Madras High Court
Sukumar Swaminathan vs Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan
Author: K.Ravichandrabaabu
Bench: K. Ravichandrabaabu
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED:
Orders Reserved on 28.03.2018
Orders Delivered on 05.06.2018
C O R A M
THE HON'BLE Mr.JUSTICE K. RAVICHANDRABAABU
Review Petition No.43 of 2016
And
CMP Nos.4556 of 2016 and 17619 of 2017
Sukumar Swaminathan ..Petitioner
Vs
Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan ..Respondent
Prayer:Review petition filed under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC to review the common judgment and decree dated 20.12.2013 passed in A.S.No.517 of 1993, in terms of and in the directions of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 07.12.2015 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.14124-14125 of 2015, in so far as it relates to fourth defendant Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan and modify the said judgment by setting aside the same and allowing the appeal in A.S.No.517 of 1993 and pass orders in accordance with law, as directed by the Supreme Court in the said judgment dated 07.12.2015.
For Petitioner : Mr.T.V.Ramanujam Senior Counsel for Mr.A.Satyaseelan
For Respondent : Mrs.Hema Sampath Senior Counsel for M/s.R.Meenal
O R D E R
This review petition is filed seeking to review the judgment and decree made in A.S.No.517 of 1993 dated 20.12.2013 in terms of the directions contained in the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 07.12.2015.
2. The review petitioner is the third appellant/eighth defendant. The respondent herein is the fifth respondent/fourth defendant.
3. Brief facts, which have driven the petitioner to file the present review petition, are as follows:
a) One Dhanabagyam Francis, one of the daughters of one Sathyanathan filed O.S.No.751 of 1985 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Salem, against one Rajamani Cunniah and 11 others for partition of her 1/7th share in the suit properties. The trial court by its judgment and decree dated 01.02.1993 granted preliminary decree as prayed for, also by granting 1/7th share each to the defendants 2, 3, 4, who are the sisters of the plaintiff. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendants 6 to 9 filed A.S.No.517 of 1993 before this Court.
b) Likewise, defendants 10 to 12 filed another appeal in A.S.No.685 of 1993 before this Court. During the pendency of these appeals, a Memorandum of compromise was entered into between the appellants and respondents 1, 3, 4, 6 to 9 in A.S.No.517 of 1993. The respondent in this review petition, who is the fifth respondent in the appeal and fourth defendant in the suit, was not a party to the said compromise memo. However, based on the said compromise memo, this Court by a common judgment and decree dated 12.04.2001 made in A.S.No.517 and 685 of 1993 decreed the suit in terms of the compromise memo. After nearly eight years, The respondent in this review petition, who was not a party to the memorandum of compromise, filed petitions to set aside the judgment and decree made in A.S.No.517 of 1993 dated 11.04.2001. This Court by an order made in CMP Nos.921 and 922 of 2009 in A.S.No.517 of 1993 dated 23.07.2010, allowed those applications and restored the appeal suit to file. Consequently, A.S.Nos.517 and 685 of 1993 were heard afresh and this Court, by a common judgment and decree dated 20.12.2013, dismissed both the appeals, thereby confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court made in O.S.Nos.751 of 1995 dated 01.02.1993.
c) The second and third appellants/7th and 8th defendants challenged the said common judgment and decree passed by this Court in the above appeals, by filing Special leave petition before the Honble Supreme Court in Nos.22795-22796 of 2014.
d) Likewise, the ninth respondent in A.S.No.517 of 1993 and another also challenged the judgment and decree made in appeals by filing SLP Nos.14381 and 14382 of 2014 before the Honble Supreme Court. The Honble Supreme Court, by a common judgment dated 07.12.2015, allowed the appeals to the extent that the compromise to which the fourth defendant was not a party, shall remain as it is. The Honble Supreme Court has also issued a direction that a review application shall be filed by the appellants before this Court with a further direction to this Court to consider the effects of a sale deed dated 29.06.2001 executed by the fourth defendant, which was relied on by the appellants before the Apex Court, on the compromise deed entered into among some of the parties before this Court. The Honble Supreme Court has also permitted the said sale deed to be placed on record so that it may be looked into by this Court for considering its effects on the compromise deed entered into among some of the parties. The Honble Supreme Court also observed that this Court shall consider the effect of the said sale deed and if necessary, may modify the impugned judgment and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The Apex Court has also observed that as shares of the other defendants were purchased by the eighth defendant, the amount, if any, which might become payable to the fourth defendant shall be paid by the eighth defendant. The Apex Court, set aside the impugned judgment to the extent it nullified the compromise, after recording the submissions made by the parties agreeing that the compromise entered into among the defendants, which has been referred to in the impugned judgment, will not get affected by the order passed by the Apex Court except qua the defendant No.4 and the same shall be considered to be a valid compromise qua others, who have not disputed it.
e) Consequent upon the above judgment of the Apex Court dated 07.12.2015, the present review application is filed before this Court by the eighth defendant. The fourth defendant alone is arrayed as the sole respondent in this review petition.
f) During the pendency of this review application, CMP No.4556 of 2016 is filed by the review petitioner seeking permission to file eight documents referred to in the petition, as additional evidences and to mark the same as Exhibits in the review petition. The documents sought to be filed and marked are as follows:
SI.
NO.
Date Description Doc.Nos.1
29.06.2001 Certified copy of the Sale Deed registered as Doc.No.2094 of 2001 on the files of SRO Sooramangalam executed by the 4th defendant Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan through her Power of Attorney, referred to in the judgment dated 07.12.2015 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Doc.No.1 2 23.12.1985 Certified copy of the Decree passed in O.S.No.21 of 1982 by the Sub Court Salem, referred to in the sale deed dated 29.06.2001.
Doc.No.2 3 08.09.2000 Copy of the Power of Attorney executed in USA by the 4th defendant Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan and certified as registered document under Section 32 of the Stamp Act in Serial No.12/2000 dated 23.11.2000 in the office of the District Registrar Salem, West, referred to in the sale deed dated 29.06.2001.
Doc.No.3 4 20.02.2001 Copy of the codicil to the Power of Attorney dated 08.09.2000 executed in USA by the 4th defendant Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan and certified as registered document under Section 32 of the Stamp Act in Serial No.4/2001 dated 19.04.2001in the office of the District Registrar Salem, West, referred to in the sale deed dated 29.06.2001.
Doc.No.4 5 24.03.1982 Copy of sale deed registered as Doc.No.2980 of 1982 executed by Mrs.Rajamani Canniah, the 1st defendant in the suit in favor of Mr.Alfred Swaminathan, one of the appellant in A.S.No.517 of 1993, a document filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as part of paper book document.
Doc.No.5 6 24.03.1982 Copy of sale deed registered as Doc.No.2213 of 1982 executed by Mrs.Rajamani Canniah, the 1st defendant in the suit in favor of Esther Gnanambal, Alfred Swaminathan and Sukumar Swaminathan, the appellants in A.S.No.517 of 1993, a document filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as part of paper book document.
Doc.No.6 7 24.03.1982 Copy of the certified copy of sale deed registered as Doc.No.3045 of 1982 executed by Mrs.Rajamani Canniah, the 1st defendant in the suit in favor of Sukumar Swaminathan, one of the appellant in A.S.No.517 of 1993, a document filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as part of paper book document.
Doc.No.7 8 19.02.1964 Typed copy of amendment to the Partnership Deed dated 29.01.1960 in respect of Scotforth Estate.
Doc.No.8
g) CMP No.17619 of 2017 is filed by the review petitioner to direct the respondent in the review to produce two documents, which are as follows:
1) The compromise stated to have been arrived at between the Vendor and one of the parties to the suit namely Asa John Divyanathan (as recorded in the said sale deed dated 29.06.2001).
2) The allotment of the schedule property to the said sale deed dated 29.06.2001 to the Vendor in part satisfaction of the decree in O.S.No.751/85 (as recorded in the said sale deed dated 29.06.2001).
4. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to know the respective case of the parties before the trial Court, which in brief, is stated as hereunder.
