Karnataka High Court
K T Venkatappa Since Decd By Lrs vs Seethappa on 6 April, 2022
Author: Pradeep Singh Yerur
Bench: Pradeep Singh Yerur
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R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL No.2301 OF 2006(DEC)
BETWEEN:
K.T.VENKATAPPA
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
(AMENDED VIDE COURT
ORDER DATED 20.07.2009)
1. K.V.GOPAL
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
1(a) SMT.K.R.SARASWATHAMMA
W/O.K.V.GOPAL
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
2. K.A.SRINIVAS
S/O.T.V.ASWATHAIAH
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS
BOTH ARE RESIDING AT
KRISHNARAJAPURAM
BENGALURU DISTRICT
BENGALURU-560 036 ... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI A.V.GANGADHARAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SEETHAPPA
S/O.MUNI ANNEPPA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
R/AT KALKERE VILLAGE
KRISHNARARAPURAM HOBLI
BENGALURU - 560 036
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2. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
MULTISTORIED BUILDING
DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560 001
3. THE LAND TRIBUNAL
BY ITS SECTETARY
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU - 560 009 ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI JAYAKUMAR S.PATIL, SR.COUNSEL FOR R-1;
SMT.H.R.ANITHA, HCGP FOR R-2 & R-3)
***
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 100 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PRAYING
TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT & DECREE DATED 04.04.2006
PASSED IN R.A.NO.170/2002 BY THE DISTRICT & SESSIONS
JUDGE AND PRESIDING OFFICER, FAST TRACK COURT NO.V,
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU DISMISSING
THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER
DATED 31.01.2002 PASSED IN OS.NO.240/1993 ON THE
FILE OF II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN.) BENGALURU
RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU & ETC.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 26.10.2021 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
This is a plaintiffs' appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 31.01.2002 in O.S.No.240/1993 passed by II Addl. Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) at Bangalore Rural District, Bengaluru, which came to be dismissed and the same having been confirmed in RA.No.170/2002 vide order dated 04.04.2006 by the -3- District Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No.V, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:
2. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the agricultural land bearing Sy.No.130/2 measuring 3 acres 30 guntas and Sy.No.133/2 measuring 1 acre 30 guntas situated at Kowdenahally, Bengaluru South Taluk absolutely belongs to their father Sri K.T.Venkatappa and that he was in actual possession and enjoyment thereof personally cultivating the land by raising Casurina and Eucalyptus trees therein. The RTC and other revenue records are in the name of their father and at no point of time, he had leased out the said lands to tenants.
3. It is further stated that Kowdenahally village was an Inam Village and pursuant to the abolition of the Inams under the Karnataka Personal and Miscellaneous Inams Abolition Act, 1954 their father Sri K.T.Venkatappa submitted his claim for registration of his occupancy rights before the Spl. Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition. The Spl. Deputy -4- Commissioner, who was competent to adjudicate all such claims regarding such Inam land held an enquiry and passed an order in case bearing No. RC 52/1959-60 and RC No.172/1963-64 declaring Sri K.T. Venkatappa as an occupant and Kathedar in respect of aforesaid two lands along with other lands and an endorsement to that effect was issued dated 03.07.1964.
4. It is further stated that after abolition of the Inams and after the re-grant of the occupancy rights in favour of Sri K.T.Venkatappa his name continuously reflected in Pahani and other revenue records showing that he was in continuous possession and enjoyment and personally cultivating the same as absolute owner by paying kandayam (tax) to the said lands.
5. This being the state of affairs, respondent No.1 had filed Form No.7 before respondent No.3 - Land Tribunal for registration of the occupancy rights in his favour claiming that he was a tenant in respect of two parcels of land of Sri K.T. Venkatappa by claiming that he was a tenant for past 30 years. Father of plaintiffs deceased Sri K.T. Venkatappa was notified of the same, -5- who had objected to the said application for grant of occupancy rights inter alia claiming that he was never a tenant and sought for dismissal of the claim made in Form No.7.
