Gujarat High Court
Vallabh Glass Works Co. Limited vs Union Of India And Ors. on 1 January, 1800
Equivalent citations: 1980(6)ELT437(GUJ)
JUDGMENT S.H. Sheth, J.
1. The petitioners are manufacturing glass products. Within the meaning of Item 23A in the First Schedule to the Centarl Exicises and Slat Act, 1944, they have been manufacturing sheet glass and plate glass and not other glassware or glass product. The petitioners in another factory of theirs have been manufactureing wooden contaners for their glass products. The iron strapplings are purcahsed bythem from the market. They are wrapped roudnd the woodn boxes in which their glass products are packed. In regard to wooden containers, teh petitioners applied on 21st May, 1975 for a licence in pursuancce of Item 68 in the First Shcedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. They were given the modified licence on 1st September, 1975. The factory manufacturing glass products and the factory.
Similarly, the proceedings for reassessment under Rule 173-J read with rule 10 will be governe section 40(2) and the period of limitation of one yea prescribed by rule 173-J would become invalid. These consequences are somewhat startling and could not have been intended by the Legislature."
(The under lines is mine).
I am in respectful agreement with the decision and observations of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the Universal Cables case.
2. On the other hand, reliance was placed by Mr. Shah on the decision in Abdul Aziz Ansari v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1958 Bombay 279, where it was held that the phraseology `any legal proceeding' in section 48(2) (ii) of the Sales Tax Act, 1953 was not confined merely to proceedings in a Court of law, and would mean in its normal connotation, a proceeding in accordance with law and that assessment proceedings under the Sales Tax Act were such proceedings. This dicision can be of no assistance to the petitioner in view in view of the fact that the phraseology of section 48(2)(ii) of the Sales Tax Act is entirely different from the phraseology of Section 40(2) of the Central Excise Act. While in section 40(2) of the Central Excise ACt, the words "other legal proceeding" are succeeded by the words "any suit, prosecution of" and hence must be read ejusdem generis in their plain context, no such construction is permissible in respect of section 48(2) (ii) of the Sales Tax which reads as under:-
"Notwithstanding the repeal of the said ACt and the said entries, the said repeal shall not affect o be deemed to affect-
* * * *
(ii) any legal proceeding pending on the 1st day of November 1952 in respect of any right, title, obligation or liability or anything done or suffered before the said date; and any such proceeding shall be continued and be disposed of as if this Act had not been passed."
Thus the language of section 48(2)(ii) of the Sales Tax Act is far from comparable with the language of section 40(2) of Central Excise Act and hence a wide connotation was given by the Bombay High Court to the words `any legal proceeding" in section 48(2)(ii) of the Sales Tax Act.
3. Mr. Shah also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in public Prosecutor, Madras, v. R. Raju, A.I.R. 1972 Supreme Court 2504. Raju's case was considered by the Madhya Pradesh High COurt in Universal Cables case (supra). Raju's case is no authority for the proposition canvassed by Mr. Shah. It is an authority that section 40(2) is not confined in operation to Government servants only and that it is applicable to any person including an assessee.
4. In the result, all the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the petitioners insut fail and the petition must stand dismissed with costs. Rule is discharged.