5. The case of the plaintiff is as follows:
The plaintiff, defendants 1 to 5 and one R.P.David are the children of one Sathyanathan and Gnanambal. The suit properties were self acquired properties of the said Sathyanathan. He was also having partnership business with his son R.P.David, in which all his children were partners. The said Sathyanathan died intestate on 05.05.1974 leaving behind his widow Gnannambal and his seven children viz., plaintiff, defendants 1 to 5 and R.P.David. The said R.P.David and the fifth defendant created an oral Will said to have been expressed by late Sathyanathan on 02.05.1974, which was reduced into writing later, expressing his intention to give all his properties to his grandsons born through his two sons viz., defendant No.5 and R.P.David. They also claimed to have registered the said family arrangement. The document described as family arrangement was not a valid document and the said Sathyanathan, who died intestate, did not express any wish to give his property to his grandsons. The widow of Sathyanathan viz., Gnanambal also died on 30.12.1981 intestate and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to 1/7th share in the suit properties. The said R.P.David, the brother of the plaintiff, was in management of the properties and died on 13.04.1985, leaving defendants 10 to 12 as his legal heirs. After the death of the said R.P.David, misunderstanding arose between the parties and some of the properties were transferred in the names of the defendants 6 to 9 without the knowledge of the plaintiff. Thus, the transfer of properties in the names of the defendants 6 to 9 and 10 to 12 are not binding on the plaintiff. Hence, the suit is filed for partition of her 1/7th share in the suit properties.
6. The seventh defendant filed written statement and the same was adopted by defendants 6 and 8. Their case is as follows:
Sathyanathan did not die intestate. On 02.05.1974, he expressed his intention to give all his properties to his grandsons born through his sons David and Swaminathan and the same was recorded by Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran, as the said Sathyanathan was not in a position to sign or to affix his thumb impression. In the memorandum written by the doctor, the wishes of Sathyanathan were noted and the plaintiff, the fifth defendant, R.P.David and other daughters signed it and it was also attested by the family doctor and Advocate S.V.Anandhapadmanaban. On 16.05.1974, the wishes of late Sathyanathan, expressed by him orally to the doctor, was reduced into writing and it was signed by the legal heirs and the same was also registered. Therefore, as per the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974, the grandsons of late Sathyanathan through his sons became the absolute owners of the suit properties. The plaintiff was aware of the same and she was also party to the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974. The plaintiff never claimed any share in the properties and was never in joint possession with the grandsons of Sathyanathan and other members. The suit filed for partition without setting aside the family arrangement dated 16.07.1974, was not maintainable. In O.S.No.951 of 1980, the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 was upheld.
7. The 11th defendant filed a statement and the same was adopted by the defendants 10 and 12. They disputed the claim of the plaintiff and claimed their right under the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974.
8. The eighth defendant filed an additional statement and the same was adopted by the defendants 6, 7 and 9, wherein it is stated as follows:
After the death of Sathyanathan, his widow Gnanambal became entitled to 1/3rd share in his properties and she executed a settlement deed dated 31.10.1981 in respect of item No.4 in favour of the eighth defendant. She also executed a Will dated 11.07.1981, bequeathing her 1/3rd share in respect of other properties in favour of the ninth defendant and therefore, the ninth defendant became the absolute owner in respect of 1/3rd share in respect of other properties except item No.4. Therefore, the plaintiff can claim only 1/7th share out of 2/3 share of Sathyanathan and in respect of 1/3 share of Gnanambal, the plaintiff cannot claim any right.
9. Based on the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:
(1)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3 share in the suit properties and if so, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the income from those properties ?
(2)Whether Late Sathyanathan executed an oral Will on 02.05.1974 in respect of his properties as alleged in the written statement ?
(3)Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction ? and (4)To what relief, the plaintiff is entitled to ?
(5)Whether the Will dated 11.04.1981 alleged to have been executed by Gnanambal is true and valid ? and (6)Whether Settlement deed dated 31.10.1981 alleged to have been executed by Gnanambal is true and valid ?
10. The trial court found that the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 will not have the effect of transferring any interest in the properties owned by Sathyanathan; that the Memorandum written by the doctor writing the wishes of late Sathyanathan on 02.05.1974 cannot be accepted as true document; that the late Sathyanathan never expressed his intention to give his property to his grandsons born through his sons and the said document dated 02.05.1974 was fabricated by the sons with an intention of defrauding the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4; that Ex.B6 Will and Ex.B 7 Settlement Deed are also not valid and not proved to have been executed by Gnanambal; that the execution of Will and Settlement Deed by Gnanambal will also go against the case of the defendants that there was a family arrangement on 16.05.1974, by which all properties were given to grandsons through his sons. Thus, the trial court decreed the suit as prayed for.
11. The said judgment and decree of the trial court was challenged before this Court in A.S.Nos.517 and 685 of 1993. However, during the pendency of these appeals, a memorandum of compromise between the appellants and respondents 1, 3, 4, 6 to 9 in A.S.No.517 of 1993 was entered into.
12. Admittedly, the respondent in this review petition, who is the fourth defendant in the suit and the fifth respondent in the appeal, was not a party to the said compromise memo. However this Court, as stated supra, disposed both the appeals in terms of the said compromise memo entered into between the parties. Nearly after eight years, the respondent herein filed applications to set aside the said judgment and decree passed in those two appeals and for restoration of appeals. Those applications were allowed as stated supra, thereby restoring the appeals for hearing on merits.
13. Accordingly, the appeals were taken up for hearing on merits and the following points were framed for considering the appeals:
(1)Whether the Court below erred in holding that Exs.B.8 and B.1 will not transfer any interest in the properties in favour of the grandsons of Sathyanathan ?
(2)Whether the Court below was right in rejecting Exs.B.8 and B.1 ? and (3)Whether the Court below was right in rejecting the Will and Settlement deed, Exs.B.6 and B.7 executed by Gnanambal ?
14. After hearing both sides, this Court by judgment and decree dated 20.12.2013, answered point Nos.1 and 2 against the appellants by observing that the trial court rightly held that no title was passed under Ex.B1 and Ex.B8 and the non-examination of the family doctor and the family advocate would lead to the conclusion that Ex.B1 and Ex.B8 were not executed in the manner as alleged by the defendants 6 to 12 and they will not convey any interest in the properties in favour of the defendants 6 to 12. Point No.3 was also decided against the appellants by observing that the mother Gnanambal was under the custody of her son Swaminathan/fifth respondent during her last days and the Will and Settlement Deed must have been created by him and that those documents were not proved to have been validly executed. Thus, this Court dismissed both appeals, thereby confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court.
15. It is to be noted at this juncture that in the meantime, after the disposal of the appeals by this court earlier on 11.04.2001 decreeing the suit in terms of compromise memo, the respondent in this review petition/fourth defendant executed a sale deed dated 29.06.2001, through her power of attorney agent conveying an extent of 6250 sq.ft. of land. It is stated that the extent of land conveyed in the said sale deed is part of one of the item of the suit property in O.S.No.751 of 1985.
16. As already stated supra, the above said judgment and decree passed by this Court in A.S.Nos.517 of 1993 and 685 of 1993 were challenged before the Honble Supreme Court. Before the Apex Court, the appellants had relied on the above said sale deed dated 29.06.2001, executed by the fourth defendant. The Honble Supreme Court found that the main dispute in the appeals is only with regard to the share of the fourth defendant/the respondent in this review petition. Thus, the Apex Court passed the judgment in the appeals on 07.12.2015, which reads as follows:
"1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and the facts pertaining to the case, we find that the main dispute in the appeals is only with regard to the share of defendant No.4- Victoria Srinivasan.
4. In the course of hearing of these appeals, the appellants had relied upon a sale deed dated 29th June, 2001 executed by defendant No.4, by virtue of which some property had been sold by her. The said document has not been exhibited before any court. The said sale deed is permitted to be placed on record so that it may be looked into by the High Court and consider its effects on the compromise deed entered into among some of the parties.
5. In these cicumstances, we dispose of these appeals with a direction that a review application shall be filed by the appellants within four weeks from today before the High Court and the High Court shall permit the appellants to do the needful to get the said document exhibited.
6. The High Court shall consider the effect of the said sale deed after hearing the concerned paties and if necessary, may modify the impugned judgement and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
7. It may further be noted that as shares of other defendants have been purchased by defendant No.8, the amount, if any, which might become payable to defendant No.4 shall be paid by defendant No.8.
8. It is also agreed among the parties during the course of hearing of these appeals that the compromise entered into among the defendants which has been referred to in the impugned judgment will not get affected by this order except qua defendant No.4 and the same shall be considered to be a valid compromise qua others who have not disputed it. Therefore, the impugned order, to the extent it nullifies the compromise, is set aside. The appeals are allowed to the extent that the compromise to which defendant No.4 was not a party, shall remain as it is.
9. The registry of the High Court will fix the date for hearing of the review application in the month of February, 2016. Only defendant Nos. 4, 8 and 9 or their representatives shall be heard by the High Court.
11. Pending applications stand disposed of.
12. There shall be no order as to costs."
Consequently, the present review is filed with the above miscellaneous petitions as stated supra.
