Bombay High Court
Union Of India vs M/S Indusind Bank Ltd And 3 Ors on 27 July, 2015
Author: Roshan Dalvi
Bench: Roshan Dalvi
(1) CHSL 1137/15
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
Amk
CHAMBER SUMMONS (L) NO. 1137 OF 2015
AND
CHAMBER SUMMONS (L) NO. 1119 OF 2015
IN
SUIT NO. 163 OF 2008
Union of India .. Applicant
(Original Plaintiff)
In the matter between
Union of India .. Plaintiff
Vs.
M/s. Indusind Bank Ltd. & Ors. .. Defendants
Ms. S. I. Shah i/b S. I. Shah & Co. for the Plaintiff/Applicant.
Mr. Dinyar Madon, Sr. Advocate a/w. Mr. Shyam Kapadia i/b M/s. Crawford
Bayley & Co. for Defendant No.1.
Mr. Sudeep Dasgupta for Defendant No.2.
CORAM : MRS. ROSHAN DALVI, J.
Date of reserving the Order : 13.07.2015
Date of pronouncing the Order : 27.07.2015
ORDER
1. The plaintiff has sued for recovery of Rs.11.02 Cr with interest thereon @ 24% p.a. as per Exhibit K to the plaint. The suit is filed upon invocation of a bank guarantee. The bank guarantee has been given to the plaintiff by defendant No.1 in respect of custom duty payable by defendant No.4. Certain custom duty was levied. The bank guarantee was invoked. That amount was paid. Later there was a second invocation of the same bank guarantee. The defendants obtained an attorney's opinion based upon the invocation and refused to honour that invocation.
2. The real issue between the parties is only whether in a continuing bank guarantee a second or subsequent invocations can be legally ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (2) CHSL 1137/15 made or whether upon the first invocation being honoured the bank guarantee would come to an end.
3. The execution of the bank guarantee and the invocations have been admitted. Hence the parties wisely did not desire to lead oral evidence.
There was none to lead. The documentary evidence between the parties and the admitted facts of the issue and the invocation of the bank guarantee would be seen upon interpretation of the terms of the guarantee and the related law.
4. Consequently the issue came up on board for arguments on 10.06.2015. The arguments commenced. Soon it was realized that the second invocation made by the plaintiff upon defendant No.1 under its letter dated 13.09.2002 and received by defendant No.1 was itself not on record.
However that invocation was relied upon by defendant No.1 to obtain the attorney's opinion which was conveyed to the plaintiff and which was annexed to the written statement based upon which the legal contention on behalf of the defendants was advised.
5. Under these circumstances the plaintiff has sought to rely upon, tender and produce the said letter in fact relied upon by defendant No.1 in the opinion. This would be an additional document relied upon by the plaintiff which was not relied upon in the plaint. Consequently the plaintiff has sought to amend the plaintiff and/or to rely upon the said document. Of course, the plaintiff has sought to rely upon certain further documents also. These are the letter of defendant No.1 in reply to the plaintiff's, second invocation and certain further notice given by the plaintiff which is replied by the defendants. Other than this the plaintiff has sought to rely upon its letter dated 24.03.2006 which has been replied by the defendants by its letter dated 25.03.2006 already marked Exhibit J to the plaint.
::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (3) CHSL 1137/156. The plaintiff, therefore, has essentially sought to make the record complete. The further documents to be relied upon by the plaintiff are essentially only consequent upon the letter dated 13.09.2002 upon receipt of which the legal opinion was taken which has already been relied upon in the written statement. The last letter to be relied upon by the plaintiff is the letter in reply to which Exhibit J has already been relied upon in the plaint.
7. The plaintiff has also sought to carry out certain amendments in the plaint to place on record how the correspondence came to be.
8. It may at once be stated that the part of the correspondence hitherto not relied upon making demands of similar nature does not enhance the plaintiff's case. The further letters are not required to be allowed to be relied upon or incorporated in the plaint for determining the real issue between the parties. The execution of all the aforesaid letters and the replies thereto form a chain of correspondence.
9. Mr. Madon on behalf of defendant No.1 rightly conceded that these may be relevant documents. He also did not wrongly contend that they are not the correct correspondence between the parties or that they are fabricated or brought in at a late stage to defeat the defence of the defendants or which would cause prejudice to the defendants.
