Bombay High Court
Prakash Haldankar vs Shri Bill Carneiro And Others on 21 August, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1997CRILJ1254
Author: T.K. Chandrashekhara Das
Bench: T.K. Chandrashekhara Das
ORDER
1. Rule. By consent heard forthwith.
2. An order of the District and Sessions Judge, Panaji in Criminal Appeal No. 5/96 dated 6-6-1996 is challenged in this revision. The said order under revision, arises out of an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mapusa in Criminal Case No. 243/95/A, dated 31-1-1996. In that judgment of the learned Magistrate, the accused in that case was charged under Section 380, I.P.C. for having committed an offence of theft between 20th October, 1995 at 19.00 hours to 24th October, 1996 at 6.30 hours at Saligao. The accused is alleged to have committed theft of gold bangle, weighing 20 grams, worth Rs. 8,000/- from the jewellery box of his father, defacto complainant, PW 2. At the end of the trial, the learned Magistrate has passed an order convicting the accused under Section 380, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo 2 months' R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to undergo another one month S.I. 2A. While convicting the accused, the learned Magistrate has disposed of the stolen property by an order purported to have been passed under Section 452 of the Cr.P.C. whereby he has ordered the return of melted gold M.O. 1 to PW 7, the revision-petitioner herein, who has purchased bona fide the said gold bangle for valuable consideration in the usual course of his business and converted the same into melted gold and was produced before the police. The other articles have been ordered to return to PW 2. Against the order of disposal of the property M.O. 1 by the Magistrate as aforesaid, PW 2 filed an appeal before the District and Sessions Judge, Panaji. The appellate Court set aside the order passed by the Magistrate and ordered that M.O. 1 melted gold should be returned to Mrs. Lela Sebnis, PW 5, who is none other than the daughter of PW 2, on executing a bond before the Lower Court to produce M.O. 1 or its gold equivalent if and when ordered by the Court, during the period of one year.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Lotlikar has submitted that the Lower Appellate Court has committed a serious miscarriage of justice in setting aside the order of the Magistrate. He submits that the Lower Appellate Court has not properly construed the provisions of Section 452, particularly sub-section (2) of the said Section. He submits that the Lower Appellate Court has, without any justification not followed the dictum laid down in the decision of this Court in AIR 1918 Bom 215 : (1918 (19) Cri LJ 721). He submits that following this decision, the order of the learned Magistrate is not liable to be set aside. He also submits that the Lower Appellate Court has passed the order discarding another decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kanchanlal Somalal Chokshi v. The State, . He further submits that the learned Sessions Judge ordered to deliver the articles to a person other than that applied for.
4. It appears that the Lower Appellate Court has discarded the decision reported in AIR 1918 Bom 215 : (1918 (19) Cri LJ 721) on the ground that there is a vast difference between the old Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the present Section 452 of Cr.P.C. Learned Counsel Shri Lotlikar has read out before me the two Sections and I am not able to notice any difference in those two Sections. I cannot see any substantial difference in the old Section 517 and new Section 452 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the reasons to discard the decision of this Court in AIR 1918 Bom 215 : (1918 (19) Cri LJ 721) are not based on sound reasons. I find considerable force in the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner.
5. Section 452 says that on conclusion of the trial, the Court may make such an order as it thinks fit for the disposal of ...... or deliver to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise of any property or document produced before it or in its custody or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of any offence. It is clear from this section that disposal of the property on conclusion of a criminal trial, which is the subject-matter for the prosecution, can be disposed of at the discretion of the Magistrate. Sub-section (2) of Section 452 says that such disposal or delivery of property to such person can be on condition where the claim regarding the property is finally settled or adjudicated by the competent authority. Sub-section (5) deals with that the property need not be one exactly the same that has been stolen, it can be equivalent of the property converted after the theft has been committed, or even the property acquired by such conversion or exchange will also come under the term 'property', shown in Section 452 of the Act.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also brought to my notice the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kanchanlal Somalal Chokshi v. The State, (1963 (2) Cri LJ 262 (2)) (supra), where exactly a similar question has been dealt with. In that case, stolen property was sold by the accused to J who sold the same to K. K sold that property along with his own property receiving the whole sale proceeds in a lump sum. K gave Rs. 151.40 to the police as the value of the stolen property which he had sold. The Magistrate ordered this amount to be paid to the complainant from whose possession, the property was stolen. It was held in that decision that the Magistrate was not entitled to order to pay the sum to the complainant, as it was not the specific money which the K had received. In that case, the High Court of Gujarat has ordered that instead of delivering the money to the complainant, it should be delivered to the person from whom the police had recovered the money. I do not think a different view is possible than the taken by this Court in the aforesaid decisions in this case also.
7. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, argued that the property given in the hands of the bona fide purchaser is a stolen property and it cannot be delivered to such person on conclusion of the trial. I do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, in view of the aforesaid decisions. I am of the view that the Appellate Court has committed an error in setting aside the order of the Magistrate. It has also committed a serious error to order delivery to PW 5, who has not applied for at all. But, I find that the Magistrate's order was unconditional. In such circumstances, the Magistrate should not have ordered the delivery of the property to the petitioner without any conditions. As is done by the Appellate Court, delivery of such property should be on condition of executing a bond to produce the M.O. 1 or its gold equivalent if and when ordered by the Court during the period of 1 year.
8. In the result, the revision petition is partly allowed. The order of the District and Sessions Judge is set aside. The order of the Magistrate dated 31-1-1996 is modified to the extent that M.O. 1 should be delivered to the petitioner on condition that he should execute a bond before the Magistrate's Court to produce M.O. 1 or its gold equivalent if and when ordered by the Court, during the period of one year. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
9. Revision partly allowed.