17. The crux of the contentions raised in this review petition is as follows:
a) The fourth defendant, though had not signed memorandum of compromise entered into between the parties during August 2000 in the pending appeals before this Court, has executed the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 to a third party by taking advantage of such compromise. Thus, she is not entitled to pursue her claim any further. The said sale deed refers to the pending appeals against the suit in O.S.No.751 of 1985 and a compromise arrived between the vendor viz., the fourth defendant and the eleventh defendant. The fourth defendant along with other sisters challenged and questioned the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 in the suit in O.S.No.751 of 1985 and also in the pending appeal in A.S.No.517 of 1993. The said sale deed dated 29.06.2001 was executed during the pendency of the appeal in A.S.No.517 of 1993. In such circumstances, there could not have been any independent compromise/accommodation between the fourth defendant and the eleventh defendant, in respect of the property conveyed by the fourth defendant in the said sale deed. The fourth defendant conveyed the said property under the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 by claiming herself as the absolute owner. This would not have been possible, unless the challenge and questioning of the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 had been given up by the fourth defendant, as was done by the plaintiff and other sister defendants in the said suit.
b) Even assuming without conceding that execution of the said sale deed was not based on the memorandum of compromise, still such exercise by the fourth defendant would be based on the memorandum of compromise only, as it is in the said memorandum of compromise, the parties have agreed that the division made and the properties held by the respective parties based on the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 and confirmed in terms of the decree in O.S.No.913 of 1984 will not be disturbed or questioned. The fourth defendant, having taken advantage of the memorandum of compromise entered during August 2000 and also acted upon on that basis should be seen also confirming the validity of Ex.D1 and Ex.D8 like other defendants as in the said memorandum of compromise. Since the said memorandum of compromise altered the basis of decree in O.S.No.751 of 1985 and consequently also the judgment dated 20.12.2013 made in A.S.No.517 of 1993, the fourth defendant is not entitled to any benefit under the said judgment any further and consequently, the judgment dated 20.12.2013 made in A.S.No.517 of 1993, in so far as the claim of the fourth defendant is concerned, is to be reviewed.
c) The decree passed in O.S.No.751 of 1985 was entirely based on evidence and pleadings of the plaintiff. The fourth defendant had not filed any written statement nor examined herself or any of the defendant in the suit in respect of her claim of 1/7th share. The plaintiff and her sisters other than the fourth defendant were signatories to Ex.D8 and the plaintiff and all her sisters including the fourth defendant were signatories to Ex.D1. However, they contested the suit claiming that Exs.D1 and D8 are invalid documents. However, when the issue was pending in appeal before this Court, the plaintiff, the second defendant, the third defendant, in the memorandum of compromise entered during August 2000, confirmed that Exs.D1 and D8 are valid documents and that the appellants in pending appeal are only entitled to get the properties of Sathyanathan in terms of the family agreement made under Ex.D1. They also confirmed the division of the property among the grandchildren of Sathyanathan in the suit in O.S.No.913 of 1984, which was based on the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974. It is based on the said assertion and admission of truth on the validity of Ex.D1 that the decree dated 12.02.2001 passed by this Court in A.S.No.517 of 1993 has also become final in terms of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 07.12.2015, allowing Civil Appeal Nos.14124 and 14125 of 2015.
d) The fourth defendant either has to stand or fall on the pleading and evidence of the plaintiff in the suit, having not made any separate pleading and not chosen to enter the witness box. The fourth defendant cannot take advantage of the judgment and decree made in O.S.No.751 of 1985, as the same stand set aside by the decree passed by this Court in A.S.No.517 of 1993 dated 12.02.2001, based on the memorandum of compromise, which has also been confirmed by the Honble Supreme Court. The judgment and decree of the trial court is not separable. Thus, there cannot be two judgments.
e) The Honble Supreme Court, having allowed the appeal, has also given direction that this Court, if necessary, to modify the impugned judgment and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The plaintiff and the third defendant along with other sister defendant have confirmed the validity of said agreement dated 16.05.1974 in the memorandum of compromise signed during August 2000. Based on the said memorandum, this Court passed the decree on 12.02.2001, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 07.12.2015. There is no prayer even in the suit to declare the family arrangement as null and void.
f) When the plaintiff and the third defendant admitted that all their sisters, their mother and their brothers executed the Ex.D1 on 16.05.1974 and that it was a valid document and that it was also acted upon by the concerned parties in terms of the decree in O.S.No.951 of 1980, the fourth defendant cannot take any independent plea that she signed the same without knowing the contents. She cannot also plea invalidity of Ex.D1. The fourth defendant, though had taken a stand in the counter filed before the Honble Supreme Court in the SLP, questioning the compromise by taking a supportive view of the judgment and decree dated 20.12.2013 made in A.S.No.517 of 1993, the Honble Supreme Court negatived the same and confirmed the decree dated 12.02.2001 passed in A.S.No.517 of 1993 based on the compromise and allowed the appeal to the said extent. Thus, the fourth defendant will have no plea whatsoever to question the same to support the lower court decree in her favour.
g) The judgment dated 22.08.1980 made in O.S.No.951 of 1980, which was marked as Ex.P1 in O.S.No.751 of 1985 show that Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran, the said attesting witness was examined as PW1 in the said judgment in O.S.No.951 of 1980. The court, after extracting the contents of Ex.A10 dated 02.05.1974 and Ex.A11 dated 16.05.1974 and after thoroughly examining the evidence of Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran, held that the oral Will dated 02.05.1974 cannot be construed as a Will and that it is only a recording of what was stated by late Sathyanathan and consequently, the question of the attesting witness proving the same does not arise. It was also found therein that the document Ex.D1 dated 16.05.1974 is only a family arrangement and it need not even be registered.
h) Though the plaintiff in O.S.No.751 of 1985 has marked and relied upon the judgment made in O.S.No.951 of 1980, she sought to rely upon the same only to the extent of proving her contention that her brothers used to sign in blank papers, the trial court in O.S.No.751 of 1985, while accepting the judgment made in O.S.No.951 of 1980 to the extent of supporting the above contention of the plaintiff, rejected the same only on the ground that the plaintiff and the defendant sisters were not parties to the said suit. Hence, the plaintiff could not have relied one part of the judgment and left another part of the judgment.
i) The trial court in O.S.No.751 of 1985 has drawn an adverse inference for not examining Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran and Advocate Ananda Padmanaban, which the High Court has also confirmed, without considering that Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran entered the witness box and deposed about the truth and genuineness of the subject matter document in O.S.No.951 of 1980.
j) It is settled law that family arrangement only confirms the pre-existing right and Ex.D1 merely records the fact as per the wishes of late Sathyanathan. Such recording is sufficient to prove title and possession of the properties of late Sathyanathan in the hands of his grandchildren. Thus, the confirmation of the contrary finding rendered by this Court in A.S.No.517 of 1993 requires to be reviewed.
k) When admittedly the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4 are parties to Ex.D1, such document will not become void but it may become voidable provided they filed separate suit to set aside the Ex.D1 within three years, as contemplated under Sections 31 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. There has been no suit filed seeking to set aside or to cancel the Ex.D1. As per Sections 114 and 115 of the Indian Evidence Act and under the Registration Act, 1909, the Registrar is performing his statutory right and there is clear endorsement that the parties to the document have admitted its execution and that endorsement has not been questioned. Therefore, in the absence of any suit filed to set aside or cancel Ex.D1, such registered document will stand.
l) The power of Attorney Agent of the fourth defendant, as one of the legal heirs of the late first defendant in the suit was fully aware of the memorandum of compromise executed by the parties filed before this Court in A.S.No.517 of 1993 and this Court, passing the decree thereon the said memorandum of compromise. It is through this power agent, the fourth defendant conveyed one of the portion of the suit property under the said sale deed dated 29.06.2001. In the aforesaid circumstances, it should be seen that the fourth defendant knows about the compromise. Thus, the filing of the petitions to restore the appeals and contesting against the compromise entered into even before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, could only be with ulterior motive with some unfair and unjustifiable monetary gain. Thus, in view of the monetary benefit already secured by her out of the said sale transaction effected by her under the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 referred to in the judgment dated 07.12.2015, she is not entitled to receive any further or other payment from the appellants. Therefore, the common judgment and decree dated 20.12.2013 passed in A.S.No.517 of 1993 has to be reviewed in terms and in the directions of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 07.12.2015 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.14124 and 14125 of 2015, in so far it relates to the fourth defendant is concerned.
18. Perusal of the records of the review petition would show that the respondent/fourth defendant has not filed any counter in the review petition.
