Allahabad High Court
Ranjeet Singh vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 7 December, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1995CRILJ3505
ORDER Virendra Saran, J.
1. Heard Sri Raza Zaheer on behalf of the applicant and Sri Bireshwar Nath and Sri Janardan Singh for the State.
2. By means of this application Ranjeet Singh alias Laddu Singh has prayed for the quashing of the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow purporting to have been passed under Section 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the Code) in respect of crime No. 496 of 1994 under Sections 302/120B, l.P.C. of police station Aliganj, district Lucknow.
3. The deceased Sri Susheel Kumar Misra was the Chief Engineer, Mandi Parishad, Uttar Pradesh. He is alleged to have been shot while going on usual morning walk at about 7 a.m. on August 7,1994. He was rushed to the hospital, but he succumbed to his injuries. The crime was reported by Sri Vinod Kumar younger brother of the deceased at P. S. Aliganj, Lucknow. The applicant is not named in the F.I.R. but his complicity emerged during the course of investigation. The applicant is accused in yet another murder case at Faizabad, that is, Crime No. 326 of 1989 under Sections 302/323/308/147/148/149, l.P.C. P. S. Cantt. Faizabad. It is averred in paragraph 3 of the affidavit that the applicant is confined in District Jail, Faizabad pending commitment of the case there and is under remand under Section 309 of the Code. The learned counsel for the applicant has stated that the applicant, who was on bail in respect of murder case at Faizabad, himself surrendered on 12-8-1994 by getting his bail bonds cancelled and since then he is confined in Faizabad Jail.
4. Sri Raza Zaheer, learned counsel for the applicant who argued the case with great proficience, has contended that since the applicant is confined in Faizabad Jail in another case pending commitment, it was beyond the competence of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow to make an order under Section 267 of the Code. Learned counsel has referred to the following extract of Section 267 which states:
"267.- (1) Whenever, in the course of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Criminal Court-
(a) that a person confined or detained in a prison should be brought before the Court for answering to a charge of an offence, or for the purpose of any proceedings against him. or
(b) ..."
(The underlining is mine) Sri Raza Zaheer has urged that Section 267 and Section 269 are to be read together and has laid emphasis on the following extract of Section 269:
"269.- Where the person in respect of whom an order is made under Section 267-
(a) ...
(b) is under committal for trial or under remand pending trial or pending a preliminary investigation; or
(c) ...
(d) ...
the officer-in-charge of the prison shall abstain from carrying out the Court's order and shall send to the Court a statement of reasons for so abstaining."
5. The contentions of Sri Raza Zaheer are two- fold. His first contention is that a plain reading of Section 267 of the Code shows that an order under Section 267 of the Code can be made if a person confined or detained in any prison is required by the Court for answering to a charge of an offence. Sri Zaheer has submitted that in the present case, no charge-sheet has been filed in Court against the applicant and the applicant is not required for answering to a charge of any offence in the Court. The second contention of Sri Raza Zaheer is that Section 267 and Section 269 of the Code are to be read in harmony and Section 269 requires the officer-in-charge of the prison to abstain from carrying out the Court's order passed under Section 267 if the person (in respect of whom an order under Section 267 is made) is under committal for trial or under remand pending trial or pending preliminary investigation. According to Sri Raza Zaheer since the applicant is in custody in Faizabad Jail pending committal in respect of crime No. 326 of 1989 it was beyond the competence of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow to make an order under Section 267 of the Code.
6. The first contention of the learned counsel for the applicant meets with rejection without much difficulty. The words, "or for the purpose of any proceedings against him" occurring in Section 267(1)(a) are compendious and include proceedings encompassing all stages and have in their fold remand proceedings and even proceedings of an investigation. In the present case, the presence of the applicant is required for the purposes of remand which may even include police remand or for their purposes of the investigation.
7. More serious reflection is needed on the second contention of the learned counsel for the applicant. There does appear some ambiguity in Section 269 of the Code. Clarity, unfortunately, has not been a strong point of our legislative draftsmanship. The arduous task of creasing out the ambiguities has to be done by the Courts by interpreting the law in a reasonable manner so as to make the law meaningful and put life into it. The legislature may not visualise all future situation as it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise and it is not possible to provide for them in clear terms, free from ambiguity. At the same time, the procedural law is meant to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the same. If the contention of Sri Raza Zaheer is accepted, hardened criminals would always give a slip by surrendering in another case at a distant district and cripple the process of investigation relating to crimes subsequently perpetrated by them. The committal proceedings or the trial in respect of the earlier crime may take long time and sometime several years and by long lapse of time the evidence in the subsequent crime may fade away. The fact that commitment proceedings in respect of the applicant have remained pending for the last five years at Faizabad. In an offence like murder amply illustrates my above observations. The presence of an accused is required during an investigation for various purposes, such as, making of recoveries, identification and the like. Speed is the essence in a criminal investigation and if it is allowed to linger on for several years, its very purpose is lost. In my opinion, even if there is some ambiguity in Section 269 of the Code, it has to be overcome by adopting a reasonable approach.
8. I am of the opinion that Section 269 of the Code has a salutary purpose. All criminal proceedings must conclude as expeditiously as possible. If commitment proceedings or the trial is in progress, carrying out of the order under Section 269 of the Code may disrupt the speedy disposal of the case. Section 269 is aimed at uninterrupted disposal of the proceedings which are in progress and hence, the officer-in-charge of the prison has to abstain from carrying out the orders under Section 267 of the Code. Normally when the accused is confined in prison, he is incapable of moving out and commit further offence is another district. His detention prevents him from doing so. Perhaps the law makers did not foresee a case where the accused after release on bail commits a crime in another district and soon thereafter gets his bail cancelled to hinder the investigation of the crime subsequently committed by him. The legislature could hardly foresee that even in henious offences like murder, the commitment proceedings may remain in doldrums for half a decade as in the present case. In appears to me that the only reasonable construction of words, "is under committal for trial or under remand pending a preliminary investigation," occurring in Section 269 is that the commitment proceedings, trial or investigation, as the case may be, should be in actual progress and not merely pending. In a case where the proceedings are not in actual progress, an accused can be reasonably sent for the purposes of another investigation, committal proceedings or trial. Thus, when an order has been passed by the Magistrate under Section 267 of the Code, the officer-in-charge of the prison may with the consent of the concerned Court or the Investigating Officer carry out the order under Section 267 of the Code.
9. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The mere fact that committal proceedings are pending in respect of the applicant at Faizabad does not take away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Lucknow to pass an order under Section 267 of the Code and for this reason, too, the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow does not suffer from any infirmity.
10. To conclude, this application fails and is hereby dismissed.