Gujarat High Court
Diyalbhai Lavjibhai Mathodiya vs State Of Gujarat on 7 April, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 7267 of 2022
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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DIYALBHAI LAVJIBHAI MATHODIYA & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR MAUNISH T PATHAK(5892) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4
NIYATI V VAISHNAV(6168) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR. RONAK RAVAL, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
Date : 07/04/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present application has been preferred for quashment of the FIR being C.R. No. 11190002220710 of 2022 dated 01.04.2022, registered with Botad Police Station, District Botad, for the offences punishable under Sections 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2) Page 1 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
2. As per the contents of the FIR lodged by the first informant, namely Himmatbhai Rajabhai Maru, it is stated that the complainant had been allotted land by the Government for Santhni purposes, admeasuring approximately 12 vighas, and is engaged in cultivation thereof. It is further alleged that the adjoining land falls under Zambrala Survey Number and is owned by one Diyalbhai Lavjibhai Mathodiya, however, he was in the habit of using the complainant's land as a passage to access his own field, which was objected to by the complainant. It is alleged that on 08.03.2022, while the complainant and one Dahyabhai Nathubhai Godavariya were present in the complainant's field, the accused persons named in the FIR attempted to use the said land as a pathway to reach their field. Upon objection being raised, the accused persons asserted that it was an old road and that they would continue to use the same. The complainant is stated to have questioned that if the said pathway were to be dug up, how the accused would continue to use it. It is further alleged that, upon such Page 2 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined exchange, the accused persons became agitated, used abusive language referring to the caste of the complainant, and issued threats that if the complainant proceeded to dig the pathway, he would face dire consequences. Upon intervention by the said Dahyabhai, the complainant returned to his residence. It is further stated that on 09.03.2022, the complainant dug up the said pathway and thereafter proceeded to Vadodara on 11.03.2022. Subsequently, on 26.03.2022, the complainant received a telephone call from one Damjibhai Virabhai Solanki informing him that the portion which had been dug up had been refilled by the accused persons, who had resumed using the said pathway to access their field. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, the FIR came to be lodged, which is the subject matter of challenge before this Court.
3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Maunish Pathak for the applicant, learned advocate Ms. Niyati Vaishnav for the complainant and learned APP Mr. Ronak Raval for the State.
4. Learned advocate Mr. Pathak, appearing for the Page 3 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined applicant, submits that the alleged incident is stated to have occurred on 08.03.2022, whereas the FIR came to be lodged on 01.04.2022, i.e., after a delay of more than 22 days. It is further submitted that there was no element of "alarm" caused to the complainant, which is a sine qua non for attracting the provisions of Sections 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Insofar as the allegations under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are concerned, it is contended that no statements of any independent witnesses have been recorded, nor is there any specific reference to the exact words allegedly used by the accused in relation to the caste of the complainant. It is further submitted that, in any case, the alleged incident cannot be said to have occurred in "public view," which is an essential requirement for constituting an offence under the Atrocities Act, and therefore, the impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is also contended that a bare reading of the FIR indicates that the dispute pertains to the use of a pathway, which is essentially of a civil nature, and instead of seeking appropriate remedies Page 4 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined under civil law, the present FIR has been lodged. It is thus submitted that neither the essential ingredients of the offences under the Atrocities Act nor those of criminal intimidation are satisfied in the present case, and therefore, the present application deserves to be allowed and the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed and set aside.
5. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Vaishnav submits that the investigation is yet to be concluded, and the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences. In such circumstances, it is contended that no interference is warranted at this stage, and the present application deserves to be rejected.
6. Learned APP Mr. Raval has also supported the submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the complainant and has urged that the present application be dismissed.
7. Having considered the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties, and upon perusal of the FIR registered for the offences punishable Page 5 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined under Sections 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, this Court deems it appropriate, at this stage, to refer to the relevant statutory provisions, which are reproduced hereinbelow:-
"Section 504 of IPC - Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace:
Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 506 of IPC - Punishment for criminal intimidation: Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. If the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, such punishment may extend to imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.Page 6 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined Section 114 of IPC - Abettor present when offence is committed: Whenever any person who, if absent, would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence.
Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Attrocities) Act, 1898:
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view, shall be punishable.
Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Attrocities) Act, 1898:
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view, shall be punishable.
Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Attrocities) Act, 1898:
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence specified in the Schedule to the Act against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, shall be punishable with such punishment as provided for the offence under the Indian Penal Code, and shall also be liable to fine."
