Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Chilaka Srikanth vs K Arogyaraju on 23 January, 2026
APHC010628452025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY,THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 12090/2025
Between:
1.CHILAKA SRIKANTH, S/O. SUNIL BABU, AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
R/O. SC COLONY, KROSURU VILLAGE AND MANDAL, GUNTUR
DISTRICT.
2.DUGGI DASU ALIAS PRABHUDASU,, S/O. RAMANAIAH ALIAS PEDA
RAMANAIAH, AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS, R/O. SC COLONY,
KROSURU VILLAGE AND MANDAL, GUNTUR DISTRICT
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
AND
1.K AROGYARAJU, S/O. NOT KNOWN, AGED MAJOR, OCC SUB
INSPECTOR OF POLICE, R/O. NALLAPADU, GUNTUR, GUNTUR
DISTRICT.
2.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH SHO NALLAPADU
POLICE STATION, REP BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH
COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S):
1.PATIL YUGANDHAR REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
2.
The Court made the following:
2
ORDER:
Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Act, 2023 (for brevity the 'BNSS') by the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 & 2, seeking to quash the proceedings against them in C.C.No.4579 of 2025 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, Guntur.
2. The allegation against the Petitioners is that, on 11.05.2021 at about 19:00 hours, while the Sub‑Inspector of Police, Nallapadu Police Station, along with his staff, was engaged in enforcing the curfew orders promulgated by the Government to contain the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the accused persons, namely, Chilaka Srikanth and Duggi Dasu @ Prabhudas, were found travelling in a car bearing registration No.AP 07 EB 7929 without any lawful pass or authorization, and upon being lawfully intercepted, they not only disobeyed the prohibitory orders but also abused the police officials in vulgar language, threatened them with dire consequences, invoked political influence, and physically obstructed them from discharging their legitimate duties, thereby committing acts amounting to criminal intimidation, obstruction of public servants, violation of epidemic control measures, and disobedience of lawful orders. Their conduct, as recorded in the police proceedings, is alleged to constitute offences punishable under Sections 353, 188, 269, 270, 271 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity 'the I.P.C.,') and Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, and Section 51(1)(b) of the National Disaster Management Act, 2005. 3
3. The factual matrix, as borne out of the complaint lodged by K.Arogyaraju, Sub‑Inspector of Police, Nallapadu Police Station, Guntur Urban, is that on 11.05.2021 at about 07:00 PM, while he along with his staff HC‑02 and PC‑5415 was engaged in patrolling within the jurisdiction of Nallapadu Police Station to enforce the Government‑promulgated curfew orders issued in view of the COVID‑19 pandemic, they intercepted a car bearing registration No.AP07EB7929 near Mirchi Yard. Upon questioning the occupants regarding their travel and demanding production of a valid pass, the two individuals allegedly descended from the vehicle, quarrelled with the police officials, abused them in filthy language, pushed them aside, and obstructed their lawful duties. Consequently, proceedings were registered in Cr.No.392/2021, culminating in the filing of a charge sheet numbered as C.C.No.4579/2025 before the learned Special Mobile Magistrate, Guntur.
4. Sri Patil Yugandhar Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the entire prosecution is vitiated by legal infirmities and is a manifest abuse of the process of law. It is contended that the allegations under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' are unsustainable inasmuch as cognizance of such offence is barred under Section 195(1)(i) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' which mandates that only a complaint, in writing by the public servant who promulgated the order, or his administrative superior, can form the basis of prosecution. In the present case, the Sub‑Inspector of Police, being merely an implementing authority, had no competence to lodge the complaint, and therefore the proceedings are void ab initio. It is further urged that the charge sheet has been filed mechanically 4 without adherence to statutory requirements, thereby rendering the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate wholly unsustainable in law.
5. It is further argued that the ingredients of Sections 269 and 270 of 'the I.P.C.,' are conspicuously absent, as there is no allegation that the Petitioners were suffering from COVID‑19 or that their conduct was likely to spread infection. Similarly, invocation of Section 271 of 'the I.P.C.,' is wholly misconceived, since the provision pertains to quarantine regulations relating to vessels and intercourse between infected and non‑infected places, which is not applicable to the facts at hand. The allegation under Section 353 of 'the I.P.C.,' is also untenable, as the complaint itself does not disclose any act of assault or use of criminal force against the police officials, but merely a quarrel and verbal exchange. Moreover, the offences under Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act and Section 51(1)(b) of the National Disaster Management Act cannot be sustained, as cognizance thereof requires a direct complaint by the competent public authority, which is absent in the present case. Thus, the continuation of proceedings against the Petitioners is malicious, instituted with mala fides, and amounts to sheer abuse of the process of Court, and it is urged to quash the charge sheet and all consequential proceedings.
6. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor.
7. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 5
8. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is:
"Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.4579/2025 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, Guntur is liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of 'the Cr.P.C.,'/Section 528 of 'the BNSS'?"
9. On a careful consideration of the record and the allegations, this Court is of the view that the offences invoked under Sections 269, 270 and 271 of 'the I.P.C.,' are not attracted to the facts of the present case. The gravamen of these provisions is the likelihood of spreading infection of a disease dangerous to life, either negligently or malignantly, or by disobedience of quarantine rules. The prosecution material does not disclose that the Petitioners were suffering from COVID- 19 or any other contagious disease, nor does it allege that their conduct was capable of transmitting infection. In the absence of such foundational facts, the essential ingredients of these offences are conspicuously lacking, and their application to the present case is wholly misconceived.
10. Turning to the allegation under Section 353 of 'the I.P.C.,' the complaint does not disclose any act of assault or use of criminal force against the police officials. The narration is confined to a quarrel and verbal abuse, which, however reprehensible, does not satisfy the statutory requirement of assault or criminal force as contemplated under Section 353 of 'the I.P.C.' Mere obstruction or exchange of words, without physical interference amounting to assault, cannot be elevated to the level of an offence under this provision. 6 Hence, the invocation of Section 353 of 'the I.P.C.,' against the Petitioners is legally untenable.
11. With respect to Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and Section 51(1)(b) of the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, cognizance of offences under these special enactments requires a direct complaint by the competent authority empowered under the respective statutes. In the present case, no such complaint has been filed by the designated authority, instead, the proceedings have been initiated on the basis of a police report. In the absence of a valid complaint from the competent authority, the prosecution under these provisions cannot be sustained. The continuation of proceedings under these sections, therefore, amounts to a mechanical exercise without adherence to statutory mandate and is liable to be quashed as an abuse of process of law.
12. Further, as per Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' there is a bar for taking cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both inclusive of, 'the I.P.C.,' unless there is a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned.
13. In the instant case, there is no 'complaint' by the public servant, and there was only chargesheet filed under Section 188 of 'the Cr.P.C.' The 'complaint' as contemplated under Section 190 read with 200 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' was not filed. When such a complaint was not filed, but based on the police report, the learned Magistrate was not authorised to take cognizance of the 7 alleged offences, inasmuch as, under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' there is an embargo for taking cognizance.
14. In this regard it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.,1 wherein at paragraph Nos.28 & 29, it is held as under:
"28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in those sections. (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar [(1971) 3 SCC 329 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 608 : AIR 1971 SC 1708] , Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548 :
AIR 1971 SC 1935] , Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [(1996) 3 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 521] , State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 642] , K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy [(2005) 7 SCC 352 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1673] and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] .)
29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. [(1953) 1 SCC 637 : AIR 1953 SC 293 : 1953 Cri LJ 1232] and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1775 : 1966 Cri LJ 1491] , this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it."1
(2010) 9 SCC 567 8
15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar2, at paragraph No.12 it is held as under:
"12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528 :
(1967) 1 SCR 520 : 1967 Cri LJ 528] . The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein."
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh3, at paragraph No.6 it is held as under:
"6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to the court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein. In Patel Laljibhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376 :
1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR 1971 SC 1935] the main controversy was as to when the accused had become a party to the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in 1974 replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of any relevance. It is seen that the appellants therein had filed a civil suit on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-1963 and the civil suit had come to be dismissed on 30-1- 1965. Thereafter, the private complaint was filed on 16-11-1965. In the light of those facts it was held that the respondent was a party to the 2 (1971) 3 SCC 329 3 (1996) 3 SCC 533 9 proceedings in the suit and that, therefore, the private complaint was not maintainable."
17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh4, at paragraph No.2 held as under:
"2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC. The judgment of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy [(1983) 4 SCC 240 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 822 : AIR 1983 SC 1053] on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the civil court and hence it was held that the court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 CrPC."
