Allahabad High Court
Ashiq Ali And Ors. vs Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon And Anr. on 5 October, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(2)AWC1342
JUDGMENT N.K. Mehrotra, J.
1. This is second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 2.8.1980 passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Faizabad upholding the judgment and decree dated 6.11.1978 passed by Civil Judge, Faizabad.
2. I have heard Shri Molul, Arif Khan, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Abid Ali for the respondent No. 1.
3. It appears from the facts on record that Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed suit against Usman, Abo Mohammad (deceased appellant No. 1) and Mashooq Ali (deceased appellant No. 2) with the allegations that house No. 2868 situated in Mohalla Hayat Ganj in Tanda. District Faizabad was the property of late Abdul Haq @ Hukka who died on 24.1.1972. The only son of Abdul Haq @ Hukka left India for Pakistan leaving Abdul Haq alone, in Tanda, District Faizabad. It is alleged that there was none in Tanda to look after him. Hazi Madari the father of Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon, the plaintiff-respondent was a close friend and neighbour of Abdul Haq. Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon used to look after Abdul Haq and used to spend money for his services. It is further alleged that about seven years before the filing of the suit on the occasion of ld. Abdul Haq on being pleased from the services of Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon made oral gift of the house in suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondent Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon which was accepted by her and he handed over possession to Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon over that house. Since then Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon was living in the house of Abdul Haq and was looking after him also. In the southern portion of the house, there were tenants. They were making payment of rent to Abdul Haq but after the alleged oral gift, Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon was realising the rent from them as owner of those shops. After about one year before the death, Abdul Haq felt apprehension that after his death, some other person may disturb the possession of the plaintiff, hence, as an evidence of oral gift, he executed a written deed of gift in favour of the plaintiff. Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon even after the death of Abdul Haq continued to be in possession of that house. It is alleged that within one month from the date of death of Abdul Haq, the defendants dishonestly moved an application under Section 145, Cr. P.C. before S.D.M.. Tanda with an intention to evict the plaintiff from that house. The plaintiff-respondent Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon filed a suit for declaration that she was owner and in possession of the house in suit. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants took possession over the house in pursuance of the release order passed by the S.D.M. on 12.4.1975. Thereafter, the plaintiff amended the plaint and sought the relief of possession also.
4. It is admitted to the defendant that Abdul Haq was the owner in possession of the house in suit. They denied that Abdul Haq had any son living in Pakistan. They denied the oral gift by Abdul Haq in favour of Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon seven years before the institution of the suit. They also denied the execution of the alleged gift deed in favour of the plaintiff. It is contended that Abdul Haq had three daughters namely Mussammat Khairulnissa, Qamrulnissa alias Kumul and Jauharulnissa. Mussammat Khairulnissas died during the life time of Abdul Haq leaving behind Mohd. Ayub, Moinduddin, Mohd. Yaseen and Sagir as sons. Defendant No. 1 is the son of Jauharulinissa. After the death of Abdul Haq, Mst. Khairulnissa, and Jauharulnissa and sons of Khairulnissa were the owner in possession of the house in suit. Mst. Jauhirulnissa and Usman were looking after Abdul Haq. Abdul Haq had given the western shop of the house to the son of the defendant No. 2 which was fallen down. After the death of Abdul Haq, the defendant No. 2 constructed that shop with the permission of defendant No. 1 on the condition that the shop shall be let out to him. Subsequently, Jauhirulnissa executed a sale deed on 8.3.1972 and Usman and Rauf executed a sale deed on 31.3.1972 in respect of the house in suit in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and since then the defendants No. 2 and 3 were owner in possession of the house in suit. The plaintiff and her husband initiated proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P.C. and house in suit was attached but ultimately case under Section 145, Cr. P.C. was decided in favour of the defendant. In this way the defendants claimed their title and possession over the house in suit.
5. Learned Civil Judge, Faizabad framed the following issues :
"(1) Whether plaintiff is owner of the disputed house as claimed in plaint?
(2) Whether defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are the owners of the disputed house as claimed in their written statement?
