any questions. The criticism is that this Magistrate did not satisfy himself that Vimal was in a fit condition to answer questions. In our opinion on the facts of this case, this criticism is misplaced because Dr. Tamboli who was attending upon Vimal says that Vimal was in a fit condition to make a statement. Dr. Tamboli has stated that no relative was present around the cot of Vimal, but her neighbour and neighbour's son were present near the bed of Vimal. However, he has hastened to add that those people were giving courage and solace to Vimal. It has not been suggested to the Magistrate that either the neighbour or the neighbour's son was prompting Vimal in any manner. The entire statement was given by Vimal after the Magistrate asked her as to how she was burnt. It was not necessary to put any more questions to her.
8. The dying declaration is at Exhibit 21. It mentions the name of the person making it as Vimal Baburao Sawant aged 20 years. She resides at Raviwar Peth and states that she had burns. She has further stated that Nandkumar Khamkar (the accused) of Sadar-bazar poured kerosene on her body and he set her on fire. The provocation for this act is the refusal of Vimal to marry him, though she has further stated that the accused was not coming to her in the past. He was, however, threatening her that he would stab her. She holds him completely responsible for the act of setting her on fire. She prays that the accused be dealt with according to law.
9. Miss Sharma's first criticism that the dying declaration has not been recorded when Vimal was in a fit condition to give it has to be rejected without giving any detailed reasons. Dr. Tamboli, who has been examined as P.W. 9, has in categorical terms stated that Vimal was in a fit condition to give a statement to the Magistrate. In fact he himself had suggested that a Magistrate should be called for recording her dying declaration. We do not see any reason why we should suspect the unequivocal statement made by Dr. Tamboli on oath regarding the fitness of Vimal to make a statement. He was the doctor in charge of Vimal at the relevant time; he was the one who received Vimal when she was brought to the hospital; and he was the one who had already started treatment on her. He was, therefore, competent to satisfy himself and to satisfy the Magistrate regarding the physical and mental fitness of Vimal to make the dying declaration. We fully accept this part of the evidence of Dr. Tamboli. If we cannot reject what Dr. Tamboli, says, there was lessor reason for P.W. 3 Abdul Latif Khan to disregard the opinion given by Dr. Tamboli. If in these circumstances Abdul Latif Khan proceeded to record the statement of Vimal, we are satisfied that the said statement was recorded when Vimal was physically and mentally fit to give that statement.
10. The suggestion that the dying declaration must be held to be tutored one in view of the fact that Sonabai and her son Niwas were present at the time when it was recorded cannot be brushed aside summarily. However, we notice that Sonabai and Niwas, P.W. Nos. 1 and 8 respectively, had already witnessed Vimal coming out of her room in a burning condition and they had heard her saying that it was Nandya, namely the accused, who was responsible for her burn injuries. There was absolutely no reason for them to tutor Vimal and to involve the accused in the instant case. As we will see presently when we examine the oral testimonies of Sonabai, Pratibha and Niwas, P.W. Nos. 1, 4 and 8 respectively, there is convincing evidence to show that it was the accused who came out of the room of Vimal when the latter had already come out screaming that she had been set on fire by the accused. There is also evidence to show that the accused had run away from that place, but was apprehended to be brought back to the scene of the offence. If this is the state of evidence, which commends itself to us, then it becomes difficult to accept the criticism of Miss Sharma that the dying declaration (Exhibit 21) must be held to be a tutored one. This is so despite the fact that P.W. 1 Sonabai and P.W. 8 Niwas were probably present when the said dying declaration was recorded by P.W. 3 Abdul Latif Khan. This is so also despite the fact that there is strong suggestion that P.W. 1 Sonabai and her son P.W. 8 Niwas were ill-disposed towards the accused for some reason or the other.
