Chattisgarh High Court
Mojjam Rahmani vs Union Of India & Others on 14 December, 2011
HIGH COURT OF CHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WRIT PETITION C No 5251 of 2011
Mojjam Rahmani
...Petitioners
VERSUS
Union of India & Others
...Respondents
! Shri Rajeev Shrivastava Advocate for the petitioner
^ Shri S K Tiwari Standing Counsel for the respondent No 1 and 2
CORAM: Honble Shri Satish K Agnihotri J
Dated: 14/12/2011
: Judgement
(Passed on 14th day of December, 2011)
WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA
1. By this petition, the petitioner seeks a direction
to the respondent No. 3 for issuing National Trade
Certificate to the petitioner for the Trade of
Electrician.
2. The facts, in brief, as projected by the
petitioners are that the petitioner, after passing
Higher Secondary Examination, was admitted to Industrial
Training Institute (for short `the ITI') at Belganga
Nagar, Tahsil Chalisgaon, District Jalgaon, Maharashtra.
The training was conducted as per the Training Manual
for ITIs and Centres, prepared by the Directorate
General of Employment and Training, Ministry of Labour,
Government of India i.e. the respondent No. 2. As per
the Training Manual, on the basis of various
recommendations from time to time, the National Council
for Vocational Training (for short `the NCVT') was
constituted which is the prime body for controlling and
regulating the training programme. The petitioner
successfully completed the training programme held
between August, 2001 and July, 2003, and thereafter
passed the Trade Test conducted by the NCVT. A
provisional certificate to this effect was issued in the
year 2003. However, till date, the petitoiner has not
been issued the National Trade Certificate as prescribed
under para 33 (b) read with para 33 (c) of the Manual of
the NCVT.
3. Shri Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner has not been issued National Trade
Certificate due to which, the petitioner could not
secure job in Delhi Metro, though the petitioner has
successfully passed the competitive examination for the
post of Assistant Loco Pilot, held in the month of
February, 2011. The petitioner made an application on
08.08.2011 to the respondent No. 2 (Annexure P/2)
requesting to issue the National Trade Certificate,
however, the petitioner has not received any response in
this regard from the respondent No. 2. Thus, the
respondent authorities may be directed to issue the
certificate, as aforestated, as expeditiously as
possible, as in absence of the certificate, the
candidature of the petitioner for the post of Assistant
Loco Pilot would not be considered.
4. On the other hand, Shri Tiwari, learned counsel
appearing for the Union of India/respondent No. 1 and 2
submits that this petition is not maintainable as the
cause of action has arisen in the State of Maharashtra,
thus, this Court may not be appropriate forum for
issuance of a direction to the respondent authorities.
5. Shri Shrivastava next submits that though, the
petitioner has persued his I.T.I. training in the State
of Maharashtra, but as the petitioner is the resident of
District Durg, Chhattisgarh, thus, this petition is
maintainable before this Court. Under Article 226(2) of
the Constitution of India, any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which
the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, may issue directions/orders or
writs to any Government, authority or person. In support
of his contention, Shri Shrivastava relies on a decision
of Rajendran Chingaravelu v. R.K.Mishra, Additional
Commissioner of Income Tax & Others1 and Rajasthan High
Court Advocates Association v. Union of India & Others2.
6. The petitioner relies on para 33 of the NCVT manual
which prescribes for issuance of National Trade
Certificate. However, the petitioner has not filed a
copy of the NCVT manual alongwith this petition. The
petitioner has persued his trained in the State of
Maharashtra. None of the respondents belong to the State
of Chhattisgarh. Even, the petitioner has failed to
establish asto how cause of action arises to file
petition, before this Court. The petitioner has also not
arrayed ITI, Belganganagar, as the party respondent,
from where, the petitioner has completed his training.
7. Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, reads
as under:
"226. (2) The power conferred
by clause (1) to issue
directions, orders or writs
to any Government, authority
or person may also be
exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories
within which the cause of
action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of
such power, notwithstanding
that the seat of such
Government or authority or
the residence of such person
is not within those
territories."
8. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India3,
the Supreme Court observed as under:
"6. Cause of action implies a
right to sue. The material
facts which are imperative
for the suitor to allege and
prove constitute the cause of
action. Cause of action is
not defined in any statute.
It has, however, been
judicially interpreted inter
alia to mean that every fact
which would be necessary for
the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to
support his right to the
judgment of the Court.
Negatively put, it would mean
that everything which, if not
proved, gives the defendant
an immediate right to
judgment, would be part of
cause of action. Its
importance is beyond any
doubt. For every action,
there has to be a cause of
action, if not, the plaint or
the writ petition, as the
case may be, shall be
rejected summarily.
7. Clause (2) of Article
226 of the Constitution of
India reads thus:
"226. (2) The power
conferred by clause (1) to
issue directions, orders or
writs to any Government,
authority or person may also
be exercised by any High
Court exercising jurisdiction
in relation to the
territories within which the
cause of action, wholly or in
part, arises for the exercise
of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat
of such Government or
authority or the residence of
such person is not within
those territories."
8. Section 20(c) of the
Code of Civil Procedure reads
as under:
"20. Other suits to be
instituted where defendants
reside or cause of action
arises.-Subject to the
limitations aforesaid, every
suit shall be instituted in a
court within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction-
(a)-(b)* * *
(c) the cause of action,
wholly or in part, arises."
9. Although in view of
Section 141 of the Code of
Civil Procedure the
provisions thereof would not
apply to writ proceedings,
the phraseology used in
Section 20(c) of the Code of
Civil Procedure and clause
(2) of Article 226, being in
pari materia, the decisions
of this Court rendered on
interpretation of Section
20(c) CPC shall apply to the
writ proceedings also. Before
proceeding to discuss the
matter further it may be
pointed out that the entire
bundle of facts pleaded need
not constitute a cause of
action as what is necessary
to be proved before the
petitioner can obtain a
decree is the material facts.
The expression material facts
is also known as integral
facts.
10. Keeping in view the
expressions used in clause
(2) of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India,
indisputably even if a small
fraction of cause of action
accrues within the
jurisdiction of the Court,
the Court will have
jurisdiction in the matter.
11. In Chand Kour v. Partab
Singh4 it was held: (IA pp.
157-58)
"The cause of action has no
relation whatever to the
defence which may be set up
by the defendant, nor does it
depend upon the character of
the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff. It refers entirely
to the grounds set forth in
the plaint as the cause of
action, or, in other words,
to the media upon which the
plaintiff asks the court to
arrive at a conclusion in his
favour."
12. This Court in Oil &
Natural Gas Commission v.
Utpal Kumar Basu5 held that
the question as to whether
the Court has a territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a
writ petition, must be
arrived at on the basis of
averments made in the
petition, the truth or
otherwise thereof being
immaterial.
13. This Court in Oil and
Natural Gas Commission case
held that all necessary facts
must form an integral part of
the cause of action. It was
observed: (SCC p. 719, para
8)
"So also the mere fact that
it sent fax messages from
Calcutta and received a reply
thereto at Calcutta would not
constitute an integral part
of the cause of action."
14. In State of Rajasthan
v. Swaika Properties6 this
Court opined that mere
service of a notice would not
give rise to any cause of
action unless service of
notice was an integral part
of the cause of action. The
said decision has also been
noticed in Oil and Natural
Gas Commission. This Court
held: (SCC p. 223, para 8)
"The answer to the question
whether service of notice is
an integral part of the cause
of action within the meaning
of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution must depend upon
the nature of the impugned
order giving rise to a cause
of action."
15. In Aligarh Muslim
University v. Vinay Engg.