8. For attracting the provisions of Sections 504 and 506(2) Page 7 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined of the Indian Penal Code, it is imperative that there is a specific reference to the abusive language alleged to have been used. Ordinarily, the nature and tenor of the abusive language constitute the determinative factor in assessing whether such language amounts to an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of peace, and not the particular temperament or conduct of the complainant. Mere use of abusive or discourteous language, rudeness, or insolence would not, by itself, amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504 of the IPC, unless such conduct contains the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of peace or any other offence. Furthermore, it must also be established that the accused intended, or knew it to be likely, that such provocation would cause the person insulted to breach the peace. To constitute an offence under Section 504 of the IPC, the insult must be of such a nature as is calculated to cause the aggrieved party to lose self-control and to act in a manner that would disturb public peace. Only upon satisfaction of these essential ingredients can the provisions of Page 8 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined Sections 504 and 506(2) of the IPC be said to be attracted.
9. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2026) 2 SCC 622, wherein the relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:-
15. Insofar as Section 294IPC is concerned, this Court in N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha [N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818] has explained the true purport and scope of Section 294. We quote the relevant observations as under: (SCC pp. 821-22, paras 6-9) "6. Section 294(b)IPC talks about the obscene acts and songs.
Section 294IPC as a whole reads thus:
'294. Obscene acts and songs.--Whoever, to the annoyance of others--
(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.'
7. It is to be noted that the test of obscenity under Section 294(b)IPC is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open Page 9 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined to such immoral influences. The following passage from the judgment authored by K.K. Mathew, J. (as his Lordship then was) reported in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko [P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko, 1967 SCC OnLine Ker 125 : 1967 KLT 799] explains as follows: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 5-6) '5. The only point argued was that the 1st accused has not committed an offence punishable under Section 294(b)IPC, by uttering the words abovementioned. The courts below have held that the words uttered were obscene and the utterance caused annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this view. In R. v. Hicklin [R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360] , QB at p. 371 Cockburn, C.J. laid down the test of "obscenity" in these words:
(QB p. 371) "... the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences...."
6. This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra [Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 52 : AIR 1965 SC 881] . In Roth v. United States [Roth v. United States, 1957 SCC OnLine US SC 106 : 1 L Ed 2d 1498 : 354 US 476 (1957)] , Warren, C.J. said that the test of "obscenity" is the 'substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires'. Harlan, J. observed that in order to be "obscene"
the matter must "tend to sexually impure thoughts". I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think that the words are "obscene" and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable under Section 294(b)IPC.' Page 10 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined
8. It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b). None of the records disclose the alleged words used by the accused. It may not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b)IPC.
9. To prove the offence under Section 294IPC mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellant-accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294(b)IPC is made out."
16. We fail to understand how the act of a police officer assaulting the complainant within public view or public as alleged would amount to an obscene act. Obscene act for the purpose of Section 294 has a particular meaning. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by themselves are not sufficient to attract the offence under Section 294IPC.
17. Thus, insofar as Section 294IPC is concerned, we are of the view that no case is made out to put the appellant-accused to trial.
18. We shall now deal with Sections 504 and 506IPC, respectively.
19. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through one of us, Page 11 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined J.B. Pardiwala, J., in its decision in Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. [Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219] explained what constitutes an offence of criminal intimidation. We quote the relevant paragraphs from the said decision as under: (SCC pp. 241-44, paras 25-34) "25. Chapter XXII IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:
'503. Criminal intimidation.--Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.--A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.
Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.'
26. Section 504 reads thus:
'504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.--Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment Page 12 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.'
27. Section 506 reads thus:
'506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.--Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.--and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.'
28. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:
(1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested.
(2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of Page 13 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined such threat.
29. Section 504IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender.
30. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
31. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section Page 14 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined 504IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In R. v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai [R. v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78] , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:
'To constitute an offence under Section 504IPC it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.'
32. A bare perusal of Section 506IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
33. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of Page 15 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined abuses is not stated in the FIR.
34. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present."
(emphasis in original)
20. Applying the principles as explained aforesaid, we are of the view that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Sections 504 and 506IPC, respectively, are borne out.
21. We fail to understand how the Magistrate could have directed the police to investigate into the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500IPC. We are at a loss to understand as to why this aspect was not looked into even by the High Court.
22. The aforesaid reflects the mechanical manner in which the order came to be passed for police investigation under Section 156(3)CrPC. It was expected of the High Court to look into all these relevant aspects before rejecting the petition filed by the appellant herein under Section 482CrPC.
23. The allegations as regards simple hurt also do not inspire any confidence.
24. This Court in a plethora of its decisions, more particularly in Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439 : (2015) 3 Page 16 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined SCC (Cri) 192] , has laid emphasis on the fact that the directions under Section 156(3) should be issued only after application of mind by the Magistrate. Para 22 of the said decision reads thus:
(SCC p. 456) "22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:
22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued.
