Calcutta High Court
Usha Rani Kundu vs Agradut Sangha And Ors. on 16 March, 2006
Equivalent citations: (2006)3CALLT139(HC), 2006(3)CHN77, AIR 2006 (NOC) 911 (CAL.)
Author: Maharaj Sinha
Bench: Asok Kumar Ganguly, Maharaj Sinha
JUDGMENT Maharaj Sinha, J.
1. Normally, a learned Single Judge exercises the revisional jurisdiction both under the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also under Article 227 of the Constitution to decide on merits all applications under such jurisdiction.
2. In the present case, however, in dealing with the merits of the above revisional application the learned Judge found that the point that arose for his Lordship's consideration was a point where there was no direct authority or judicial pronouncement of this Court. In the words of the learned Judge, "The point as to whether an unregistered society or an unregistered club can acquire and hold properties movable as well as immovable is a point which has not been dealt with and decided in a direct way be this Court.
As it will appenr ...the point is not at all free from controversies".
3. On the above basis, after having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the decided authorities on the subject, the learned Judge was pleased to frame two questions, which questions, the learned Judge thought should be referred to "higher Bench" for decision. For the sake of convenience the said two questions, as framed by the learned Single Judge, including the concluding portion of His Lorship's judgment are quoted below:
In view of what has been stated above the following two points are being framed for referring them to a higher Bench for decision:
1. Does a society including a club not registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act come under the category of a "living person" as per Section 5 of the Tranfer of Property Act and can such an unregistered society or an unregistered club validly acquire immovable property by purchase under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act?
2. Will a purchase of immovable property made by an unregistered club showing the Secretary alone as the purchaser in the deed of purchase be a valid one?
Place the records before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for referring the points framed above to a higher Bench for decision.
4. Thus, we in the Division Bench are to decide the above points or rather the questions framed by the learned Single Judge. Before attempting to answer or decide the above questions the facts and circumstances out of which the questions as above have arisen for consideration need, I think, be mentioned in brief.
5. Usha Rani Kundu invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court claiming that on 13 December, 1976 she purchased a plot of land, particulars of which are mentioned in her revisional application, from one Murari Mohan Saha, the previous owner of the said plot of land. The opposite parties to the said revisional application are the members of a Club named Agradut Sangha who were claiming pre-emption on behalf of the said Club, Agradut Sangha by making an application under the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act in the Court of learned Munsiff, at Barasat. The stand that the members of the said Club took claiming pre-emption was that the said Club "became owner of adjoining and contiguous land" on the basis of a previous purchase by the Club of a contiguous land by a registered deed executed by the owner of the said land in favour of the Secretary of the said Club, Agradut Sangha.
6. Usha Rani, however, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the said application for pre-emption on the ground that the said transfer of adjoining and contiguous land by the erstwhile owner thereof in favour of the Secretary of the said Club, could not be treated to be a valid transfer as on the date of such transfer i.e. 13th February, 1975 the said Club Agradut Sangha was not registered under the Societies Registration Act and as such neither the Club nor its Secretary could acquire any title to the land in question by way of "transfer inter vivos" and that no suit could be brought either for or against the said Club since the said Club was not a registered one and as such not a juridical person.
7. Since there was no valid transfer in the name of the Secretary of the said Club the said transfer was void ab initio and as such no right of pre-emption could accrue or be exercised on the basis of the said transfer dated 13th February, 1975 by the Secretary of the said Agradut Sangha in the first place.
8. The said preliminary objection, however, was upheld by the learned Munsiff as he was of the opinion that the said claim on behalf of Agradut Sangha could not be entertained as Agradut Sangha was an unregistered society at the relevant time of transfer and also at the time when the said application claiming pre-emption was made before the learned Munsiff on behalf of said Agradut Sangha (hereinafter referred to as the Club), being an unregistered society, the said Club firstly, did not acquire any "juridical status" as contemplated in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, secondly, the petitioners being the members of the said Club could not make any claim on behalf of the said Club as the property in question was purchased in the name of its Secretary only and thirdly, the Club being an unregistered one had no legal entity to recover property in any proceeding. The application for pre-emption on behalf of the said club, therefore, was dismissed on 10th January, 1981.