Enterprises (P) Ltd.7 this
Court lamented: (SCC p. 711,
para 2)
"2. We are surprised, not a
little, that the High Court
of Calcutta should have
exercised jurisdiction in a
case where it had absolutely
no jurisdiction. The
contracts in question were
executed at Aligarh, the
construction work was to be
carried out at Aligarh, even
the contracts provided that
in the event of dispute the
Aligarh court alone will have
jurisdiction. The arbitrator
was from Aligarh and was to
function there. Merely
because the respondent was a
Calcutta-based firm, the High
Court of Calcutta seems to
have exercised jurisdiction
where it had none by adopting
a queer line of reasoning. We
are constrained to say that
this is a case of abuse of
jurisdiction and we feel that
the respondent deliberately
moved the Calcutta High Court
ignoring the fact that no
part of the cause of action
had arisen within the
jurisdiction of that Court.
It clearly shows that the
litigation filed in the
Calcutta High Court was
thoroughly unsustainable."
16. In Union of India v.
Adani Exports Ltd.8 it was
held that in order to confer
jurisdiction on a High Court
to entertain a writ petition
it must disclose that the
integral facts pleaded in
support of the cause of
action do constitute a cause
so as to empower the Court to
decide the dispute and the
entire or a part of it arose
within its jurisdiction.
17. Recently, in National
Textile Corpn. Ltd. v.
Haribox Swalram9 a Division
Bench of this Court held:
(SCC p. 797, para 12.1)
"12.1. As discussed
earlier, the mere fact that
the writ petitioner carries
on business at Calcutta or
that the reply to the
correspondence made by it was
received at Calcutta is not
an integral part of the cause
of action and, therefore, the
Calcutta High Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the
writ petition and the view to
the contrary taken by the
Division Bench cannot be
sustained. In view of the
above finding, the writ
petition is liable to be
dismissed."
18. The facts pleaded in
the writ petition must have a
nexus on the basis whereof a
prayer can be granted. Those
facts which have nothing to
do with the prayer made
therein cannot be said to
give rise to a cause of
action which would confer
jurisdiction on the Court."
9. In Rajendran Chingaravelu1 the Supreme Court held
as under:
"9. The first question that
arises for consideration is
whether the Andhra Pradesh
High Court was justified in
holding that as the seizure
took place at Chennai (Tamil
Nadu), the appellant could not
maintain the writ petition
before it. The High Court did
not examine whether any part
of cause of action arose in
Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of
Article 226 makes it clear
that the High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to
the territories within which
the cause of action arises
wholly or in part, will have
jurisdiction. This would mean
that even if a small fraction
of the cause of action (that
bundle of facts which gives a
petitioner, a right to sue)
accrued within the territories
of Andhra Pradesh, the High
Court of that State will have
jurisdiction."
10. In Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association2, the
High Court observed as under:
"17. The expression "cause of
action" has acquired a
judicially-settled meaning. In
the restricted sense cause of
action means the circumstances
forming the infraction of the
right or the immediate
occasion for the action In the
wider sense, it means the
necessary conditions for the
maintenance of the suit,
including not only the
infraction of the right, but
the infraction coupled with
the right itself.
Compendiously the expression
means every fact which it
would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support
his right to the judgment of
the Court. Every fact which is
necessary to be proved, as
distinguished from every piece
of evidence which is necessary
to prove each fact, comprises
in "cause of action". It has
to be left to be determined in
each individual case as to
where the cause of action
arises."
11. In Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central
Excise10, the Supreme Court observed as under:
"17. There cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that in terms of
Article 227 of the
Constitution of India as also
Clause (2) of Article 226
thereof, the High Court would
exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction as also power to
issue writ of certiorari in
respect of the orders passed
by the subordinate courts
within its territorial
jurisdiction or if any cause
of action has arisen
therewithin but the same tests
cannot be applied when the
appellate court exercises a
jurisdiction over a tribunal
situated in more than one
State. In such a situation, in
our opinion, the High Court
situated in the State where
the first court is located
should be considered to be the
appropriate Appellate
Authority. The Code of Civil
Procedure did not contemplate
such a situation. It provides
for jurisdiction of each
court. Even a District Judge
must exercise its jurisdiction
only within the territorial
limits of a State. It is
inconceivable under the Code
of Civil Procedure that the
jurisdiction of the District
Court would be exercisable
beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the district,
save and except in such
matters where the law
specifically provides
therefor.
