Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

Delhi District Court

(Sh) Joginder Singh vs Shri Harminder Singh Chowdhary S/O ... on 7 February, 2024

Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary                      Judgement dt. 7.2.2024


                  IN THE COURT OF RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL
                  WEST DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI

RCT ARCT/11/2022
CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022

Joginder Singh
S/o Late S. Kirpal Singh
R/o BD­85, Janakpuri,
new Delhi­110058.                                                 .....Appellant

Versus

1.        Harminder Singh Chowdhary
          S/o S. Pritpal Singh
2.        Satinder Singh
          S/o S. Pritpal Singh

          Both Address at :
          Shop No. 3,4, WZ­199, G­Block,
          Jail Road, Hari Nagar,
          Opp. Rajiv Motors,
          New Delhi­110058.                                       .....Respondents

Date of institution : 23.09.2022
Date of arguments : 12.01.2024
Date of judgement : 07.02.2024

JUDGEMENT

1. Appellant has filed this appeal under Section 38 of The Delhi RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 1 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 Rent Control Act 1958 (in short DRC Act) against the order dated 22.8.2022 passed by Ld. ARC, West, Delhi vide which the application under Section 19(2) of the DRC Act has been dismissed in MISC. RC ARC NO. 85/2019.

2. Notice of the appeal was issued to respondents. Trial court record was summoned. Respondents contested the appeal by filing reply.

3. Briefly stated the facts, which emerge out from the perusal of the trial court record, are that landlords (respondent no.1 & 2 herein) had filed an eviction petition E­45/2013 against the appellant herein and one Sukhvinder Kaur Kwatra under Section 14(1)(e) of The Delhi Rent Control Act on the ground of bonafide requirement. In the said petition, the respondents­landlords herein had averred that they required premises for running their professional office being Advocates and they do not have any other property for running their office. Therefore, they required the demised premises for their bonafide requirement.

4. The said petition was allowed vide judgement dated 30.9.2014 by Sh. Sumedh Kumar Sethi, Ld. ARC and respondent no.1 was directed to vacate the tenanted premises i.e. one shop bearing Private No.2, measuring 10 ft. X 15 ft. situated on ground floor of property no.

Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 WZ­199, G­Block, Jail Road, Hari Nagar, New Delhi­110058 (henceforth referred as the demised premises).

5. The trial court record reveals that on 1.11.2019, the appellant­ tenant filed an application under Section 19(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act in the court of Ld. ARC. In the application, the appellant herein stated that the possession of demised premises was taken by the respondents­landlords on 4.1.2018. However, since then it was not used or occupied by the respondents­landlords. Therefore, the appellant herein prayed that the premises may be restored to him.

6. The landlords filed reply. After hearing both the parties, Ms Upasana Satija, Ld. ARC dismissed the said application vide impugned order holding that period for filing application under Section 19(2) DRC Act is specified under Rule 4 of the DRC Rules 1959 and there is no provision for extending the said period. Further, she held that Section 5 Limitation Act will not apply to the proceedings u/s 19(2) DRC Act as such power is not vested in the Rent Controller by the Statute creating it.

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the appellant­evicted tenant has filed the present appeal. It is argued by Ld. Counsel for appellant that Ld. ARC has erred in holding that Ld. ARC has no power to condone the delay in filing the appeal. He has mainly relied upon RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 3 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 following judgements :

(1) Director, Directorate of Education Vs. Mohd. Shamim & Ors. AIRONLINE 2019 DEL 2509, Date of decision 29.11.2019.

(2) Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through LRs. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. Civil Appeal No. 5867 of 2015, Date of decision 9.10.2023.

(3) Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co­operative Bank Ltd. And Anr. Civil Appeal No. 9198 of 2019, Date of decision 22,3.2021.

8. First of all I would like to discuss the relevant provisions necessary for disposal of the present case. The same are as under :

(i) A landlord can get the tenant evicted under Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act on the ground of bonafide requirement.

(ii) Section 19(2) of DRC Act provides that such landlord must occupy the premises within two months of obtaining its possession.

(iii) Section 19(2) of DRC Act further provides that if landlord does not occupy such premises within two months, the evicted tenant may file an application, within such time as may be prescribed, for restoration of the premises.

(iv) Section 56 of DRC Act empowers Central RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 4 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the DRC Act. Therefore, the Delhi Rent Control Rules 1959 were framed by the Central Government.

(v) Rule 4 of The Delhi Rent Control Rules 1959 provides six months time for filing of an application for re­entry. This limitation period would start from the date on which cause of action for re­entry arises.