10. Defendant No.1 nevertheless has vehemently opposed the plaintiff's reliance upon these documents as also the application for amendment of the plaint.
11. It is clear that the cause of action of the plaintiff does not change. No new case is sought to be made out. No further reliefs are claimed. The amendment is opposed on the ground that the trial has begun.
::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (4) CHSL 1137/15It is contended that the trial has begun because the issues have been framed, the parties agreed not to lead oral evidence but to rely upon the documents annexed to the pleadings and the arguments upon such pleadings with annexures began when the plaintiff realized that it required the second invocation of the bank guarantee upon which defendant No.1 obtained the attorney's opinion and which has been admittedly received by the defendants so that defendant No.1 obtained the opinion and which has also been replied by defendant No.1. The other correspondence similarly follows. The Court is called upon to see the stage at which either further documents can be accepted on record, of course, subject to the admissibility and relevancy, and the stage at which the amendments can be allowed.
12. The question of reliance upon further documents at a later stage must be considered first. Under Order 7 Rule 14(1) the plaintiff must produce the documents on which he sues or relies. If all the documents that the plaintiff relies upon are produced in the plaint, there would be no cause for complaint. If, however, the plaintiff does not produce all the documents in the plaint, the plaintiff must obtain leave of a Court to receive further documents in evidence under Order 7 Rule 14(3) of the CPC.
13. The Court has a discretion to grant leave based upon the facts and circumstances. There is a good deal of jurisprudence by precedents in cases where leave would be granted to rely upon and produce further documents.
14. The Court must first consider how the specific provision came to be. Order 7 Rule 14(3) has been added by way of amendment of the CPC in 2002. The position that prevailed prior to the amendment must, therefore, be seen with regard to such documents which are produced at a later stage. Order 7 Rule 14 prior to the amendment ran thus:
"14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues. - (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document in his possession or power, he shall ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (5) CHSL 1137/15 produce it in Court when the plaint is presented, and shall at the same time deliver the document or a copy thereof to be filed with the plaint.
(2) List of other documents. - Where he relies on any other documents (whether in his possession or power or not) as evidence in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list to be added or annexed to the plaint."
There was no provision under which a plaintiff could not be allowed to produce further documents which were not earlier produced with the plaint and no leave of Court was necessary for such production. The plaintiff had the liberty to enter such documents in the list of documents to be relied upon by the plaintiff and annexed to the plaint. In fact, the plaintiff relied upon all further documents also subject, of course, to the rules relating to the inspection of those documents.
15. The CPC came to be amended to streamline the tardy procedure that prevailed allowing the parties to produce the documents at will. The CPC, therefore, mandated the plaintiff to produce all the documents with the plaint and allowed the plaintiff to rely upon further documents only with the leave of the Court. The entire purpose of the amendment was to prevent needless delay in relying upon the documents not earlier relied upon, shown or stated. The legislature, therefore, left the need for discretion to the Court.
The discretion would have to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, capriciously or mischievously. Such judicious discretion would determine which document can be relied upon at a later stage.
16. In fact, the CPC before the amendment of 2002 contained within itself Order 7 Rule 18 which came to be omitted by the amendment of 2002. Rule 18(1) prior to the amendment was in terms of Rule 14(3) upon the amendment. It runs thus:
"18. Inadmissibility of document not produced when plaint filed.-
(1) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint, and which is not produced or ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (6) CHSL 1137/15 entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit."
Order 7 Rule 14(3) upon amendment reads thus :
"(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit."
It must be seen in which situation leave of the Court was contemplated so that the plaintiff's inherent right to rely upon the documents came to be curtailed. It must be appreciated that the curtailment was prior to as well as after the amendment. In the case of Sharangdhar Purshottam Kanhere Vs. Sitaram Mahadeo Dabholkar 1978 BLR 695 this Court considered the purport or Order 7 rule 18 of the CPC as it then was thus:
"we find in O. VII, r.18 of the Code, discretion is given to the Court to allow the production of such document with the leave of the Court and if the Court refuses the leave to produce subsequent to the presentation of the plaint, such document shall not be received in evidence on behalf of the plaintiff at the hearing of the suit. The object of rr.14 and 18 is to provide against false documents being set up after the institution of a suit. In those cases, therefore, where there is no doubt of the existence of a document at the date of the suit, the Court should, as a general rule admit the document in evidence though it was not produced with the plaint or entered in the list of documents annexed to the plaint as required by r. 14. But the Court even in certain cases may refuse to receive it in evidence if it is produced at a very late stage of the proceeding or the Court may allow the production of a document which ought to have been produced at the time of the presentation of the plaint on showing good reason or sufficient cause for non-production. Rule 18 of O. VII of the Code gives the discretion to the Court to allow the production of a document after the presentation of the plaint.
