Supreme Court - Daily Orders
M. Kalegowda @ Kala vs The State Of Karnataka on 3 August, 2022
Author: Bela M. Trivedi
Bench: Bela M. Trivedi
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1135 OF 2022
(SLP (Crl.) No. 8430/2021)
M. KALEGOWDA @ KALA & ORS. APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA RESPONDENT
O R D E R
Leave granted.
M. Kalegowda, Vasu, Fayaz, Anila and one Viji who has died, were convicted by the trial court,1 for the offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 2 in the charge-sheet arising out of FIR No. 106/2005 registered at Police Station Metagalli, District Mysore, Karnataka. The conviction was upheld by the first appellate court3. By the impugned judgment dated 30th March, 2021, the High Court4 has dismissed their revision petition and affirmed their conviction, albeit modified the sentence awarded.
Conviction of M. Kalegowda and Vasu has been made and sustained on the basis of the joint disclosure statements recorded immediately after their arrest on 20 th 1 The appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year six months and a fine of Rs. 500/- each, and in default payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months.
2 For short, ‘IPC’
3 Not
Signature The
Verified first appellate court modified the sentence to simple imprisonment for one year Digitally signed by and eight months and a fine of Rs. 500/- each, and in default of payment of SONIA BHASIN Date: fine 2022.08.08 to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 15:19:39 IST 4 The High Court modified the sentence to simple imprisonment of one year and six Reason: months with fine and the default clause. 1 July, 2005 by N.H. Ramachandraiah (PW-11), marked as Exhibit P-15 and P-17, respectively, consequent to which it is claimed that recovery of the stolen articles, namely, regulator-cum-escape sluice, four gear boxes and gear rod were made. The articles were stolen on 17th July, 2005 from the reservoir of the Irrigation Department at Echalaguthi, Mysore. There is no other evidence and material to implicate and connect M. Kalegoeda and Vasu with the crime.
The law on joint disclosure statements and its contours has been explained by this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) versus Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, wherein it has been held :
“145. ……Joint disclosures, to be more accurate, simultaneous disclosures, per se, are not inadmissible under Section 27. “A person accused” need not necessarily be a single person, but it could be plurality of the accused. It seems to us that the real reason for not acting upon the joint disclosures by taking resort to Section 27 is the inherent difficulty in placing reliance on such information supposed to have emerged from the mouths of two or more accused at a time. In fact, joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in a chorus. At best, one person would have made the statement orally and the other person would have stated so substantially in similar terms a few seconds or minutes later, or the second person would have given unequivocal nod to what has been said by the first person. Or, two persons in custody may be interrogated separately and simultaneously and both of them may furnish similar information leading to the discovery of fact. Or, in rare cases, both the accused may reduce the information into writing and hand over the written notes to the police officer at the same time. We do not think that such disclosures by two or more persons in police custody go out of the purview of Section 27 altogether. If information is given one 2 after the other without any break, almost simultaneously, and if such information is followed up by pointing out the material thing by both of them, we find no good reason to eschew such evidence from the regime of Section 27. However, there may be practical difficulties in placing reliance on such evidence. It may be difficult for the witness (generally the police officer), to depose which accused spoke what words and in what sequence. In other words, the deposition in regard to the information given by the two accused may be exposed to criticism from the standpoint of credibility and its nexus with discovery. Admissibility and credibility are two distinct aspects, as pointed out by Mr Gopal Subramanium. Whether and to what extent such a simultaneous disclosure could be relied upon by the Court is really a matter of evaluation of evidence. With these prefatory remarks, we have to refer to two decisions of this Court which are relied upon by the learned defence counsel.” In the context of the present case, as far as the appellants M. Kalegowda and Vasu are concerned, there is no other evidence and material to show their involvement in the occurrence, except for the two disclosure statements, marked as Exhibit P-15 and P-17, respectively, which as per the prosecution were made simultaneously and on the same day on their arrest on 20th July, 2005. In Navjot Sandhu case, this Court has observed that joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more accused persons would not normally make the same statement or utter informatory words exactly at the same time. At best, one of them would make the statement orally and the others would