(3) Whether there has been an oral gift and subsequent writing evidencing this gift in favour of the plaintiff by Abdul Haq on 9.10.1970, as alleged in the plaint?
(4) Whether suit is undervalued and deficient in suit fees?
(5) Whether suit is not maintainable, as alleged in para No. 29 of the W.S.?
(6) Whether suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act?
(7) To what relief--if any, is the plaintiff entitled in the case?"
Findings of the Civil Judge :
6. Out of the aforesaid seven issues, issues No. 1, 2 and 3 were material issues. Learned Civil Judge held that the plaintiff had proved the oral gift. It has also been held that the plaintiff has proved the gift deed executed by Abdul Haq which is unregistered document. Learned Civil Judge held that no registration of gift deed is required under Mohammedan Law after passing of the Shariat Act of 1937 and Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has also been held by the Civil Judge that the gift deed cannot be ignored because the same was not registered. It has also been held that the gift deed is not a forged document. Learned Civil Judge held that it is established from the oral evidence coupled with documentary evidence itself that Abdul Haq had made a gift of the house in favour of the plaintiff and plaintiff was put in possession and as such the plaintiff is the owner of the house on the basis of the gift in her favour and is entitled to get possession.
Finding in First Appeal ;
7. The Ist Additional District Judge, Faizabad dismissed the appeal. The Additional District Judge found that oral gift was made in the year 1968 and document of gift was executed in the year 1970 as an evidence of the gift. The Ist Additional District Judge has also referred the provisions under Sections 123 and 129 of Transfer of Property Act for holding that registration of a gift deed executed by a Mohammedan is not required by referring two decisions in Karam Ilahi v. Sharfuddin, AIR 1916 All 351 and Naseeb Ali v. Wazed Ali, AIR 1927 Cal 197.
Substantial question of law "
8. The defendants-appellants have preferred this second appeal. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law :
"(i) Whether the lower appellate court has misread the document dated 9.10.1970 by describing it as a document evidencing an oral gift allegedly made two years earlier, although the date purports to transfer the property in presenti?
9. The appellants have raised following substantial questions of law in memo of appeal :
"(i) Whether a gift deed executed by a Mohammedan is exempt from the registration in view of the provisions of Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act?
(ii) Whether the deed paper No. 100/C is a deed of gift duly executed and attested by witnesses or merely a memorandum of any previous oral gift, in spite of the fact that no such oral gift is mentioned therein?
(iii) Whether the statement of the plaintiff amounts to oral gift in spite of the fact that Abdul Haq claimed to be the owner in possession of the house in dispute till date when the date of gift alleged to have been executed?
(iv) Whether the orders passed are not vitiated by a misreading of the evidence on record and mis-interpretation of the law applicable to the case?"
10. The main substantial question of law that arises in this appeal is whether the deed Paper No. 100/C is a deed of gift or it is merely a memorandum of any previous oral gift. The copy of the alleged deed is Annexure No. 1 in this second appeal.
11. According to the defendant-appellant, it is an unregistered gift deed and it belies the existence of some oral gift. It has also been argued that it does not mention about any earlier oral gift. It has been argued that alleged deed of gift is not admissible in evidence as deed of gift but it can be read for collateral purposes.
12. According to the plaintiff-respondent, it is a memorandum of gift evidencing the earlier oral gift in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the registration of this deed is not required.
13. Both the learned counsel for the parties have conceded before this Court that under the Mohammedan Law, there can be an oral gift and provisions of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable by virtue of the provisions under Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act. They have also conceded that in case any gift deed is executed by a Mohammedan, it is required to be registered compulsorily under Section 17 of the Registration Act.
14. Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act is as follows :
"Savings of donations mortis causa and Mohammedan Law.--Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death, or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mohammedan Law."
15. Section 17 of the Registration Act provides a list of the documents which are compulsorily registrable. In this list, instrument of gift of immovable property is also included.