9. Ld. Counsel for appellant has submitted that cause of action for re­entry would arise from the date when it comes to the knowledge of the evicted tenant that the demised premises has not been occupied and used by the landlord. It is submitted that in para 8 of the application under Section 19(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act before Ld. ARC, the appellant had mentioned that on the occasion of Guru Parab, a video was prepared and put on Face Book on 1.7.2018 and 21.6.2019 respectively, which shows that demised premises was locked and no­one was in occupation and in use. There was no sign board over the premises. It is stated that video clip on Face Book dated 1.7.2018 came into knowledge of appellant in June 2019.

Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 Therefore, application was filed within limitation period of six months on 1.11.2019. It is argued that Ld. ARC has erred in holding that Section 5 of Limitation Act would not be applicable.

10. Ld. Counsel for respondent argued that Ld. ARC has discussed the case law cited by Ld. Counsel for appellant and she has rightly held that there is no provision for extending the said limitation period. Ld. Counsel for respondent­landlords has further drawn my attention to para 19 of the impugned judgement in which Ld. ARC has held that even otherwise no sufficient explanation was furnished by the evicted tenant­appellant herein for not filing the application within limitation period.

11. First I would like to discuss Director Directorate of Education Vs. Mohd. Shamim & Ors. AIRONLINE 2019 DEL 2509, (date of decision 29.11.2019) relied upon by Ld. Counsel for appellant. The questions of law before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi are reproduced as under :

"42. Let the file be placed before Hon‟ble the Chief Justice to consider the constitution of a Larger Bench for consideration of the following question:

(A) Whether this Court, in exercise of powers under Section 25B (8) of the Act, is entitled to set aside an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) or 14A or 14B or 14C or 14D owing to the application for leave to defend having not been filed within the prescribed time, if finds sufficient grounds for non­filing of application for leave to defend and to condone the delay and remand the matter to the Rent Controller to consider the leave to defend application on merits.

Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 (B) Whether the Rent Controller, in exercise of powers under Section 25B(7) or 25B(9) is entitled to set aside an order of eviction under Sections 14(1)(e) or 14A or 14B or 14C or 14D owing to non­filing of application for leave to defend within the prescribed time, if finds sufficient grounds therefor."

12. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi answered as under :

26. Having held so, we answer the question no.(A) framed in the referral order in the affirmative and with the condition that this Court would be empowered to set aside the order of eviction only if the tenant passes the dual test of prevented by reasons beyond control from applying for leave to defend within the prescribed time (as distinct from every default) and if makes out a substantial case for consideration of the application for leave to defend. We, however, in deference to Prithipal Singh supra choose/opt to not answer the question (B) framed in the referral order."

13. Ld. Counsel for appellant argues that Hon'ble High Court held that Rent Controller is empowered to condone the delay in filing an application by tenant under Section 25B(4) & (5) of DRC Act praying for leave to defend. It is therefore submitted that the same logic would be applicable to an application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act.

14. I disagree with this submission. Ld. ARC has considered this case law in the impugned judgement. Perusal of the aforesaid judgement show that question no. A, reproduced above, was answered in affirmative. In other word, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that High Court in exercise of its power of revision under Section 25B(8) of RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 7 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 DRC Act is empowered to set aside the eviction order only if it finds sufficient grounds to condone delay. This judgement does not in any manner empowers ARC to condone any delay in filing application.

15. I would like to mention here that Hon'ble High Court of Delhi did not answer question no. B in deference to Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (dead) through its LRs. (2010) 2 SCC 15., which means that Hon'ble High Court of Delhi answered question no. B in terms of Prithipal Singh (supra). This directly takes us to Prithipal Singh (supra) and it has to be seen as to what was held by Supreme Court of India in this judgement. Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where ARC dismissed the application of tenant for leave to defend because there was delay of eight days in filing the same. The tenant filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the said order, which was allowed by Ld. ARC. The landlord filed a petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India challenging the said order before Hon'ble High Court, which dismissed the said petition holding that there was no error in the said order. Therefore, the landlord preferred a special leave petition before Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, which framed following questions of law :

(i) Whether the Additional Rent Controller, exercising powers and jurisdiction under the Rent Act, which is a special Act, was justified in setting aside the order of eviction which amounted to restoration of and allowing the RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 8 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 application for leave to defend the eviction petition although such application was rejected earlier on the ground of delay.

(ii) Whether the Additional Rent Controller is competent to recall orders of eviction on an application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Order 37 Rule 4 and Section 151 of the Code and condone the delay in applying for leave to defend when he was not conferred with such power to condone the delay in filing the application for leave to defend the eviction proceedings under the Rent Act specially when such an affidavit (application for leave to defend) was earlier rejected by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi on the ground of delay."