9. Against the said dismissal, however, the members of the Club, namely the opposite parties to the above revisional application, preferred an appeal and the learned Additional District Judge, Alipore, by his judgment and order dated 14th December, 1982 allowed the appeal by reversing the order of the learned Munsiff and the application for pre-emption of the opposite parties, namely the members of the said Club was sent back on remand for the decision of the learned Munsiff on its merits. Usha Rani being seriously aggrieved by the judgment of reversal and the said order of remand of the learned Additional District Judge, Alipore, dated 14th December, 1982 preferred the above revisional application against the said judgment and order which revisional application, as aforesaid, was heard by the learned Single Judge, His Lordship Justice S.S. Ganguly and His Lordship was pleased to frame the above two questions for the decision of the "higher Bench" with which questions we in the Division Bench, as aforesaid, again are concerned.
10. I have had the advantage of considering both the judgments of the learned Munsiff and the Additional District Judge who in their respective turns were considering the quetion as to whether the said Club not being registered under the Societies Registration Act could still acquire the land in question or rather could still acquire the valid title to the said land and consequently whether the said Club being an unregistered society could validly maintain any application of pre-emption in the first place.
11. The learned Munsiff, however, after having considered the relevant provisions, namely Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act and the relevant provisions of the Societies Registration Act opined that the said Club being an unregistered one could not acquire the title to the plot of land in question as the Club being an anregistered society did not have the status of a living person as contemplated in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently the Secretary of the said unregistered Club could not also claim that he acquired any valid title to the said land by virtue of the transfer in question of the said plot of land for and on behalf of the said Club and the said Club also being an unregistered Club could not claim or recover any property in any proceeding nor could the Secretary of the said Club could do the same on behalf of such unregistered Club.
12. The learned Additional District Judge, however, in dealing with the appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Munsiff did not, in my opinion, even attempt to consider the question as to what was the effect of such transfer of land in favour of the Club which was an unregistered Club/Society when the transfer of land in question took place in favour of the Club. The learned Additional District Judge also did not consider whether the Club could validly acquire the property or rather validly acquired the title to the property, namely the land in question by virtue of the said transfer in its favour though the Club was not registered under the Societies Registration Act.
13. The learned Additional District Judge, it seems, proceeded on the basis that simply because the transfer of the plot of land in question was made in the name of the Secretary of the Club which Club was not duly registered would not make the transfer invalid, why this is so has not, however, been answered or even attempted to be answered by the learned Additional District Judge in his judgment. At least, I on my part have not been able to find out as to on what basis the learned Additional District Judge thought that the learned Munsiff was wrong in his decision in rejecting the application of the Club or rather its members for pre-emption.
14. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, in fact, defines what is meant by the expression 'transfer of property':
Transfer of property' means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself, [or to himself] and one or more other living persons; and 'to transfer property" is to perform such act.
15. The expression 'living person' in Section 5 above includes "a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals".
16. The above definition of living person in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act was brought about by way of amendment in the year 1929 and this amendment, in my opinion, is of immense importance in the present context as the amendment provides that this inclusive definition of living person shall not, in any way, affect any low for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals. Surely, I am not concerned with companies in the present case but I am certainly concerned with the expression associations or bodies of individuals as I am now dealing with the legal status of an unrgistered Club which in its turn can safely be defined as an association or a body of individuals in relation to its acquiring property/ properties including valid transfer of immovable property in its favour from or by a living person as contemplated in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act,
17. The learned Single Judge was pleased to observe in His Lordship's judgment before framing the above two issues:
A club has been described as a society of persons associated together for social reasons such as the promotion of polities, sports, arts, science or literature or for any other lawful purpose". (Page 2 of the judgment at page 55 of the paper book).
18. The expression in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act "but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals", naturally will lead me to the provisions made in the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and also, if necessary, the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 as these two statutes are laws "for the time being in force relating to transfer of property" to or by societies which are, no doubt, associations or bodies of individuals as well. If the club in question is described as a society of persons which, in my opinion, it is, then, Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 has the most material bearing upon the question or questions framed for our consideration and answer, as Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 provides how property both movable and immovable belonging to a registered society should vest. Section 5 of the Act of 1860 provides as follows:
5. Property of society how vested.--The property, movable and immovable, belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedings, civil and criminal may be described as the property of the governing body of such society for their proper title.
19. If Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act especially the amended part thereof and the provisions in Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are read together then it appears that there is no conflict between the said provisions of the said two sections of the respective Acts in question. The amended provisions of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, in fact, fully acknowledges amongst others, the existence of the provisions of Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act and that acknowledgement is apparent from the words in the amended provisions of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act when it says, after giving an inclusive definition of 'living person', "but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals".