19. CMP No.4546 of 2016 is filed by the review petitioner seeking permission to file 8 documents as additional evidence and mark the same as exhibits in the above review petition. Though such application is filed for receiving eight documents, during the course of hearing, the learned senior counsel Mr.T.V.Ramanujam appearing for the review petitioner submitted that the document in Serial Nos.5 to 8 are given up. An endorsement is also made to that effect by the learned counsel for the review petitioner on 04.12.2017. Therefore, the documents Nos.1 to 4 alone are sought to be admitted and marked as exhibits. Document in Serial No.1 is a sale deed dated 29.06.2001, registered as document No.2094/2001 executed by the fourth defendant in favour of a third party. The said document was referred to by the Honble Supreme Court in its judgment and a direction was issued to place the said document on record before this court.
20. A counter affidavit filed by the respondent in CMP No.4546 of 2016 also accepted that the said sale deed alone can be received as document. However, the other documents produced by the petitioner are opposed to be received and marked as evidence.
21. In view of the above stated facts and circumstances, the document No.1 viz., the sale deed dated 29.06.2001, is received and marked as Ex.P1 in this review petition.
22. The second document sought to be marked is certified copy of the decree passed in O.S.No.21 of 1982 on the file of the Sub Court, Salem. The said certified copy of the decree is sought to be marked only on the reason that the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 referred to the decree passed in O.S.No.21 of 1982. Likewise, Document Nos.3 and 4 are copy of power of attorney executed by the fourth defendant referred to in the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 and the copy of codicil to the Power of Attorney dated 08.09.2000 referred to in the sale deed dated 29.06.2001, respectively. Marking of these documents are objected by the other side. Since this Court has admitted and marked the sale deed dated 29.06.2001, as directed by the Honble Supreme Court and since the appellants have not obtained such permission from Apex Court for marking any other documents viz., document Nos.2, 3, 4 other than the document No.1, this Court is of the view that such new documents cannot be permitted to be marked in this review other than the one permitted by the Honble Supreme Court. Accordingly, the claim of the review petitioner to mark documents in Serial Nos.2, 3, 4 are rejected.
23. CMP No.17169 of 2017 is filed by the review petitioner for a direction to the respondent to produce a compromise stated to have been arrived at between the vendor and one of the parties to the suit viz., Asa John Divyanathan and the allotment of the schedule property to the said sale deed dated 29.06.2001 to the vendor in part satisfaction of the decree in O.S.No.751 of 1985 as recorded in the said sale deed dated 29.06.2001.
24. In my considered view, this application filed seeking for a direction to the respondent to produce the documents referred to in the petition cannot be and need not be entertained, while hearing the review petition, more particularly, when the respondent in the counter affidavit has specifically denied any such compromise between herself and the said Asa John Divyanathan. Moreover, as already stated supra, the petitioner has not obtained any such permission from the Honble Supreme Court to widen the scope of this review thereby asking the other party to produce certain documents, which according to the petitioner, are in existence, while the other side disputes the same. Therefore, I find that this application in CMP No.17619 of 2017 is liable to be rejected as the relief sought for is beyond the scope of the present review. Accordingly, the same is rejected.
25. Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the review petitioner and made his oral submissions. A written submission is also filed by the learned counsel for the review petitioner. The sum and substance of the submissions made on behalf of the review petitioner is as follows:
a) In the order passed in the Civil Appeals by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the compromise entered into among the parties has been held as valid compromise between the parties to the said compromise. The judgment of this Court made in the appeal dated 20.12.2013, nullifying the said compromise has been set aside by the Apex Court. However, with regard to the claim of 1/7th share by the respondent/fourth defendant, in the light of the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 executed by her, the judgment of this court under review is to be reviewed. The judgment under the review has not taken into consideration the Memorandum of Compromise entered between the parties to the said compromise during August 2000.
b) In the said Memorandum of Compromise, the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 have made admissions that Ex.D1 is valid and in terms thereof, the properties of the deceased would go to the grandchildren born to his two sons. The plaintiff and other defendants sisters admitted that they have no right over the said properties. The plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 have also admitted in the compromise that the grandchildren of late Sathyanathan have already filed O.S.No.951 of 1980 and 913 of 1984 and have got the properties divided on the basis of Ex.D1 and taken the separate possession of their respective shares. Though the respondent herein is not party to the said compromise, in the absence of any pleading by her separately with regard to her entitlement of 1/7th share, this Court ought not to have confirmed the judgment of the trial court. This compromise executed in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC has also been held as valid compromise by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said Civil Appeals. The respondent in order to establish her entitlement of 1/7th share, must have pleaded her own case and adduced evidence against such admissions made by the plaintiff and other defendants 2 and 3. She has not done so. Therefore, this Court ought not to have disbelieved and rejected Ex.D1 by ignoring the judgment in O.S.No.951 of 1980 by this court, where the Ex.D1 and Ex.D8 are proved.
c) This Court failed to note that in terms of Ex.D1 and pursuant to O.S.Nos.913 of 1984 and 951 of 1980, the grandchildren of Sathyanathan are already in separate possession of their respective share and in enjoyment of the same and therefore, the respondent herein is not in joint possession as co-owner, as contended by her. The respondent herein has not denied that she executed the registered family arrangement dated 16.05.1974-Ex.D1. Hence, it is binding on her.
d) The respondent has referred to the sale of about 151 acres of land by the petitioner to justify her sale of the specified extent of land in and out of the 1st item of suit schedule property subject to adjustment in the final allotment of her 1/7th share entitlement in the suit schedule properties in O.S.No.751 of 1985. In this regard, it may be pertinent to note that the said extent of 151 acres of land sold by the petitioner is the undivided half share of the extent of land described in item 5 of the suit schedule property in O.S.No.751 of 1985, which was allotted to the share of his father Nathanial Swaminathan based on the partnership deed between late Satyanathan and the said Nathanial Swaminathan as confirmed in O.S.No.951 of 1980. In the said judgment, in O.S.No.951 of 1980, the finding is that out of the total extent of about 300 acres, half undivided extent belongs to Nathanial Swaminathan and the other undivided half share belong to late Sathyanathan and based on Ex.D1 and D8, the grand children of Sathyanathan would be entitled to get equal share in the other half undivided extent belonging to late Sathyanathan. In fact, the plaintiff in O.S.No.751 of 1985 in regard to this item of property described in Item No.5 has claimed partition out of the undivided half belonging to the deceased Sathyanathan. Even as on date, the said undivided half share of late Sathyanathan allotted to the share of the petitioner is still there unsold, however in the name, possession and enjoyment of the petitioner. Hence, the respondent referring to the said sale to justify her sale effected through the sale deed dated 29.067.2001 is irrelevant and is to be rejected as the same is canvassed to mislead the matter before this Court.
e) In regard to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to payments if any to the respondent, it is to be noted that the payment made to the plaintiff, 3rd and the 4th Defendant in the suit under the compromise is not by way of any purchase consideration of their shares in the family properties. If it were to be assumed that the payments made under the compromise was a payment of consideration for the purchase, if any, then the payments to be made under the compromise was by all the grand children of late Sathyanathan and in that view, directing the 8th respondent alone to make the payment to Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan as in the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court may not arise at all. In the present case, the plaintiff, the 3rd and 4th defendant in the suit based on their realization of the fact arising out of O.S.No.951 of 1980 and O.S.No.913 of 1984 have chosen to abandon their questionable claim in O.S.No.751 of 1985. Thus the payment made at the intervention of the mediators in consideration of the relationship between the contesting parties could not have been termed as consideration paid for purchase of their respective shares in the family property.
26. In support of the review petitioner, the following decisions are relied on:
i) 2012(8) SCC 148, Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin;
ii) 2005(4) SCC 741, BCCI vs. Netaji Cricket Club.