6. On 22.09.1979, respondent No.3 - Land Tribunal passed an order holding that respondent No.1 was a tenant and registered the occupancy rights in his favour. This fact came to the knowledge of deceased Sri K.T. Venkatappa, hence, he lodged a complaint before the Police as respondent No.1 was illegally attempting to trespass into the said land after a lapse of 15 long years. In view of such interference by the respondent No.1 deceased Sri K.T.Venkatappa instituted OS No.240/1993 seeking for a declaration to declare the occupancy rights granted to the respondent No.1 herein by the Land Tribunal as one without proper jurisdiction and same to be declared as null and void and not binding on the plaintiff and for other consequential reliefs.
7. On receipt of notice in the said original suit, the respondent No.1 - defendant No.1 filed his written -6- statement, pursuant to which on the basis of the pleadings seven issues came to be framed by the trial Court. Issue No.3 framed by the trial Court pertains to the maintainability of the suit in view of the contentions raised by defendant No.1 therein. On an application made by respondent No.1-defendant No.1 to treat Issue No.3 as preliminary issue, on consideration, it came to be rejected by the trial Court, which was challenged before this Court in CRP No.2366/2000 and the same came to be allowed and a direction was issued to consider Issue No.3 a preliminary issue and accordingly, the same was considered as preliminary issue and after hearing both sides the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff as barred by law in view of Section 132(2) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act').
8. Aggrieved by the said dismissal of the suit plaintiff preferred an appeal in R.A. No.170/2002 before the first Appellate Court, which on re-consideration and re-appreciation of applicable provisions of law more particularly, Sections 132 and 133 of the Act dismissed -7- the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by holding that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by the provisions of Sections 132 and 133 of the Act.
9. The plaintiffs are before this Court in Second Appeal challenging the aforesaid concurrent judgments against him.
CONTENTIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS-PLAINTIFFS:
10. It is the vehement contention of Sri A.V.Gangadharappa, learned counsel for appellants-
plaintiffs that the judgment and decree of both the Courts are contrary to law and facts and circumstances of the case. He contends that both the Courts have committed a serious error in holding that the plaintiffs are not the owner and not in possession of the suit schedule property, despite production of revenue records which depict the name of father of plaintiff, which would clearly show that the plaintiffs were in a settled possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
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11. He further contends that the Courts below have seriously erred in not applying its mind to the various contentions urged on behalf of the appellants- plaintiffs. He further contends that the first Appellate Court has casually confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court without giving any proper findings or reasons for confirming the said judgment. He further contends that the first Appellate Court has ignored and failed to appreciate that the respondent No.1-defendant No.1 who had claimed tenancy rights by submitting Form No.7 had got the same dismissed by withdrawing it, by clearly stating that he was not cultivating the land in question, and that he was not the tenant of the said property.
12. Learned counsel for appellants-plaintiffs further contends that the respondent No.3 - Land Tribunal has failed to consider the objections raised by the plaintiffs, wherein the very jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal was questioned in view of the fact that Spl. Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition had already inquired into the matter and passed an order -9- holding that deceased Sri K.T. Venkatappa is the occupant and the khathedar of the aforesaid lands, which remained unchallenged and that the provisions of the Land Reforms Act did not apply to the facts of the present case.
13. Learned counsel further contends that the order of grant of occupancy rights in favour of respondent No.1-defendant No.1 is obtained by fraudulent means behind the back of appellants- plaintiffs and hence the said order is null and void and would not create any right in the respondent No.1- defendant No.1. He further contends that the first Appellate Court has not appreciated the above facts and the legal implications and has mechanically dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of the trial Court.
14. Learned counsel further contends that the first Appellate Court failed to notice the inherent defect of the trial Court which has not considered the provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC and has failed to
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conduct trial even in deciding the preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the suit, thereby causing miscarriage of justice to the appellants - plaintiffs.
15. Learned counsel further contends that both the courts have grossly erred in holding that the suit is barred under Section 132 and 133 of the Act and both the Courts have failed to appreciate that the provisions of the Act is not applicable to the facts of the present case. He further contends that once the Spl. Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition, who is the competent authority, had decided the claim pertaining to the Inam that the appellants-plaintiffs was the occupant and kathedar of the land in question, the question of respondent No.3 - Land Tribunal considering the tenancy rights of respondent No.1-defendant No.1 would not arise.
