Bombay High Court
Prabhakar Manoharrao Deshpande vs Appropriate Authority on 18 June, 2002
Equivalent citations: (2004)186CTR(BOM)270, [2004]266ITR292(BOM)
Author: R.G. Deshpande
Bench: R.G. Deshpande, P.S. Brahme
ORDER R.G. Deshpande, J.
1. The petitioners have approached this Court challenging the order dt. 24th Feb., 1995 passed in case No. AHD/AA/NAG-241/1994-95 by respondent No. 1, the Appropriate Authority, IT Department under Section 269UD(1) of the IT Act, 1961 (which is hereinafter referred to as "Act") for the purposes of brevity.
2. The facts which are necessary to be narrated for the purposes of this decision, in short are as under :
The matter relates to disposal of the disputed property by the petitioners in a manner so as to develop the property in pursuance of an agreement arrived at between the petitioners and a contractor, the details of which can be narrated as under:
The property concerned is a Nazul plot No. 34, admeasuring 17,807 sq. ft. together with the existing residential premises bearing house No. 38 (new), situated at Cement Road, Dharampeth Extension, Shivaji Nagar, Nagpur within the municipal limits in Ward No. 73. The petitioners claim to be the owners of the property which was originally belonging to Mr. Manohar K. Deshpande, who had acquired the same on leasehold rights and subsequently constructed a residential house thereon. Present petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 are the sons and daughters of late Mr. Manohar K. Deshpande. Mr. M.K. Deshpande, the father of petitioner Nos. 1 to 5, expired on 3rd January, 1982 and their mother expired on 31st Oct., 1991. Prior to his death, as is clear from the record. Mr. M.K. Deshpande, along with his son--petitioner No. 2 Rajaram sold certain portion of the property in question, to one Vasudeo Shivankar. That was on 30th Dec., 1957. Since it was a benami transaction in the name of Vasudeo, he relinquished his rights in the property in question in favour of his brother Baliram Shivankar, who was original petitioner No. 6 in this petition. In short, along with Deshpande, Baliram has also become owner of certain portion of the property, sold in the property in his favour.
3. Because of certain differences and disputes between Deshpande and Shivankar, petitioner No. 6 had initiated Regular Civil Suit No. 150/1963 against Deshpande for eviction and arrears of rent etc. The suit was decreed and the same was maintained throughout. Simultaneously, proceedings were initiated by Mr. Deshpande, petitioner No. 1, vide Regular Civil Suit No. 849/1964 which was decided on 31st Oct., 1969, by the Joint Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) Nagpur. This was a suit for partition and separate possession in respect of the said property. However, the suit came to be dismissed which prompted the plaintiff in that suit to file another civil suit for title which was registered as Special Civil Suit No. 2/1976. Needless to mention that it was also against Baliram Shivankar--petitioner No. 6. This was a suit again where relief was sought in the nature of declaration and injunction and the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Nagpur decreed the same in favour of Mr. Deshpande, which was taken in appeal at the instance of Mr. Shivankar vide Civil Appeal No. 205/1982, but was dismissed. However, second appeal in that matter, which was registered as Second Appeal No. 75/1987, was partly decreed, whereby the decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 2/1976 was modified and ultimately, the matter was required to be taken to the Supreme Court of India at the instance of Baliram Shivankar vide SLP No. 180/1991, which concluded in compromise before the Supreme Court. The litigating parties settled their disputes through their compromise. However, before the Supreme Court, the daughter of Mr. Manoharrao Deshpande namely Mrs. Neelam S. Kalikar objected to the compromise. However, in spite of that objection, the compromise was recorded in the Supreme Court. However, so far as regards rights of Neelam Kalikar was concerned, the point to that effect was left open.
4. In short, suffice it is to observe that so far as regards the litigation between the petitioners inter se, is yet burning and not concluded.
5. Regarding the property in question, there are various litigations pending between the landlords and tenants. There are two tenants in the property in question i.e., one Arun Gosewade and another Shri Krishna Bhagade. This litigation, no doubt, is between Baliram and those two tenants it is the contention of the petitioners that there are about 8 such civil suits pending between the parties to which detailed reference is made by the petitioners is para 11 of the petition. For the purpose of present decision, suffice it is to observe that the property is not free from any encumbrances in all respects and that the property is not further free from various types of litigations. These are the aspects which no doubt would carry importance in the present type of matter, wherein the respondents are taking action under Section 269UD of the Act.
