Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
Srinagar vs Ut Of J&K & Anr on 29 December, 2025
Author: Sanjay Dhar
Bench: Sanjay Dhar
2025:JKLHC-SGR:400
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT
SRINAGAR
Reserved on: 24.12.2025
Pronounced on:29.12.2025
Uploaded on: 29.12.2025
Whether the operative part
or full judgment is
pronounced: Full
Arb P. No.45/2024
c/w
Arb P. No.46/2024
Arb P. No.47/2024
PROMARK TECHSOLUTIONS PVT. LTD.
...PETITIONERS/APPELLANT(S)
Through: - Mr. Vinayak Phull, Advocate (through VC)
Vs.
UT OF J&K & ANR ...RESPONDENT(S)
Through: - Mr. Abdul Rashid Malik, Sr. AAG, with
Mr. Younis Ahad, Advocate.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1) By this common judgment, the afore-titled three arbitration petitions, involving identical parties and common questions of law and fact, are proposed to be decided together. The petitioner company has filed the present petitions under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), seeking appointment of an independent arbitrator for adjudication of disputes that have arisen between the parties.
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2) Arb. P No.45/2024:
2.1 As per case of the petitioner company, six contract agreements were awarded in its favour by the respondent Department for supply of furniture at the office of Block Development Office, Qamarwari, Srinagar, for a total consideration of ₹2,44,056.89. The petitioner company is stated to have supplied the furniture and delivered the same to the relevant office on 15.07.2020 against proper receipt. It has been pleaded that upon receipt of the furniture, the respondent Department (Rural Development Department) did not clear the bills and the same remained unpaid.
2.2 It seems that the petitioner company filed a civil suit for recovery of ₹3,23,250.44, which includes the principal amount of ₹2,44,146.86 and ₹79,103.58 interest @18% per annum, together with future interest, in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), SAS Nagar, Mohali. The respondents/defendants were set exparte. However, upon conclusion of the trial, the learned civil court held that it lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and, accordingly, vide order dated 25.09.2020, the original plaint was directed to be returned to the petitioner company for its presentation before the competent court. Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 2 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 2.3 Instead of presenting the plaint before the court having jurisdiction, the petitioner company invoked Clause (16) of the General Terms and Conditions of the Contract (GCC), which provides for resolution of the disputes through arbitration. In this regard, notice dated 28.03.2024 was issued by the petitioner company to the Block Development Officer, Qamarwari, Srinagar, with a copy endorsed to the Commissioner/Secretary, Rural Development Department and Panchayati Raj, J&K, seeking appointment of a sole Arbitrator. 2.4 When the Arbitrator was not appointed despite service of notice, the petitioner company has approached this Court by filing the present petition seeking appointment of an independent Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 3) Arb. P No.46/2024 3.1 The subject matter of the present petition pertains to seven contract agreements executed in favour of the petitioner company by the respondents for providing furniture to the office of the Block Development Officer, Harwan, for a total consideration of ₹6,09,999.36. According to the petitioner company, the furniture was duly supplied and delivered to the Block Development Office, Harwan on 17.07.2020 but the bills remain unpaid. Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 3 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 3.2 Again, the petitioner company instituted a civil suit before the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), SAS Nagar, Mohali, seeking recovery of an amount of Rs.8,08,842.36 which includes ₹6099,999.36 as principal amount and an amount of Rs with ₹1,98,843/- as interest calculated @18% per annum up to the date of institution of the suit, along with future interest. The said suit was filed on 12.05.2022. It is stated that the suit was subsequently withdrawn by the petitioner on 11.05.2024 when the matter was taken up in the Lok Adalat. 3.3 Thereafter, the petitioner company served notice dated 28.03.2024 upon the Block Development Officer, Harwan, with a copy endorsed to the Commissioner/ Secretary, Rural Development Department and Panchayati Raj, J&K ,invoking Clause (16) of GCC seeking reference of the disputes to a sole Arbitrator. When no action was taken by the respondents, the present petition came to be filed by the petitioner company seeking reference of disputes to the Arbitrator.
4) Arb. P No.47/2024:
4.1 The subject matter of the present petition pertains to five contract agreements executed in favour of the petitioner company by the respondent Department for supply of furniture to the office of Block Development Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 4 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 Officer, Khonmoh, Srinagar, for a total consideration of ₹4,32,479.38. According to the petitioner company, the furniture was duly supplied in accordance with the contractual terms and acknowledged through proper receipt, however, the payment for the same was not released.
