Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rammoo vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 17 November, 1989
Equivalent citations: [1990(60)FLR426], (1992)ILLJ371MP
JUDGMENT S.K. Jha, C.J.
1. Heard Shri Rohit Arya, counsel for the petitioner, on the question of admission.
2. The petitioner was initially appointed as Casual Khalasi under the Inspector of Works, Central Railway, Damoh (M.P.). He asserts to have rendered 4 to 5 years service continuously. It is therefore, claimed that the petitioner has acquired the status of a temporary employee under the Central Government. The petitioner's employment having been terminated by respondent No. 2, General Manager, Central Railway, V.T., Bombay, without the payment of any retrenchment compensation as provided under Section 25F of the I.D. Act, he was entitled to be reinstated. He accordingly filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). His case was registered as O.A.354 of 1987. The Tribunal by its judgment dated March 30, 1988, observed that the petitioner, along with other applicants before the Tribunal standing at par with the petitioner, can file fresh applications, if they so wished, and if need be, to this Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, in the event of a reference not being made by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the I.D. Act to the Industrial Tribunal or any other appropriate remedy under the provisions of that Act having been rejected. The Tribunal has, therefore, deferred the exercise of its power to a date when the petitioner is either unable to get a reference being made by the appropriate Government under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or on such a reference having been made, the decision being given against the petitioner. For, in that event, the Tribunal has already observed that the petitioner shall be at liberty to file a fresh application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the Tribunal. In the course of argument, however, he confined his submission only to Article 227 of the Constitution and invoked the powers of superintendence of this Court over the Tribunal. In the course of argument, on a previous occasion, he had submitted that ouster of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution under Section 27 of the Act was ultra vires, We do not see how that question is relevant or pertinent in this case because we are testing the order of the Tribunal on the decision that it has given. Even applying the provisions of Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order of the Tribunal.
4. Learned counsel tried to strenuously contend that by virtue of the provisions of Section 28 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was ousted once the matter was adjudicated upon by the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The submission is that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, originally was on account of the applicability of the Act under Section 2(b) of the Act, as it originally stood. This was done away with by the obliteration or deletion of the erstwhile provisions of Section 2(b) referrable to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Notwithstanding such deletion, it is contended, by inclusion of such a provision under Section 28 of the Act it should be deemed that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is ousted after the adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. This argument proceeds upon a fallacy. There is no ouster of jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 28 of the Act. Section 28 enjoins that on and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under the Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of any service or persons appointed to any service or post, no Court except"...., or any Industrial Tribunal.... authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ...." shall be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters...... This does not exclude jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It merely excludes the jurisdiction of regular Civil Courts in contradistinction with the Tribunal. The expression "no Court" occurring in Section 28 of the Act speaks of a Court ordinarily understood as in Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, there is no merit in the submission that once the matter is gone into by Industrial Court or Labour Court, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be ousted. As a necessary corollary the vires of Section 27 of the Act does not arise at all.
5. We accordingly do not find any merit in this petition. It is dismissed in limine.