11. It must be remembered that the incident took place around 10 in the morning. There is no scope for mistakenly identifying some other person, if that some other person was involved in the act of burning. There is also no mistake in the identification of the accused for the additional reason that Vimal herself had shouted that it was Nandya, the accused, who had set her on fire. In fact these words which Vimal uttered immediately after she came out of the house themselves constitute an oral dying declaration. That oral dying declaration has been proved, as we will presently show, by the testimonies of Sonabai, Pratibha and Niwas, P.W. Nos. 1, 4 and 8 respectively.
12. Miss Sharma says that there is some inherent infirmity in the dying declaration at Exhibit 21. One recital in the dying declaration is to the effect that the accused was never coming to her in the past. Miss Sharma says, and with considerable justification, that there is evidence to show that the accused was on intimate terms with Vimal. If this is so, then this statement to be found in the dying declaration is destructive of the entire dying declaration. We refuse to accept this inference from the recitals in the dying declaration. One must not forget that Vimal has also stated in her dying declaration that the accused set her on fire because she did not marry him. She has also stated that the accused was threatening her that he would stab her. There is thus left no doubt in the mind of the writer of this dying declaration that Vimal was not herself will-disposed towards the accused as to have allowed him the intimacies. It is in this context that she has stated that the accused was never coming to her in the past. In any case, this recital is not so serious, considering all the circumstances, as to destroy the kernel or truth that is contained in this dying declaration. It is perfectly permissible to reject a part of the dying declaration if it is found to be untrue and if it can be separated. See Godhu v. State of Rajasthan . If the dying declaration as a whole recorded in circumstances which are free from suspicion rings true, the Court would be fully justified in acting upon it. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting all the three criticisms which have been made by Miss Sharma on the evidence relating to the dying declaration.
13. We would have been perfectly justified in confirming the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that it was the accused who was responsible for the clothes of Vimal being set on fire on the basis of this dying declaration alone. However, there is adequate oral evidence and that evidence consists of, as already mentioned above, the testimonies of the three witnesses, namely P.W. 1 Sonabai, P.W. 4 Pratibha and P.W. 8 Niwas. Sonabai who is a senior citizen of Satara being 61 years old, resides in a house at Raviwar Peth. Along with her, her husband, her son Niwas (P.W. 8) and one daughter Ratna also reside. Deceased Vimal was known to her and was residing in her house as a tenant for nearly 11 years before the witness gave evidence in the Court. Sonabai states that since Vimal had no other relative and had her left hand and leg paralysed, Sonabai had brought her up in her house. Vimal was staying in the rear portion of the house. About the incident giving rise to this prosecution, Sonabai has stated that at about 9.15 a. m. when she was sleeping in her house, Vimal came to her house screaming that Nandya, that is the accused, had burnt her. When this witness came out of her house she saw that Vimal's clothes were burning and hence her daughter Ratna and a neighbour called Babai threw water from the bucket on the body of Vimal. Vimal had come in the courtyard of the house of this witness while she was burning. At that time her son was sitting on a wooden seat. He also therefore necessarily witnessed the incident. Sonabai says that Vimal also mentioned that Nandya had run away from the place. Niwas, namely the son of Sonabai, chased the accused. and brought him back to the place. Several other persons had gathered there and they all took Vimal as well as the accused to the hospital where Vimal was admitted for treatment and the accused was apprehended by the police who arrived there on being informed of the commission of the offence.
14. In her examination-in-chief Sonabai has given some more details about the life she is leading at Satara. In the cross-examination, some details about the situation of her house and the apartment in which Vimal was staying has been elicited Some family details have also been brought out in the cross-examination. On the main part of the incident, the cross-examination made on behalf of the accused has been totally ineffective. In fact we are surprised that specific questions about the ability of Sonabai to see and hear what she saw and heard and about the presence of the accused who was seen running away and who was brought back to the scene of offence have not been asked at all. In the detailed cross-examination, an attempt has been made, which has succeeded to some extent, to show that her own children are involved in some criminal activities. That itself, in our opinion, is no ground for rejecting her testimony because in the instant case the criminal background, if any, of the sons of this witness is totally irrelevant to the veracity of her testimony if it otherwise is found to be persuasive.