20. Thus, Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 expressly recognises the legal existence of such societies which are registered under the said Act and I do not need to repeat that the said section also provides how the properties both movable and immovable of such a registered society should vest and in whom should they vest.
21. Since the statutes, namely, the Societies Registration Acts (both Central and State Acts) only recognise the legal existence of a society which is registered under the Acts by express provision or provisions of the statutes then a society which is not registered under the said Acts and yet claims to be a society cannot also claim its legal existence irrespective of or notwithstanding the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. As such a society can claim its legal existence only in accordance with the provisions of the said Acts as a society is governed by the provisions of the said Acts and enjoys all its rights and privileges under the said Acts.
22. In other words, if a society wants to claim its legal existence then such society has got to be a registered one under the Societies Registration Act and in the absence of such registration such society cannot, in my opinion, claim its legal existence as no such legal existence of an unregistered society has been or is recognised by the said Act or by any other enactment. If it is said or claimed that there is no difference between a registered society and an unregistered society in law and both an unregistered society and a registered society have the same status in law and are equally recognised in law as to their respective existences then and in that event, the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can be said to be of no effect and has no role to play as a statute or an enactment of parliament in the first place.
23. The learned Single Judge, however, proceeded on the basis that section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act does not provide anywhere that an association or body of persons must compulsorily be registered before it can be a party to transfer a property. According to the learned Judge if there had been such an intention of the legislature, the legislature would have clearly provided for that in the section itself.
24. True, it is that Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act does not make it obligatory on the part of an association or body of persons that such association or body of persons must be a registered one but as I said above that the amended provisions of Section 5 of the Act makes it very clear that the inclusive definition of living person given in the section shall not affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals. The provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 make it very clear that the societies of the which are registered under the said Act can claim the legal existence and can claim certain rights and privileges and naturally, therefore, the societies which are not so registered under the said Act cannot claim such right or rights and privileges and, in my opinion, acquiring property either movable or immovable is definitely one of such rights recognised by the said Act.
25. In my opinion, therefore, simply because Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require a society to he registered in order to claim its legal existence doe not lead us to conclude that Section 5 recognises the legal existence of a society which is not registered, at lest, I have not been able to read any such meaning of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act.
26. Since Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act recognises the provisions in any other law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property, that by itself makes the provisions of Section 5 conditional to other provisions of other statutes relating to the subject with which Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned. The amended provisions of Section 5 was, in my opinion, brought about in recognition of the existence of other relevant provisions in other statutes on the subject with which Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned.
27. Otherwise, the law-makers would have simply provided an absolute non-obstante clause by way of amendment in order to circumvent any provisions of any statute on the subject covered by Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act.
28. There have been very many judicial pronouncements as to what rights and privileges are enjoyed by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, I mean both the Central and the State Acts. The learned Single Judge was pleased to refer to quite a number of decisions which dealt with the effects of registration of a society registered under the Act or Acts. I do not think it is necessary to deal with all those cases which dealt with registered societies and the rights and privileges enjoyed by such societies as I am primarily concerned here with a society, namely a club which was not a registered one at the relevant point of time when a transfer of an immovable property took place in its favour.
29. However, suffice it to refer to the Five-Judge Bench decision in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. State of Delhi or rather the portion/portions of the said decision where the said Bench dealt with the effect or effects of a society which was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.- The said decision is . The Supreme Court in Unani Tibia College (supra), was dealing with a case where a reputed physician named Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan established a pharmaceutical institute in the town known also Hindustani Dawakhana in the year 1903. The physician also established a medical college known as the Tibia College. Before his death, however, in the year 1911, he with some other persons formed a society called Anjuman Tibia "and had it registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860". The name of that society was changed subsequently and it became known as the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi, which was shortly called by the Supreme Court in the judgment as the Board.
30. The Supreme Court after having dealt with and considered several provisions of the said Act and the position of English Law on the subject in considering the true legal status of the said Board, being a registered society under the Act, observed as follows:
Now, the question before us is--regard being had to the aforesaid provisions--was the Board a corporation? Our conclusion is that it was not. The most important point to be noticed in this connection is that in the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, there are no sufficient words to indicate an intention to incorporate; on the contrary, the provisions show that there was an absence of such intention. Section 2 no doubt provides for a name as also for the objects of the society. Section 5, however, states that the property belonging to the society, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, the property will be described as the property of the governing body. The section talks of property belonging to the society; but the property is vested in the trustees or in the governing body for the time being. The expression "property belonging to the society" does not give the society a corporate status in the matter of holding or acquiring property, it merely describes the property which vests in the trustees or governing body for the time being, Section 6 gives the society the right to sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman etc., and Section 7 provides that no suit or proceeding in a Civil Court shall abate by reason of the death etc. of the person by or against whom the suit has been brought.
