Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Nimmagadda Venkaiah And Ors. vs Sri Sangameswara Swamy Temple, Rep. By ... on 26 February, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1993(2)ALT283
ORDER G.V.L. Narasimha Rao, J.
1. This revision petition arises out of an order dated 25-11-1992 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Tenali in CM. A.No. 18 of 1992, setting aside the order dated 18-5-1992 of the Principal District Munsif, Tenali in IA.374/92 in O.S.40/1992 granting temporary injunction. The petitioners herein are the plaintiffs in the suit. First defendant is the temple. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to herein as the plaintiffs and the defendants.
2. It is useful to state a few facts which have given rise to prefer this revision. The plaintiffs filed the suit against the defendants for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of their respective plots in the plaint schedule land. The case of the plaintiffs (petitioner herein) is that they are the cultivating tenants and the first defendant (respondent No. 1 herein) is the landlord of the suit schedule lands; they have been cultivating tenants since more than 15 years and their lease was renewed in the year 1987 by the Commissioner of Endowments by his order dated 9-1-1987. According to the plaintiffs they are in Possession of the plaint A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, schedule plots and the maktha fixed varies from one tenant to the other. The Paripalanakartha of the temple was maintaining the accounts of the temple and he was collecting the Maktha from the plaintiffs. Subsequently disputes arose between the Paripalanakartha and the present Chairman of the temple with regard to the appointment of the members of the Trust Board. The first defendant issued a notice dated 22-10-1991 through his advocate to the plaintiffs to pay Maktha for the years 1988-89, 1989-90 and 1990-91, and for that, except the 7th plaintiff, others sent a reply notice informing the first defendant that the Paripalanakartha was collecting the Makta from them. According to the plaintiffs all of a sudden, the Chairman of the first defendant-temple announced on 11-3-1992 that he was going to auction the lease hold rights of the plaint schedule lands on 12-3-92; and some of the defendants participated in the said auction; the first defendant without following the procedure prescribed under law, for conducting the auction, leased out the lands of the temple in the auction. On 15-3-92, the defendants went to the plaint schedule lands and stated to the plaintiffs that the auction was knocked down in their favour, and tried to take possession of the plaint schedule lands, and on the resistance of the plaintiffs, the defendants went away. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants have no right to take possession of the suit schedule lands. Hence the plaintiffs filed the suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their followers from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of their respective plots in the schedule land. In the said suit the plaintiffs filed I.A.374/92 for the issuance of the temporary injunction against the defendants. In the petition, they reiterated the averments of the plaint and stated that the first defendant did not take possession of the land from them and all of them raised garden crops by investing huge amounts and if they are dispossessed, they will suffer irreparable loss.
3. The first defendant filed a counter stating that the plaintiffs are not the cultivating tenants in respect of the suit schedule lands and that the lease approved by the Commissioner of endowments on 9-1-87 was not given effect to as the petitioner failed to execute lease agreements and as they sub-leased the lands to others. According to the first defendant, the plaintiffs neither cultivated the lands nor paid any rent to the first defendant-temple and no tenancy exists in favour of the plaintiffs. It is also stated that the plaintiffs did not pay Maktha for the year 1991-92 and the first defendant denied the renewal of the lease by the Commissioner of Endowments on 15-3-1992 in favour of the plaintiffs. The ryots voluntarily surrendered possession of the lands to the first defendant in February, 92 and wanted to take fresh leases by enhancing the Maktha and by the date of filing of the suit by the plaintiffs, defendants 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, to 18 and 22 and some others were in possession of the temple-lands and the balance of convenience is in favour of the defendants and most of them ploughed the lands and commenced agricultural operations. Defendants 6 and 8 are members of the Trust Board of the temple and defendants 3, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 29, 21 and 23 are strangers and they are in no way concerned with the temple lands. According to the first defendant, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the conditions of the lease and they were never in possession of the schedule lands, and they are not entitled for any interim injunction. It is further stated in the counter that the Paripalanakartha was removed and the Trust Board has taken possession of the lands and the Paripalanakartha filed O.S.125 /91 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tenali and sought an injunction in I.A.1310/91 restraining the Chairman and the members of the Trust Board from performing their duties and that petition was dismissed after due enquiry on 14-10-91. The first defendant also further stated that the plaintiffs filed this petition at the instigation of one Kotha Satyanarayana, the power of attorney holder of the Paripalanakartha, who has misappropriated the temple funds to a tune of Rs. 7,50,000/- as evidenced by the audit report. He further stated that a single and common suit is not maintainable, that the defendants obtained lease for three years upto 31-3-1995 from the competent authority and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the relief claimed in the suit is prohibited under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act and requested the Court to dismiss the petition.