16. Learned counsel further contends that both the Courts have failed to consider the inherent defect in the Form No7 filed by respondent No.1-defendant No.1 which depicts his age to be 40 years as on the date of
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application and he claims that from the past 30 years he has been cultivating the land, which would infer that the respondent No.1-defendant No.1 was of the age of 10 years according to his statement which cannot be believed and the same has been ignored by both the Courts. He further contends that Form No.9 and Form No.10 clearly depict the name of the plaintiff for the period 1966 to 1988-89. On the other hand, no documents have been produced by the respondent No.1-defendant No.1 to show that he has been a tenant prior to 1974.
17. Learned counsel further contends that the respondent No.3 - Land Tribunal has stealthily passed an order behind the back of appellants-plaintiffs and no enquiry was conducted by the Land Tribunal and since no enquiry has been conducted, which is mandatory as per Section 48-A(5) of the Act, the order granting occupancy rights is bad in law. He further contends that the grant of occupancy rights in favour of respondent No.1-defendant No.1 was not intimated or known to the appellants-plaintiffs and the same was known to the
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appellants-plaintiffs only on 10.12.1990 on the date of issuance of legal notice by the plaintiffs. He further contends that the order of grant of occupancy rights is not binding on the appellants-plaintiffs and the same is null and void. Respondent No.1 and defendant No.1 obtained the occupancy rights by playing fraud, the jurisdiction is not barred under Section 132 or 133(2) of the Act for the Civil Court to adjudicate the matter.
18. Learned counsel for appellants further contends that both the Courts have seriously erred in coming to the conclusion that the suit is not maintainable in view of bar of jurisdiction under Section 132 of the Act. He further contends that the bar of jurisdiction under Sections 132(2) and 133 of the Act only pertains to the matter which are in exclusive jurisdiction of Land Tribunal and no others, wherein the question of land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1st March 1974, whereas the appellants-plaintiffs has taken the plea of fraud having been played by respondent No.1-
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defendant No.1 in obtaining the occupancy rights and that there being no jurisdiction to the Land Tribunal to grant such occupancy rights in view of the Spl. Deputy Commissioner for Inams already having granted the rights in favour of the appellants-plaintiffs. Therefore, both the Courts have totally misdirected itself in appreciating the relevant issue.
19. Learned counsel further contends that the judgment relied on by respondent No.1-defendant No.1 before the trial Court and appreciated by both the Courts, would not be applicable to the facts of the present case and both the Courts have erred in taking into consideration the said judgment and in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs. On the basis of these submissions learned counsel prays to allow the appeal and consequently set aside the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts.
CONTENTIONS OF LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.1-DEFENDANT NO.1:
20. It is the vehement contention of Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel
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appearing on behalf of Sri N.Sonnegowda, learned counsel for respondent No.1 that the suit filed by the appellants-plaintiffs is not maintainable in law and the trial Court has rightly dismissed the same in view of the specific bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court as contemplated under Section 132 of the Act. He further contends that the subject matter involved before the Land Tribunal and the Civil Court admittedly pertains to two parcels of agricultural land which are tenanted lands and which were initially governed by the provisions of Karnataka (P & M) Inams Abolition Act, 1954. He further contends that pursuant to the abolition of the said Act and due to operation of law, the same came to be governed by the provisions of the Act for determination of tenancy rights.
21. He further contends that respondent No.1- defendant No.1 applied for grant of occupancy rights under Form No.7 on 24.07.1974 by making an application on which notice was issued to the appellants-plaintiffs who had appeared before the Land Tribunal and filed detailed statement of objections to
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the grant of occupancy rights in favour of respondent No.1. Thereafter, the appellants-plaintiffs had participated in the proceedings before the Land Tribunal and by an order dated 22.09.1979, the Land Tribunal granted occupancy rights to respondent No.1 herein. He contends that this order came to be passed pursuant to the local enquiry having been conducted by the Land Tribunal and on being satisfied that respondent No.1 was cultivating the land for the past 15 years, the same was allowed.
22. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that it cannot lie in the mouth of the appellants that the order of the Land Tribunal is obtained fraudulently for the simple reason that the appellants-plaintiffs had very well participated in the proceedings before the Land Tribunal and had effectively defended the proceedings by filing statement of objections for grant of occupancy rights which was duly adjudicated by giving sufficient opportunity to the appellants and pursuant to the local enquiry being conducted and by due application of
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mind, the Land Tribunal has passed the reasoned order granting occupancy rights to respondent No.1 herein.
23. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs with regard to there being no jurisdiction to the Land Tribunal to consider the grant of occupancy rights, in view of the occupancy rights having already been granted by the Special Deputy Commissioner for abolition of inams under the Karnataka (P & M) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 to the appellants, would not survive for consideration for the reason that the appellants themselves had challenged the very same issue of there being no jurisdiction to the Land Tribunal to decide the occupancy rights by filing a writ petition in WP.No.14623/1979, during the pendency of proceedings before the Land Tribunal which came to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated 25.10.1989. He further contends that when this issue of jurisdiction to the Land Tribunal would deal with the matters for grant of occupancy rights has already been decided by the aforesaid writ petition by this Court, the same
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cannot be agitated once again as the appellants have not challenged the said decision and same has attained finality.
24. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that the order of the Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights to respondent No.1 herein is by order dated 22.09.1979 and same is well within the knowledge of the appellants-plaintiffs, which has not been challenged till date before any higher authorities or as contemplated under the provisions of the Act and this order has also attained finality. He further contends that the appellants have slept over the matter and after a period of 14 years, filed the present suit in question seeking for a relief of declaration of nullity of the order passed by the Land Tribunal. He further contends that prior to 22.09.1979, respondent No.1 has been cultivating the land and even post the grant of occupancy rights by the Land Tribunal, respondent No.1 is in peaceful possession and is cultivating the land.
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25. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that the allegation made by the appellants with regard to respondent No.1 herein having filed an application dated 07.07.1979 before the Land Tribunal to the effect that he was not a tenant and that he was not cultivating the land and to dismiss his claim in Form No.7 is frivolous and a motivated malafide attempt of the appellants-plaintiffs. He further contends that no such application as alleged aforesaid was ever made by respondent No.1 before the Land Tribunal and same is also not forthcoming in the order sheet maintained by the Land Tribunal, a copy of which has been produced along with a memo dated 24.10.2020 before this Court. Therefore, the said allegation made is without any basis and the same requires to be out rightly rejected.
26. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that having slept over the matter for 14 years pursuant to the order passed by the Land Tribunal, the initiation of original suit by the appellants-plaintiffs is barred under Section 132 of the Act and the trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit filed by the appellants-
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plaintiffs as being barred under the provisions of Section 132 of the Act. He places reliance on the judgment in the case of SHIVAPPA BHEEMAPPA AND ANOTHER vs NAGAPPA BHEEMAPPA reported in (1983) 2 Kant. L.J. 248 which has been applied by the learned trial Judge while dismissing the suit filed by the appellants-plaintiffs being barred by law.
27. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that the matter in dispute having been decided in accordance with law by the Land Tribunal as well as by the trial Court and having considered the relevant issues involved in the matter more specifically with regard to the maintainability of the suit, there is no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the trial Court. He further contends that the trial Court is vested with the jurisdiction to decide the matter summarily where the question of maintainability of the suit is involved and there is no mandatory requirement of conducting a full- fledged trial by recording evidence when it is only a question of law. It is further contended that the judgment in the case of Smt.Mallamma vs.
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Channegowda ILR 2010 KAR 5437 relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs would not be applicable to the fact and circumstances of the present case as in the said case, the concerned aggrieved person was not made as a party to the proceedings which is not the factual situation in the present case on hand. On the basis of these submissions, learned Senior Counsel prays for dismissal of the appeal and to confirm the order passed by the trial Court.
28. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, substantial questions of law that would arise for consideration before this Court are:
"(i) Whether there is any patent illegality or perversity in the orders passed by both the Courts?
(ii) Whether the appellants-plaintiffs have made out a case to be considered in this appeal?
(iii) What order?"
29. It is not in dispute that the lands in question are situated at Kowdenahally, Bengaluru South Taluk,
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Bangalore and was governed by the Karnataka (P & M) Inams Abolition Act of 1954. It is also not in dispute that the respondent No.1 herein filed application for grant of occupancy rights in Form No.7 dated 24.12.1974 under the Act before the respondent No.3 - Land Tribunal. It is also not in dispute that the notice of the said proceeding of Land Tribunal was given to the appellants' father deceased Sri K.T.Venkatappa. It is also not in dispute that a detailed statement of objections were filed by the deceased Sri K.T.Venkatappa to the said Form No.7. So also, it is not in dispute that the said deceased Sri K.T.Venkatappa was the jodidhar of the lands in question and hence he was made party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal.