27. Mrs.Hema Sampath, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the respondent and made her oral submissions. A written submissions is also filed by the learned counsel for the respondent. The sum and substance of the submissions made are as follows:
a) In a suit for partition, the plaintiff is the defendant and the defendant is the plaintiff. Therefore, the respondent/fourth defendant is entitled to contest the matter even though the plaintiff has compromised. In the compromise memo, everybody got a share except the fourth defendant. Non filing of the written statement by the fourth defendant cannot be put against her, since the review petitioner, who is the eighth defendant, also did not file separate written statement and on the other hand, he only adopted the written statement of the seventh defendant. Properties are vast extent and therefore, everybody should be given a share. The fourth defendant is not a party to Ex.B1. Therefore, it is not binding on her.
b) The contention of the review petitioner that by virtue of sale executed by the fourth defendant dated 29.06.2001, she is prevented from claiming any share of the properties belonging to her father, cannot be sustained. The said sale deed has been made subsequent to the decree for partition granted by the trial court. This has been clearly stated in the sale deed.
c) The branches of two sons had filed O.S.No.21 of 1982 clandestinely leaving out the sisters and obtained a collusive decree in which the property sold had been allotted to Asa John Divyanathan. To avoid any dispute with him due to the conflicting subsequent decree in her favour, the fourth defendant had come to an understanding with the said Asa John Divyanathan and sold less her 1/7th share out of 44536 sq.ft. allotted to her in the earlier decree in O.S.No.21 of 1982. There is no ambiguity in the sale deed dated 29.06.2001. The parties to the said document have correctly understood the same. If really, the compromise mentioned in the sale deed is the compromise recorded in O.S.No.751 of 1985, the parties should have brought it to the notice of this court, when the appeal was heard. It only meant that the understanding was only between Asa John Divyanathan and Victoria (fourth defendant). There was no written compromise between them.
d) The review petitioner has conveniently omitted to divulge the fact that he had sold 58.62 acres of the Yercaud estate. He further sold 58.62 acres pending the first appeal. Thus, the whole suit item 5 has been sold to defeat the right of the respondent knowing fully aware that she is entitled to 1/7th share. This clearly proves the malafide intention of the family of two sons only to deny the respondent of her rightful share.
e) The respondent is not bound by any of the documents or proceedings involving the other sharers. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has accepted the fact that the respondent herein is entitled to her share. The scope of the review is limited to see the sale made by her. In a suit for partition, a bonafide sale made pursuant to a decree is not illegal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had noticed that the review petitioner had purchased the shares of other 5 sharers and has held that only he is bound to satisfy the decree in favour of the respondent.
f) It cannot be stated that as a daughter of the original owner, the respondent is not entitled to 1/7th share. This has been recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Only because of the representation made on behalf of the petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court seems to have been under the impression that the sale made by her would have a huge impact on the share to be allotted to her. Only in this context, the matter was sent back for the review petition to be filed. The appeal is presumed to be allowed to the extent that the shares allotted to the other sharers are not to be disturbed. It cannot be construed to say that the claim of Victoria has been denied by allowing the appeal by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. If really the Hon'ble Supreme Court had discountenanced her claim, there was no necessity to remand the matter to this Court for filing a review petition.
28. In support of the above contention, the following decisions are relied on:
i)1994(1) SCC 1, S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath.
29. Heard both sides and perused the materials placed before this Court.
30. The point for consideration in this review petition is as to whether the judgment and decree passed by this Court in A.S.No.517 of 1993 dated 20.12.2013, is to be reviewed in the light of directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in Civil Appeal Nos.14124 and 14125 of 2015 dated 07.12.2015, in so far as it relates to the respondent herein, who is the fourth defendant in the suit.
31. One N.Sathyanathan owned the subject matter suit properties. He died on 05.05.1974. His wife Gnanambal died on 30.12.1981. They had two sons and 5 daughters. They are as follows: Nathaniel Swaminathan (D5), R.P.David, Dhanabakkiam Francis (Plaintiff), Rajamani Canniah (D1), Victoria Srinivasan (D4), Kamala Thambusamy (D2) and Saroja Prabhakar(D3). The said Nathaniel Swaminathan has four children viz., Esthar Jasper Swaminathan (D6), Alfred Swaminathan(D7), Sukumar Swaminathan(D8), Sathiya Swaminathan(D9). The other son viz., R.P.David died on 13.04.1985, leaving behind his wife Rajkumar David (D10) and their children Asha John Divyanathan (D11) and Susana Rani Sekar (D12).
32. After the death of the said Sathyanathan, one of the daughter viz., Dhanabakkiam Francis filed the suit for partition in O.S.No.751 of 1985 on the file of the Sub Court, Salem claiming 1/7th share in the suit properties by specifically contending that the said Sathyanathan died intestate. The said suit, after contest, was decreed as prayed for. Challenging the judgment and decree of the trial Court, two separate appeals were filed in A.S.Nos.517 and 685 of 1993 before this Court. In A.S.No.517 of 1993, the defendants 6 to 9 are the appellants. In A.S.No.685 of 1993, the defendants 10 to 12 are the appellants. During the pendency of the appeals, it is stated, the second respondent in both the appeals viz., Rajamani Cunniah died on 18.02.1996, leaving behind her legal heirs viz.,Samuvel Devados Canniah and Raja Devapathran Canniah. However it is seen that they were not brought on record as parties to the appeals, as the legal heirs of the second respondent (first defendant in the suit). However it is further seen that the said Samuvel Devadoss was permitted to represent as Power of Attorney of the fifth respondent in the appeals (respondent in this review) vide order made in CMP No.245 of 2009 dated 23.07.2010.
33. During the pendency of those appeals, a Memorandum of Compromise was entered into between the appellants and respondents 1, 3, 4,6 to 9 in A.S.No.517 of 1993. The terms of the compromise read as follows:
1.The plea of the appellants and the respondents 6 to 9 are that the desire of the deceased N.Sathyanathan expressed by him on 02.05.1974 that all his properties should go to the grandchildren born through his two sons and that accordingly a family arrangement was entered into on 16.05.1974 as per which the properties were given to the appellants and respondents 8 and 9. Though the said plea was rejected by the lower Court, the parties herein agree that all properties of late N.Sathiyanathan go to his grandchildren born through his two sons, namely R.P.David and N.Swaminathan in accordance with the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974. Hence the appellants herein being the children of N.Swaminathan and the respondents 8 and 9 being the children of (late) R.P.David are only entitled to the properties of deceased N.Sathiyanathan. The respondents 1, 3 and 4 have no right whatsoever over the said properties of N.Sathiyanathan.
2.The respondents 1, 3 and 4 will not press the final decree application filed before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem in O.S.No.751/85.
3.The appellants and respondents 8 and 9 who have already filed suits in O.S.Nos.951/80 and 913/84 have got the properties divided on the basis of the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 and taken their separate possession of their respective shares. This will not be challenged nor disputed by any of the parties hereto. The said division already effected between them shall hold good.
4.Considering the relationship between the parties the appellants as well as the respondents 8 and 9 who have succeeded the properties of deceased N.Sathiyanathan as per family arrangement dated 16.05.1974, and the 6th respondent the father of the appellants have agreed to, as per the advice of the mediators to pay respondents 1, 3 and 4 each a sum of Rs.5,83,333/- (Rupees Five Lakhs eighty three thousand three hundred and thirty three only). In so far as late R.P.David the eldest son of late N.Sathiyanathan had two children and N.Swaminathan, the younger, the younger son of late N.Sathiyanathan has four children, the properties of late N.Sathiyanathan had been divided in that proportion, namely 2/6th (1/3rd) and 4/6th (2/3rd). It is therefore now agreed that the sum of Rs.8.75 lakhs each will be paid in the same proportion, i.e., Rs.5,83,333 by the Appellants to each Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis, Mrs.Kamala Thambuswamy and Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar making a total payment of Rs.17,49,999 and Rs.1,45,833 by Respondents 8 and Rs.1,45,833 by Respondent 9 to each Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis, Mrs.Kamala Thambuswamy and Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar. It has been agreed that the sum of Rs.17,49,999 to be paid by the Appellants will be undertaken by their father N.Swaminathan, the 6th respondent. It has been further agreed that Respondents 6, 8 and 9 are given three months time from the date of the final decree on the compromise to make their payments.
All such payments will be made directly to Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis, the 1st Respondent who will distribute the amounts as per this compromise agreement to Mrs.Kamala Thambusamy, Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar and herself. It has been specifically agreed that the compromise will come into force simultaneously on the confirmation of the absolute right and title of Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis and Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar to their respective house properties as per clause 5 and 6 of this compromise petition.
5.The Respondents 6 to 9 have filed a suit in O.S.15652/96 on the file of the III Additional City Civil Court, Chennai against the 4th Respondent herein in respect of the property bearing Door No.5, Sterling Avenue, Nungambakkam, Chennai and the respondents 6 to 9 filed another suit in O.S.15651/96 on the file of the Additional City Civil Court, Chennai against the first respondent herein in respect of the property bearing Door No.4, Chowdhry Colony, Nungambakkam, Chennai, i.e., against Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar and Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis respectively. The respondents 6 to 9 hereby agree to withdraw the above suits and give up all their claim in respect of the suit properties and also give consent for passing a decree in C.S.No.423/2000 and C.S.No.424/ 2000 concerning the said properties filed by the 1st and 4th respondents respectively on the file of the original side of this Hon'ble Court against the respondents 6 to 9.