4. Defendants 6 to 8 filed a memo adopting the counter filed by the first defendant. The second defendant filed a counter denying the allegations in the affidavit filed in support of the injunction petition. Defendants 3 to 5, 7, 9 to 14, 16 to 22 filed a memo adopting the counter filed by the second defendant.
5. The plaintiffs-petitioners in support of their case, marked Exs. A-l to A-26, Ex.A-1 to A-8 are the notices issued by the advocate for the defendants 1, 6 and 8 to plaintiffs 1 to 8. Exs. A-9 to A-20are the receipts issued by the Paripalanakartha in favour of the plaintiffs 1 to 8 on various dates. Exs. A-21 to A-26 are the notices issued by the first defendant-temple to plaintiffs to 6. The defendants marked Exs.B-1 to B-l1, the receipts issued by the Chairman of Trust Board of the temple for Makta paid by them during 1991-92.
6. The Principal Munsif Magistrate, after considering the material on record, came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are the cultivating tenants of the lands of the first defendant-temple and that they are in possession of the lands and therefore, they are entitled to the relief of temporary injunction so far as the payment of Maktha is concerned, he held that the plaintiffs did not pay the Maktha for 1991-92 but gave an opportunity to them and directed mem to pay the Maktha by the 20th of June of every year, pending disposal of the suit. The learned Principal District Munsif further held that considering the material on record, it cannot be decided whether the Tenancy Act applies to the schedule lands or not, and granted the interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of their respective plots in the plaint schedule lands.
7. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Principal District Munsif the first defendant preferred C.M.A. 18/92 on the file of the Sub-Judge, Tenali contending that the Paripalanakartha, in collusion with the plaintiffs got the suit filed in the trial court and the plaintiffs are defaulters in payment of the Maktha for the year 1991-92 and they are not entitled for any interim injunction. The appellate court framed the following points for consideration:
1. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant interim injunction?
2. Whether the respondents are defaulters in payment of Makta?
3. Whether the respondents 1 to 8 are not entitled to any relief?
4. To what relief?
8. After considering various documents, the appellate court held that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the Civil Court as the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant an interim injunction to the plaintiffs against the defendants. As far as points 2 and 3 are concerned, the appellate court held that the plaintiffs (petitioners 1 to 8 herein ) committed default in payment of rent for the year 1991-92 and in that view of the matter, they are not entitled to the equitable relief of injunction without complying with the obligation cast on them. The appeal was allowed, order and the decretal order in I. A.374 /92 in O.S.40/92 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Tenali were set aside and consequently the interim injunction granted by the trial court was vacated.
9. Against the said order the plaintiffs filed the present revision petition contending that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant interim injunction. They further contended that they are not defaulters because they paid the amount as directed by the trial court on or before 20th of June, 1992. The suit schedule property is of an extent of sixty acres of land owned by the first defendant-temple. According to the first defendant previously the property was being managed by the Paripalanakartha and by an order of the Commissioner of Endowments he was removed and the Trust Board took possession of the schedule lands on 9-1-1991 on the allegation of misappropriation of the temple funds. Against that order of the Commissioner of Endowments, the said Paripalanakartha filed O.S.125/91 on the file of the Sub-Court and sought an injunction in I.A.1310/91 restraining the Chairman and the members of the Trust Board from performing their duties and that petition was dismissed on 14-10-91 after due enquiry. The first defendant took over the temple management and also the suit schedule lands and issued notices Exs.A-21 to A-26 on 22-10-91 to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not vacate the property but subsequently in February, 1992 they vacated the suit schedule lands and handed over them to the Chairman of the Trust Board and so in March, 1992 auction of the leasehold rights in respect of the schedule property was held and defendants 2 to 23 were put in possession of the schedule lands as they were the highest bidders. The plaintiffs filed the suit for the issuance of a permanent injunction and for a temporary injunction.
10. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs revision petitioners contended that under Section 16 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (For short 'the Act') only the disputes between the landlord and the tenants can be entertained under the Act but in this case it is only granting of an injunction, and hence, the Act does not apply. He further argued that the Special Officer can only enquire into the disputes arising under Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. and that under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, temporary injunction can be granted and the Civil Court has got jurisdiction and the plaintiffs-revision petitioners are entitled to the relief of temporary injunction.
11. The learned counsel for the defendants-respondents contended that the dispute is between the tenant (plaintiffs) and the landlord (the 1st defendant) and the lower court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant a temporary injunction; and that Section 15 of the Act specifies the lands to which the Act does not apply. He further argued that the Commissioner who was appointed by the trial court to inspect the suit lands submitted a report that the crop that was being raised in the schedule lands was black gram and plantation, and, therefore, it is clear that the provisions of the Act apply to the suit Sands.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Lachamma v. Buchamma, in support of his contention that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant injunction. That case arose under the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 and there was no dispute therein regarding the possession of the land. Hence the learned Judge held that the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant was not a matter for a decision in that suit and the only question to be decided in the suit was whether the plaintiff was in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule land in her own right. The plaintiff therein claimed possession of the suit schedule lads by virtue of the surrender of tenancy by the protected tenant in favour of the plaintiff. The learned Judge also held that the question whether there is a valid termination of tenancy and surrender of possession by the protected tenant in favour of the plaintiff, is not a matter for a decision in the suit. The question whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property by virtue of the surrender is only to be decided for grant of injunction claimed by her, and if the petitioners/defendants claim mat there is no valid surrender as per the provisions of the Act, then it is for them to approach the Tenancy Court for resolving the dispute. It was further held that the case on hand was a simple suit for injunction which could be filed only in a Civil Court. As stated already, no dispute pertaining to landlord and tenant arises for determination in the suit.
13. In the present case, in order to determine the forum, the allegations in the plaint have to be looked into. A reading of the plaint will disclose that the plaintiffs claimed that they are in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule lands as cultivating tenants. In the counter filed by the first defendant it was stated that the alleged lease approved by the Commissioner of Endowments on 9-l-1987 was not given effect to. No tenancy was granted in favour of the plaintiffs. The ryots who cultivated items A to H of the plaint schedule lands are quite different. They voluntarily surrendered the lands to the first-defendant temple in February,1992. It is further stated that the plaintiffs are not the cultivating-tenants and they were never in possession of the suit lands. In view of the averments made in the counter, the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a matter for decision in the suit. Therefore, the above decision relied upon the learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts of this case.
14. The learned counsel for the defendants argued that under Section 16 (1) of the Act and Rule 13 of the A.P. Tenancy Rules, a civil suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs are tenants and for an injunction against the defendant landlord is not maintainable, and under the Act the proper forum is the revenue court which alone is competent to grant injunction. He further argued that Rule 13 read with Section 16 of the Act would enable the revenue court to grant not merely a declaration but also an order which is called injunction or not can hardly make a difference. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision in Viswanadham v. Sri L.N.S. Temple, 1981 (1) ALT 457. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the Tahsildar has got jurisdiction only where the dispute is between the landlord and the tenant. The Tribunal under the Tenancy Act decides the disputes between the landlord and tenant and he relied upon Venkata Reddy v. Bushi Reddy, 1970 (2) ALT 237 (F.B.).