4.2 It seems that the petitioner company instituted a civil suit for recovery of ₹5,71,962.84/ which includes an amount of ₹4,32,479.38 towards principal amount plus an amount of ₹1,39,483.58 as interest @18% per annum till the date of filing of the suit along with future interest at the same rate. The said suit was filed on 18.05.2022. However, vide order dated 25.09.2023, the learned Civil Court at SAS Nagar, Mohali returned the plaint on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 4.3 It appears that the petitioner company, instead of presenting the plaint before the court having jurisdiction, Clause (16) of GCC by serving notice dated 28.03.2024 upon the respondent Department seeking reference of the disputes to arbitration. When no action was taken by the respondents, the petitioner company invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 11(6) of the Act, seeking reference of disputes to the Arbitrator. Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 5 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400
5) The respondents have contested the petitions by filing identical objections to all the three petitions. In the objections, it has been contended that the limitation period for seeking reference of disputes to the arbitration is three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action and in the instant case, cause of action, if any, in favour of the petitioner company had arisen in the year 2020 when the delivery of the furniture was made and the amount became due to it but in all the three case, the Arbitration Clause has been invoked by the petitioner company in March 2024, i.e. after more than three years from the date of accrual of cause of action. It has been contended that because the petitioner company has not filed application under Section 11 of the Act within the prescribed period of limitation of three years, the petitions being time barred are liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. It has been contended that the petitioner company has not furnished any explanation for the delay caused in filing these petitions. It has also been contended that the notice of invocation of arbitration clause has not been received by the respondents. It has been further contended that the petitioner company has taken a conscious decision of filing civil suits against the respondent Department and once it has elected to pursue the said Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 6 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 remedy, it cannot be allowed to re-ignite the arbitration clause as a matter of convenience. It has been contended that the alleged claims of the petitioner company are time barred and the same cannot be revived by filing these petitions.
6) I have heard learned causal for the parties and perused record of the case.
7) The main objection that has been pressed by the respondents to the maintainability of these petitions is that the claims projected by the petitioner company in these petitions are stale and time barred and, thus, have become dead and non-arbitrable. It has been contended that even the letters seeking invocation of arbitration clause issued by the petitioner company are hopelessly time barred and, therefore, the present petitions are not maintainable.
8) Before proceeding to deal with the merits of the aforesaid contention raised by the respondents, it is necessary to understand the scope of pre-referral jurisdiction of the Court under Section 11(6) of the Act. For this purpose, it would be apt to refer to the precedents delivered by the Supreme Court from time to time on this issue.
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9) The Supreme Court has, in the case of Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1, while dealing with the scope of power of the Referral Corut under Sections 11 and 8, held that at the referral stage, if it is found that the claims are ex-facie time barred and dead and there is no subsisting dispute, the reference can be refused. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced as under:
"148. Section 43(1) of the Arbitration Act states that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to court proceedings. Sub-section (2) states that for the purposes of the Arbitration Act and Limitation Act, arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred to in Section 21. Limitation law is procedural and normally disputes, being factual, would be for the arbitrator to decide guided by the facts found and the law applicable. The court at the referral stage can interfere only when it is manifest that the claims are ex facie time- barred and dead, or there is no subsisting dispute. All other cases should be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal for decision on merits. Similar would be the position in case of disputed "no-claim certificate" or defence on the plea of novation and "accord and satisfaction". As observed in Premium Nafta Products Ltd, it is not to be expected that commercial men while entering transactions inter se would knowingly create a system which would require that the court should first decide whether the contract should be rectified or avoided or rescinded, as the case may be, and then if the contract is held to be valid, it would require the arbitrator to resolve the issues that have arisen.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w
Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 8 of 21
2025:JKLHC-SGR:400
154.......154.4. Rarely as a demurrer the court may interfere at Section 8 or 11 stage when it is manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non-existent, invalid or the disputes are non-arbitrable, though the nature and facet of non-
arbitrability would, to some extent, determine the level and nature of judicial scrutiny. The restricted and limited review is to check and protect parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably "non-arbitrable" and to cut off the deadwood. The court by default would refer the matter when contentions relating to non-arbitrability are plainly arguable; when consideration in summary proceedings would be insufficient and inconclusive; when facts are contested; when the party opposing arbitration adopts delaying tactics or impairs conduct of arbitration proceedings. This is not the stage for the court to enter into a mini trial or elaborate review so as to usurp the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal but to affirm and uphold integrity and efficacy of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
10) Taking note of the aforesaid ratio laid down in Vidya Drolia's case (supra), the Supreme court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. M/S Nortel Networks India Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738, observed as under:
44. The issue of limitation which concerns the "admissibility" of the claim, must be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal either as a preliminary issue, or at the final stage after evidence is led by the parties.
xxx xxx xxx xx
47. It is only in the very limited category of cases, where there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is ex facie time-barred, or that the dispute is non-arbitrable, that the court may decline to make the reference.