40. Although in view of
Section 141 of the Code of
Civil Procedure the provisions
thereof would not apply to
writ proceedings, the
phraseology used in Section
20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure and Clause (2) of
Article 226, being in pari
materia, the decisions of this
Court rendered on
interpretation of Section
20(c) CPC shall apply to the
writ proceedings also. Before
proceeding to discuss the
matter further it may be
pointed out that the entire
bundle of facts pleaded need
not constitute a cause of
action, as what is necessary
to be proved, before the
petitioner can obtain a
decree, is material facts. The
expression material facts is
also known as integral facts.
41. Keeping in view the
expression "cause of action"
used in Clause (2) of Article
226 of the Constitution of
India, indisputably even if a
small fraction thereof accrues
within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Court will have
jurisdiction in the matter
though the doctrine of forum
conveniens may also have to be
considered."
12. In A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Another v.
A.P.Agencies, Salem11, the Supreme Court observed as
under:
"12. A cause of action means
every fact, which if
traversed, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff
to prove in order to support
his right to a judgment of
the court. In other words, it
is a bundle of facts which
taken with the law applicable
to them gives the plaintiff a
right to relief against the
defendant. It must include
some act done by the
defendant since in the
absence of such an act no
cause of action can possibly
accrue. It is not limited to
the actual infringement of
the right sued on but
includes all the material
facts on which it is founded.
It does not comprise evidence
necessary to prove such
facts, but every fact
necessary for the plaintiff
to prove to enable him to
obtain a decree. Everything
which if not proved would
give the defendant a right to
immediate judgment must be
part of the cause of action.
But it has no relation
whatever to the defence which
may be set up by the
defendant nor does it depend
upon the character of the
relief prayed for by the
plaintiff."
13. In Laxman Prasad v. Prodigy Electronics Ltd. &
Another12, the Supreme Court observed as under:
"29. According to the
appellant, since the terms
and conditions in the
agreement have to be
interpreted in accordance
with the laws of Hong Kong,
no court in any country other
than a court in Hong Kong
shall have jurisdiction to
entertain a suit, petition,
application or any other
proceeding. The submission of
the respondent Company, on
the other hand, is that what
was agreed upon was not
territorial jurisdiction of a
court but applicability of
laws. Clause 18 deals with
the second eventuality and
declares that terms and
conditions of the agreement
would be interpreted in
accordance with the laws of
Hong Kong.
30. We find considerable
force in the submission of
the learned counsel for the
respondent Company. In our
view, "cause of action" and
"applicability of law" are
two distinct, different and
independent things and one
cannot be confused with the
other. The expression "cause
of action" has not been
defined in the Code. It is,
however, settled law that
every suit presupposes the
existence of a cause of
action. If there is no cause
of action, the plaint has to
be rejected [Rule 11(a) of
Order 7]. Stated simply,
"cause of action" means a
right to sue. It consists of
material facts which are
imperative for the plaintiff
to allege and prove to
succeed in the suit. The
classic definition of the
expression ("cause of
action") is found in the
observations of Lord Brett in
Cooke v. Gill. His Lordship
stated:
"Cause of action means every
fact which it would be
necessary for the plaintiff
to prove, if traversed, in
order to support his right to
the judgment of the court.
31. In A.B.C. Laminates (Pvt)
Ltd. v. A.P.Agencies, this
Court said:
"12. A cause of action
means every fact, which if
traversed, it would be
necessary for the
plaintiff to prove in
order to support his right
to a judgment of the
court. In other words, it
is a bundle of facts which
taken with the law
applicable to them gives
the plaintiff a right to
relief against the
defendant. It must include
some act done by the
defendant since in the
absence of such an act no
cause of action can
possibly accrue. It is not
limited to the actual
infringement of the right
sued on but includes all
the material facts on
which it is founded. It
does not comprise evidence
necessary to prove such
facts, but every fact
necessary for the
plaintiff to prove to
enable him to obtain a
decree. Everything which
if not proved would give
the defendant a right to
immediate judgment must be
part of the cause of
action. But it has no
relation whatever to the
defence which may be set
up by the defendant nor
does it depend upon the
character of the relief
prayed for by the
plaintiff."
