Delhi District Court
3(Ne) vs The State (Govt.Of N.C.T.Of Delhi) on 11 January, 2019
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE
03(NE), KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI.
PRESIDED OVER BY: LALIT KUMAR, DHJS
CA No. 15/18
1 Rashid
s/o late Sh.Sabir
r/o H.No.A293,
Gokalpuri, Delhi.
2 Sonu
s/o Sh.Karam Chand
r/o Village Bheta Khajipur,
Loni, Distt.Ghaziabad, U.P. Appellants
Versus
The State (Govt.of N.C.T.of Delhi) Respondent
Date of assignment : 05.06.2018 Date of Arguments : 26.10.2018 Date of Pronouncement : 11.01.2019 Judgment : 1 By the present appeal, the appellants/accused challenge
the impugned judgment dt. 21.02.2018 thereby convicting them for offence u/s 326/34 IPC in FIR no.86/03 registered at PS Gokalpuri and the order on sentence dated 18.5.2018 directing CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 1/22 them to undergo RI (Rigorous Imprisonment) for a period of three years and to pay fine of Rs.20,000/each ID 3 months SI for offence u/s 326/34 IPC.
2 The brief facts, which are relevant for deciding the present appeal are that statement of complainant Manoj was recorded on 15.03.2003 wherein he had stated that "he used to drive TSR and on 15.03.2003 at about 8.30 p.m, he went for hair dressing/cutting at Indian Hair Dresser, situated at Gali no.7, C block, Nehru Vihar and while the hair was being dressed, the owner of the shop/appellant no.1/accused namely, Rashid abused him and asked him to go out of the shop. When the complainant objected and tried to restrain the appellant/accused Rashid, he again abused him. In the meantime, appellant no.2/accused Sonu, who is tailor in the nearby shop, also came there, who was very well known to the complainant came out of the shop towards road, but both the appellants Sonu and Rashid continued to abuse the complainant and came near to him and they were having Ustras in their hands and both of them gave Ustra blows to the complainant. Appellant no.2/accused Sonu gave Ustra blow on his neck and appellant no.1/accused Rashid gave Ustra blow on his back. After receiving the injuries, complainant ran towards Dayalpur, but after some distance, he fell on the earth. Upon this statement, present FIR for the offence u/s 326/34 IPC was lodged against both the appellants/accused at PS Gokalpuri. Chargesheet was filed against both the appellants/accused and the charge was framed for the CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 2/22 offences u/s 326/34 IPC and the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses including PW6 complainant Sh.Manoj Kumar. After closing of prosecution evidence, statements of appellants/accused u/s 281 Cr.PC were recorded and the impugned judgment was passed against the appellants/accused.
3 The appellants/accused aggrieved with the judgment/order dt.21.02.2018 and order of sentence dt.18.05.2018 of the Ld.Trial Court have preferred the present appeal on following grounds:
(a) The impugned judgment is not sustainable in law as it has been passed without taking into account the relevant materials on record and the Ld.Trial Court has not considered the arguments advanced by the appellants/accused to establish their false implication in the present case.
(b) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate the cross examination of PW6 complainant in which he clearly deposed that he consumed liquor regularly and on the date of incident, the complainant was under the influence of alcohol and the injuries sustained by the complainant was due to influence of liquor and not by the weapon i.e.Ustra and, therefore, the judgment of the Ld.Trial Court is liable to be set aside.
(c) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that the injuries sustained by the complainant was made CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 3/22 by the Ustra , however the said weapon of the offence has never been recovered by the prosecution during the investigation and also no identification of alleged Ustra I.e.shape, size and colour has been given by the complainant.
(d) The Ltd.Trial Court has failed to appreciate the deposition made by the complainant in his cross examination wherein he admitted that there was darkness at the place of incident and also admitted that the name of appellants/accused was revealed in the hospital and, therefore, the complainant could not identify the appellants/accused by whom he got injured.
(e) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate that in examination in chief of PW7 IO who deposed that he came to know from shopkeeper of Golgappa that the complainant had sustained injury from usta by the appellants/accused, however PW9 Pati Ram @ Pappu, the eye witness who used to run rairi of Golgappa, does not support the story of the prosecution.