6.The respondents 6 to 9 hereby agree to confirm title of the respondents 1 and 4 in respect of the properties covered under the above referred suits in C.S.No.423/2000 and C.S.No.424/2000 on the file of this Hon'ble Court by filing necessary memorandum in the said suits.
7.The appellants and respondents 8 and 9 have taken the properties of N.Sathiyanathan in their possession and it cannot be challenged by anyone, in presence of the partition decree obtained by themselves.
8.The respondents 1 and 3 to 4 hereby give up their right acquired under the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.751/85 and they will not make any claim over the said suit properties.
9.The parties to this Memorandum of Compromise agree and undertake that they shall execute necessary documents and also file requisite petitions and make endorsements before the competent courts and authorities to fulfil the objects of this memorandum of Compromise and safeguard the interests of eithe parties.
This compromise memo shall be an agreement between the parties hereto under Order 23 rule 3 C.P.C.
Therefore the parties herein humbly pray that this Honourable Court may be pleased to pass a final decree in terms of the above compromise and thus render justice.
34. Apart from the said two appeals, another two suits filed and pending before this Court in C.S.Nos.423 and 424 of 2000 were also clubbed together and a common judgment was passed by this Court on 11.04.2001, granting a decree in terms of the above compromise. Admittedly, the respondent herein, who is the fourth defendant in the suit and the fifth respondent in the appeals was not a party to the said compromise memo. She is said to be residing in a foreign country and represented through her power of attorney. However taking advantage of the decree passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.751 of 1985 dated 01.02.1993, allotting her 1/7th share in the suit properties and by presuming that the appeals before this Court were pending, she sold a portion of one of the suit item properties to a third party by sale deed dated 29.06.2001 by specifically claiming that her father Sathyanathan died intestate on 05.05.1974; her share has been determined by the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.751 of 1985 and that appeal is pending in A.S.No.517 of 1993. Therefore, it is evident from the above sale deed executed by the fourth defendant that she was not aware of the compromise entered between other parties to the suit before this Court and a compromise memo filed by them to that effect and the consequential judgment and decree passed by this Court on 12.04.2001. Therefore, on coming to know about those facts, she filed CMP Nos.921 and 922 of 2009, after nearly 8 years, to set aside the judgment and decree passed in First Appeal 517 of 1993 and to restore the same. This Court allowed those applications on 23.07.2010 and restored the appeal. Except for the appellants in A.S.No.517 of 1993 and the fifth respondent, there was no appearance for other parties in A.S.No.517 of 1993. Likewise in A.S.No.685 of 1993, there was no appearance for the appellants and respondents 1, 4 and 6. After hearing the matter on merits, this Court dismissed both the appeals on 20.12.2013, thereby confirming the judgment and preliminary decree granted by the trial court. Challenging the same, two separate civil appeals were filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The sale deed executed by the fourth defendant dated 29.06.2001 was brought to the notice of the Apex court by the appellants therein in support of their case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, upon hearing both the parties found that the main dispute in the appeals was only with regard to the share of the fourth defendant viz., the respondent herein. Also by taking note of the submissions made that the compromise entered into among the defendants will not get affected by the order passed by the Supreme Court except in the case of defendant No.4 and that the same shall be considered to be a valid compromise in respect of others who have not disputed it, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of this court to the extent it nullifies the compromise. Thus the Apex Court allowed the appeals to the extent that the compromise to which defendant No.4 was not a party, shall remain as it is. Since the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 executed by the fourth defendant has not been marked before the Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court permitted the same to be placed on record so that it may be looked into by this Court for considering its effects on the compromise deed entered into among some of the parties. Thus, the Apex Court also has given a direction for filing a review application before this Court by the appellants therein and with further direction to this court to consider the effects of the said sale deed after hearing the concerned parties and if necessary, to modify the impugned judgment and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The Apex Court further observed that as shares of other defendants have been purchased by the eighth defendant, the amount, if any, which might become payable to the defendant No.4 shall be paid by the defendant No.8.
35. A careful reading of the above order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in my considered view, would indicate that the compromise entered between the parties except the respondent herein was restored and consequently parties to the said compromise memo are bound by that. Therefore, it is evident that the judgment and decree passed by this Court in dismissing the appeals thereby confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court were set aside by the Apex Court as the appeals filed therein were allowed however only to the extent of the terms of the compromise and the parties to the same.
36. Based on the above categorical findings rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the only scope in this review, as observed and directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is to find out the effects of the sale deed executed by the fourth defendant dated 29.06.2001 on the compromise deed entered into between the parties in the above appeal. In other words, the question arises for consideration in this review is as to whether the respondent/fourth defendant by virtue of her conduct in executing the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 had indirectly admitted to the terms of the compromise entered between the parties in the above appeal, as claimed by the review petitioner or whether execution of such sale deed by the respondent/fourth defendant was in pursuance of acquiring a right and title by her over the subject matter property, as claimed by the respondent. Though the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioner has made an attempt to contend as though this review is by way of remand by the Apex Court so that all the contentions can be raised once again, this Court is not inclined to accept such contentions in view of the specific finding rendered by the Apex Court as stated supra and also limiting the scope of hearing of the review petition.
37. Consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would reveal that though the legal heirs of the late Sathyanathan fought with each other in various litigations in respect of his self acquired properties, the dispute among themselves has subsequently narrowed down only as between the fourth defendant (the respondent in this review petition) and the eighth defendant (petitioner in this review petition). The eighth defendant is one of the grandson of the late Swaminathan whereas the fourth defendant is one of the daughters of the deceased. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically found that the main dispute is only with regard to the share of the fourth defendant . I have already pointed out that the fourth defendant executed a sale deed on 29.06.2001 in respect of portion of one of the items of the suit properties in favour of the third party even after the disposal of the appeals before this Court on 11.04.2001 recording the compromise entered between the parties as stated supra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court permitted the said sale deed to be placed on record for the purpose of considering its effects on the compromise deed already entered into among some of the parties.
38. There is no dispute to the fact that suit items are self-acquired properties of the late Sathyanathan. Therefore, it is evident that if the document marked as Exs.B1 and B8 viz., Will of Sathyanathan dated 02.05.1974 and family arrangement entered between the legal heirs of late Sathyanathan dated 16.05.1974 respectively, are found to be true, valid documents and acted upon, the claim of the respondent herein has to fail.
39. There is no dispute to the fact that all the legal heirs of the late Swaminathan including the respondent herein were signatories to the family arrangement marked as Ex.B1 dated 16.05.1974. Perusal of the said document would show that legal heirs of the deceased Sathyanathan specifically admitted that he dictated a Will on 02.04.1974 and the same was taken down by Doctor Prabhu Ramachandran when he was fully conscious. Further considering the recitals of Ex.B1 would show that signatories to the said document have specifically agreed that assets of late N.Sathyanathan would devolve upon the legatees viz., the grandchildren born through his two sons. For proper understanding, the recitals of Ex.B1 is extracted hereunder:
16th day of May 1974 in Town of Salem by and among Mrs.Gnanambal Ammal, widow of N.Sathyanathan (1).R.P.David (2) N.Swaminathan (3) Mrs.Rajamani Cunniah (4) Mrs.Dhanabaggiam Francis (5) Mrs.Kamala Thambusamy (6) Mrs.Saroja Prabakar (7) Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan (8) 2 and 3 sons of Sathyanathan 4 to 8 are the daughters of Sathyanathan and provides as follows: Whereas N.Sathyanathan, husband of No.1 and father of Nos.2 to 8 now deceased has left property; Whereas Sri N.Sathyanathan dictated a Will on 2-5-1974 and the same was taken down by Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran, when he was fully conscious and with the intention of 2-executing the document as his Will. But he was not able to execute due to his illness since his right hand was shaky. Persons are sent by the bed side at that time were his wife, his two sons, four daughters, the doctor attending on him (Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran and the family lawyer (S.V.Ananthapadmanabhan); His heirs on his death on intestate in the following order- All th eheirs are of one mind that the late N.Sathyanathan's Will as taken by Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran in the presence of his lawyer and relations should be effected to and acted on as his will so that his wishes may be given full effect. And accordingly the undersigned hereby agree that the properties and assets of late N.Sathyanathan 's wish devolve upon the legaties namely the grandchildren through his two sons abovenamed according to his testamendary wishes as recorded by Dr.Prabhu Ramachandran the photostat copies of which are annexed to this agreement and its copies. All the heirs agree that the arrangement to dispose off the property in accordance with the wishes of testator as recorded in the document shall be effected by R.P.David and N.Swaminathan and each of us hereby agree to execute any release or other documents which may be required to perfect the title of the legaties and we agree to ratify all acts and deeds done by R.P.David and N.Swaminathan to give effect to the late N.Sathyanathan's wishes as agreed to by us. We have signed this agreement in token of acceptance thereof on this aforesaid date month and year in the presence of witnesses mentioned below-
40. Therefore, it is evident that the legal heirs of the late Sathyanathan have specifically admitted to the last wish of the deceased that the properties and assets of the deceased would go to the grandsons born through his two sons only. There is no dispute to the fact that the family arrangement/Ex.B1 is a registered document. It is also not in dispute that the said document has not been put to challenge before any court of law so far by any of the parties. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the subject matter suit was filed simply for partition without seeking for a declaration to set aside the family arrangement, especially when the plaintiff and other sisters including the respondent herein were party to the said document. On the other hand, it is seen that the said document was found to be valid in another suit filed by the branches of two sons. No doubt, these sisters including the respondent herein were not parties to the said suit. But at the same time, it is to be noted that in the present suit, the sisters including the plaintiff in the present suit, except the respondent herein, admitted the execution of the family arrangement under Ex.B1, when a compromise memo entered into before this Court during the pendency of the appeals filed against the judgment and decree of the trial court. I have already extracted the terms of the compromise memo supra. Perusal of the same would reveal that the parties to the compromise have specifically agreed that all properties of late N.Sathyanathan would go to his grandchildren born through his two sons in accordance with the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974. At this juncture, it is to be noted, at the risk of repetition, that the respondent herein was also a signatory to the said family arrangement dated 16.05.1974, a registered document. She has not questioned the same before any court of law so far. Now taking advantage of fact that she is not signatory to the compromise memo, the respondent herein sought to dispute the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974. Therefore, she sought to contend that she is entitled to 1/7th share in the suit property as decreed by the trial court. Consequently, she sought to sustain the sale deed executed by her which is marked as Ex.P1 in this review petition.