15. She has firmly rejected the suggestions made on behalf of the defence that she was living on the immoral earnings of Vimal and that she was opposed to Vimal marrying the accused because that would deprive her of some money. We remain totally unimpressed by the material which has been brought out by this line of cross-examination of P.W. 1 Sonabai. We are adequately satisfied with the account given by her of the incident that took place on 25th of November 1982 in which Vimal sustained burn injuries and her said evidence has totally remained intact despite the detailed cross-examination to which she was subjected to. We, therefore, accept that Vimal came out of her house with her clothes burning; that Sonabai's daughter Ratna and one neighbour Babai poured water over her body; and that around the same time Vimal shouted that it was Nandya, the accused who had set her clothes on fire. If these three aspects of the evidence are accepted, then naturally the accused is firmly in the grip of conviction.
16. Sonabai has, in all material particulars, been corroborated by P.W. 4 Pratibha, who is a neighbour of Sonabai. It is not necessary to examine the evidence of P.W. 4 Pratibha in greater details because the account of the incident given by her is almost identical to the account given by Sonabai. Miss Sharma, however, wants to contend that either Pratibha or Sonabai is not telling the truth because both of them claim to have gone to the rescue of Vimal and both of them say that they poured bucket full of water on the burning body of Vimal. Pratibha has given the sequence of the incident in such a manner as to suggest that she and Babai threw the water first and Sonabai and her daughter Ratna came in the lane at that time. We are reluctant to accept the suggestion of Miss Sharma that both Sonabai and Pratibha or either of them is telling untruth. We are, here, dealing with a situation where a woman has come out of her dwelling with her body in flames and two persons have rushed to help her to get rid of the flames. If, therefore, each of them has mentioned that she has thrown water on the body of the victim and at that time the other also came on the scene, we do not think that there is any such discrepancy in the sequence as to reject the testimony of both or either of them. The cross-examination of Pratibha is totally ineffective, as it was bound to be.
17. Similarly, the testimony of P.W. 8 Niwas is also, in our opinion, sufficiently convincing on the point that it was the accused who had poured kerosene on the body of Vimal and set fire to her clothes. He has stated that on the date of the incident he was present near his handcart when Satish and Deepak came to him and told him that Vimal was burnt. He went running to his house when Ratna and Vimal told him to find out Nandya Vimal was sitting in front of the house of this witness. Her body had been covered with a saree by his sister asher clothes were burnt. He went running to Minakshi Hotel where the accused was serving. He found the accused in the kitchen. He was sweating and frightened. The witness asked the accused to come to the house. Overruling the objections of the accused, this witness brought the accused to his house and then along with Vimal and others he was taken to the hospital The police arrived at the hospital and took the accused in a jeep.
18. On the main incident, there is hardly any cross-examination of P.W. 8 Niwas. One must, therefore, proceed to accept the statement of this witness that he on being told that the accused had done an act which ultimately Resulted in the death of Vimal apprehended the accused and brought him to the hospital where he was taken into custody by the police. We are more than adequately satisfied with the oral testimonies of these three witnesses, namely P.W. 1 Sonabai, P.W. 4 Pratibha and P.W. 8 Niwas to hold that it was the accused who had caused burn injuries to Vimal by throwing kerosene on her clothes and setting the same on fire. This is in addition to the evidence, which has also commended itself tous, namely the dying declaration of Vimal at Exhibit 21 made to P.W. 3 Abdul Latif Khan in the presence of P.W. 9 Dr. Tamboli, who has certified that she was at the time of the making of the dying declaration, in a physically and mentally, fit condition to make the same.