(f) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate the material facts that there was no information of the present incident has ever been reported to the police and no deposition made by any police officials that they were on duty at the place of incident then how the police officials reached at the spot without getting any information from any person.
(g) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate that no incident as stated by the complainant has ever happened and no CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 4/22 injuries have been sustained by the complainant due to the reason the blood sustained clothes of the victim have never been seized by the IO to prove the alleged injuries sustained by the complainant which creates the serious doubt in the prosecution story.
(h) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to consider that there were material discrepancies in the testimony of complainant PW6, PW7 IO and PW9 eye witness which creates doubt in the prosecution story.
(i) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate that no public witnesses have been examined before the court despite there were several public persons found present at the spot, however the prosecution has examined eye witness PW9 Patti Ram @ Pappu who did not support the version of the prosecution.
(j) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the appellants/accused have been arrested without following due process of law and arrest of appellants/accused is unlawful and they have been falsely implicated in the present case.
(k) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate that appellants/accused have suffered rigorous of trial since more than 15 years and their age were only 18 years at the time of alleged offence and they were not previously involved in any criminal case and as such the Ld.Trial Court did not consider the conduct of the appellants/accused and release them under the CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 5/22 probation on good coduct.
(l) The Ld.Trial Court has passed the judgment in regular manner and has not implemented its judicial mind before giving conviction to the appellants/accused.
(m) The Ld.Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the prosecution has not even proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore the judgment of the Ld.Trial Court is liable to be set aside.
4 Notice of the appeal was issued to the respondent and the Trial Court Record was called for.
5 I have heard the submissions made by Sh.Tarun Khanna, Ld.Counsel for appellants/accused and Sh.Zenul Abedeen, Ld.Addl.PP for the State. I have also perused the record carefully.
6 It is the settled proposition of law that ordinarily, sitting in appeal does not reappreciate the evidence that already appreciated in detail by the Ld.Trial Court for the reason that Trial Court has also an opportunity of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witness. Of course, the same is provided the Trial Court has not committed an error of such an impact that the same was resulted in miscarriage of justice. Reference may be held in judgment of Apex Court in Hussain and Another Vs CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 6/22 Union of India and Ashu Vs State of Rajasthan which is dated 19.03.2017 passed in Crl.App. no.509/17.
7 It is argued on behalf of appellants/accused that Ld. Trial Court has passed the impugned judgment and conviction on the basis of surmises and conjectures and the same is liable to be set aside.
8 On the other hand, Ld. APP for the State has strongly opposed the submissions and has submitted that the judgment of the Ld.Trial Court is not bearing any illegality and infirmity and the Ld.Trial Court has duly appreciated the evidence led on record by prosecution. It is, therefore, prayed that this appeal is liable to be dismissed.
9 At the outset,it is relevant to discuss the material grounds of the appeal one by one. Firstly, the ground as has been taken by the appellants that the complainant was under the influence of liquor, nothing has come on record to prove the same and even MLC Ex.PW 5/A does not find mention that PW6 complainant was under the influence of liquor when he was brought before the hospital for medical examination. As far as sustaining injuries by the complainant is concerned, MLC Ex.PW 5/A corroborates the same which shows that injured has been inflicted serious injuries on his neck and back and, CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 7/22 therefore, the version of the injured/complainant finds support from the medical evidence and photographs Ex.PW 3/A to Ex.PW 3/F. 10 As far as the argument of the appellants/accused regarding the injuries sustained by the complainant by the Ustra is concerned, prosecution has examined Dr.Harpreet Singh, Consultant ENT, Specialist, Mata Chanan Devi Hospital as PW 5 and MLC Ex.PW 5/A reflects that stab wound has been shown on the base of neck at right side in the measurement of 8cm X 3 cm and the nature of injury has been shown as sharp and opinion in respect of injuries has been given as dangerous and, therefore, MLC of the injured substantiates the version of the complainant/injured.
11 It has further been argued by the appellants/accused that weapon of offence has never been recovered by the prosecution, to which no suggestion has been put to the IO on the aspect of seizing of the weapon of offence i.e.Ustra.
