Kerala High Court
Joseph vs Gulam Gasool on 21 November, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2002 A I H C 1613, (2002) 1 KER LJ 66 (2002) 1 KER LT 328, (2002) 1 KER LT 328
Author: B.N. Srikrishna
Bench: B.N. Srikrishna, M. Ramachandran
JUDGMENT B.N. Srikrishna, C.J.
1. The appellant is a landlord of certain lands leased out to the first respondent for commercial purposes. The first respondent has construed a building thereupon which is admittedly used for commercial purposes. Alleging that the first respondent was in arrears of rent, the appellant filed an application under Section 26 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with Rule 16 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970. An objection was taken to the maintainability of the said application. The Land Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the claim application of the appellant. Being aggrieved, the first respondent moved the learned single Judge by way of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Original Petition was allowed. Being aggrieved thereby, the first respondent is in appeal before us.
2. The learned Single Judge has taken the view that by reason of the exemption granted under Section 3(1) of the Act to leases for commercial purposes, the Land Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the first respondent. The relevant portion of Section 3 of the Act reads as under:
3. Exemptions.-(1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to-
xxx xxx xxx xxx
(iii) leases of land or of buildings or of both specified granted for industrial or commercial purposes; or xxx xxx xxx xxx
3. It is seen that the intention of the Legislature is not to apply anything contained in Chapter II to specified categories of leases, including lease of land or of buildings or of both specifically granted for industrial or commercial purposes. It is not in dispute that the lease of the appellant's land in favour of the first respondent was specifically of the type prescribed in Clause (iii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. Chapter II of the Act comprises several provisions commencing from Section 3 and ending with Section 80G. When the legislature by express provision at the commencement of Chapter II declares that nothing in the Chapter shall apply to leases of specified categories, what is meant thereby is that Sections 3 to 80G would not apply to leases of specified categories including the one specified in Clause (iii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. Consequently, Section 26 would not apply to such a lease at all. This is precisely the reasoning of the learned Single Judge.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant however placed great reliance on the non-obstante clause with which Sub-section (4) of Section 26 begins. The relevant sub-section is:
"(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force,no court or other authority or officer other than the Land Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain any claim for arrears of rent."
Learned counsel for the appellant urges that the force of the non obstante clause of Sub-section (4) of Section 26 operates not only against any law contained in any other enactment, but also against the provisions of all other sections contained in the Act itself. it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel. It is elementary that one reads an enactment from beginning to end. When one does so, one comes across Chapter II commencing from Section 3 which declares that nothing in that Chapter would apply to leases intended for commercial purposes falling within the description of Clause (iii) of Section 3(1). The impact of this exemption is that Section 26 itself would not apply to such a lease. Sub-section (4) is part and parcel of Section 26 and, therefore, in a situation when Section 26 is exempted, Sub-section (4) of Section 26 cannot operate independently. The non obstante clause Sub-section (4) could operate only if the entire Section 26 is allowed to operate. In our judgment, and as found by the learned Single Judge rightly, there is an exemption from the operation the entire provisions of Section 26 in the case of leases for commercial purposes falling within the ambit of Clause (iii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3. Thus, no part of Section 26 would apply; Sub-section (4) would also not apply. Ergo, the non obstante clause would not apply. The learned Judge is right in his decision that the Land Tribunal erroneously held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application of the first respondent and in setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal. We see no reason to differ from the view taken by the learned Single Judge.
5. Writ Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.