The parameters of production of documents at late stage were, therefore, laid down by judge-made law even prior to the amendment to the CPC and to the same end. Hence the leave is specially meant not to be given to allow the plaintiff to produce any suspicious document which may be seen to be got up or fabricated later based upon the defence of the defendant to ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (7) CHSL 1137/15 defeat the defence set out by the defendant.
17. Mr. Madon on behalf of defendant No.1 contended that the leave of the Court must be granted even for production of documents upon the same terms as an amendment would be granted to the plaint at such time. He drew the analogy between Order 7 Rule 14(3) with the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17. Whereas under the former a document could be relied upon by the plaintiff only with leave of the Court, under the latter the amendment could be allowed after the trial commenced only if in spite of due diligence such matter could not be raised earlier in the pleading. Mr. Madon would, therefore, contend that the plaintiff must show how despite due diligence these documents were not relied upon at an earlier stage.
18. The statute does not imperatively require such due diligence to be shown for obtaining leave of the Court. Grant of leave is a matter between the applicant and the Court. The Court would have discretion to grant leave upon any case being made out. Cases are like snowflakes. They cannot be put in straightjacket formula. Even the stage at which the document is sought to be relied upon, which is otherwise admissible and relevant, and in this case even admitted to have been received, would determine the requirement of grant of leave as held in the case of Sharangdhar (supra). The Court would not grant leave, for example, if it suspected the document to have been fabricated later or to be false document set up after the institution of the suit. It is impossible to accept that any Court would not allow parties to rely upon the documents which have admittedly been in existence, which have been relied upon by the either side (in this case to procure the opinion) and which are truthful documents which may be required for determination of the controversy in the suit. One is yet to come across the Court which would choose to shut its eye to the whole truth being brought before it for the ultimate adjudication of the dispute at least at the final hearing on merits. Leave of the Court is required ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (8) CHSL 1137/15 not to avoid and shunt evidence being produced. Leave of the Court would be required to explain the Court how in a given case a document which could have been produced, remained to be produced and the Court in its infinite mercy would condone the default by error or even by negligence to admit on record the truth. In fact, it is, therefore, that the due diligence, which is required to amend the plaint and which may add to the controversy between the parties, is thought fit by the legislature not to be imposed when a mere further document is to be produced.
19. Mr. Madon relied upon the judgments under Order 6 Rule 17 as also under Section 14 of the Limitation Act which also require the prosecution of the suit in a Court without jurisdiction with due diligence to be the yardstick for granting leave to the plaintiff to merely rely upon further documents - in this case a document that defendant No.1 itself relied upon to obtain the attorney's opinion. [See. Foreshore Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Praveen D. Desai 2009(1) Bom. C. R. 757 and Foreshore Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Praveen Desai 2006(6) Bom. C. R. 230]. Consequently the judgments relied upon by Mr. Madon do not require to be considered in this matter and need not be elaborated.
20. In fact, the right analogy would be the consideration of Order 13 Rule 2(1) of the CPC in relation to production of original documents. That order also has been amended by the Amendment Act of 1999. The relevant part of the Rule as it stood prior to the Amendment runs thus:
2. Effect of non-production of documents.- (1) No documentary evidence in the possession or power of any party which should have been but has not been, produced in accordance with the requirements of rule 1 shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-production thereof; and the Court receiving any such evidence shall record the reasons for so doing.
The production of original documents under Order 13 upon amendment has done away with the aforesaid Rule 2. Hence the bar to ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (9) CHSL 1137/15 production does not apply. Even when it was applicable good cause was the reason to allow the production of original documents at a subsequent stage of the proceeding which is after the settlement of issues. Even the initial mandate of production only if good cause was shown was only so that suspicious document would not be produced as a matter of right at a subsequent stage. The explanation to satisfy the Court why they were not produced earlier had to be given but the sub-rule was always interpreted to be liberally construed so as to advance cause of justice if those documents were necessary for the proper decision of the case.