6. Admittedly, the petitioners including Mr. Shivankar entered into an agreement of development and sale of the entire plot with Mr. Mohanlal Raojibhai Kothari and Mr. Mahesh Purshottam Kothari vide agreement dt. 27th Oct., 1994. The agreement was based on very many terms and conditions and relevant contents thereof will be referred to at appropriate stage in the subsequent paragraphs.
7. In view of the abovesaid agreement, naturally, the petitioners are required to fill in Form No. 37-I under Rule 48, intimating the IT Department about the transaction and seeking necessary sanction for the delay. Details about the property have been mentioned in the form. This naturally indicated the apparent consideration for the alleged transfer of the property in question which is shown at Rs. 69,44,730.
8. Respondent No. 1, after taking into consideration the contents of form, appeared to have formed an opinion that the apparent consideration indicated in the form appeared to be totally understated or less than the market price and the natural presumption entertained by the authority concerned was that of intention to evade tax and defraud the Government. This prompted the authority concerned to issue a notice under Section 269UD(1) of the IT Act, 1961 calling upon the petitioners as to why an order should not be passed under Section 269UD(1). By the same notice, the petitioners were directed that, if they so desired to avail opportunity of being heard, they should remain present before the Appropriate Authority respondent No. 1 on 21st Feb., 1995 at 11.00 A.M. The petitioners were also directed to submit their written say or submissions so as to reach in the office of respondent No. 1 on or before 21st Feb., 1995. Pertinent it is to note at this stage that this notice is dt. 10th Feb., 1995 issued from Ahmedabad. But, virtually it appears to have been posted on 13th Feb., 1995.
9. Mr. K.H. Deshpande, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, along with Mr. Purohit, advocate pointed out specifically that a specific statement to that effect though is not made in the petition, however, the original envelope through which the notice was received, clearly indicates that the date of dispatch from Ahmedabad was 13th Feb., 1995. Mr. Deshpande, however, further made a specific statement that, in the petition, he has specifically mentioned that said notice was received by the petitioners on 15th Feb., 1995 and this date is not disputed by the respondents in any manner. In view of this and as is clear from the record, no doubt there were six days available for the petitioners to get themselves prepared in that respect so as to defend their claim. It is also necessary to make a passing reference to one aspect in the matter that, out of the abovesaid six days, there were two days which were holidays i.e., Saturday and Sunday. Thus, factually working days at the disposal of the petitioners could be only four days. Since the petitioners were called at Ahmedabad, naturally, they were supposed to travel from Nagpur to Ahmedabad by some mode available and which was not to take time, less than two days for the petitioners to reach at Ahmedabad i.e., at least a day in advance. Thus, factually, there remained two days at the disposal of the petitioners to prepare all these things, to collect the documents and other evidence and appear including that of instructing legal advisor, getting things drafted, etc.
10. On 21st Feb., 1995, however, the petitioners presented themselves before respondent No. 1 through their power of attorney holder, one Mr. Ramesh Nagorao Pise. On the same day, reply to the notice under Section 269UD(1) of the Act was submitted on behalf of the petitioners, giving as far as possible details as to why it was not a fit case wherein an action under Section 269UD could be taken. In the reply, which was no doubt filed on behalf of the transferors only, it was specifically pointed out that the authority concerned was absolutely wrong in equating value of the present property with the value of the property which was situated in Civil Lines area of Nagpur. Most of the points, which were referred to in the notice of respondent No. 1, are denied throughout the reply to the notice giving details about the same and requesting the authority concerned invoking the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the Act, were absolutely unwarranted in the present case. In the reply, the petitioners rightly mentioned that the property was not free from litigations and encumbrances, which definitely had tremendous adverse effect in fixing the value of the property. Rather the price was no doubt severally hampered because of the various litigations and more so, when the property is virtually branded as the property in litigation. The petitioners, therefore, had requested for dropping the proceedings holding that there was no underestimation in the price fixed much less 15 per cent and above than the market value. The sale instances which were taken into consideration by the authority concerned for fixing price of the property under consideration was also pointed to be totally wrong and it was pointed out that the prices of those properties could not be taken into consideration for the property which were situated far away from Civil Lines area definitely beyond three kms.