12 Moreover, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment titled as "Murlidhar Vs State" Crl.A 279/02, while discussing the aspect on Recovery of weapon - Whether essential for conviction under Section 397 of the IPC? , it has been observed in para no.17 of the said judgment and answered CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 8/22 in para 23 which is as under:
17. The issue raised in the present case, both by the Counsel for the accused and the Prosecution, is about the sustainability of the conviction under Section 397 IPC in view of the weapon not being recovered. Ld.Counsel for the Accused submits that going by the judgments of various Ld.Single Judges of the Delhi High Court in Ghanshyam @ Bablu, Jitender @Jitu and recently in Dig Bahadur v.
State 4 , all of which hold that if there is no recovery of the deadly weapon, the conviction under Section 397 IPC cannot be sustained.
18.However, the Prosecution relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashfaq and another judgment by a Ld. Single Judge of this Court in Seetal v. State (NCT of Delhi) 5 .
19. A perusal of all the judgments cited and also further case law reveals in the case of Phool Kumar Vs. Delhi Administration 6 , the Supreme Court drew a distinction between the expressions used in Section 397 IPC and Section 398 IPC. In Section 398 IPC the use of the word "armed" is used whereas in Section 397 IPC the term is "uses". In this case the Supreme Court held that merely being armed at the time of attempting a robbery does not constitute Use.
20.Subsequently, in Ashfaq, following Phool Kumar the Supreme Court held that for a conviction under Section 397 IPC what is relevant is the „use‟of the weapon and not the recovery thereof. In Ashfaq, the weapons used were a countrymade pistol and knives. The CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 9/22 weapons used by the accused were not recovered. The Supreme Court then observed:
"7.So far as the contention urged as to the applicability of Section 397 IPC and the alleged lack of proof of the necessary ingredients therefor, is concerned it proceeds, in our view, upon a misconception that unless the deadly weapon has been actually used to inflict any injury in the commission of the offence as such, the essential ingredient to attract the said provision could not be held to have been proved and substantiated. We are of the view that the said claim on behalf of the appellants proceeds upon a too narrow a construction of the provision and 56 (2014) 215 DLT 60 (1975 (1) SCC
797)CRL.A.279/2002 meaning of the words "uses" found in Section 397 IPC. As a matter of fact, this Court had an occasion to deal with the question in the decision reported in Phool Kumar v. Delhi Admin. and it was observed as follows:
(SCC p.800, para 6) "6.Section 398 uses the expression „armed with any deadly weapon‟ and the minimum punishment provided therein is also 7 years if at the time of attempting to commit robbery the offender is armed with any deadly weapon.
This has created an anomaly. It is unreasonable to think that if the offender who merely attempted to commit robbery but did not succeed in committing it attracts the minimum punishment of 7 years under Section 398, if he is merely armed with any deadly weapon, while an offender so armed will not incur the liability of the minimum punishment CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 10/22 under Section 397 if he succeeded in committing the robbery. But then, what was the purport behind the use of the different words by the Legislature in the two sections, viz. „uses‟in Section 397 and „is armed‟ in Section 398. In our judgment the anomaly is resolved if the two terms are given the identical meaning. There seems to be a reasonable explanation for the use of the two different expressions in the sections. When the offence of robbery is committed by an offender being armed with a deadly weapon which was within the vision of the victim so as to be capable of creating a terror in his mind, the offender must be deemed to have used that deadly weapon in the commission of the robbery. On the other hand, if an offender was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of attempting to commit a robbery, then the weapon was not put to any fruitful use because it would have been of use only when the offender succeeded in committing the robbery.
"8. Thus, what is essential to satisfy the word "uses" for the purposes of Section 397 IPC is the robbery being committed by an offender who was armed with a CRL.A.279/2002 weapon which was within the vision of the victim so as to be capable of creating a terror in the mind of the victim and not that it should be further shown to have been actually used for cutting, stabbing, shooting, as the case may be.