15. In the present case the plaintiffs are the tenants of the first-defendant temple. The plaintiffs filed the suit for permanent injunction against the temple and other defendants. They also filed I.A.734/92 for issuance of a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession of the schedule lands. According to the plaintiffs they are the tenants of the first defendant temple and they took on lease 60 acres of the temple lands and they have been in possession of the land as cultivating tenants. According to the first defendant he gave notices to the plaintiffs on 22-10-91 under Exs.A-1 to A-8. Exs.A-21 to A-26 are the notices informing that the Paripalanakartha was removed and the Maktha was to be paid to him only, and also claiming arrears of the Maktha for the previous years. No reply was given by the plaintiffs to the notices. It is also the contention of the plaintiffs that they are the tenants of the schedule lands and they have taken the land on lease by virtue of the order of the Commissioner of Endowments. The above contentions clearly show that the plaintiffs are the cultivating tenants of the temple land. According to defendants 2 to 23, they have taken the schedule lands on lease in March, 1992 in the auction held by the temple-authorities. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the suit is between the landlord and tenants and not between the tenants and some other strangers. Hence by relying upon the decision in Visiuanadham v. Sri LN.S. Temple , 1981(1) ALT 457 I hold that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and only the tenancy court has jurisdiction to decide the dispute in question. As per the report of the Commissioner appointed by the trial court, the crops raised in the suit lands are plantations and black gram and they do not come under the definition of "plantation crops" mentioned in Section 2 (h) of the Act. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the Act applies to the facts of the case on hand, that the competent authority to decide the dispute between the landlord and tenant is only the Special Officer under the Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the Civil Court as the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant interim injunction to the plaintiffs against the defendants. The same view was also expressed in K. Kasulu v. The Commissioner, Endowments Department and Ors., 1986 (2) ALT (S.N.) 44 and also in Viswanadham v. Sri L.N.S. Temple (2 supra).
16. The learned counsel for the defendants further contended that the trial court having found that the plaintiffs committed default in payment of rent for 1991-92 though they have received the notices from the defendant, erred in holding that as there is no agreement regarding the due date for the payment of the rent, the rent can be paid at any time before the end of the agricultural year with a grace period of one month provided under the Act and granted time to the petitioners till20th of June, 1992 for payment of the arrears for the year 1991-92. He also contended that it is clearly stated in the nonces Exs.A-1 to A-8 and A-21 to A-26 that the plaintiffs have to pay the rent on or before 20th of November, 1992 but even after receipt of those notices, the petitioner failed to pay the rent due and thus they committed default in payment of the rent, that a person who approaches the court for any relief must come with clean hands, that a tenant who has committed default in observing his obligations under the tenancy agreement becomes liable to be evicted and disentitled to the assistance of the court and is also not entitled to the equitable relief of injunction without complying with the obligation cast on him.
17. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that no specific time is prescribed for the payment of the maktha and hence the petitioners cannot be said to have committed any default and they are entitled to the equitable relief of injunction granted by the trial court. In support of his contention, he relied upon K. Veera Raju v. Revenue Divisional Officer, 1986 (1) APLJ 143 . Raghuvir, J. (as he then was) and Rama Rao, J, considered the circumstances therein and held that default of payment of Rs. 5/- which is a trivial amount, cannot be a ground for eviction of the tenant. In the present case the rent runs into thousands of rupees and, therefore, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the fact of the case. In the instant case though notices were received by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs did not pay the rent for 1991-92 inspite of the specific mention in the notice that the rent should be paid to the first defendant on or before 20-2-1992. It is further argued that as the notices are not supported by any other documents and as no agreement is filed into court, the lower court gave an opportunity to the petitioners to pay the rent within the agricultural year. The plaintiffs were claiming lease and confirmation of their lease by the Commissioner of Endowments by his order dated 9-1-1987. It is an admitted fact that there is no lease deed between the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant temple. The plaintiffs filed receipts Exs. A-10, A-11, A-13, A-15, A-16, and A-18 to show that they were paying the rents in the month of February alone every year. These receipts clearly establish that the plaintiffs are fully aware that the rent for the schedule lands has to be paid by the end of February every year. As the rent for 1991-92 was not paid by the plaintiffs, before 20-2-92 as demanded by the first defendant, I hold that the plaintiffs committed default in payment of the rent for the year 1991-92. Hence they are not entitled to the equitable relief of injunction without complying with the obligations cast on them. This view of mine is supported by the decision in P. Adinarayana and Anr. v. K. Krishna Ravindra Babu and Anr., 1976 APHC Notes 140.
18. For all the reasons stated above, the order of the appellate Court holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit is correct and it does not call for interfence in this revision petition.
19. The Special Tribunal under the Tenancy Act has to dispose of the case on the evidence placed before it, without being influenced by any findings or observations made by this Court.
20. The Revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.