21. Hence in the case of Madan Gopal Kanodia Vs. Mamraj Maniram (1977) 1 SCC 669 the Court considered the ambit of Order 13 Rule 2. The suit was between two wholesale businessmen. The Court considered the purchase by them of certain bales of cloth for which the price was not paid but, upon accounts, was to be taken to be adjusted. The plaintiff was called upon to file a statement in writing giving better particulars of his case under the provisions of Order 6 Rule 4 of the CPC.
The plaintiff filed its written statement relying upon certain documents.
Though the High Court rubbished the documents having been produced at a late stage, the Supreme Court in para 14 of the judgment appreciated the delay, if any, being condoned by the trial Court. The Supreme Court observed that those documents were produced, though not at the time of the filing of the plaint but along with statement of the better particulars, they were before the evidence had started and could not have taken the defendants by surprise. The Supreme Court observed that Order 13 Rule 2 did not provide any particular "ritualistic formula" in which the order of the Court had to be passed and hence upon good cause being shown held that the documents could be produced. The Supreme Court further observed that the defendants would have an opportunity to rebut the documents to show that they were not genuine, if that be so. The Court, therefore, observed that the defendants suffered no prejudice by the production of those documents ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (10) CHSL 1137/15 and hence they could be produced at a later stage. In fact, in that case, as in this, the defendants never even suggested that those documents were forged or fabricated.
In this case the facts reflected in the documents are averred in the plaint. They are only sought to be substantiated by the documentary evidence to prove those averments since the averments are not admitted. They are not sought to be produced to counter the case of the defendants in the written statement. They are not suspicious or stated to be fabricated.
22. The application to produce documents at a later stage in terms implies condonation of delay in producing them at the earlier stage. The parameters of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would justifiably apply. The cause to be shown for condoning the delay for filing an appeal after the period of limitation is over would be upon the same parameters. In the case of The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality AIR 1972 SC 749 the Supreme Court considered the sufficient cause for excusing the delay to admit an appeal upon exercise of discretion of the Court thus:
This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. ............... the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as "to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant."
Of course, utter negligence or inaction or complete lack of bona fides would disentitle a party as much under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as in application under Order 7 Rule 14(3) of the CPC. Defendant No.1 would contend that there is gross negligence and inaction in not producing the documents by the plaintiff along with the plaint.
23. The aforesaid case came to be followed in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353 in which also the parameters of liberal approach for condoning delay in an application ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (11) CHSL 1137/15 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act have been set out more particularly with regard to the cases of the Government. Whereas in the case of the State of West Bengal (supra) no preferential treatment was claimed by the Government or was observed could be granted to the Government, in this case it has been observed:
experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause".
In that case the delay came to be condoned upon the footing that:
the approach of the Courts must be to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.
Of course, the Court observed that the delay would be non deliberate as ordinarily a litigant did not stand to benefit by any delay. The Court observed:
Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. ........
........ When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. ....... ........ There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately; or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. ........
........ It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. .......
24. This case came to be further followed in the case of State of ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (12) CHSL 1137/15 Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani AIR 1996 SC 1623 in which after setting out the above parameters of the functioning of the Government the principle of treatment required to be accorded to the State came to be extended thus:
Therefore certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. It is upon the reasoning that if the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest.
25. In the case of Merwyn Anthony Fernandes Vs. Brian Louis Sequeira in Writ Petition No. 683 of 2010 dated 10 th January, 2011 also single Judge of this Court has set out in what circumstances further documents can be allowed to be relied upon at a later stage. That would be only after satisfying the Court the reason for not producing the same at the time of the filing of the plaint. Such discretion is to be exercised in rare cases and not in a routine manner.
