Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ram Kumar @ Raj Kumar Rathore vs State Of M.P. Through P.S. Inderganj on 8 February, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000CRILJ2644, 2000(1)MPHT661
ORDER Maithli Sharan, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 482 read with Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, invoking the inherent powers of this Court.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this petition lie in a narrow compass; a criminal case for the offences under Sections 420, 120B, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the petitioner and other co-accused persons. Undisputedly, the petitioner was arrested on 9-3-1998, and after the charge-sheet having been filed in the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, charges were framed on 15-2-1999, and on 27-2-1999 the evidence in the case, for the first time, was recorded. Thereafter other dates in the case were fixed by the learned Magistrate, but somehow the trial could not be concluded till date. Meanwhile, much after completion of period of 60 days from 27-2-99, the petitioner filed an application under Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the trial Court praying therein that as he was in custody during the whole of such period and the trial had not concluded, hence, he be released on bail. The learned trial Magistrate rejected the said application on 7-9-1999.
3. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 7-9-99 passed by the learned trial Magistrate preferred a revision, petition No. 31/99 in the Court of Session, The learned Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, by his order dated 19-11-99, dismissed the revision petition. Now, the petitioner Ram Kumar @ Raj Kumar Rathore, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has challenged the aforesaid impugned orders passed by the learned trial Magistrate and the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior.
4. I have heard the learned counsel on both the sides at length. So far as the factual aspects of the case concerning the dates of arrest of the petitioner and the starting of the prosecution evidence in the trial Court as well as other further dates are concerned, there is absolutely no dispute. The only point that crops up for decision in this case is, whether in view of the factual circumstances prevailing in the case the petitioner gets a tight to be released on bail. Thus, a very short legal point in regard to the interpretation of the provisions of Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure falls to be pondered over. For the sake of convenience it would be worthwhile to refer to the said provision hereunder:--
"437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence:--
(1) **** **** **** **** (2) **** **** **** **** (3) **** **** **** **** (4) **** **** **** **** (5) **** **** **** ****
(6) If in any case triable by Magistrate the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.
(7) **** **** **** ****"
5. Looking to the provision referred to above it is but clear that it is mandatory in nature, and the mandate is that if the Magistrate is trying a case in which the accused has been charged for a non-bailable offence and the trial has not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date of recording the evidence in the case and that the accused had remained in custody during the whole of such period of sixty days, then he becomes entitled to be released on bail, provided of course, the Magistrate does not reject the same recording in writing his reasons therefor. Circumscribing the undisputed factual circumstances in the ambit of the provisions of Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is apparent that they hold the field and apply here from all four corners. In rejecting the bail application of the petitioner the learned trial Magistrate and the learned Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, have no doubt given their reasonings as required under the above provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure but they are simply to the effect that if the petitioner were to be released then it is doubtful that he would be attending the Court on each and every date fixed by the Magistrate. These reasonings indicating the apprehension of the learned Courts below, by no stretch of imagination, could be termed as judicious, and therefore, they are not of such a nature as to thwart and wash off the mandatory character of the provisions of Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am of the considered view that the statutory right given to the accused by the above provisions cannot be taken away in such a fashion. Since the petitioner had althrough remained in custody during the said period of more than sixty days from the first date fixed for recording the evidence, he would be deemed to have been clothed with the right to be released on bail. The rejection of his application under Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned trial Magistrate and later the dismissal of his revision petition by the learned Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, was nothing but the abuse of the process of Court and had given rise to the miscarriage of justice.
6. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion, this petition is allowed and the impugned orders passed by both the Courts below are set aside.