19. Miss Sharma has thereafter argued that the offence, if it is held proved, could not be one under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, but could only be one under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. In order to support her contention, she has, naturally, drawn our attention to the medical evidence on record P.W. 2 Dr. Ahiwale has stated that he conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of Vimal on 13th of December 1982. It should be stated at this stage that though Vimal was admitted in the hospital on 25th of November 1982, she survived up to 11th of December 1982. The external examination made by Dr. Ahiwale showed that there were deep burns on the lower parts of chest, around and below the umbilicus, upper part of left thigh, entire right thigh anteriorly and posteriorly, genitelia, buttocks, posterior part of both fore-arms and lower arms of both sides of Vimal. There was no particular internal damage. He has given septicemic shock, due to burns as the probable cause of death. In the examination-in-chief, the doctor has further stated that in case of 30% burns, there are very rare chances of survival. In the cross-examination, to a specific question, he has stated that burn injuries directly on upper part of chest, neck and face are supposed to be fatal injuries and a patient with such injuries is likely to die in all probability. He has accepted the suggestion that the patient having 30% burns below umbilicus has more chances of survival than a patient having 30% burn injuries above the umbilicus. From this Miss Sharma wants us to conclude that the death of Vimal was not the necessary consequence of the act of the accused. It has also been stated by Dr. Ahiwale that septicemia may be developed on account of the exposition of the burn injuries to things which are not sterilised, including the substituted clothes. If, therefore, says Miss Sharma, Vimal is shown to have died on account of septicemia, it cannot be said that the act of the accused caused the death of Vimal. The submission is based upon the interpretation of the first part of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. According to Miss Sharma, even if it is assumed that the intention of the accused was to cause death, he has not done an act which caused the death of Vimal. At most it could be said that the intention of the accused to cause the death of Vimal was not translated into the effect of causing her death; it was translated into causing only bum injuries, which burn injuries alone were not the cause of the death of Vimal.
20. We have examined this apparently attractive submission of Miss Sharma with all the care that it deserves and we are unable to accept the same. In order to appreciate this submission, we think it necessary to refer also to the evidence of P.W. 9 Dr. Tamboli, whose case papers have been produced before the Court at Exhibit 10. He has stated that treatment was given to Vimal for burn shock. Though she came out of that shock, later, on account of extensive burns, she developed complications, including sepsis due to infection. In reply to questions in the cross-examination, he has reaffirmed this position. He has stated that pus formation must have started on the second or third day of admission. He accepts the proposition put to him that septicemia may lead to septic shock. But it had not been brought out that septicemia was not the result of the burn injuries suffered by Vimal. On the other hand, as we have already seen, in the examination-in-chief he has asserted that on account of the extensive burns Vimal developed complications, including sepsis due to infection. The summary of the medical evidence is that the burn injuries which the accused had caused by setting the clothes of Vimal on fire were 30%. They caused burn shock. Though the patient came out of the same due to treatment, on account of the extensive burns received by her, she developed complications, including sepsis. The next condition was septicemia leading to septic shock. Septicemia itself is the species of the larger disease known as erysipelas. The question now, therefore, is whether the death of Vimal can be attributed to the act of the accused, which was that of pouring kerosene on the clothes of Vimal and setting them on fire?
21. At one stage Miss Sharma suggested that the intention of the accused was only, if at all, to cause grievous hurt and it was not his intention to cause her death. We emphatically reject this submission. Though one may agree that a person committing an offence relating to human bodies is not always aware of the consequences of his act, in the present case, the act of pouring kerosene on the clothes of Vimal and setting them on fire, in our opinion, necessarily implies an intention on the part of the accused to cause her death. If a person pours kerosene on the clothes of another person and then sets fire to the same, the only intention that could be inferred is that of causing the death of the other person. That a person who is set on fire is bound to suffer serious injuries and is; bound to die as a result of those injuries is a part of the knowledge which must necessarily be attributed to the person who indulges in such act. In B. Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. , it was held that when one of the accused poured kerosene on the boy after which the appellant lighted a match and set fire to his clothes, the intention was necessarily to cause the death of that boy. There was no doubt about that intention.
22. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad (1968) 2 SCJ 355 : 1968 Cri LJ 1025 the accused had put kerosene oil upon his wife and then set her clothes on fire. The Supreme Court held that it was obvious that the accused must have known that he was running the risk of causing the death of his wife or such bodily injury which was likely to cause her death. The Supreme Court held that the act could even be covered under clause Fourthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. It was, therefore, held that his offence was culpable homicide amounting to murder even if he had not intended to cause the death. There, naturally, the Supreme Court examined a position alternative to the First Clause of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and held that even if that alternative position was accepted, still the offence would be one covered by Section 300 and punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. We are of the opinion that a person who pours kerosene on the clothes of another and sets fire to the same must be attributed with the intention of causing the death of that other person. In the instant case, therefore, we hold that the accused did the act which is proved to have been committed by him with the intention of causing the death of Vimal.
23. The next submission of Miss Sharma that the act itself did not result in the death of Vimal and, therefore, even if the accused entertained the intention of causing her death, his act itself did not cause the death and therefore he could not be held guilty of the offence covered by clause Firstly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code needs to be examined in some details. The first clause of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code says that culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. The act under examination is one of pouring kerosene over the body of a person and setting fire to the same. The necessary consequence of such an act is causing burns on the body of the victim. If the said burns result in the death of the person concerned, there is no dispute that the act which the accused caused in the instant case caused the death of the victim. But Miss Sharma says that it is not the act of the accused which caused the death in the instant case, but a supervening factor, namely the development of septicemia, which could not be attributed to any act of the accused. We take it as settled law that if a supervening factor causes the death, but if that supervening factor is a necessary consequence or a necessary incident of the injury caused by the accused, then it can be said that the act itself caused the death of the victim concerned.
24. Dr. Sir Hari Singh Gour in his Penal Law of India has mentioned a rule applicable in such cases and it has been stated that it was laid down in Reg v. Flynm (1868) 16 WR (Eng) 319. In that case it was pointed out that the authorities seem to lay down the rule that if a man who has received a serious blow or hurt does not alter his ways on that account, but continues to go through his ordinary course of life which he has been accustomed to pursue, that shall not exonerate the giver of the blow from his liability if such conduct has had the effect of causing death. But if, on the other hand, his acts subsequent to the blow, are so far out of his ordinary course as to give rise to a distinct set of circumstances causinga new mischief, then the new mischief will be regarded as the cousa causati, and not the original blow. (See Penal Law of India by Dr. Sir Hari Singh Gour, Volume IV, 10th Edition, page 2223). It is only when the intervening cause was totally unexpected or unrelated to the original injury caused by the act of the accused that one can possibly contend that the death was not the direct or proximate result of the act of the accused We have before us the evidence of two doctors which unerringly shows that septicemia was incidental to or a necessary consequence of the burn injuries suffered by Vimal. This fact is not obliterated by the fact that by a proper medical care the possibility of septicemia could have been avoided. (See Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code).
25. Similar is the view taken by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Manajar Allabux v. State . It has been pointed out in that case that broadly speaking, the courts have to distinguish between two types of cases; namely those cases where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury and those cases where the so-called complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In the first place it may be that the complication was not the cause of death but in the latter case when the probability is very high amounting to practical certainty, then death must be held to be the result in due course of natural events. In the case before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, a deep abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal organs had been given. It was found to be practically certain that the said injury would result in acute peritonitis which caused the death.
26. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in fact relied upon a judgment of the Nagpur High Court namely Salebhai v. Emperor . In this case it was held that the offence amounted to murder even though death was ultimately due to supervention of gangrene and paralysis of intestines. The Nagpur High Court, while so holding expressed their agreement with a similar view taken earlier in Lal Singh v. Emperor AIR 1938 Lah31 : 39 Cri LJ 265.
27. On the evidence, which has commended itself to us, we have held that the burn injuries were to the extent of 30% and there was every likelihood of those injuries becoming septic. In this case they became septic resulting in what the doctors have described as septicemia which ultimately was the cause of death of Vimal. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that it was the act of the accused which resulted in the death of Vimal. Since we have already held that the intention of the accused was to cause the death of Vimal, the accused must be held guilty of the act contemplated in the First) Clause of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. The offence committed by the accused, therefore, is punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the instant case, therefore, is on facts and in law correct and has to be affirmed.
28. In the result, the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Satara in Sessions Case No. 30 of 1983 are confirmed.