18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy5, at paragraph Nos.3 & 4 held as under:
"3. By the impugned order, the High Court of Madras quashed the prosecution of the respondents, which was launched under Sections 467, 468, 471, 472 and 477-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code (for short "IPC") on the ground that the complaint was barred under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CrPC"). Undisputedly, the forgery is said to have been committed before the document was filed. Earlier, there was diverse opinion of this Court as to whether protection of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC was available in relation to forgery committed prior to the filing of document or after its filing. A 4 (1998) 2 SCC 391 5 (2005) 7 SCC 352 10 Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] has categorically laid down in para 33 of the judgment that protection engrafted under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it had been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. This being the position, in our view, the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents on the ground that provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC were applicable.
4. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to claim protection under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, which enumerates the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC. It has been pointed out that according to the petition of complainant, the accused persons had falsely filed a complaint before the Deputy Registrar, Chits, who dismissed the matter finally. The said complaint was not dismissed by the Deputy Registrar on merits, but without any adjudication, inasmuch as there was no finding that the complainant had lodged a false complaint before the Deputy Registrar. The present complaint does not relate to falsity or otherwise of the complaint before the Deputy Registrar;
rather according to the prosecution case, the accused persons are said to have forged the document. This being the position, in our view, the provisions of Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, shall have no application to the case in hand. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents."
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B.,6 at paragraph No.12 held as under:
"12. Section 195 CrPC, on which the question raised is grounded, provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned no prosecution for an offence under Section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are committed, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on the other hand, they may also constitute the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence. The section does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been made. It was however argued that if on the same facts an offence of which no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of Section 195 is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as well which is outside the purview of the section and prosecution for that other offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of Section 6 (1953) 1 SCC 637 11 195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that section would become nugatory and if such a course was permitted those provisions will stand defeated. It was further said that it is not permissible for the prosecution to ignore the provisions of this section by describing the offence as being punishable under some other section of the Penal Code."
20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh7, wherein at paragraph Nos.15 & 16 it is held as under:
"15. On a scrutiny of Section 195(1)(a), we are of the view that a successor in office of a public servant concerned will also fall within the ambit of the expression 'public servant concerned'. Any other view contrary to it will only create difficulties in certain situations. For example, in a case where a public servant concerned promulgates a preliminary order under Section 133, 145 or 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is transferred or retires or ceases to be in office on any account before a final order is passed, would it mean that the successor who is under the law to continue the same proceeding has no right to file a complaint if the preliminary order is disobeyed. The answer would be that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation, one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by the public servant concerned.
16. Therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1422 : 1969 Cri LJ 4 : 70 Pun LR 1131] we are of the view that the successor in office of the public servant gets into the same position of the public servant concerned and he is in law eligible to file a complaint against wrongdoers. To say in other words, the successor in office falls within the ambit of the expression 'public servant concerned'. The view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed."
21. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy8, at paragraph No.8 it is held as under:
"8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld."7
(1994) 4 SCC 95 8 (1981) 2 SCC 185 12
22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh9, at paragraph No.5 it is held as under:
"5. The learned counsel next contends that the complaint could only be filed by the Magistrate before whom the original proceedings were taken. He says that according to Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint in respect of Sections 193, 195 and 211 IPC, can only be made by the Court in which the proceedings out of which the offences arose took place. We see no force in this contention. Section 559 enables a successor-in- office of a Magistrate to file a complaint. The relevant portion of Section 559 reads as follows:
"559. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor in office.
(2) When there is any doubt as to who is the successor in office of any Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency town, and the District Magistrate outside such towns, shall determine by order in writing the Magistrate who shall, for the purposes of this Code or of any proceedings or order thereunder, be deemed to be the successor in office of such Magistrate."
This section was substituted for the original Section 559 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (18 of 1923). Since the amendment it has been held, and we think rightly, that a successor in office of a Magistrate can file a complaint under Section 476, CrPC, in respect of an offence under Section 195 IPC, committed before his predecessor. (See Behram v. Beparor [27 Cr LJ 776] Bara Kanon Manjhi v. Gopi Manjhi [AIR 1927 Pat 327] ; and In re Subramaniam Chettiar [AIR 1957 Mad 442] . This section applies to all Magistrates and there is no reason why the plain terms of the section should be cut down to limit it, as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant, to Magistrates whose courts are permanent. It seems to us further clear that sub-section (2) has not the effect of limiting Section 559(1) Section 559(2) applies when there is a doubt as to who the successor is, and that doubt can be resolved in the manner laid down in sub-section (2). The sub-section does not mean, as contended by the learned counsel, that until a successor is determined under sub-section (2) there is no successor for the purposes of sub-section (1). If there is no doubt about who the successor is, then that person can exercise the powers under sub-section (1). We accordingly hold that the complaint was properly filed by Shri Joginder Singh "Karangarhia", Magistrate."
23. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni10, wherein at para No.48, it is held as under:
9
1968 SCC OnLine SC 253 10 (2020) 20 SCC 1 13 "48. Equally important to remember is that if in the course of the same transaction two separate offences are made out, for one of which Section 195 CrPC is not attracted, and it is not possible to split them up, the drill of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC must be followed. Thus, in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , this Court referred to a judgment of the Madras High Court (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy, In re [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] ) and approved its ratio as follows : (Hemareddy case [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , SCC pp. 190-91, paras 7-8) "7. ... In the third case, Somasundaram, J., has observed : (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy case [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] , SCC OnLine Mad) 'The main point on which Mr Jayarama Ayyar appearing for the petitioner seeks to quash this committal is that on the facts an offence under Section 193 IPC is disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under Section 193 IPC is revealed. Section 193 reads as follows:
"193. Punishment for false evidence.--Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
"Fabrication of false evidence" is defined in Section 192. The relevant portion of it is:
"Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending that such circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and that such circumstance may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding is said "to fabricate false evidence"."
The effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred by the complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will to come into existence intending that such will may cause the Judge before whom the suit is filed to form an opinion that the will is a genuine one and, therefore, his minor daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation, therefore, in the complaint will undoubtedly fall under Section 192 IPC. It will, therefore, amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC i.e. fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that the facts disclosed will also amount to an offence under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. For prosecuting this petitioner for an offence under Sections 467 and 471, a complaint by the court may not be necessary as under Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to any proceeding in any court.
Mr Jayarama Ayyar does not give up his contention that the petitioner, though he appears only a guardian of the minor girl, is still a party to the proceeding. But it is unnecessary to go into the question at the present moment and I reserve my opinion on the question whether the 14 guardian can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be disposed of on the other point viz. that when the allegations amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC, a complaint of court is necessary under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and this cannot be evaded by prosecuting the accused for an offence for which a complaint of court is not necessary.'
8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.""
24. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Kantamaneni Ravishankar v.
State of A.P.,11 at para No.86 it is held as under:
"86. Therefore, to register a crime against a person, who disobeyed the ordinance, there must be a complaint from public servant about the disobedience of ordinance. Hence, the very registration of crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. is contrary to the settled law laid down by the Apex Court and other High Courts (referred supra) and the police officer is incompetent to register a crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. on the complaint of any other person other than a public servant and any other person, who is authorized by pubic servant. Consequently, registration of crime against the petitioner is vitiated by irregularity."
25. This Court, in Kollu Ravindra v. State of A.P12 has categorically held that a complaint invoking offences under Sections 172 to 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' must emanate from a "public servant" as envisaged under Sections 190 and 200 of 'the Cr.P.C.' In the absence of such a statutory complaint, the learned Magistrate is divested of the competence to take cognizance of the alleged offence. The bar contained in Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' therefore, operates as a clear embargo on the assumption of cognizance based merely on a police report.
11
2020 SCC OnLine AP 726 12 2025 SCC OnLine AP 3870 15
26. This Court, further also held in Kanakamedala Ravindra Kumar v. State of A.P13 that when the allegations arise out of a single, indivisible transaction giving rise to multiple offences, one falling squarely within the ambit of Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and another ostensibly outside its sweep, such offences, being inextricably interwoven, cannot be artificially segregated to bypass the statutory embargo. The Court has categorically held that mere deletion of Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' from the charge sheet does not efface the bar, for the factual substratum of the alleged act continues to be integrally connected with the disobedience of a promulgated order, thereby mandating a complaint by the competent public servant as required under Section 195(1)(a) of 'the Cr.P.C.'
27. Considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan supra, the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, Guntur was not authorised to take cognizance in view of the embargo under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.'
28. Therefore, the proceedings against the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 & 2 in C.C.No.4579/2020 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, are liable to be interfered and quashed.
29. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed. Accordingly, the proceedings in C.C.No.4579/2020 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, are quashed.
_________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J 13 Criminal Petition No: 987/2020 16 Date: 23.01.2026 VTS