9. The further plea that one accused alone, was in any event in possession of the countrymade pistol and the others could not have been vicariously held liable under Section 397 IPC with the assistance of Section 34 IPC overlooks the other vital facts on record found by the CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 11/22 Courts below that the others were also armed with and used their knives and that knife is equally a deadly weapon, for purposes of Section 397 IPC. The decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court relied upon turned on the peculiar facts found as to the nature of the weapon held by the accused therein and the nature of injuries caused and the same does not support the stand taken on behalf of the appellants in this case. The provisions of Section 397, do not create any new substantive offence as such but merely serves as being complementary to Sections 392 and 395 by regulating the punishment already provided for dacoity by fixing a minimum term of imprisonment when the dacoity committed was found attendant upon certain aggravating circumstances viz.,use of a deadly weapon, or causing of grievous hurt or attempting to cause death or grievous hurt. For that reason, no doubt the provision postulates only the individual act of the accused to be relevant to attract Section 397 IPC and thereby inevitably negates the use of the principle of constructive or vicarious liability engrafted in Section 34 IPC. Consequently, the challenge made to conviction under Section 397 even after excluding the applicability of Section 34 IPC does not merit countenance, for the reason that each one of the accused in this case were said to have been wielding a deadly weapon of their own, and thereby squarely fulfilled the ingredients of Section 397 IPC,CRL.A.279/2002 de hors any reference to Section 34 IPC. "
Thus the Supreme Court, despite the non recovery of the weapons, upheld the conviction under Section 397 IPC.
CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 12/22
21. Insofar as this Court is concerned, there are two lines of cases. One line of cases trace back to Charan Singh v. State 7 , wherein a Ld. Single Judge observed:
"At the time of committing dacoity one of the offenders caused injury by knife on the hand of the victim but the said knife was not recovered. In order to bring home a charge under S.397 the prosecution must produce convincing evidence that the knife used by the accused was a deadly weapon. What would make knife deadly is its design or the method of its use such as is calculated to or is likely to produce death. It is, therefore, a question of fact to be proved by the prosecution that the knife used by the accused was a deadly weapon. In the absence of such an evidence and particularly, the nonrecovery of the weapon would certainly bring the case out of the ambit of S.397. The accused could be convicted under S.392."
This was followed by other decisions in Ghanshyam; Samiuddin Vs. State 8 ; Jitender; Dig Bahadur and very recently on 19 th May, 2018 in Rajender @ Raju Vs. State 9 . In all these decisions, Ld. Single Judges have taken the view that since the weapon was not recovered, conviction under Section 397 IPC is not tenable.
22. However, in Seetal a Ld. Single Judge of this Court discusses the legal position and observes that there are two lines of decisions in the Delhi High court on the issue of recovery of weapon under Section 397 IPC. In 1988 CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 13/22 Crl.L.J. NOC 28 (Del) 175 (2010) DLT 27 CRL.A.279/2002 one line of decisions for eg., in Salim Vs. State 10 it was held, following the decisions of Phool Kumar and Ashfaq of the Supreme Court, that it would not be correct to categorise different kinds of weapons. So long as a knife is used as a weapon of offence it would be incorrect to not call it a deadly weapon. The Ld. Single Judge observes that in the second line of decisions Charan Singh, Madan Lal v. State 11 , Rakesh Kumar v. State 12 and Samiuddin, there is no reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashfaq. In all these cases the accused were acquitted on the ground that the weapon was not recovered. The Ld. Single Judge then goes on to hold in Seetal as under:
"19. The resultant position that emerges is that Section 397 would be attracted even if the accused, who possessed a knife during the robbery, does not actually use it to threaten the victim. A victim who has noticed the knife in the hand of the accused would undoubtedly feel threatened. It is possible that the victim may not have noticed what type of knife it is and whether it is capable of causing actually harm. In other words, the actual size or length of the knife would not matter. In Phool Kumar, the Supreme Court noticed the observations of the Bombay High Court in Govind Dipaji More v. State, MANU /MH/0204/1956 : AIR 1956 Bom 353 that if the knife "was used for the purpose of producing such an impression upon the mind of a person that he would be compelled to part with his property, that would amount to using the weapon within the meaning of Section 397". Therefore, the fact that the knife was not CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 14/22 recovered at all, or that the recovered weapon was not shown during the course of trial to the victim, would not matter as long as the CRL.A. 616/2003, CRL.A. 82/2004 decided on 19 th May 2018 24 (1998) DLT 111 70(1997) DLT 595 12 2005 (1) JCC 334 10 CRL.A.279/2002 eye witnesses to the crime are able to convincingly and consistently recount the fact that they were threatened by the sight of the accused wielding the knife into parting with their belongings."