However, if there is even the slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the disputes to arbitration, Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 9 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 otherwise it would encroach upon what is essentially a matter to be determined by the tribunal.
48. Applying the law to the facts of the present case, it is clear that this is a case where the claims are ex facie time-barred by over 5½ years, since Nortel did not take any action whatsoever after the rejection of its claim by BSNL on 4-8-2014. The notice of arbitration was invoked on 29-4-2020. There is not even an averment either in the notice of arbitration, or the petition filed under Section 11, or before this Court, of any intervening facts which may have occurred, which would extend the period of limitation falling within Sections 5 to 20 of the Limitation Act. Unless, there is a pleaded case specifically adverting to the applicable section, and how it extends the limitation from the date on which the cause of action originally arose, there can be no basis to save the time of limitation.
49. The present case is a case of deadwood/no subsisting dispute since the cause of action arose on 4-8-2014, when the claims made by Nortel were rejected by BSNL. The respondent has not stated any event which would extend the period of limitation, which commenced as per Article 55 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act (which provides the limitation for cases pertaining to breach of contract) immediately after the rejection of the final bill by making deductions.
11) In NTPCL Limited vs. SPML Infra Limited, (2023) 9 SCC 385, the Supreme Court, while discussing the scope of jurisdiction of the Court under Section11(6) of the Act, made the following observations:
25. The above referred precedents crystallise the position of law that the pre-
referral jurisdiction of the Courts under Section 11(6) of the Act is very narrow and inheres two inquiries. The primary inquiry is about the existence and the validity of an Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 10 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 arbitration agreement, which also includes an inquiry as to the parties to the agreement and the applicant's privity to the said agreement. These are matters which require a thorough examination by the Referral Court. The secondary inquiry that may arise at the reference stage itself is with respect to the non-arbitrability of the dispute.
26. As a general rule and a principle, the Arbitral Tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of non-arbitrability. As an exception to the rule, and rarely as a demurrer, the Referral Court may reject claims which are manifestly and ex facie non-arbitrable. Explaining this position, flowing from the principles laid down in Vidya Drolia , this Court in a subsequent decision in Nortel Networks held (Nortel Networks case SCC p. 764, para 45) "45. ... 45.1. ... While exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 as the judicial forum, the Court may exercise the prima facie test to screen and knockdown ex facie meritless, frivolous, and dishonest litigation. Limited jurisdiction of the Courts would ensure expeditious and efficient disposal at the referral stage. At the referral stage, the Court can interfere "only" when it is "manifest" that the claims are ex facie time-barred and dead, or there is no subsisting dispute."
27. The standard of scrutiny to examine the non-arbitrability of a claim is only prima facie. Referral Courts must not undertake a full review of the contested facts; they must only be confined to a primary first review [and let facts speak for themselves. This also requires the Courts to examine whether the assertion on arbitrability is bona fide or not. The prima facie scrutiny of the facts must lead to a clear conclusion that there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is non-arbitrable. On the other Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 11 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 hand, even if there is the slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the dispute to arbitration.
28. The limited scrutiny, through the eye of the needle, is necessary and compelling. It is intertwined with the duty of the Referral Court to protect the parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably non-arbitrable [Ibid.]. It has been termed as a legitimate interference by Courts to refuse reference in order to prevent wastage of public and private resources. Further, as noted in Vidya Drolia , if this duty within the limited compass is not exercised, and the Court becomes too reluctant to intervene, it may undermine the effectiveness of both, arbitration and the Court . Therefore, this Court or a High Court, as the case may be, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act, is not expected to act mechanically merely to deliver a purported dispute raised by an applicant at the doors of the chosen arbitrator, as explained in DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. Rajapura Homes (P) Ltd.
12) Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. Asap Fluids Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 1 SCC 502, after surveying previous judgments on the issue made the following observations:
43. Therefore, while determining the issue of limitation in the exercise of powers under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act, the referral Court must only conduct a limited enquiry for the purpose of examining whether the Section 11(6) application has been filed within the limitation period of three years or not. At this stage, it would not be proper for the referral Court to indulge in an intricate evidentiary enquiry into the question of whether the claims raised by the petitioner are time-barred. Such a determination must be left to the decision of the arbitrator.