41. I have already stated supra that the very sale deed was executed by the respondent only after the disposal of the appeals by this Court on 11.04.2001 disposing the same in terms of the compromise entered into between the parties. Admittedly, the terms of compromise do not refer or indicate any right conferrred on the respondent herein to deal with the property which was conveyed by her under Ex.P1 herein. No doubt, it is contended by the respondent that she is not party to the compromise and hence is not bound by the same. True, she is not party to the compromise. But the fact remains that the other parties to the suit, more particularly, the other sisters have signed the compromise memo admitting the family arrangement entered between the parties on 16.05.1974 marked as Ex.B1. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that one of the signatory to the compromise memo is the very plaintiff in the suit and that the respondent herein, as the fourth defendant, did not file any written statement nor let in any evidence except to file a memo with other defendants for adopting the pleadings of the plaintiff. When the very plaintiff herself has admitted the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 in the memorandum of compromise, in the absence of any contra pleading made by the respondent herein as the fourth defendant therein, she cannot be permitted to contend otherwise before this Court. It is well settled that the appeal is continuation of the suit and hence the compromise memo filed by the parties in the appeal is to be treated as their pleadings in the suit as well.
42. One more vital aspect as discussed below has to be seen as against the respondent in respect of the said family arrangement dated 16.05.1974:
There is no dispute to the fact that a compromise memo was entered into before this Court during the pendency of the appeals and this Court originally disposed of the appeals in terms of the said compromise entered between the parties. It is true that at the instance of the respondent herein, the appeals were restored for hearing on merits and the learned Judge, who heard the matter afresh had found that Ex.B1 and B8 are not proved. However the fact remains that the appeals filed against the judgment and decree of this Court, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, were allowed in so far as the parties to the compromise are concerned. There is no dispute to the fact that the said compromise categorically referred to the execution of the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 executed by all the parties including the respondent herein. Therefore, the fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has allowed the appeals in so far as the parties to the compromise are concerned, would go to show that the said compromise was taken into consideration and recognized by the Apex Court. Under the above circumstances, the respondent herein is not entitled to either question the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 or the correctness or otherwise of the averments contained in the said compromise memo filed before this Court, that too in this review petition.
43. No doubt, the appeals, which were previously disposed of by recording the compromise memo, were restored to file nearly after eight years for hearing the matter afresh. Thus it is evident that when the appeals were restored, the compromise memo already filed was also restored to file and available on record for consideration. Therefore while disposing the appeals, the said compromise memo should have been taken into consideration more particularly its effect on the fifth respondent in the appeal (respondent in the review petition) who alone contested the appeals after restoration. A perusal of the judgment rendered in the appeals would show that unfortunately the compromise memo filed by other parties and its effect on the fifth respondent in the appeals were not taken into consideration at all.
44. In any event, as the Hon'ble Supreme Court has now specifically directed to find out the effects of the sale deed marked as Ex.P1 herein on the compromise deed entered into between the other parties, I find that in view of the above stated facts and circumstances, execution of such sale deed by the respondent herein marked as Ex.P1 was without having any overriding effect on the family arrangement.
45. Further perusal of the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 would show that there was some understanding between the respondent herein and one of the legal heir of R.P.David. Whatever be the understanding between themselves, the fact remains that they cannot act against the family arrangement dated 16.05.1974 marked as Ex.B1 and therefore, the sale deed executed by the respondent herein in favour of the third party based on understanding said to have been entered between herself and one of the sons of R.P.David cannot override the compromise memo already entered between the parties in which Asa John Divyanathan, with whom the respondent said to have entered into an understanding, is also party to the compromise. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court has allowed the appeals in so far as the parties to the compromise memo are concerned, where there is an admission of the Ex.B1, the respondent herein is not entitled to question the same. Though it is contended as though the execution of the sale deed marked as Ex.P1 by the respondent was by taking advantage of the compromise entered between the parties during the pendency of the appeals, I do not find any clause in the compromise memo entitling the respondent to deal with the property conveyed under Ex.P1 sale deed. When the family arrangement marked as Ex.B1 has specifically vested the properties in the hands of the grandsons of late Sathyanathan born through his sons, there is no legal sanctity for the respondent herein to deal with the subject matter property under Ex.P1 and execute a sale deed on her own in favour of a third party, assuming that she had some understanding with the said Asha John Divyanathan, one of the legal heirs of the said R.P.David, Hence it is to be held that Ex.P1 sale deed does not have a overriding effect on Ex.B1 family arrangement.
46. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that as shares of the other defendants were purchased by the eighth defendant, the amount if any which might become payable to the fourth defendant shall be paid by the eighth defendant. Though the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioner sought to contend that such payment made to the plaintiff, third and fourth defendants in the suit under the compromise was not by way of any purchase consideration to their shares in the family properties, this Court is not in a position to appreciate the above stand, especially when it is the categorical finding of the Appellate Court that shares of other defendants have been purchased by the eighth defendant and the amount if any which might become payable to the fourth defendant shall be paid by the eighth defendant.
47. A careful perusal of the compromise entered between the parties would show that the sixth respondent in the appeal viz., Nathanial Swaminathan had agreed to pay his sisters, viz., respondents 1, 3 and 4, except the other sister viz.,respondent herein, each a sum of Rs.5,83,333/-. Likewise, the eighth and ninth respondents have agreed to pay Rs.1,45,833/- each to each of the respondents 1, 3 and 4. It is stated that the amounts have been paid accordingly to those respondents 1, 3 and 4 in the appeal. As it is now found by the Apex Court that as shares of the other defendants have been purchased by the eighth defendant, I am of the considered view that he has to pay a sum of Rs.5,83,333 + Rs.1,45,833 + Rs.1,45,833, totalling a sum of Rs.8,74,999/- with interest at the rate of 24% p.a. from 11.04.2001, being the date of the judgment rendered by this Court in the appeals in terms of compromise to the respondent herein, since such payment was agreed to be made to other sisters.
48. Apart from the abovesaid relief of payment to the respondent herein, this Court has to see as to whether any further relief could be granted to the respondent herein, in the light of the sale deed executed by her under Ex.P1 sale deed in favour of a third party, more particularly when such sale has not been questioned by any of the parties so far. No doubt, in this review, this Court found that the said sale by the respondent was beyond the purview of the terms of the family arrangement as well as the compromise entered into between the parties before this Court. But at the same time, this Court cannot ignore certain terms of the compromise entered between the parties before this Court, wherein it was specifically agreed that the said compromise will come into force simultaneously on the confirmation of the absolute right and title of Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis (First respondent in the appeals) and Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar (fourth respondent in the appeals) to their respective house properties as per Clauses (5) and (6) of the compromise petition. For proper understanding, the relevant clauses in the compromise memo are extracted hereunder:
...All such payments will be made directly to Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis, the 1st Respondent who will distribute the amounts as per this compromise agreement to Mrs.Kamala Thambusamy, Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar and herself. It has been specifically agreed that the compromise will come into force simultaneously on the confirmation of the absolute right and title of Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis and Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar to their respective house properties as per clause 5 and 6 of this compromise petition.