16. In both the questions of law, the fundamental issue was as to whether Additional Rent Controller had power to condone the delay in filing of application to defend by application of Section 5 of Limitation Act. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India answered this question as under :

"27. We may now note that the High Court, relying on Mohd. Quresh (supra) which had relied on the decision of Gurditta Mal (supra) held that the application under Order 37 Rule 4 read with Section 151 was entertainable by the Rent Controller. In our view, the High Court, while deciding the present case had failed to notice that the decision in Gurditta Mal (supra) was considered in the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Prakash H Jain v. Ms. Marie Fernandes (AIR 2003 SC 4591). In para 8 at page 4593 of the aforesaid decision, this Court observed as follows:­ "In Gurditta Mal v. Bal Swarup (AIR 1980 Delhi

216) a learned Single Judge of the said High Court chose to infer conferment of power under Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959, though such power was not conferred under the statute, by relying upon Section 151 CPC which RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 9 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 in our view could not have been, having regard to the very nature and content of power under Section 151 and its inapplicability to Authorities other than ordinary courts"

Again in para 10 at page 4594, this Court observed asunder :­ "We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. Questions of the nature raised before us have to be considered not only on the nature and character of the Authority, whether it is court or not but also on the nature of powers conferred on such Authority or Court, the scheme underlying the provisions of the Act concerned and the nature of powers, the extant thereof or the limitations, if any, contained therein with particular reference to the intention of the Legislature as well, found expressed therein.

There is no such thing as any inherent power of court to condone delay in filing a proceedings before Court/Authority concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it, since it has a tendency to alter the rights accrued to one or the other partly under the statute concerned."

28. Therefore, in view of our discussions made herein earlier and in view of our findings that there was no reason for us not to rely on the decision of Prakash H. Jain (supra), only because that decision was rendered under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, whereas the present case has been filed under the Delhi Rent Control Act, but on comparing the aforesaid two Acts and in view of the observations and principles laid down by this Court in Prakash H. Jain (supra), as noted herein earlier, we are of the view that the provisions under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act and the provisions under the Delhi Rent Control Act are pari materia and therefore, the decision in the case of Prakash H. Jain (supra) practically overrules the decision of the Delhi High Court reported in Mohd. Quresh (supra) and Gurditta Mal (supra).

29. For the reasons aforesaid, we are therefore of the view that the High Court has acted illegally and with material RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 10 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in affirming the order of the Additional Rent Controller whereby the Additional Rent Controller had allowed the application for setting aside the order of eviction and restored the application for leave to contest the eviction proceeding when such power, in our view, was not conferred on the Rent Controller to entertain such an application filed by the tenant/respondent.

30. There is another aspect of this matter. It is difficult to understand how an application for leave to contest having been rejected, may be on the ground of delay, could be allowed when it is not disputed by the tenant respondent that no application for condonation of delay could be entertained by the Rent Controller as the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not be attracted."

17. In Prithipal Singh (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court of India relied upon its own judgement in Prakash H. Jain Vs. Ms Marie Fernandes AIR 2003 SC 4591. The facts in Prakash H. Jain (supra) were that the tenant moved an application for leave to defend along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act. The application for condonation of delay was allowed. Aggrieved by this order, landlord approached High Court. High Court held that there was no provision in the concerned Rent Act and the order of condonation of delay was set aside. Aggrieved by this order of High Court, the tenant approached Supreme Court of India and it was held that there was no inherent power of the court to condone delay in filing proceedings in the court and there was no scope to have RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 11 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 recourse to provisions of Limitation Act when the Act provides a specific scheme to proceed in special Acts. I may mention here that the aforesaid case, the applicable Act was Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prithipal Singh (supra) held that the relevant provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act and Delhi Rent Control Act of this Act are pari materia and therefore, the law laid down in Prakash H. Jain (supra) are applicable to Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 also.

18. In nutshell, Hon'bel Supreme Court of India in Prithipal Singh (supra) clearly held that provision of The Limitation Act 1963 wuold not applicable to Delhi Rent Control Act, where specific limitation have been provided. In Director, Directorate of Education Vs. Mohd. Shamim & Ors. (supra) cited by Ld. Counsel for appellant, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has answered question B in terms of Prithipal Singh (supra). Thus, the legal proposition is now well settled to the effect that Additional Rent Controller has no power to condone any delay under Delhi Rent Control Act 1958.