22.2. The cases where the Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed".
Category of cases falling under para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under Section 202.
22.3. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case."
25. Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3)CrPC which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word "may". The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable Page 17 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police.
29. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that no case is made out to put the appellant-accused to trial for the alleged offence. Continuance of the investigation by the police will be nothing short of abuse of the process of law.
42. The impugned order [Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 13471] passed by the High Court is set aside. The order passed by the Magistrate directing police investigation under Section 156(3)CrPC is also set aside."
10. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that the FIR came to be lodged after a delay of 22 days, without specifying the exact words allegedly used by the accused for abusing the caste of the complainant. The only allegation is to the effect that the complainant was threatened with dire consequences if he proceeded to dig the field. However, despite such alleged threat, the complainant dug the field on 09.03.2022, which was subsequently refilled by the accused persons to facilitate passage to their field. In this factual backdrop, it cannot be said that the complainant was either intentionally insulted or provoked by the accused persons in a manner that would Page 18 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined lead to a breach of public peace or the commission of any offence. The essential ingredients required to attract the provisions of Sections 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, therefore, do not appear to be satisfied. Insofar as the allegations under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are concerned, it is an admitted position that the complainant has not specified the exact words allegedly used to insult his caste. To constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the said Act, it is necessary that the accused intentionally insults or intimidates a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe with an intent to humiliate such person in any place within public view.
11. The Apex Court, in the case of Karuppudayar Vs. State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215, has elucidated the distinction between the expressions "any place within public view" and "public place," the relevant extract whereof is reproduced hereinbelow:-
Page 19 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined "10. The term "any place within public view" initially came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh and others v. State through Standing Counsel and another2. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and another3 referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as under:
"14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view".
It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would (2008) 8 SCC 435 (2020) 10 SCC 710 certainly be a place within the public view.
On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. :
This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:"Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view."] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) "28. It has been Page 20 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view"
with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies." (emphasis in original)."
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place 'within public view', the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.
12. If we take the averments/allegations in the FIR at its face value, what is alleged is as under:
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NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined That on 2nd September 2021, while the complainant was engaged in his office doing his duty, the accused came to the office in the morning in order to enquire about the petition given by him already to the Revenue Divisional Officer regarding entering the name of his father in the 'patta'. On such enquiry being made, the complainant informed the accused that the said petition has been sent to the Taluk office, Lalgudi and that appropriate action would be taken after receipt of the reply from the Taluk Office, Lalgudi. It is alleged that at that stage, the accused asked the complainant as to what caste he belongs to and stated that the complainant belongs to 'Parayan' caste. Thereafter, the accused stated that, "if you people are appointed in Government service you all will do like this only...". Thereafter, he scolded the complainant calling his caste name and insulted him using vulgar words. The further allegation is that thereafter the colleagues of the complainant came there, pacified the accused and took him away.
13. Taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, it would reveal that what is alleged is that when the complainant was in his office the accused came there; enquired with the complainant; not being satisfied, started abusing him in the name of his caste; and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came there, pacified the accused and took him away.
14. It is thus clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the complainant. The other colleagues of the complainant arrived at the scene after the occurrence of the incident.
15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that since the incident has not taken place at a place which can be termed to be Page 22 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined a place within public view, the offence would not come under the provisions of either Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act."
12. Upon perusal of the material collected during the course of investigation, it emerges that, except for one Dahyabhai, who also belongs to the same caste as the complainant, no other person was present at the time of the alleged incident. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are satisfied. Furthermore, there is no material on record to indicate that the alleged incident was witnessed by any independent person so as to establish that the offence was committed within "public view," which is a sine qua non for attracting the aforesaid provisions.
13. Insofar as the offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is concerned, it is an admitted position that the foundational ingredients of the scheduled offence under Section 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, as discussed hereinabove, are not satisfied. In such Page 23 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026 undefined circumstances, it is evident that there are no specific averments on record constituting the alleged offence. Consequently, the continuation of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and circumstances, the impugned FIR being C.R. No. 11190002220710 of 2022 dated 01.04.2022 is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, all further and consequential proceedings arising therefrom shall also stand quashed and set aside.
15. In view of the aforesaid, the present application deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed.
16. Rule is made absolute.
(M. K. THAKKER,J) NIVYA A. NAIR Page 24 of 24 Uploaded by MRS. NIVYA ABHAY NAIR(HC01901) on Thu Apr 09 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Apr 09 22:55:45 IST 2026