Supreme Court of India
Smt. Panna W/O Pandharinath L. Waringe vs A.S. Samra And Others on 27 January, 1993
Equivalent citations: AIR1994SC1274, 1994CRILJ1111
Bench: Kuldip Singh, S. Mohan
JUDGMENT
1. Special leave granted.
Pandharinath Laxman Waringe has been detained, by an order dated April 3, 1992, under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. His wife Smt. Panna challenged the detention order by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Bombay High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition by its judgment dated July 21, 1992. This appeal by way of special leave is against the judgment of the High Court.
2. The detention order is founded on four incidents which took place between June 2, 1990 and September 13, 1991. The detention order was served on the detenu on April 3, 1992 itself. The learned Counsel for the detenu challenged the order of detention, before us, on the following grounds:
(1) There was inordinate delay in considering the representation of the detenu by the Central Government and as such the detenu was denied the right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. According to the learned Counsel the representation was submitted on April 24, 1992 and the rejection was communicated to him on June 15, 1991.The contention is that there is no explanation for the gross delay on the part of the Central Government in considering the detenu's representation.
(2) There has been long delay in issuing the detention order. The first ground of detention is year and five months earlier to the date of detention order. According to the learned Counsel due to delay in issuing the detention order the live link was snapped and as such the detention order was not justified.
(3) There was non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority as much as the file containing near about 200 pages including documents in Marathi was sent to him on April 3, 1992 and the same day the detention order was issued.
3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties, gone through the judgment of the High Court, read the grounds of detention and examined other relevant material on the record. The High Court in a well reasoned judgment, has dealt with all the points raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant.
4. The High Court examined the original records and came to the conclusion that there was no delay in considering the representation of the detenu by the Central Government. The High Court based its conclusions on the following reasoning:
The representation of the detenu is dated 24-4-1992. It was received by the jail authority on the same day. On 27-4-1992 the Jail Authority forwarded the same to the Central Government, Central Government received it on 1-5-1992. On 5-5-1992 Central Government sent a wireless message to the State Government to furnish some vital information. This vital information was received by the Central Government on 20-5-1992. After considering this vital information and the parawise comments the Central Government took decision to reject the same on 28-5-1992. The decision was communicated to the jail authority by wireless message followed by a communication dated 4-6-1992.
Mr. Gupta urged that in the first place there was delay of about 15 days on the part of the State Government or the detaining authority to forward the parawise comments. It covers the period between 5-5-1992 to 20-5-1992. He then urged that despite the receipt of the information and the parawise comments by the Central Government on 20-5-1992 it took nearly 8 days to dispose of the detenu's representation which period according to the learned Counsel does not reflect the expeditious disposal of the representation by the Central Government. Lastly he urged that the Central Government took nearly 8 days to communicate its decision and on this score also the continued detention cannot be held legal.
Mr. Ishwar Singh, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs has filed the return on behalf of Union of India. In paragraph 6, it has been stated that on receipt of the representation on 1-5-1992 it was immediately processed and since some vital information was necessary a wireless message was sent to the State Government on 6-5-1992. This wireless message was produced before us during the course of hearing. Vital information needed by the Central Government was as under:
1. Order of detention; 2. Date of actual detention; and 3. Information as regards report of the Advisory Board.
The State Government on receipt of the said wireless message on 2-5-1992 forwarded the necessary information by wireless message on 6-5-1992 (see affidavit of Shri Kelkar dated 9-7-1992). In the wireless message dated 5-5-1992 the State Government was also requested to forward parawise comments to the representation. A copy of this representation was received by the detaining authority on 8-5-1992. On 12-5-1992 the detaining authority forwarded the parawise comments by post (see paragraph 28 of the affidavit of the detaining authority dated 4-7-1992). These parawise comments were received by the Central Government on 20-5-1992. In view of these dates we are of the opinion that the first contention relating to the delay of 15 days between 5-5-1992 and 20-5-1992 has no merits.
Coming to the lag of delay between 20-5-1992 and 28-5-1992, Mr. Ishwar Singh in paragraph 7 of his affidavit-in-reply has stated that the representation along with material was put to before the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, on 21-5-1992 who after careful consideration with his comments put up the same before the Special Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs on 22-5-1992. The said Special Secretary after processing the material and representation placed it before Home Minister on 23-5-1992. Home Minister himself considered the detenu's representation and rejected the same on 28-5-1992. In our opinion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case there does not seem to be any laches on the part of the Central Government in disposing of the detenu's representation expeditiously.
As far as the communication is concerned it was brought to our notice that the Central Government vide its wireless message dated 3-6-1992 communicated to the jail authority about the rejection of the detenu's representation followed by a written communication by post on 4-6-1992 and served on detenu on 15-6-1992. Both these communications were sent to Pune Jail authority because detenu was initially lodged there. Since during this period he was shifted to Bombay, the said communications were redirected to Bombay Jail authority for service. From the record produced before us we find that there was no delay in any stage. First contention therefore fails.
5. The second point raised before us by the learned Counsel for the detenu was dealt with by the High Court in the following manner:
The detaining authority in the grounds of detention has categorically referred to its subjective satisfaction based upon not only the 4 incidents but also by reference to the preamble to the grounds of detention. What is material to note is that the detenu was released by this Court from the earlier detention order on 30-3-1990. What is required to be seen is as to whether detenu has revived his prejudicial activities after his release. If the dates of these 4 incidents are taken into account it is quite clear that the detenu again resorted back to the same prejudicial activities and he was involved inasmuch as 3 Indian Penal Code cases out of which one relates to an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34, IP Code. The last incident took place on 13-9-1991. He was found absconding and came to the first arrested on 21-12-1991. He was shown arrested on 30-12-1991 and charge-sheet in this behalf was filed on 31-1-1992. Apart from this the detenu was released on bail in incident No. 4(d) on 3-4-1992. If the chain of prejudicial activities is taken into account with the fact that the detenu was absconding and after his arrest he was released on bail on 3-4-1992, then in our opinion the impugned order issued on 3-4-1992 cannot be branded either as a delayed order and/or based on stale incidents which have no nexus to the impugned order.
6. We see no infirmity in the above quoted reasoning of the High Court in respect of the two grounds urged before us.
7. There is no force even in the third contention of the learned Counsel. The detaining authority in its affidavit before the High Court stated that he had gone through all the documents placed before him and after full application of mind, he culled out the grounds of detention. There is no material on the record to support the contention of the learned Counsel and as such we see no reason to reject the statement of the detaining authority made on oath before the High Court. Even otherwise the High Court examined the original records and satisfied itself that there was proper application of mind in issuing the detention order.
8. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.