Thus, as per the above decision in Seetal, recovery of the weapon is irrelevant so long as there is evidence to show that the same was used to threaten or terrorise the victims. In Imran v. State 13 , another Ld. Single Judge of this Court has held, following Ashfaq that "merely because weapon of offence could not be recovered, it cannot be said the offence under Section 397 is not made out."
23. This court is of the opinion that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashfaq is clear and categorical that recovery of the weapon is not a necessary ingredient for a conviction under Section 397 IPC. The `Use‟ of the same to threaten is sufficient. The Accused in the present case clearly USED the knife. The same was within the vision of both the victims as per their testimony. They were terrorised and threatened due to the use of the same. They were made to part with valuables, some of which were even recovered from the house of the accused. This Court is inclined to follow the binding precedents of the Supreme Court in Phool Kumar and Ashfaq, as also followed by Ld. Single Judges of this Court in CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 15/22 Seetal and Imran to hold that recovery of the weapon is not needed for a conviction under Section 397 IPC.
13 Therefore, in view of the aforesaid case law , the recovery of the weapon is irrelevant so long as there is evidence to show that the same was used to threaten or terrorise the victims which stands corroborated from the statement of injured/complainant PW6 Manoj Kumar with regard to the fact that injuries had been caused to him by sharp weapon i.e.Ustra . Statement of Dr.Harpreet Singh who had medically examined the injured vide MLC Ex.PW 5/A , as per which, the nature of injury is dangerous, grievous , also substantiates the testimony of the injured/complainant PW6.
14 Appellants/accused persons have also taken a ground that there was darkness at the place of incident and name of the appellants/accused were revealed only in the hospital. During cross examination of PW6 complainant/injured , he denied the suggestion that due to darkness, he had not seen the face of the accused persons. The complainant PW6 Manoj Kumar was having ample opportunity to identify the appellants/accused as he during examination in chief, he has stated that when the hair was being cut, appellant/accused Rashid came there and further stated that appellant/accused Sonu who was having a shop at CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 16/22 nearby shop of appellant/accused Rashid , also came there and started abusing him. Thus, it is crystal clear that complainant PW6 Manoj Kumar had identified both the appellants/accused.
15 The argument of the appellants/accused that the IO had come to know only from Shopkeeper of Golgappa i.e.PW9 Pati Ram @ Pappu that the complainant had received injuries by the injured/complainant with the help of Ustra, does not fatal the case of the prosecution as PW9 Pati Ram is not the eye witness of the incident, as reflected in his statement u/s 161 Cr.PC, whereas the fact is that the incident had been narrated by the complainant to him after the incident.
16 So far as the argument of the appellants/accused with regard to non seizing of the blood stained clothes of the victim/complainant is concerned, no suggestion has been put to the complainant by the appellants/accused in this regard.
17 The appellants/accused have also argued that there were material discrepancies in the testimony of the P.Ws, whereas the appellants/accused have not been able to point out the said material discrepancies.
18 As far as the argument of the appellant with regard to the fact that no public witnesses have been examined despite CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 17/22 there were several public persons found present at the spot, is concerned, it is the settled law that the quality of evidence which matters and not the quantity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indian in case titled as "Kashmiri Lal vs State of Haryana"
2013, VI AD(SC) 393, has held that:
"9. As far as first submission is concerned, it is evincible from the evidence on record that the police officials had requested the people present in the 'dhaba' to be witnesses, but they declined to cooperate and, in fact, did not make themselves available. That apart, there is no absolute command of law that the police officers can not be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If in the course of scrutinizing the evidence the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the department of police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle of quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence. These aspects have been highlighted in State of U.P.v Anil Singh 1988 Supp.SCC 686, State Govt.of NCT of Delhi V Sunil and Anr.MANU/ SC/0735/2000"(2001) 1 SCC 652 and Ramjee Rai and Ors V State of Bihar MANU/SC/8437/2006: (2006) 13 SCC CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 18/22
229. Appreciating the evidence on record on the unvell of the aforesaid principles, we do not perceive any acceptable reason to discard the testimony of the official witnesses which is otherwise reliable and absolutely trustworthy.