11. Along with its reply to the notice, the petitioners also submitted necessary documents such as valuation report from architect and registered valuer, Mr. S.W. Raje. The valuer's report also is in detail along with certain documents including map etc. which were also produced along with the reply.
12. On the date of hearing i.e., 21st Feb., 1995, an application was filed on behalf of the petitioners seeking permission to lead evidence in support of the reply to notice under Section 269UD(1). In this application, the petitioners specifically sought for an opportunity to lead evidence on oath, either in person or through affidavit, by disputing the evidence indicating the correct position as to the circumstances in which the value of the property was fixed at the apparent price shown in the Form No. 37-I of the Rules,
13. It was further specifically mentioned in application that some of the parties since resided at Pune and Delhi, it was necessary for rest of the petitioners to establish contact with these vendors so as to tender their evidence at appropriate time. The petitioners, therefore, sought for necessary opportunity and expected it to be granted by respondent No. 1.
14. However, to the surprise of the petitioner, no order on this application was passed by respondent No. 1 and appeared to have left unconsidered. Since the representative of the petitioners Mr. Bhise was present, he was heard and the authority concerned passed an order which is dt. 24th Feb., 1995, whereby respondent No. 1 reached to the conclusion that the apparent consideration/discounted consideration was below the market value, and considered the value of the property at the relevant time. As was indicated in the show-cause notice, the apparent price is understated by more than 17 per cent and therefore, the authority considered it to be a fit case where an order of pre-emptive purchase under Section 269UD(1) of the Act was called for. The net consideration to be paid to the Central Government was determined at Rs. 64,02,234 including Rs. 14,99,996 paid by the transferee upto the date of agreement. It is this order which is under challenge before this Court.
15. While passing the order, the learned members--Appropriate Authority, on the basis of the inspection made by the members Appropriate Authority, Ahmedabad reached to the conclusion that the apparent and discounted consideration appeared to have been understated by 15 per cent and more and certain sale instances were taken into consideration to which reference is made in the impugned order. While reaching to this conclusion, the authority concerned did consider the sale transactions in respect of plot Nos. 89,135 and 17 of Shivaji Nagar, Nagpur and those were on the basis of record which was produced during the course of hearing before the authority concerned by the Department. These files were having numbers 116/223, 124/231, 113/219. However, pertinent it is to note that no reference to the details was ever made in the notice under Section 269UD issued under the Act to the petitioners.
16. So far as regards the point of location was concerned, all the properties i.e., the property under consideration and the properties, the sale instances of which are taken into consideration, it appears that the Appropriate Authority was not made aware about the exact geological position of these two locations i.e., Dharampeth Extension and Civil Lines, Nagpur. On this point, there was no dispute before this Court between the parties that there is quite a long distance between the two areas and the sale instances of the properties in Civil Lines, by no stretch of imagination could be considered for the purposes of finding out the value of property in Shivaji Nagar i.e., Dharampeth Extension. No doubt, both these localities of Nagpur are one of the best localities, however, so far as regards valuation is concerned. Dharampeth Extension in ordinary course, as is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, would not stand in comparison with the Civil Lines area so far as regards valuation is concerned. The authorities further observed that since the discounted consideration was worked out on the basis of Rule 48-I of the 1962 Rules, there could not be said to be any mistake in calculation thereof when the Department arrived at the conclusion that the discounted consideration or understated consideration was 15 per cent or more. Unexpected rise or appreciation in the price in the preceding 12 to 13 months appears to have been taken into consideration by the authority concerned without there being any proof of the record. The Appropriate Authority concerned also observed that so far as regards it related to the liabilities of tenants to which reference was made in the reply, the authorities no doubt observed that there were certain litigations going on. However, according to the authority concerned, it was the responsibility of the authorities themselves to settle the matter with the tenants and so far as regards nature of the litigation was concerned, the authorities concerned observed that the same was only as regards recovery of rent and therefore, both these points, according to the authorities concerned, did not adversely affected the price of the property in question. So far as regards point raised by the petitioners before the authority concerned as regards financial position of the petitioners is concerned and the need of the petitioners, the Appropriate Authority observed that it was simply an argument without any evidence to that effect on the record. So far as regards jurisdiction point was concerned, the same authority observed saying that Appropriate Authority had' no doubt jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the Act. It is this order which has adversely affected the petitioners and prompted them to challenge the same.