19. Ld. ARC relied upon Om Prakash Vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi AIR 2010 Supreme Court 3791, decided on 27 August, 2010 which held that Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable to Rent Control Acts. Ld. Counsel for respondent has referred to Debasish Paul & RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 12 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 Anr. Vs. Amal Boral 2023 (2) RCR (Rent) 565 in which Hon'ble Supreme Court of India considered the question as to whether time to pay arrears of rent can be extended beyond the time provided by provision of Rent Act. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that the restricted provisions under the law providing a time period has to be applicable. Thus, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that time for depositing rent cannot be extended by taking help of Limitation Act.

20. In the cases where the application for re­entry is presented by evicted tenant, he has to show that the landlord had not occupied and used the premises within two months after getting its possession. It is the duty of the evicted tenant to remain vigilant and check as to whether or not the premises has been occupied and used by the landlord within two months from the date of eviction. An evicted tenant cannot be allowed to remain lethargic about the status of the demised premises and this is the reason that the limitation must start from the date on which the landlord had taken the possession of the rented premises. The provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act and Rules have to be strictly complied with. The tenant has been given a right to re­entry because non use of the demised premises by the landlord for two months after eviction would indicate that the landlord was not in urgent need of the premises. Therefore, the tenant, who wants to get RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 13 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 re­entry must be enthusiastic to keep an eye on the tenanted shop as soon as the period of two months counted from the date of taking possession by landlord expires. This is the reason that law provides six month limitation to the evicted tenant from the date of his eviction. If Section 5 of Limitation Act is allowed to be made applicable to Section 19(2) of DRC Act and Section 4 of DRC Rules, the purpose of these provisions would be frustrated. Therefore, the limitation of six months for filing of an application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act would start running immediately after completion of two months from the date of eviction. It must be kept in mind that the Tenancy Acts provide certain protection and special rights to the tenants beyond contractual rights. Such speical laws adversely restrict the right of landlords, which would have been available to such landlords under general law. When landlords have been put by law under disadvantageous situation, the provisions of law under special Tenancy Acts must be adhere to in letter and spirit. Therefore, no laxity in implementation of the tenancy laws can be accepted.

21. Admittedly in the present case, the appellant­tenant was evicted and possession of demised premises was taken by respondents­ landlords on 4.1.2018. The landlords were required to occupy and use the premises within two months i.e. by 4.3.2018 as per Section 19(2) RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 14 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 of DRC Act. The application for re­entry should have been filed by the evicted tenant within six months from 4.3.2018 as required under Rule 4 of Delhi Rent Control Rules. In other words, he should have filed the application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act before 4.9.2018. As already stated, the application was filed on 1.11.2019 i.e. much beyond the limitation period. Therefore, I fully agree with the findings of Ld. Additional Rent Controller on this issue.

22. Ld. Additional Rent Controller held that even if it is presumed that Section 5 of Limitation Act was applicable to Section 19(2) of DRC Act, no sufficient explanation has been furnished by the evicted tenant.

23. Ld. Counsel for appellant submits that if Ld. ARC was of the opinion that she had no power to condone the delay, she should not have rendered her opinion on the sufficiency of cause. I disagree with his submissions. Ld. ARC was fully empowered to look into the issue from all aspects. Therefore, she was justified in answering the question that if Section 5 of Limitation Act is made applicable, will she be able to allow the application.

24. As Ld. Counsel for appellant has referred to case law on Section 5 of Limitation Act, I would like to deal with the same. In Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co­operative Bank Ltd.

Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 And Anr., Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was dealing with the scope and ambit of Section 5 and Section 14 of The Limitation Act. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that where Section 14 strictly does not apply, the principles of Section 14 of The Limitation Act can be invoked to grant relief to an applicant under Section 5 of Limitation Act by purposively construing "sufficient cause" and that even if there is no formal application, the delay can be condoned. I may mention here that aforesaid principles of law have been laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in an appeal under Section 62 of The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India noted that the appellant for the first time raised the issue of limitation before NCLAT contending that the application under Section 7 of IBC was filed after five years from the date of accural of cause of action. NCLAT examined this issue and held that the bank in question had initiated proceedings against corporate debtor under SARFAPSI Act bonafidely and thus such period was entitled to be excluded under Section 14(2) of The Limitation Act and thereafter, NCLAT found the application of financial creditor/bank to be within limitation period. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India upheld the aforesaid order of NCLAT while discussing the scope and ambit of Section 5 and Section 14 of Limitation Act. In the said judgement, there was no dispute regarding RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 16 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 the applicability of Section 5 and Section 14 of Limitation Act in the aforesaid proceedings under Section 62 of The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. Therefore, the aforesaid principles of law are only applicable to the facts before Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and not to the cases under DRC Act.