(emphasis supplied)
32. Now, Sections 16 to 20 of
the Code deal with
territorial jurisdiction of a
court (place of suing).
Whereas Sections 16 to 18
relate to immovable property,
suits for compensation for
wrongs to persons or movables
have been dealt with under
Section 19. Section 20 of the
Code is a residuary provision
and covers all cases not
falling under Sections 16 to
19.
33. The relevant part of
Section 20 reads thus:
"20. Other suits to be
instituted where defendants
reside or cause of action
arises.-Subject to the
limitations aforesaid, every
suit shall be instituted in a
court within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction-
(a) the defendant, or each of
the defendants where there
are more than one, at the
time of the commencement of
the suit, actually and
voluntarily resides, or
carries on business, or
personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants,
where there are more than
one, at the time of the
commencement of the suit,
actually and voluntarily
resides, or carries on
business, or personally works
for gain, provided that in
such case either the leave of
the court is given, or the
defendants who do not reside,
or carry on business, or
personally work for gain, as
aforesaid, acquiesce in such
institution; or
(c) the cause of action,
wholly or in part, arises."
(emphasis supplied)
46. Territorial jurisdiction
of a court, when the
plaintiff intends to invoke
jurisdiction of any court in
India, has to be ascertained
on the basis of the
principles laid down in the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Since a part of "cause of
action" has arisen within the
local limits of Delhi as
averred in the plaint by the
plaintiff Company, the
question has to be considered
on the basis of such
averment. Since it is alleged
that the appellant-defendant
had committed breach of
agreement by using trade
mark/trade name in Trade
Fair, 2005 in Delhi, a part
of cause of action has arisen
in Delhi. The plaintiff
Company, in the
circumstances, could have
filed a suit in Delhi. So far
as applicability of law is
concerned, obviously as and
when the suit will come up
for hearing, the Court will
interpret the clause and take
an appropriate decision in
accordance with law. It has,
however, nothing to do with
the local limits of the
jurisdiction of the Court.
47. The High Court, in our
opinion, was right in
rejecting the application and
in overruling preliminary
objection. Since prima facie
the plaint disclosed a cause
of action as also territorial
jurisdiction of the Court,
the High Court rightly
rejected both the contentions
and no error was committed by
it in not rejecting plaint,
nor returning it for
presentation to proper
court."
14. The Supreme Court, in Navinchandra N. Majithia v.
State of Maharashtra & Others13, it was observed as
under:
"17. From the provision in
clause (2) of Article 226 it
is clear that the
maintainability or otherwise
of the writ petition in the
High Court depends on whether
the cause of action for
filing the same arose, wholly
or in part, within the
territorial jurisdiction of
that Court.
18. In legal parlance the
expression "cause of action"
is generally understood to
mean a situation or state of
facts that entitles a party
to maintain an action in a
court or a tribunal; a group
of operative facts giving
rise to one or more bases for
suing; a factual situation
that entitles one person to
obtain a remedy in court from
another person. (Black's Law
Dictionary)
19. In Stroud's Judicial
Dictionary a "cause of
action" is stated to be the
entire set of facts that
gives rise to an enforceable
claim; the phrase comprises
every fact, which, if
traversed, the plaintiff must
prove in order to obtain
judgment.
20. In "Words and Phrases"
(4th Edn.) the meaning
attributed to the phrase
"cause of action" in common
legal parlance is existence
of those facts which give a
party a right to judicial
interference on his behalf.
21. A Bench of three learned
Judges of this Court in the
case of Oil and Natural Gas
Commission v. Utpal Kumar
Basu considered at length the
question of territorial
jurisdiction under Article
226(2) of the Constitution of
India. Some of the relevant
observations made in the
judgment are extracted
hereunder:
"5. Clause (1) of Article 226
begins with a non obstante
clause - notwithstanding
anything in Article 32 - and
provides that every High
Court shall have power
`throughout the territories
in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction', to
issue to any person or
authority, including in
appropriate cases, any
Government, `within those
territories' directions,
orders or writs, for the
enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by Part III
or for any other purpose.