17. We heard Mr. K.H. Deshpande, the senior advocate for the petitioners, at length. Mr. Deshpande, while scathingly assailing the order of respondent No. 1 contended that the whole approach of the authority concerned clearly indicates that there could be no better example of arbitrariness than this. Mr. Deshpande contended that the approach of the authority concerned clearly demonstrates that it was totally perfunctory and non-application of mind to the facts of the case in proper prospective.
18. Mr. Deshpande, while dealing with order, point by point, contended that the sale instance of the property bearing house No. 169, Ward No. 66, Ravindra Tagore Marg, Civil Lines, Nagpur, which was considered by the authority concerned, was from Civil Lines area. According to Mr. Deshpande, the property under consideration is situated far away from this property which was taken for instance. The advocates appearing before us in this case do not dispute that the distance between the two areas is not less than 3 kms. and we do not have any difficulty in accepting this statement and taking judicial note thereof. It is really surprising that how the authority concerned compared these two sale instances when the areas are different, the value of the properties in these two areas is quite different and further pertinent it is to note, and as is rightly argued by Mr. Deshpande that, no details of the properties are given so as to show what was the size of the properties and other details, so far as regards sale transaction was concerned, what were the situations in which that property was sold whether vendors therein were in anyway compelled and constrained to dispose of the property or otherwise and very many other things including the area of the property, its surroundings, its approaches and its commercial potentials.
19. Mr. Deshpande, in our opinion, rightly, further pointed out that Dharampeth Extension i.e., Shivaji Nagar area, where the property in question is situated, is totally and absolutely a residential locality. A stray office of any commercial institution may be there, but factually, it is a residential locality only and that too mostly of the middle class and higher middle class people. Therefore, according to Mr. Deshpande, it was incorrect on the part of the Appropriate Authority to have compared these two sale instances for the purposes of invoking powers under Section 269UD(1) of the Act.
20. Mr. Deshpande further pointed out that, while dealing with this point, the authority concerned did take into consideration the very many offices established and situated in Civil Lines area. However, we wish not to dilate on this point for the very simple reason that these two areas, by no stretch of imagination, can be compared in any manner, so far as regards valuation of the property is concerned. Civil Lines area is a vast locality very widely spread having High Court, District Court, offices of All India Radio, Air Lines and sales-tax and majority of Central Government offices. Such is not the position so far as regards the area in question i.e., Shivaji Nagar. It appears that the Appropriate Authority was much impressed by the 80 ft. wide cement road in Dharampeth Extension. However, that cannot be a thing which should have so much impressed the authority concerned for reaching to the conclusions that, the apparent consideration shown, was definitely understated and that too more than 15 per cent. It is really surprising that the sale instances, which were considered by the authority concerned from Dharampeth Extension area while dealing with the matter, did not form part and parcel of the notice under Section 269UD(1) of the Act. These sale instances to which reference is made are referred to in sub-para (9) of para 3 of the order. However, these were the instances which were pointed out by the petitioners. However, the authorities did not consider the same observing that those were not relevant. In fact, these were the files which the Department was asked to show at the request of the petitioner. We have, therefore, no slightest hesitation in accepting the argument of Mr. Deshpande on this point that the property, the sale instances of which was taken into consideration was from Civil Lines area, for fixing the price of the property under consideration, which could not have been considered at all. There could not be any comparison between the two and therefore, the authority, in our opinion, did commit an error in equating these two properties in fixing the value of the property in Dharampeth Extension.