25. In Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through LRs. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr., Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was dealing with a case, wherein a proceedings for acquisition of land, High Court of Delhi held that appellant had shown a sufficient cause for which appeal could not be filed within time and thereafter condoned delay of 479 days in filing of appeal. Supreme Court of India held that High Court had judiciously exercised discretion to condone the delay and held it to be a liberal and justice oriented approach. In this judgement Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has noted that the Union of India could not file appeal before High Court within the time due to long bureaucratic official process. In this judgement also, it was not the issue as to whether Section 5 of Limitation Act is applicable to an application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act.

26. In the judgements cited by Ld. Counsel for appellant "sufficiency of cause" as required under Section 5 of Limitation Act is strongly visible and therefore, the limitation period was extended in the said RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 17 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 cases. However, in the present application filed under Section 19(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, the appellant has stated that he noticed that a video clip dated 1.7.2018 on Face Book in July 2019. It is nowhere explained as to why he did not notice non occupation by landlord since 4.3.2018 when two months after the eviction had expired. Therefore, it is clear that appellant had no inclination to make a re­ entry. No­where in his petition, he has explained as to what prevented him to keep a watch on the status of the demised property.

27. In Director, Directorate of Education Vs. Mohd. Shamim & Ors. (supra), Hon'ble High Court has referred to dual test, which an applicant should pass, if he wants condonation of delay. The first test appellant's petition was required to pass was of being prevented by reasons beyond his control from making such application. In the application, the applicant has not stated anywhere as to what prevented him from filing an application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act for more than one year. In the application, he should have stated the reasons preventing him from filing application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act, which may be like his long illness, his long stay in a foreign country or the situations like outbreak of a pandemic or some natural disaster. The application is devoid of any such reason, which could persuade the court that there are genuine reasons which RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 18 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 prevented the tenant in filing re­entry application.

28. In Director, Directorate of Education Vs. Mohd. Shamim (supra), which is heavily relied upon by Ld. Counsel for appellant, the appellant was required to pass a second test also i.e. making out a substantial case for consideration of the application. It is stated in para 27 of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act that on 13.3.2019, the appellant­tenant had filed a curative petition no. (Civil) No.7 in Supreme Court of India assailing the eviction order. It appears that this averment was made with a view to convince Ld. ARC that as he was busy in pursuing legal remedies challenging the eviction order, he did not find it appropriate to file the present application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act. Clearly this is not a substantial reason for consideration of application under Section 5 of Limitation Act.

29. The appellant in his application under Section 5 of Limitation Act has stated that a video appeared in the Face Book, which shows that the shop in question was locked. In my opinion one video showing the shop locked does not mean that the shop in question was not occupied by the landlord. In the application, the applicant has stated that Jail Road Shopkeepers Welfare Association have given a certificate that respondents­landlords were running business at Shop No.3 and 4. It is submitted that it implies that respondent are not RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 19 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 running business from Shop No.1 i.e. the premises from which the appellant­tenant was evicted. I have seen these certificates, which are placed in the trial court record. The said certificates are dated 27.4.2007 i.e. much prior to the eviction of the appellant, which took place through court process on 4.1.2018. Therefore, same are not relevant for disposal of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. These facts show that the appellant has not been able to make out any substantial case for consideration of his application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act as well as under Section 5 of Limitation Act.

30. As the appellant's applications before Ld. ARC under Section 19(2) of DRC Act and under Section 5 of Limitation Act do not pass the twin test as specified in Director, Directorate of Education (supra), such applications must fail.

31. In view of the case law discussed above, I disagree that limitation period would start from the date when the fact of non occupation by landlords came to the knowledge of the evicted tenant. The limitation period would start immediately after two months from the date of eviction.

32. Further, I fully agree with Ld. ARC that the application under Section 19(2) of DRC Act is filed beyond limitation period. Even if it is presumed that provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act is applicable, RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 20 of 21 Joginder Singh Vs. Harminder Singh Chowdhary Judgement dt. 7.2.2024 no sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant­evicted tenant in the application to extend the limitation period. Accordingly, Ld. ARC has rightly dismissed the application.

33. Consequently, there is no substance in the appeal. Same is accordingly dismissed.

34. Copy of judgement along with the trial court record be remitted back to the Trial Court.

35. Appeal file be consigned to record.

Announced in the open court on 7.2.2024.

(Vinod Kumar) Rent Control Tribunal, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi RCT ARCT/11/2022 CNR No.: DLWT01­009318­2022 Page 21 of 21