30. It is seriously contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the original plaintiff was the owner of the lands in question, which is morefully described as suit schedule property before the trial Court and he was personally cultivating the said land by growing Casurina and Eucalyptus trees therein. On the
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contrary, it is the case of the respondent No.1 herein that he has been in possession and cultivation of the land for the past 15 years and accordingly he has made an application for grant of occupancy rights by filing Form No.7 before the Land Tribunal on 24.12.1974. As stated earlier after issuance of notice to the appellant- deceased Sri K.T.Venkatappa and on consideration of the objection statement filed therein and after conducting local enquiry the Land Tribunal granted occupancy rights to the respondent No.1 herein on 22.09.1979.
31. The deceased Sri K.T.Venkatappa through his legal representative filed an Original suit for declaring the order of the Land Tribunal to be null and void before the trial Court, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 31.01.2002. Aggrieved by the same the appellant preferred an appeal before the first Appellate Court in RA No.170/2002, which on re- appreciation and re-evaluation came to be dismissed on 04.04.2006, thereby confirming the order of the trial
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Court. It is this order of confirmation of the trial Court that is being challenged before this Court.
32. It is the case of the appellant that since they have been the owners and personally cultivating the land prior to coming into force of the Act and having obtained the occupancy rights by filing an application before the Spl. Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition which after due enquiry re-granted the suit schedule property to the appellant by declaring him as occupant and as Khathedar vide endorsement dated 03.07.1964. It is also the case of the appellant that in view of the re-grant of land to the appellant in case No.RC 172/1963-64 is in peaceful possession and occupation of the said lands as Khathedar. When such being the case, the question of respondent No.3 - Land Tribunal exercising the jurisdiction to decide the application for grant of occupancy rights in Form No.7 would not arise and it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal as it is only the Spl. Deputy Commissioner under the Inams Abolition Act, who is the
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competent authority to decide any such grant of occupancy rights.
33. Admittedly, deceased Sri K.T.Venkatappa had filed the statement of objections before the Land Tribunal objecting to the grant of occupancy rights in Form No.7 by stating the afore mentioned lack of jurisdiction to the Land Tribunal to consider the said Form No.7. Therefore, primary objection was raised by deceased Sri K.T.Venkatappa before the Land Tribunal with regard to the competency of the Land Tribunal to decide the issue of grant of occupancy rights filed under Form No.7. However, the Land Tribunal proceeded to consider the application filed under Form No.7 and granted the occupancy rights in favour of respondent No.1.
34. The appellants filed a suit for declaration of the said order of the Land Tribunal as null and void as stated earlier, taking the very same contention that there was a bar for the Land Tribunal to deal with the matter and accordingly any order passed without
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jurisdiction is void and non-est and accordingly to declare the same as null and void.
35. The learned trial Judge framed the following issues:
"1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the order of the land Tribunal granting the suit schedule lands to the first defendant in L.R.F.No.2867/75-76 is null and void and not binding on the plaintiff?
2. Whether the plaintiff proves his lawful possession of the suit schedule properties?
3. Whether this suit itself is not maintainable in view of the contention taken by the first defendant in paras 3 to 5 of the written statement?
4. Whether the plaintiff proves the interference by the first defendant?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?
6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mandatory injunction as prayed for?
7. To what order or decree?"
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In the above issues, one issue is with regard to maintainability of suit, which came to be framed as preliminary issue and decided against the appellants- plaintiffs and dismissed the suit as being barred by law in view of the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 132 of the Act.
36. I find sufficient force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant Sri A.V. Gangadharappa that when a plea is made with regard to bar of jurisdiction of the tribunal, it becomes incumbent and mandatory for the tribunal to answer the said question with regard to its very jurisdiction for entertaining the lis before the tribunal, as it goes into the root of the matter, in the present case the very jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to entertain or decide the application in Form No.7 for grant of occupancy rights is questioned. It is seen from the order of the Land Tribunal that there is no discussion, reasoning or finding on the said issue of jurisdiction being vested with the Land Tribunal to decide the application for grant of occupancy rights filed in Form No.7,
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considering the facts and circumstances of the present case.