Under clause (2) of Article
226 the High Court may
exercise its power conferred
by clause (1) if the cause of
action, wholly or in part,
had arisen within the
territory over which it
exercises jurisdiction,
notwithstanding that the seat
of such Government or
authority or the residence of
such person is not within
those territories. On a plain
reading of the aforesaid two
clauses of Article 226 of the
Constitution it becomes clear
that a High Court can
exercise the power to issue
directions, orders or writs
for the enforcement of any of
the fundamental rights
conferred by Part III of the
Constitution or for any other
purpose if the cause of
action, wholly or in part,
had arisen within the
territories in relation to
which it exercises
jurisdiction, notwithstanding
that the seat of the
Government or authority or
the residence of the person
against whom the direction,
order or writ is issued is
not within the said
territories. In order to
confer jurisdiction on the
High Court of Calcutta, NICCO
must show that at least a
part of the cause of action
had arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of
that Court. This is at best
its case in the writ
petition.
6. It is well settled that
the expression `cause of
action' means that bundle of
facts which the petitioner
must prove, if traversed, to
entitle him to a judgment in
his favour by the court. In
Chand Kour v. Partab Singh
Lord Watson said:
`... the cause of action has
no relation whatever to the
defence which may be set up
by the defendant, nor does it
depend upon the character of
the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff. It refers entirely
to the ground set forth in
the plaint as the cause of
action, or, in other words,
to the media upon which the
plaintiff asks the court to
arrive at a conclusion in his
favour.'
Therefore, in determining the
objection of lack of
territorial jurisdiction the
court must take all the facts
pleaded in support of the
cause of action into
consideration albeit without
embarking upon an inquiry as
to the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts.
In other words the question
whether a High Court has
territorial jurisdiction to
entertain a writ petition
must be answered on the basis
of the averments made in the
petition, the truth or
otherwise whereof being
immaterial. To put it
differently, the question of
territorial jurisdiction must
be decided on the facts
pleaded in the petition.
Therefore, the question
whether in the instant case
the Calcutta High Court had
jurisdiction to entertain and
decide the writ petition in
question even on the facts
alleged must depend upon
whether the averments made in
paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26
and 43 are sufficient in law
to establish that a part of
the cause of action had
arisen within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta
High Court."
(emphasis supplied)
27. Tested in the light of
the principles laid down in
the cases noted above the
judgment of the High Court
under challenge is
unsustainable. The High Court
failed to consider all the
relevant facts necessary to
arrive at a proper decision
on the question of
maintainability of the writ
petition, on the ground of
lack of territorial
jurisdiction. The Court based
its decision on the sole
consideration that the
complainant had filed the
complaint at Shillong in the
State of Meghalaya and the
petitioner had prayed for
quashing the said complaint.
The High Court did not also
consider the alternative
prayer made in the writ
petition that a writ of
mandamus be issued to the
State of Meghalaya to
transfer the investigation to
Mumbai Police. The High Court
also did not take note of the
averments in the writ
petition that filing of the
complaint at Shillong was a
mala fide move on the part of
the complainant to harass and
pressurise the petitioners to
reverse the transaction for
transfer of shares. The
relief sought in the writ
petition may be one of the
relevant criteria for
consideration of the question
but cannot be the sole
consideration in the matter.
On the averments made in the
writ petition gist of which
has been noted earlier it
cannot be said that no part
of the cause of action for
filing the writ petition
arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Bombay
High Court.
36. It was the said decision
of the Constitution Bench
which necessitated Parliament
to bring the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution
by which clause (1-A) was
added to Article 226. That
clause was subsequently
renumbered as clause (2) by
the Constitution Forty-Second
Amendment. Now clause (2) of
Article 226 reads thus:
"226. (2) The power conferred
by clause (1) to issue
directions, orders or writs
to any Government, authority
or person may also be
exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories
within which the cause of
action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of
such power, notwithstanding
that the seat of such
Government or authority or
the residence of such person
is not within those
territories."