16. Learned Ist Appellate Court, besides the findings with regard to the oral gift, has held about the gift deed as follows :
"The contents of this document also go to show that Hiba was already accepted by Smt. Rasheeda Khatoon before this deed was executed. This shows that this document which stands duly proved was only an evidence of the gift which was made earlier by Shri Abdul Haq in favour of the plaintiff. I therefore, hold that the learned Civil Judge has rightly treated this document as an evidence of gift and has relied upon this deed also for granting relief of possession to the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that this document could not be read in evidence because it was not a registered document but I do not find any force in this argument. According to Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, gift of immovable property could be made only by a registered instrument. Section 129 of the same Act lays down that provisions of Section 123 do not - apply to any gift made under the .Rules of Mohammedan Law. A Mohammedan could make an oral gift of immovable property. Similarly, if a Mohammedan prepares a document relating to gift as proof of gift so that by lapse of time the evidence of gift may not disappear, such deed of gift continues to be an evidence of gift and needs no registration or attestation."
17. Learned Additional District Judge has also held that the deed of gift executed by Mohammedan, is admissible in evidence although not proved as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The learned Additional District Judge has also held that document 100/C needs no registration and it was admissible in evidence even without registration.
18. Now I may refer certain clauses of the gift deed, the interpretation of which is involved in this second appeal. The relevant statements of the executant Abdul Haq is this deed are as follows :
^^,d fdÙkk edku [kke cgkyr--------------gLCk pkSgnnh o uEcjh tSy-----------------esjh feyfd;r gS vkSj ftl ij eSa ekfydkuk dkfct] o n[khy pyk vkrk gw¡-------------eqlYye edku feueqfdj ds dCtk o n[ky ekfydkuk esa gS-----------feueqfdj pkgrk gS fd viuh g;kr esa eqlEekr etdwfj;k dks fcy,ot~ fgDdqy f[kner edku eldwuk esa tkfuc nfd[ku fdjk;snkj vkckn gS dks fgck djs vkSj c['k ns--------cgd eqlEekr j'khnk tkStk eksgEen guhQ lkfdu eksgYyk g;kr xat eksgekr dLck Vk.Mk ds fgck fd;k vkSj c['k fn;k dCtk o n[ky ekSgwc vysg dk edku ekSgwck ij feLy vius ekfydkuk djk fn;k pkfg;s---------rkjh[k bejkstk ls feueqfdj o okfjlku feueqfdj dk edku ekSgwck ls dksbZ okLrk ;k ljksdkj fdlh fdLe ds ckfd ugh jgs]**
19. The aforesaid statements of the disputed deed make it clear that upto the date of this deed, no gift was made. It is also clear that the executant of this deed was in possession of the house upto the date of execution of this deed. It is also clear that this deed transferred the property in presenti. It is also clear that the executant had not delivered the possession of the property to the donee before this date.
20. Admittedly, in any gift by a Mohammedan, three essential requirements have to be complied with for a valid gift :
(i) Declaration of the gift by the donor.
(ii) Acceptance of the gift expressed or implied by or on behalf of the donee.
(iii) Delivery of such possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee.
21. Since the deed itself makes it clear that upto the date of the execution of this deed, the executant was in possession, and there can be no oral gift without possession. Therefore, this document cannot be constituted to be a memorandum of gift but it is a gift deed itself.
22. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has fairly conceded that if the gift deed is executed in writing, its registration is compulsory under Section 17 of the Registration Act irrespective of the fact that an oral gift is possible under the Mohammedan Law. In view of the statements of deed noted above, the finding of the learned Appellate Judge, that the deed in question is a memorandum of gift is not found correct and it is perverse based on wrong interpretation of the document in question. It cannot be described as a document evidencing the oral gift but it is a document creating a gift in favour of the plaintiff. In view of the said reasons, I hold that lower appellate court has misread the document dated 9.10.1970 by describing it as a document evidencing an oral gift allegedly made two years earlier.
23. So far as the first substantial question of law stated in the memorandum of appeal is concerned, I hold that in view of the provision under Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act, the provision of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act shall not affect the validity of the gift under any rule of Mohammedan Law, so if an oral gift is there and the aforesaid three requirements are fulfilled, it cannot be ignored on the ground that a gift made by a Mohammedan is not in accordance with Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act but if a gift deed is executed, it is not exempt from registration in accordance with the provision under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act does not exempt the written gift deed executed by a Mohammedan.