37. The filing of the original suit before the trial Court by the plaintiffs to declare the order of the Land Tribunal as null and void is based on the premise of lack of jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to entertain such an application filed for grant of occupancy rights. Therefore, appellants-plaintiffs are questioning the very jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal in granting the occupancy rights when it did not have the jurisdiction to do so and the competent authority was the Spl. Deputy Commissioner under the Inams Abolition Act. This question of law touching the root of the matter ought to have been decided by the trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court in a more comprehensive and elaborate manner, whereas the trial Court has dismissed the suit of the appellants-plaintiffs as being barred by provisions of 132(2) of the Act.
38. The trial Court by relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of SHIVAPPA BHEEMAPPA AND
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ANOTHER vs NAGAPPA BHEEMAPPA reported in (1983) 2 Kant. L.J. 248 has held that the order made by the Land Tribunal even if in contravention of rules of procedure is none the less the order of the Tribunal which gets the protection of Section 132(2) of the Act and it cannot be questioned by a suit in Civil Court and that the case on hand does not pertain to a matter falling outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
39. In the light of the above facts and discussions it is necessary to have a look at the provisions of Sections 132 and 133 of the Act which reads as under:
"132. Bar of Jurisdiction.−(1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question, which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Deputy Commissioner, (an officer authorized under sub-section (1) of Section 77, the Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed authority under Section 83) (the Tribunal). (the Tahsildar), the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal or the State
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Government in exercise of their powers of control.
(2) No order of, the Deputy Commissioner, (an officer authorized under sub-section (1) of Section 77, the Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed authority under Section 83), (the Tribunal), (the Tahsildar), the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, or the State Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any civil or criminal court.
133. Suits, proceedings, etc., involving questions required to be decided by the Tribunal.−(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force,−
(i) no Civil or Criminal Court or officer or Authority shall, in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land, decide the question whether such land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1st March 1974;
(ii) such Court or officer or Authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question is concerned and
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refer the same to the Tribunal for decision;
(iii) all interim orders issued or made by such Court, officer or Authority, whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a Receiver or otherwise, concerning the land shall stand dissolved or vacated, as the case may be;]
(iv) the Tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under clause(i) and communicate its decision to such Court, officer or Authority. The decision of the Tribunal shall be final. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude the Civil or Criminal Court or the officer or authority from proceeding with the suit, case or proceedings in respect of any matter other than that referred to in that sub-section."
40. On perusal of the above Section and on a plain reading of Section 132(2) of the Act, it is clear that the provision imposes an express bar on Civil Courts as it begins with sentence, no order of the Deputy Commissioner, an officer authorized under sub-section (1) of Section 77, the Assistant Commissioner, the
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prescribed authority under Section 83, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, or the State Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. This, however, means that there is an express bar of the Civil Court or Criminal Court to examine the legality of the order of tribunal, which would be within the specific jurisdiction of the above said authorities mentioned namely, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or the Tahsildar.
41. On a careful perusal of Section 133(2) of the Act, it is seen that sub-Section (2) of Section 133 empowers the Civil Court or Criminal Court from proceeding with the suit, case or proceedings in respect of any matter other than that referred to in sub- Section(1).
42. The Legislature in its wisdom has very carefully worded and enacted these two Sections knowing fully well and keeping in mind that the matter shall not be agitated before two forums on the same
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issue. However, sub-Section (2) of Section 133 of the Act is explicitly very clear that any matter dealing with the subject other than what is stated in sub-Section (1) of Section 133 of the Act cannot be precluded within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or Criminal Court. This aspect of the matter is well settled and it is precisely the case of plaintiffs that the case on hand deals with matter which is outside the jurisdiction of tribunal falling squarely within the provisions of Sub-section(2) of Section 133 of the Act whereas it is the case of respondent No.1-defendant No.1 that since the matter falls within the purview of the Land tribunal, the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the Civil Court was right in dismissing the suit on the ground of maintainability.
43. Having heard the erudite arguments of learned counsel for the plaintiffs and learned Senior Counsel for defendant No.1, this Court is deliberately not expressing any opinion with regard to merits of the matter.