44. After all, in a scenario where the referral Court is able to discern the frivolity in the Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 12 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 litigation on the basis of bare minimum pleadings, it would be incorrect to assume or doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the same inference, especially when they are equipped with the power to undertake an extensive examination of the pleadings and evidence adduced before them.
45. As observed by us in Krish Spg., the power of the referral Court under Section 11 must essentially be seen in light of the fact that the parties do not have the right of appeal against any order passed by the referral Court under Section 11, be it for either appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Therefore, if the referral Court delves into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the Section 11 stage and rejects the application of the claimant, we run a serious risk of leaving the claimant remediless for the adjudication of their claims.
46. Moreover, the courts are vested with the power of subsequent review in which the award passed by the arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any party to the arbitration. Therefore, the courts may take a second look at the adjudication done by the Arbitral Tribunal at a later stage, if considered necessary and appropriate in the circumstances.
13) From the foregoing analysis of the legal position, it is clear that at the time of considering a petition under Section 11(6) of the Act, unless it is shown that the claim is ex-facie time barred or hopelessly time barred, the Court exercising power under Section 11(6) of the Act for appointment of Arbitrator should not reject such application. If there is slightest doubt with regard to arbitrability of the claim on account of it being time Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 13 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 barred, the issue for determination in this regard should be left to the Arbitrator and the Court while exercising its power under Section 11 of Act should not venture to determine the said issue at reference stage.
14) Before determining the issue as to whether the claims raised by the petitioner company in the present case are ex-facie time barred, it is also necessary to ascertain as to what is the period of limitation for a claim to become non-arbitrable or stale and what is the period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act.
15) Section 43 of the Act provides that Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply to arbitrations as it applies for proceedings in court. Sub-section (2) of the said provision further provides that the arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred in Section 21 whereas Section 21 of the Act provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in commenced on the date on which a request for reference of the dispute to arbitration is received by the respondent.
16) A conjoint reading of these provisions would show that the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to all proceedings under the Act, both in court and in arbitration Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 14 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 except to the extent expressly excluded by the provisions of the Act. In this regard, support can be drawn from the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169
17) In the Arbitration Act, no limitation period has been prescribed for filing an application under Section 11. Therefore, Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act would apply, meaning thereby that the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Act would arise when right to apply accrues to the petitioner. There is distinction between the period of limitation for enforcing a claim against a party and the period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act. The Supreme Court has, in the case of J. C. Budhraja v. Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 444, explained the distinction between the period of limitation for filing a petition and the period of limitation as to the claims being barred by time, in the following manner:
"25. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the limitation would begun to run from the date on which a difference arose between the parties, and in this case the difference arose only when OMC refused to comply with the notice dated 4-6-1980 seeking reference to arbitration. We are afraid, the contention is without merit. The appellant is obviously confusing the Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 15 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 limitation for a petition under Section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 with the limitation for the claim itself. The limitation for a suit is calculated as on the date of filing of the suit. In the case of arbitration, limitation for the claim is to be calculated on the date on which the arbitration is deemed to have commenced.
26. Section 37(3) of the Act provides that for the purpose of the Limitation Act, an arbitration is deemed to have been commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other party thereto, a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator. Such a notice having been served on 4-6-1980, it has to be seen whether the claims were in time as on that date. If the claims were barred on 4-6- 1980, it follows that the claims had to be rejected by the arbitrator on the ground that the claims were barred by limitation. The said period has nothing to do with the period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 8(2) of the Act. Insofar as a petition under Section 8(2) is concerned, the cause of action would arise when the other party fails to comply with the notice invoking arbitration. Therefore, the period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 8(2) seeking appointment of an arbitrator cannot be confused with the period of limitation for making a claim. The decisions of this Court in Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. DDA, Panchu Gopal Bose v. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta and Utkal Commercial Corpn. v. Central Coal Fields Ltd also make this position clear.
18) From the foregoing analysis of legal position, it is deduced that the cause of action for filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act would arise when the opposite party fails to comply with the notice invoking arbitration clause whereas limitation for the claim has to be calculated on the day on which the arbitration is deemed to have Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 16 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 commenced. Thus, the cause of action for filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act would arise when the respondent fails to respond to the notice for invocation of arbitration clause and the limitation with regard to claim, which is subject matter of arbitration, has to be calculated as on date when the notice for invocation of arbitration clause is issued. Therefore, if the claim of a party filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act is time barred as on date of invocation of the arbitration clause, then, of course, his claim would qualify to be a dead claim and, as such, non-arbitrable. Similarly, if a party files a petition beyond a period of three years after invocation of the arbitration clause, his petition will be time barred.