5.The Respondents 6 to 9 have filed a suit in O.S.15652/96 on the file of the III Additional City Civil Court, Chennai against the 4th Respondent herein in respect of the property bearing Door No.5, Sterling Avenue, Nungambakkam, Chennai and the respondents 6 to 9 filed another suit in O.S.15651/96 on the file of the Additional City Civil Court, Chennai against the first respondent herein in respect of the property bearing Door No.4, Chowdhry Colony, Nungambakkam, Chennai, i.e., against Mrs.Saroja Prabhakar and Mrs.Dhanabagiam Francis respectively. The respondents 6 to 9 hereby agree to withdraw the above suits and give up all their claim in respect of the suit properties and also give consent for passing a decree in C.S.No.423/2000 and C.S.No.424/ 2000 concerning the said properties filed by the 1st and 4th respondents respectively on the file of the original side of this Hon'ble Court against the respondents 6 to 9.
6.The respondents 6 to 9 hereby agree to confirm title of the respondents 1 and 4 in respect of the properties covered under the above referred suits in C.S.No.423/2000 and C.S.No.424/2000 on the file of this Hon'ble Court by filing necessary memorandum in the said suits. Therefore, it is evident that those two sisters of the respondent herein have been taken care of by the other parties to the compromise by confirming their absolute right and title in respect of the house properties which are presumably in their possession and enjoyment. It is also to be noted at this juncture that such confirmation of absolute right and title of those sisters in respect of those house properties was made in addition to the payments made to them as discussed supra. Therefore, it is evident that even though the family arrangement contemplates vesting of all the properties in the hands of the grandchildren of late Sathyanathan born through his two sons absolutely, when the parties entered into a compromise, such family arrangement has been accordingly either diluted or modified by giving the money to those two sisters as well as by confirming the right and title of the house properties possessed by them. Under such circumstances, I am of the firm view that interest of justice would be met only when the interest of the other sister, who has been left out in the compromise viz., the respondent herein, is also protected, if not by the parties to the compromise, but by the Court. In fact, perusal of the grounds of review raised as well as the submissions made by the petitioner herein would reveal that the very execution of the sale deed by the respondent herein was by taking advantage of the compromise entered into between the parties. It is pertinent to note, at this juncture, ground No.10 of the review, as extracted hereunder:
10. The 4th defendnat Mrs.Victoria Srinivasan, having acted upon the said compromise not only taking advantage of the same but also confirming the family agreement dated 16.05.1074 in the manner as set out above by executing the sale deed and also having derived monitory benefit out of the said sale transaction, like the plaintiff and other sister defendants as under the said Memorandum of compromise, the 4th defendant is not entitled to claim any further or other payments of money from the appellants in the said appeal.
49. Therefore, it is evident that the petitioner herein, in fact, is not questioning the validity of the sale executed by the respondent herein dated 29.06.2001 and on the other hand, it is his case that the respondent herein is not entitled to claim any further or other payments of money from the appellants in the appeals other than the monetary benefit derived by her already out of the said sale transaction. This stand of the petitioner would undoubtedly drive this Court to arrive at a conclusion that the said sale made by the respondent need not be disturbed, as the interest of the other sisters have already been taken care of by confirming their right over the house properties in their possession. Therefore, I find that though the said sale made by the respondent was outside the purview of the family arrangement and the compromise memo entered between the parties, however, the same does not get disturbed by considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the entire case and in view of the reasons and findings rendered supra, which include the conduct of the parties and their pleadings and submissions made before Court at various stage of the litigation.
50. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioner vehemently contended that in this review, this Court can consider the effect of the sale deed executed by the respondent herein dated 29.06.2001, which is marked as Ex.P1 herein to find out as to whether the conduct of the respondent in executing such sale deed containing certain admissions with regard to the compromise entered, would amount to indirect admission of the contents in the compromise memo even though she is not a signatory to the compromise memo. In support of his submission, he relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2005(4) SCC 741, Board of Control for Cricket in India vs Netaji Cricket Club, more particularly, the findings rendered at paragraph Nos.88 to 90, which read as follows:
88. We are, furthermore, of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a review application cannot be said to be ex facie bad in law. Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to review its order if the conditions precedent laid down therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court except those which are expressly provided in Section 114 of the Code in terms whereof it is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit.
89. Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason.
90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words 'sufficient reason' in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit".
I have already pointed out that the sale deed dated 29.06.2001 alone can be received and marked as evidence in this review petition. I have also discussed the reasons for not permitting the other documents to be received and marked. Therefore, based on the above decision, the review petitioner is not entitled to mark other documents when the facts and circumstances of the present case, more particularly, the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court do not entitle him to do so.
51. The learned Senior counsel further relied on the decision of the Apex Court reported in 2012(8) SCC 148,Union of India vs Ibrahim Uddin, to contend that the admission made by the respondent in the sale deed marked as Ex.P1 herein would operate as an estoppel against her in pleading contra. He further contended that even though the respondent has specifically recited in the sale deed marked as Ex.P1 that there was a compromise between him and the other person by name Asa John Divyanathan, she failed to produce the same before this Court and therefore an adverse inference has to be drawn against her. For both the propositions, the learned Senior Counsel relied on paragraph Nos.32 and 39 of the above said decision, which read as follows:
32. In view of the above, the law on the admissions can be summarised to the effect that admission made by a party though not conclusive, is a decisive factor in a case unless the other party successfully withdraws the same or proves it to be erroneous. Even if the admission is not conclusive it may operate as an estoppel. Law requires that an opportunity be given to the person who has made admission under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clarify the point on the question of admission. Failure of a party to prove its defence does not amount to admission, nor it can reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff.
......39. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non- production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide:State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101). I do not think that the above decision would help the review petitioner in support of his contention made in CMP No.17619 of 2017, seeking for a direction to the respondent to produce the said two documents. I have already discussed the reason for rejecting CMP No.17619 of 2017. In view of the reasons and discussions stated supra, the above decision is not applicable to the present case more particularly, when the facts and circumstances herein are different and distinguishable.
52. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent contended that fraud has been played upon this Court in bringing out the compromise without her consent and therefore, the learned Judge has rightly found that the compromise memo is not binding on this respondent. She further contended that the plaintiff has not produced the original of Ex.D1 and Ex.D8 before the Court and therefore, withholding of those vital documents would amount to playing fraud on the Court. In support of her above contentions, she relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1994(1) SCC 1, S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath, wherein at paragraph No.6, it has been observed as follows:
6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants- defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.
53. I do not think that the respondent can plead now in this review as if fraud has been played upon in this Court in bringing about the compromise without her consent, more particularly when the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recognized such compromise memo and allowed the appeals, in so far as the parties who are bound by such compromise memo. Therefore, I find that the above decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. Further, it is to be noted that the respondent has not filed any counter in this review petition as observed supra, though a written submission is filed at the time of argument on behalf of the respondent herein.
54. Considering the above stated facts and circumstances, the review is allowed in the following terms:
a) CMP No.4556 of 2016 is allowed in part as indicated above and CMP No. 17619 of 2017 is dismissed.
b) The sale deed dated 29.06.2001 executed by the respondent herein marked as Ex.P1 herein cannot have any overriding effect on the family arrangement already entered as early as on 16.05.1974 marked as Ex.B1 to which the respondent is a party.
c) However, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the findings rendered supra, the sale effected by the respondent under Ex.P1 shall not get disturbed by the order made in this review.
(d) In view of the terms of the compromise already entered into before this Court and the payment made to the other sisters therein, the eighth defendant shall pay the respondent herein also a sum of Rs.8,74,999/- along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum from 11.04.2001, being the date of the judgment rendered by this Court in terms of the compromise.
e) In view of the above findings, the judgment and decree passed by this Court in the appeals in so far as the fifth respondent (respondent in this review) is concerned, are modified to the effect and to the extent as indicated supra. No costs.
List of Document Marked:
1) Ex.P1- Sale Deed dated 29.06.2001 executed by the respondent in favour of third party.
05.06.2018 Speaking/Non Speaking Index:Yes/No vri K.RAVICHANDRABAABU,J.
VRI PREDELIVERY ORDER IN REV. Petition NO.43 OF 2016 05.06.2018