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44. The express provision of sub-Section (2) of Section 133 of the Act is clearly to the effect that the Civil Court/Criminal Court jurisdiction is ousted only in respect of such reliefs as could be granted by the tribunal under the special statute, but in all other aspects, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court apparently is not ousted.
45. In the instant case on hand, the question is with regard to whether the tribunal had the jurisdiction to consider the application in deciding the tenancy rights of the parties. It is the case of appellants-plaintiffs that the same is already decided by the Special Deputy Commissioner of Inams Abolition whereas the respondent No.1-defendant No.1 vehemently contends that it is the tribunal which has the jurisdiction to decide the said issue and that the same having been decided in his favour, the Civil Court is barred from entertaining any further proceedings.
46. It is also seen that there is vociferous arguments addressed by learned counsel for the
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appellants-plaintiffs that there is fraud and illegality committed by respondent No.1-defendant No.1 and so also by the tribunal in not considering the objections raised by the plaintiffs to the grant of tenancy rights in favour of defendant No.1. It is necessary to note that the specific prayer of plaintiffs in the suit at prayer (a), which reads as under:
"(a) Wherefore, the plaintiff prays that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass a decree declaring the occupancy right granted to suit schedule lands to the first defendant in LRF No.2862/75-76 by the Land Tribunal behind one's power as null and void and is not binding on the plaintiff."
47. When such a prayer has been made by the plaintiffs with regard to there being no jurisdiction or power vested in the tribunal to pass an order granting occupancy rights in favour of defendant No.1 and that the order of the tribunal is null and void and the same being not binding on the plaintiffs, it is incumbent on the trial Court to consider it as an issue and decide the same in accordance with law.
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48. Trial Court framed an issue to the effect that "Whether the plaintiff proves that the order of the land Tribunal granting the suit schedule lands to the first defendant in L.R.F.No.2867/75-76 is null and void and not binding on the plaintiff?"
However, despite framing above issue, no order has been passed by the Civil Court on the said issue No.1, but has dismissed the suit on the ground that it is barred under Section 132(2) of the Act and that the suit does not come within the exception of falling outside the jurisdiction of matters to be dealt with by the Land tribunal.
49. Under the above said facts, circumstances and discussions, I am of the opinion that the trial Judge has not applied his mind and has mis-directed himself in only considering the aspect of bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 132(2) of the Act, but has failed to appreciate the contentions raised by the plaintiffs with regard to other aspects enumerated in the
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plaint averments and so also with regard to issue No.1 by the Court itself.
50. I am of the considered view that the learned trial Judge ought to have considered these aspects and passed a detailed order rather than merely dismissing the suit on the ground of bar of jurisdiction under Section 132(2) of the Act. Hence, this is a fit case to be remanded back to the trial Court for adjudication of the matter afresh to consider and decide the issues framed by the trial Court in detail, notwithstanding the specific aspect of jurisdiction of the tribunal in deciding the application for grant of occupancy rights as against the right already decided by the Special Deputy Commissioner of Inams Abolition as contended by the plaintiffs.
51. In view of the fact that the subject matter of the present appeal is on the substantial questions of law with regard to whether is there any patent illegality or perversity in the impugned order? As stated earlier, this Court deliberately abstains from going into merits of the
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matter and neither is any opinion expressed and if any stray sentences are mentioned, the same shall not influence the mind of the trial Court in deciding the matter. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law at Nos.1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative.
52. It is also incumbent upon the trial Court to have pronounced judgment on all issues as contemplated under Order XIV Rule 2 of CPC and not limiting itself to only the preliminary issue of bar of maintainability of the suit, considering the specific facts and circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, I pass the following:
ORDER
i) The appeal is allowed-in-part;
ii) The matter is remanded back to the trial Court for fresh consideration;
iii) In view of the fact that the original suit is of the year 1993 and almost two decades having gone by, I deem it appropriate to direct the trial Court to dispose of this
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matter within a period of eight (08) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment;
iv) Both the plaintiffs as well as defendant No.1 along with their respective counsel shall appear before the trial Court on 06.06.2022 without waiting for further notice either from this Court or from the trial Court and they are directed to cooperate with the trial Court for disposal of the matter expeditiously;
v) All contentions of the parties are kept open.
Sd/-
JUDGE VK/LB