It is clear from the aforesaid decision that provisions similar to the provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 were held not to show any intention to incorporate; on the contrary, the very resort to the machinery of trustees or the governing body for the time being acquiring and holding the property showed that there was no intention to incorporate the society or union so as to give it a corporate capacity for the purpose of holding and acquiring property. It appears to us that the legal position is exactly the same with regard to the provisions in Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. They do not show any intention to incorporate, though they confer certain privileges on a registered Society, which would be wholly unnecessary if the registered society were a corporation.
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the provisions aforesaid do not establish the main essential characteristic of a corporation aggregate, namely, that of an intention to incorporate the society. We may further observe that the scheme and provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are very similar to those of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 (59 and 60 Vict. c. 25), as amended in certain respects by subsequent enactments. It is appropriate to quote here what Dennis Lloyd has said in his "Law relating to Unincorporated Associations" (1938 Edn.) at page 59 in respect of the provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 as modified by subsequent enactments. He has said:
The modern legislation still maintains the policy of the older Acts in withholding corporate status from friendly societies. Registration does not result in corporation, but merely entitles the society so registered to enjoy the privileges conferred by the Act. These privileges are of considerable importance and certain of them go a long way towards giving registered societies... a status in many respects analogous to a corporation strictly so called, but without being technically incorporated. Thus, something in the nature of perpetual succession is conceded by the provision that the society's property is to vest in the trustees for the time being of the society for the use and benefit of the society and its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society's rules, and further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees without assignment or transfer. In the same way, though the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue and be sued in its own name, it is given the statutory privilege of suing and being sued in the name of its trustees.
We think that observations made with regard to similar provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, correctly and succinctly summarise the legal position in respect of the several provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood.
31. It must also be said at this stage that the Supreme Court in the above case was primarily concerned with the question whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act could also be treated as a corporation in the sense of being incorporated as that term is legally understood. The Supreme Court, however, unhesitatingly said that the society just by being registered under the Societies Registration Act could not at all acquire the status of a corporation.
32. However, it should also be mentioned that the Supreme Court in its judgment also did not think it necessary to question the correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, namely Justice Bhagawati in Satyavarat Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj AIR 1946 Bom 560. The learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court, however, held in Satyavarat's case that a registered society under the 1860 Act "was a legal entity apart from the members constituting it and it can sue and be sued in its own name".
33. While dealing with the above observations of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court the Supreme Court in Unani Tibia (supra) said "it is unnecessary for us to consider the correctness or otherwise of the reason given; it is sufficient for us to state that we do not think that the decision proceeds on the footing that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is a corporation in the sense of being incorporated as that term is legally understood, but if it does, we are unable to accept it as correct".
34. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act may have characteristics, which are analogous to some of the characteristies of a corporation, yet it is not incorporated and remaned an unncorporated society. As soon as it is held that it is an unincorporated society, it must come under the second part of Entry 32 of List II of the Constitution. (See paragraphs 11, 13, 14 and 16 at pages 465, 466, 467 and 469 of the report).
35. Thus, on the basis of the above authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Unani Tibia College (supra), one should not, to my mind, entertain any doubt as to the true legal status of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and the rights and privileges enjoyed by such society for the purpose of carrying out its object in the first place with which such society is formed.
36. It appears from the judgment of the learned Single Judge that before framing the above questions the learned Single Judge considered the said questions himself and that is apparent from the observations of the learned Judge in his judgment which observations, I think, should also be mentioned before I myself attempt to give my answer to the question or rather the questions so framed. Thus, some of the portions of the judgment are mentioned herein:
The point as to whether a registered society is a juridical person, or not has not been decided finally. In a number of decisions it has been held that this is so. Thus in Satyavarat Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj, Bombay reported in AIR 1946 Bom. 516, it was held after an elaborate discussion of the provisions of the Act in the background of the decision in Taff Vase Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants that a registered society notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Act enjoys the status of a legal entity apart from the members constituting it.