37. The object of the
amendment by inserting clause
(2) in the article was to
supersede the decision of the
Supreme Court in Election
Commission v. Saka Venkata
Subba Rao and to restore the
view held by the High Courts
in the decisions cited above.
Thus the power conferred on
the High Courts under Article
226 could as well be
exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories
within which "the cause of
action, wholly or in part,
arises" and it is no matter
that the seat of the
authority concerned is
outside the territorial
limits of the jurisdiction of
that High Court. The
amendment is thus aimed at
widening the width of the
area for reaching the writs
issued by different High
Courts.
38. "Cause of action" is a
phenomenon well understood in
legal parlance. Mohapatra, J.
has well delineated the
import of the said expression
by referring to the
celebrated lexicographies.
The collocation of the words "cause of action, wholly or in part, arises" seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect of the courts. As per that section the suit could be instituted in a court within the legal limits of whose jurisdiction the "cause of action wholly or in part arises". Judicial pronouncements have accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the said compendious expression even prior to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as to mean "the bundle of facts which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court".
39. In Read v. Brown Lord Esher, M.R., adopted the definition for the phrase "cause of action" that it meant "every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved".
40. The Privy Council has noted in Mohd. Khalil Khan v.
Mahbub Ali Mian that the aforesaid definition adopted by Lord Esher M.R. had been followed in India. Even thereafter the courts in India have consistently followed the said interpretation without exception for understanding the scope of the expression "cause of action".
41. Even in the context of Article 226(2) of the Constitution this Court adopted the same interpretation to the expression "cause of action, wholly or in part, arises"
vide State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties. A three- Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu observed that it is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed to entitle him to a judgment in his favour.
Having given such a wide interpretation to the expression Ahmadi, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J. and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., utilised the opportunity to caution the High Courts against transgressing into the jurisdiction of the other High Courts merely on the ground of some insignificant event connected with the cause of action taking place within the territorial limits of the High Court to which the litigant approaches at his own choice or convenience. The following are such observations.
"If an impression gains
ground that even in cases
which fall outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation."
15. Admittedly, looking into the relief clause i.e. seeking a command to the NCVT, Government of India, New Delhi to issue National Trade Certificate to the petitioner in the trade of Electrician, arises from the cause of action when as prayed by the petitioner, the petitioner passed trade test on completion of his training at ITI, Belganganagar, Tahsil Chalisgaon, District Jalgaon, Maharashtra. The office of the NCVT is located in New Delhi. Thus, all the materials taken together make a cause of action as defined in a catena of decisions by the Supreme Court, as aforestated. The petitioner made an application for appointment on the post of Assistant Loco Pilot in Delhi Metro and the candidature of the petitioner could not be considered for want of National Trade Certificate, is not a part of the cause of action involved in the instant case. It is a second cause of action, and the same is not under challenge in this petition. Requirement of National Trade Certificate by the Delhi Metro for consideration for appointment on the post of Assistant Loco Pilot is not questioned in this petition. Thus, the facts, forming cause of action in this petition, are very clear that the petitioner was admitted to ITI, Belganganagar, Tahsil Chalisgaon, Maharashtra, which has not been arrayed as a respondent in this petition. Secondly, thereafter, the NCVT i.e. the respondent No. 3 which conducted the trade test, has not issued the National Trade Certificate for which the instant petition has been filed. It is not a case that even a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Chhattisgarh. Thus, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction in relation to cause of action which wholly or in part, arose outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
16. Reliance of learned counsel for the petitioner on Rajendran Chingaravelu1 and Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association2 are of no avail to the petitioner as in those cause, a part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court. In order to invoke the jurisdiction, it has further been settled by the Supreme Court that the cause of action depends on each individual case.
17. Applying the well settled principles of law on the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to the facts of the case wherein not even a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court, no writ/direction may be issued by this Court.
18. Resultantly, the writ petition is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. However, on the request of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, liberty is reserved to take recourse to appropriate forum as available under the provisions of law, if so advised.
19. No order asto costs.
JUDGE