26. Indeed such leave cannot be granted mechanically and without application of mind. It has to be granted upon seeing why the documents were not produced earlier and how they came to be produced later. The plaintiff's officer has stated in para 4 of his affidavit-in-support of his application under Order 7 rule 14(3) of the CPC that only when the parties were called upon to produce the documents in Court that he found the documents which are now sought to be relied upon. Indeed the letter of 13.09.2002 would be specifically required to be seen, since the attorney's opinion was upon receipt of the said letter as the second invocation. His affidavit shows that he searched for the letter dated 24.03.2006 to which the reply was annexed as Exhibit J to the plaint. It appears that it was then he also came upon the other correspondence between the plaintiff and defendant No.1. His affidavit shows that another officer of the plaintiff was in-charge at the time of the filing of the plaint (which is accepted since the plaint has been filed 7 years ago). Hence his affidavit shows non availability ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (13) CHSL 1137/15 of the correspondence with such officer. Much is made about whether the documents were in one file or more than one file by Mr. Madon on behalf of defendant No.1. Mr. Madon would question as to how the documents could not be available if they were in a single file since the documents are merely correspondence. He would argue that if they were in more than one file then the plaintiff must explain how the documents were searched. This argument is upon the speculation whether there was one or more than one file. The officer of the plaintiff has not mentioned about the number of files. The fact remains that there would be more than one officer attending to the above suit on behalf of the plaintiff. In fact, certain documents may just not be relied upon in the plaint as not important enough to be made available to be produced. Another officer may have another perspective of the matter and may require the documents to be produced. In fact, this Court itself would require the parties to produce the letter based upon which the opinion was obtained. It so happens that in this case both the letters are to the knowledge of defendant No.1. They have been received by defendant No.1 and such as would not arouse the suspicion of the Court that they could have been fabricated after the filing of the suit. To grant leave, the Court must act as a watch-dog, and not a blood-hound. Hence even upon the above parameters leave must deservedly be granted.
27. These are the noble parameters that must guide this Court. The documents are required to be considered for ascertaining the entire truth of the matter between the parties. The letter dated 13.09.2002 is admittedly received by defendant No.1 to obtain the attorney's opinion. The letter dated 24.03.2006 is the letter in reply to which the letter of defendant No.1 dated 25.03.2006, Exhibit J to the plaint is addressed to the plaintiff. The other letters relied upon by the defendants are unnecessary as they are only further correspondence. The aforesaid two letters must be produced and can be relied upon by the plaintiff. Leave in that behalf is, therefore, required to be granted for their production. The delay, if any, deserves to be condoned.
::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (14) CHSL 1137/1528. Mr. Madon argued that just as amendments cannot be allowed after the trial commenced unless what was sought to be averred could not be averred earlier in spite of due diligence, further the documents also cannot be relied upon by a party after the trial commenced except with such diligence and that is reflected in the requirement of taking leave of the Court to rely upon any further documents under Order 7 Rule 14 (3) of the CPC.
He argued that the issues have been framed and the parties have decided not to lead any oral evidence and to go to trial but to prosecute their respective cases upon the pleadings and their documentary evidence. He argued that the suit, in fact, reached hearing on 10.06.2015 after which this application has come to be made when the arguments had commenced.
29. In the case of Rajendrakumar Bhogilal Shaha Vs. Pushpa Damodar Nandurkar MANU/MH/0681/2011 this Court upon considering the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court held that the trial commenced with the performance of the first steps necessary or essential to proceed with the trial. The Court, therefore, said that mere filing of the affidavit of examination-in-chief may not necessarily amount to commencement of trial unless the witness started his deposition and the affidavit in lieu of evidence was proved and taken on record along with the documents. The Court considered whether trial had begun in an application for allowing amendments to the plaint without consideration of "due diligence" in not producing them before.
30. Since in this case no affidavit of evidence is filed, there would be no question of the parties having started their deposition though indeed the suit reached hearing on 10.06.2015. Consequently the same rigour as is required in the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 for allowing any amendments after the trial has begun should not apply for granting leave to produce two necessary documents which are admitted to have been received by defendant ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 ::: (15) CHSL 1137/15 No.1 under the requirement of granting leave under Order 7 Rule 14(3) of the CPC.
31. Hence Chamber Summons (L) No. 1137 of 2015 is, therefore, granted in respect of aforesaid two letters.
32. Since only two out of five letters sought to be now relied upon by the plaintiff are allowed to be produced since it is seen that those letters are admittedly received by defendant No.1 and considered by defendant No.1 in the legal opinion obtained by defendant No.1 as also in its reply, Exhibit J to the plaint, further amendment to the plaint is unnecessary. Consequently there shall be no order in Chamber Summons (L) No. 1119 of 2015.
33. There shall be no order as to costs.
34. The Suit is adjourned to 03.08.2015.
(ROSHAN DALVI J.) ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2015 23:57:58 :::