The point as to whether a registered society has a legal entity separate from its members is not really very much relevant for the purpose of the present controversy. After all the right of a registered society to have and to hold moveable or immoveable properties of its own has been recognised by the Societies Registration Act itself. It is immaterial, therefore, as to whether such a society has a legal or jural personality, or not.
37. The learned Single Judge, however, proceeded on the basis that even though the Societies Registration Act expressly recognizes the right of a registered society to acquire property it does not follow that law, does not recognize the rights of unregistered society to acquire properties of their own though according to the learned Judge an unregistered society may not sue or be sued in its own name but that by itself does not mean that it has no right to acquire any property.
38. In my opinion, however, the provisions of the Societies Registration Act (both Central and State Acts) make it absolutely clear as to how the properties of a registered society should vest and in whom should they vest, the judicial pronounce of the Supreme Court in Unani Tibia College (supra), which I have referred to above in somewhat detail, namely, I have dealt with the portions of the said judgment of the Supreme Court which have a direct and most material bearing upon the questions I am dealing with and the point or points in issue, leaves no manner of doubt that a registered society under the Societies Registration Act can alone claim its legal existence simply by virtue of tis registration under the Act or Acts and though it is not provided specifically in the said Acts, namely both Central and State Acts that unregistered society cannot claim its legal existence of its own, the position in law by necessary implication is quite clear that a society which is not registered under the Act or Acts cannot claim such legal existence in the first place. '
39. I find immense support of the above view of mine from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Panchanan Jash and Ors. v. Board of Secondary Education, W.B. and Ors. reported in 71 CWN 189. Speaking on behalf of the Division Bench His Lordship Justice B. C. Mitra after having considered, inter alia, the decision of the Supreme Court in Unani Tibia College (supra) in para 23 at page 201 of the report said : "In our opinion, on the basis of the decisions discussed above the law on this question is well-settled, namely, that members of the managing committee of a school have no individual and independent right of ownership to the property, the management of which for the time being vests in the managing committee as a whole. Individual members of a committee or the committee taken collectively, if it is not registered under the Societies Registration Act, have no vested rights of ownership of the property. Nor are the members of the committee the owners of the property which they manage for the benefit of the school. The right of management of the property for the benefit of the school remains vested in the members so long as they constitute the managing committee. If by operation of law or an order validly made, the members cease to constitute the managing committee, they would undoubtedly be deprived of the right to manage the property, but such members cannot claim that they have been deprived of the rights of ownership of such property, as the members of the managing committee, which in this case is not registered under the Societies Registration Act never has any such right. This contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners must, therefore, be rejected."
40. The learned Single Judge, however, said in his judgment that the Division Bench in P. Jash (supra) was dealing with a different set of facts, the learned Judge is no doubt right in this respect that the Division Bench of this Court was not dealing with an identical facts as to the present one but the position of law as pronounced by the Division Bench in the said decision makes it abundantly clear that a society not being a registered one under the Act or Acts cannot claim its If gal existence nor the members of such an unregistered society can claim any right to hold or acquire properties both movable and immovable let alone any official of such society be he, the Secretary, the President or anybody else.
41. Needless to mention, that a club like the present one can practically be equated with the position of a society and since the club in the present case was not registered which had the same status as has the unregistered society could not claim any better right than an unregistered society in the first place.
42. On the above basis it can safely be said that the Secretary of the unregistered Club in the present case, namely Agradut Sangha had no legal status to hold or acquire the property in question which property or rather land was transferred in his favour by the owner of the said land in favour of the Secretary as the Club in question having the same status of a society had no legal existence because on the day when such transfer took place it was not a registered body or rather a society.
43. On a plain reading of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act it can by no stretch of imagination be said that an unregistered society, in the present case of ours a club can come within the definition of a 'living person' and if one entertains any doubt as to this legal position of an unregistered society or a club the said doubt is bound to disappear and, in fact, disappears when one sees the provisions in the Societies Registration Act or Acts (meaning thereby both Central and State Acts).
44. Last but not the least, I must acknowledge that I agree with the view of the learned Munsiff and I think that he on the basis of the correct principles of law dismissed the application for and on behalf of the said Club for pre-emption on the ground of its maintainability.
45. Thus, the question number one where two questions have been clubbed together is answered in the negative. The answer to question number two should naturally be and is answered in the negative as well.
46. On the basis of the above answers, the revisional application may now be placed before the appropriate Single Bench for its disposal.
47. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties at the earliest.
Asok Kumar Ganguly, J.
48. I agree.