19 The appellants/accused have further argued that they have been arrested without following due process of law and their arrest is unlawful. In this regard, nothing has been pointed out by the appellants/accused as to how arrest of the accused was without following due process of law.
20 Furthermore, the appellants/accused had taken the defence during their statements u/s 281 Cr.PC that they have been falsely implicated in this case, but no witness has been examined by the appellants/accused in support of their assertion.
21 It is relevant to mention that that present appeal was fixed for clarifications/orders for 29.11.2018 and on the said date, injured/complainant Manoj Kumar had appeared before the court and submitted that he has settled all the disputes with the appellants/accused and, therefore, did not wish that appellants/accused be sentenced. He has further submitted that he did not have any objection if the conviction of the appellants/accused be set aside. He has also filed Memorandum CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 19/22 of Understanding Ex.PX with a judgment titled as "Raisuddin Vs State of NCT of Delhi on record in this regard. Separate statement of injured/complainant has also been recorded to this effect. Injured/complainant Manoj Kumar has no objection if the conviction of the appellants/accused is set aside.
22 The appellants/accused in support of their arguments have filed judgment titled as Raisuddin V The State of NCT of Delhi (Supra) wherein, the appellants/accused had relied upon judgment of Randhir Singh Vs State MANU/DE/1388/2011 where the Hon'ble High Court reduced the sentence awarded to the appellants/accused to the period already undergone for the offence u/s 326 IPC and the Hon'ble Apex Court in similar circumstances in case of Ram Pujan and ors vs State of Uttar Pradesh MANU/SC/0155/1973, reduced the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone for the offence u/s 326 IPC. Abovesaid law has been followed in case of Hasi Mohan Barman and Anr.V State of Assam and Anr.MANU/SC/4357/2007. It has further been observed in the judgment titled as Raisuddin Vs The State of NCT of Delhi (Supra) that this is a case of exceptional nature where the sentence awarded u/s 326 IPC needs to be modified.
23 Coming to the facts of the present case. Accused Rashid submits that he is the sole bread earner of his family consisting CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 20/22 of two daughters aged about 4 ½ years and 12 years and one son aged about 12 years. It is further submitted that wife of appellant/accused Rashid is having breathing problem due to damage of left lung.
It is submitted by appellant/accused Sonu that he is the sole bread earner of his family consisting of three sons aged about 8 years, 10 years and 12 years.
The appellants/accused suffered agony of trial since last 15 years and at the time of alleged offence, appellants/accused were 18 years of age. Appellants/accused were not previously involved in any other criminal case except the present case. It is, therefore, prayed that a lenient view be taken against them.
24 So far as the judgment as relied upon by the appellants/accused is concerned, the aforesaid case law holds the correct proposition of law , but distinguished from the facts and circumstances of the case and, therefore this judgment does not help the appellants/accused.
25 Keeping in view all the the facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the fact that they have suffered agony of trial since last 15 years and there is nobody else to look after their families, the sentence awarded to the appellants/accused for offence u/s 326/34 IPC is reduced and the appellants/accused be now sentenced to Rigorous CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 21/22 imprisonment for a period of one year. However, the order on sentence dt.18.05.2018 with regard to fine is upheld. TCR be sent back to the concerned court along with copy of judgment.
Appeal file is consigned to record room.
Digitally
signed by
LALIT LALIT KUMAR
Date:
KUMAR 2019.01.11
16:28:42
+0530
ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT (LALIT KUMAR)
TODAY ON 11.01.2019 ASJ03/NE/KKD/DELHI
CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 22/22
CA no.15/18 Rashid Vs State 23/22