19) With the aforesaid legal position in mind, let us now analyse the facts of the present case. As per case of the petitioner company, the delivery of furniture was made to the buyers in July, 2020. Admittedly, the arbitration clause has been invoked by the petitioner company in March, 2024. The cause of action in respect of claims of the petitioner company against the respondents would arise after it made the delivery of the furniture to the buyers and the respondent Department refused to clear its bills. There is nothing on record to show as to when the bills were raised by the petitioner and when the Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 17 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 respondent Department conveyed its refusal to clear the bills. However, it has been pleaded by the petitioner that despite requesting the respondents to clear the bills in respect of the furniture products already delivered, no fruitful result emanated and the bills remained unpaid.
The issue as to when the cause of action has arisen in favour of the petitioner company, as such, becomes a question of fact which can be gone into only during arbitration proceedings when the parties file their pleadings/documents and explain this aspect of the matter to the Arbitrator.
20) Even if the contention of the respondents that the cause of action in favour of the petitioner company had arisen in July, 2020, when the delivery of furniture products was made by it, still then it cannot be stated that the claim of the petitioner company is ex-facie time barred for the reason that there is material on record to show that the petitioner company was pursuing the civil suits before a court that was not having jurisdiction. Prima facie, it appears that the petitioner has the right to seek exclusion of time taken in pursuing the remedy before a wrong forum by taking resort to the provisions contained in Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The petitioner can very well plead before the Arbitrator that it was prosecuting civil Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 18 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 proceedings before a wrong forum in good faith and claim exclusion of the period during which the suits remained pending before the civil court at SAS Nagar, Mohali. Thus, it cannot be stated that the claim of the petitioner company is ex-facie time barred, though this issue has to be gone into and analysed by the Arbitral Tribunal before considering the claims of the petitioner on merits. This Court, while exercising its powers under Section 11(6) of the Act, cannot go into this issue and it is only the Arbitral Tribunal who can go into all these issues during the arbitral proceedings.
21) Thus, it is clear that the issue as to whether the claim made by the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case is time barred cannot be gone into by this court while exercising its power under Section 11(6) of the Act and it would be appropriate to leave the said issue to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal.
22) So far as the issue as regards maintainability of the application under Section 11(6) of the Act on the grounds of limitation is concerned, the application in the present case has been filed by the petitioner company within less than one year of the invocation of arbitration clause and. Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 19 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 therefore, by no stretch of reasoning it can be stated to be time barred.
23) For the aforesaid reasons the objections raised by the respondents to the maintainability of these petitions and non-arbitrability of the claims of the petitioner company on account of the same being time barred, is rejected. Once it is held that the issue with regard to arbitrability of the claims of the petitioner company on the ground of limitation is a matter which is required to be gone into by the Arbitral Tribunal and once it has been found that there is an arbitration clause existing between the parties, which has been invoked by the petitioner company without any response from the respondents, there is no other option available with this Court but to refer the disputes arising between the parties to the Arbitral Tribunal.
24) Accordingly, the petitions are disposed of by referring all the disputes and differences covered by the agreements, to the learned Sole Arbitrator in the following terms:
(I) Ms. Asifa Padroo, Advocate is appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes and differences between the parties arising out of and in connection with the agreement referred to above.
Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 20 of 21 2025:JKLHC-SGR:400 (II) A copy of this order be communicated to the learned Sole Arbitrator by the Registry of this Court within a period of ten days from today. (III) The learned Sole Arbitrator is requested to forward the statutory statement of disclosure under Section 11(8) read with Section 12(1) of the Act of 1996 to the parties within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this order. (IV) The parties shall appear before the learned Sole Arbitrator on a date and place to be fixed by the learned Sole Arbitrator.
(V) All the arbitral costs and fee of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be borne by the parties equally and shall be subject to final award that may be passed by the learned Arbitrator in relation to the costs.
(VI) The learned Arbitrator shall, before proceeding to decide the merits of the claims, decide the issue with regard to limitation after hearing the parties.
(Sanjay Dhar) Judge SRINAGAR 29.12.2025 "Bhat Altaf-Secy"
Whether the Judgement is speaking: YES Whether the Judgement is reportable: YES Arb. P No.45/2024 c/w Arb. P No.46/2024 & Arb. P No.47/2024 Page 21 of 21