24. So far as the second substantial question of law raised in the memo of appeal is concerned, I have already held above that the deed Paper No. 100-C is a deed of gift and it is not a memorandum of any previous oral gift. It being a gift deed, cannot be admissible in evidence for want of registration as provided under Section 17 of the Registration Act. But at the same time, it shall be read for other collateral purposes.
25. Now I take up substantial questions of law Nos. 3 and 4 as stated in the memo of appeal. A perusal of the judgments of the 1st Appellate Court make it clear that there is a clear cut finding of fact that the plaintiff had established the oral gift made by Abdul Haq on the occasion of ld. For the proposes of recording finding of the oral gift made by Abdul Haq in favour of the plaintiff, both the courts below have misread the deed Paper No. 100/C as the memorandum of gift and it appears that the finding of the oral gift of the two courts below is based on oral evidence as well as the document 100/C besides other documents on record and the document Paper No. 100/C has been misconstrued by the two courts below.
26. Since the Ist appellate court has taken the document 100/C to be the memorandum of gift and has taken corroboration about the oral gift by misconstruing the document 100/C, the finding about the oral gift is vitiated and is the result of misreading of document and incorrect application of law. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the finding of the oral gift is the result of the misreading of the document of 100/C while the counsel for the respondent No. 1 has argued that the appellate court has recorded the finding of proof of oral gift independent of the document Paper No. 100/C. But in both the cases, the finding of the proof of the oral gift is the result of the misconstruing the document 100/C.
27. In view of my discussions, it is clear that the document 100/C is not the memorandum of gift but it is a gift deed and it being a gift deed, its registration is compulsory under Section 17 of the Registration Act. In the absence of the registration, this document cannot be read in evidence for the purpose of proving the oral gift deed but it can be read for any other collateral purposes.
28. The finding of oral gift is also vitiated because the plaintiff's case of possession at the time of oral gift is belied by the document 100/C filed by the plaintiff-respondent herself. Oral evidence in contradiction to the fact mentioned in the document 100/C, the basis of suit cannot be relied on. Even if any oral gift was there, it was not valid because possession was not delivered by the donor at the time of alleged oral gift.
29. The learned courts below have relied on the decisions in Karam Ilahi v. Sharafuddin, AIR 1916 All 351 and Naseeb Ali v. Wajed Ali, AIR 1927 Cal 197. So far as the principle of law laid down in these two cases is concerned, there is no dispute but I am of the view that these decisions had been relevant if the deed Paper No. 100/C would have not belied the factum of possession at the time of oral gift or it would have been only a memorandum of gift which was made orally prior to the execution of this document. In the instant case, the deed Paper No. 100/C makes it clear that upto the execution of this deed, the donor had not delivered the possession and no oral gift by a Mohammedan is complete unless possession is delivered at the time of oral gift.
30. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has argued that none of the heir of Abdul Haq, the donor of the gift, has appeared in the Court to support the case of the defendant to deny the gift made by late Abdul Haq and he has also argued that no Court should base its decisions on technicality alone. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has relied on Kulwant Kaur and Ors. v. Gurudayal Singh Mann and Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 262 ; Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat, AIR 1970 MP 225 ; Arjun Singh v. Virendra Nath and Anr., AIR 1971 All 29; Abdul Kareem v. Babu Lal and Anr., AIR 1953 Bhopal 26 and Abdul Gharoor and Anr. v. Lala Kunj Behari Lal, AIR 1957 All 346, but in view of the substantial question of law framed for the purpose of this second appeal, these decisions referred by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent are not required to be discussed for arriving at any conclusion on the substantial question of law arising in this appeal.
31. In view of the reasons given above, this appeal is allowed with cost The impugned judgment and decree dated 2.8.1980 passed by the 1st Additional District, Judge, Faizabad in Civil Appeal No. 435/78 and the judgment and decree dated 6.11.1978 passed by Civil Judge, Faizabad in Regulate Suit No. 31 of 1975 are set aside.