21. Mr. Deshpande further contended that the Appropriate Authority did commit an error in arriving at discounted consideration at Rs. 358. While dealing with this aspect, the Appropriate Authority wrongly rejected the contentions raised by the petitioners, observing that no error whatsoever has been pointed out in this calculation. In fact, as is apparent from the rules i.e., Rule 48-I, the rate of interest for determination of the discounted value of consideration under Sub-Clause (1) or Sub-clause (2) of Clause (d) of Section 269UD has to be eight per cent p. a. Even otherwise, this was not going to, according to Mr. Deshpande, increase the valuation of the property so as to indicate that there was concealment or understating by 15 per cent in our opinion. Therefore, even otherwise, assuming for the sake of argument that there could not be any mistake so far as calculation of 8 per cent is concerned, it was not in any manner going to increase the sale proceeds of the property under consideration and definitely not more than 15 per cent as alleged.
22. It was the contention of the petitioners before the authority concerned that there was no considerable appreciation in the value of the real estate in the preceding 12 to 13 months. This contention of the petitioners was totally rejected by the authority concerned simply observing that:
"It is a common knowledge and no evidence is required to lead to prove that there has been a considerable appreciation in the value of immovable property in the last 12 to 13 months in all the important cities and Nagpur is no exception."
We are really surprised to note such type of observation in the order, the cognizance of which, much less judicial cognizance cannot be taken unless the documents and evidence to that effect is produced on the record. Even assuming for the sake of argument that there may be some escalation, but, unless and until it is brought on record as to what was the rate of escalation, what was the percentage thereof and if at all there was any escalation, what was the reason for a sudden shoot up in the prices, decision based on gathered knowledge by the authority concerned from other sources cannot be used while deciding the matter judicially or in a quasi-judicial decision. This conclusion drawn by the Appropriate Authority, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Merely because it was said that prices were increased, it would not mean that the judicial authorities and the quasi-judicial authorities could straightway accept the same, without there being any proof to that effect on the record.
23. Mr. A.S. Jaiswal, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, contended that the decision arrived at by the Appropriate Authority was just and proper and justifiable. However, when a pointed question was put to the learned advocate for the respondents as regards comparison of two properties i.e., the property in Civil Lines and the property in Dharampeth Extension i.e., Shivaji Nagar, he just made a feeble attempt to support the findings of the Department on this point. In our opinion, Mr. Jaiswal though was aware of the factual position in the town, he however, tried to contend that since price of the properties have been understated, the authority was justified invoking the powers under Section 269UD(1) of the Act. However, in our opinion, all these attempts, by which Mr. Jaiswal tried to support the order, were just feeble attempts as it is an order, which even otherwise is difficult to defend.
24. Mr. Deshpande, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that while determining the price of the property in question i.e., the property under consideration, very many, aspects are required to be taken into consideration, such as its demand in the investment or its commercial potential, annual net income of the property which may be yielded in future, the sale instances to be compared from the same locality or nearby locality, but, definitely, not the locality which is situated far away from the spot where the property under consideration is situated, the nature of the locality whether residential or otherwise, encumbrances and other factors hampering the price thereof, involvement of the property in litigation and such other consideration which could be said to be the limitations imposed on the property either by vendors or vendee. Mr. Deshpande, the learned advocate, contended that no doubt if there is understanding of the price to the tune of 15 per cent and more, in ordinary course, it was open for the authority concerned to presume that this understating has been made with a view to evade tax. However, at the same time, Mr. Deshpande contended that this presumption is rebuttable and opportunity to that effect has been given to the party concerned. Mr. Deshpande further contended that pre-emptive acquisition of the property under Section 269UD of the Act would definitely. prove to be punitive for the vendor or vendee and therefore, before taking any such harsh action, it was very much necessary for the authority concerned to consider all the points germane to the object for which Chapter XX-C of the Act has been introduced.