follow or give similar statements after a few seconds or minutes. Two or more persons in custody, when interrogated, can both furnish identical information, albeit there would be some time gap 3 between the statements. However, in rare cases, the two or more accused may furnish information almost at the same time. Consequently, if such information is given without any break, almost simultaneously and is followed up by pointing out the material thing by the two or more accused persons, the recovery pursuant to the disclosure would be admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 5, but there would be practical difficulty in placing reliance on such evidence as it may be impossible for the witness to depose which accused person spoke what words and in what sequence. Where information has been received from another accused first in point of time, it cannot be used against another accused who subsequently makes an identical disclosure statement. There cannot be multiple disclosure or re- disclosure statement, as otherwise provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act would be rendered futile and ineffective. In such circumstances the evidence relying on Section 27 of the Evidence Act would be open to challenge on the ground of suspicion that the police have deliberately attributed similar confessional statements relating to the facts discovered to different accused persons. Such cases demand cautious approach. In Lachhman Singh and two others v. State, AIR 1952 SC 167, this Court has held that the court should look for clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authentic statement so as to implicate and
5 For short, “Evidence Act”.
4 connect a particular accused with the discovery of the new or unknown fact resulting in the recovery of the physical article connected with the crime.
Court depositions regarding the information given by two or more accused may be exposed to criticism from the point of credibility and its nexus with discovery. Thus, even if the joint disclosure statements are admissible, the evidentiary value and credibility attached to them can be a matter of debate and issue. In the present context there is lack of any evidence or material so as to segregate or otherwise to connect one of the two appellant-accused, namely, K. Kalegowda or Vasu with the recovery of the stolen articles. Further the third accused Viji, who had expired had made a similar disclosure resulting the purported recovery of the stolen articles, which complicates and further weakens the case of the prosecution against K.Kalegowda or Vasu. The law of circumstantial evidence mandates that the court should be satisfied that the accused has committed the offence, albeit the evidence and the material on record should also exclude the possibility of a third person committing the same offence.
In light of the aforesaid legal position, we would accept the present appeal and accordingly, acquit M. Kalegowda and Vasu giving them benefit of doubt. As already noted, Viji, who is also convicted by the trial court and whose conviction has been upheld by the Sessions Court and 5 the High Court, has expired.
As far as appellants Fayaz and Anila are concerned, their case is on a better footing. No recoveries are stated to be made, on the basis of their disclosure statements. They have been convicted primarily as their names were given by M. Kalegowda, Viji and Vasu. It is claimed that they had identified the location from where the recoveries of the stolen articles were earlier made. This does not satisfy the mandate of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Their conviction, therefore, cannot be upheld and sustained. They are, thus, also entitled to acquittal.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we allow the present appeal and set aside the conviction of M. Kalegowda @ Kala, Vasu, Fayaz and Anila, arising out of FIR No. 106/2005 under Section 379 of the IPC. They are hereby acquitted. The appellants are already on bail. Their bail bonds would be cancelled.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………………………. .J. [SANJIV KHANNA] ……………………………………………. .J. [ BELA M. TRIVEDI] NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 3, 2022.
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ITEM NO.13 COURT NO.12 SECTION II-C
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 8430/2021 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 30-03-2021 in CRLRP No. 3/2012 passed by the High Court Of Karnataka At Bengaluru) M. KALEGOWDA @ KALA & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Respondent(s) (IA No. 143513/2021 - APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION IA No. 143516/2021 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. IA No. 143509/2021 - GRANT OF BAIL) Date : 03-08-2022 These matters were called on for hearing today. CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE BELA M. TRIVEDI For Petitioner(s) Mr. C.B. Gururaj, Adv.
Mr. Vaibhav Sehgal, Adv.
Mr. Animesh Dubey, Adv.
Mr. Prakash Ranjan Nayak, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(SONIA BHASIN) (DIPTI KHURANA)
COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
[Signed Order is placed on the file]
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