25. After having considered all the arguments and the points raised on behalf of both the parties, we see that the notice issued by respondent No. 1 under Section 269UD does not disclose all the material on the basis of which it could be said to have been issued, much less the details thereof and therefore, the interest of the petitioner could be said to have been totally prejudiced. If the authority concerned reached to the conclusion that there was concealment or understating on the part of petitioners on the basis of sale deed, then, in that case, it was very much incumbent on the part of the authority concerned to have annexed all the relevant documents giving details of the property, such as sale transactions and the details thereof including the size and otherwise, so as to give appropriate opportunity to the petitioners to defend themselves,
26. We also see that the time, which was taken by the authority concerned for issuing notice under Section 269UD, was much more, thereby leaving a short period at the disposal of the petitioners to defend themselves. We have already pointed out in the foregoing paragraphs that there was hardly any time for the petitioners to make preparation and to defend themselves. In spite of having made a specific request for permission to lead evidence either orally or by way of affidavit, it appears that the same has not been considered by the authority concerned and we are of the opinion that the authority intentionally did not do the same as the time was running out against the Department. It is pertinent to note that the Form No. 37-I under Rule 48-I was submitted on 8th Nov., 1994. The period for issuing notice under Section 269UD was three months from the last date of the month, in which the form is submitted. So virtually the notice came to be issued in the third month itself i.e., virtually at the fag end of the period of limitation and thereafter, the authority concerned started making haste to dispose of the matter, else it would not have been possible to take action under Chapter XX-C of the Act for the respondents. We see no justification for such haste as it is not clear from the record as to why the authority did waste all this time for issuing notice under Section 269UD and if at all the authority took very much time to think over the matter of issuance of notice after getting whatsoever material it might have collected, then, in applying the same ratio, we find it very difficult to accept as to how the petitioners could collect all the material within a couple of days time only. It is pointed out that notice was received on 15th Feb., 1995 and the petitioners were expected to represent themselves with all the details on 21st February, though the matter was no doubt shunted for one day only. We, therefore, find that this cannot be said to be reasonable opportunity afforded to the petitioners to defend themselves.
27. Principles of natural justice are not embodied in law. However, that by itself would not mean that the authorities were justified at their own whims to refuse said opportunity to the petitioner. We are, on this point, totally fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India wherein the Supreme Court specifically observed that:
"Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. It is an established principle that the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. It is also well known that these rules of natural justice can operate only in the areas not covered by any law validly made. In short, these rules can be said to be supplement to law and not supplant the law."
28. In the instant matter, we have already observed that though it is the decision of the authority concerned which prompted the authority to initiate the action under Section 269UD, however, this satisfaction of the authority concerned for initiating the action for pre-emptive acquisition has to be a subjective satisfaction of objective facts. We see that respondent No. 1 Appropriate Authority is totally lacking in this respect, much less when it did not take into consideration even the application made by the petitioner for permission to lead evidence.
29. We asked the learned counsel for the respondents as to whether any order was passed by the authority concerned on that application, Mr. Jaiswal, the learned counsel, expressed that there appeared to be no order passed on that application. We even do not find reference to that application in the impugned order. We have to observe that the authority concerned totally failed to act itself within the ambit of the principles of natural justice.
30. The authority concerned also did not take into consideration that the agreement clearly indicated that the vendors had put very many and major restrictions so far as regards development was concerned. Suffice it to refer to the point which deals with preserving of one tree which is said to be pious and further construction of flats in such a way so that the flats of petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 would face the tree. That clearly means that there were certain restrictions on the development which were bound to adversely affect the price of the property.
31. The authorities concerned did not take into consideration the litigations between the parties to which reference has been made in the petition and further that, in spite of the matter having gone to the Supreme Court of India, so far as regards the title of Mrs. Neelam Kalikar was concerned, it was a point yet to be decided, which clearly mean that there was yet another dent on the property in the nature of apprehended civil litigation by the youngest daughter of Mr. M.K. Deshpande.
32. If the sale instances of the adjoining areas would have been taken into consideration by the authorities concerned in proper prospective, it would not have been much difficult for the authority concerned to have arrived at the decision that there is no understating as regards value is concerned. However, the authority turned totally blind eye towards these aspects and reached to the erroneous conclusions that the vendors did understate the value and with an intention to evade the tax thereof. We find it difficult to agree with the learned Appropriate Authority on this point. We find considerable substance in this petition and taking into consideration the time which has been spent so far in this litigation, we do not find it even appropriate to remit the same to the authorities concerned for the decision afresh. We have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order for the reasons stated above.
33. In the circumstances, the impugned order dt. 24th Feb., 1995 passed by the Appropriate Authority in the case No. AHD/AA/NAG-241/1994-95 is quashed and set aside. If the respondents have deposited the amount in pursuance of the decision under Section 269UD of the Act, they are at liberty to withdraw the same.
In the circumstances the petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. Costs is quantified at Rs. 15,000 to be borne by the Department and to be paid to the petitioners.