Karnataka High Court
The State Of Karnataka vs Dr.Prashant S/O Kbhimashankar on 4 January, 2022
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 4 DAY OF JANUARY 2022
TH
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.100117 OF 2020
BETWEEN
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY STATE
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING, DHARWAD.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI G.I.GACHCHINAMATH, ADVOCATE)
AND
DR.PRASHANT S/O. BHIMASHANKAR NALWAR,
AGED: ABOUT 50 YEARS,
OCC: TAHASILDAR,
R/O: HAVERI-581 110.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. ARAVIND D. KULKARNI, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED U/S 37(4) OF CR.P.C.,
PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF ACQUITTAL DATED 30/08/2019 MADE IN SVC NO.8/2012
PASSED BY THE PRL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, HAVERI
AND SPECIAL JUDGE, HAVERI AND CONVICT THE ACCUSED FOR
THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 7, 13(1)(D) R/W
SECTION 13(2) OF PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988.
2
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE
COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
The appellant-Karnataka Lokayukta is before this Court calling in question the judgment delivered in Special Vigilance Case No.8/2012, whereby, the respondent - accused was acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'the P.C.Act').
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as the prosecution and the accused.
3. Brief facts leading to filing of the present appeal as borne out from the pleadings are as follows :
The respondent - accused is a government servant, working in the cadre of Tahsildar. On 17.05.2011, at about 12.30 p.m., it was alleged that the accused demanded a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the complainant - Sri Maruteppa, a resident of Dambaramattur in Savanur Taluk, as illegal gratification for issuance of Agricultural Labour Certificate. It was further alleged 3 that on 21.05.2011, the accused accepted an amount of Rs.6,000/- as advance from the hands of the complainant. At the time when the amount of Rs.6,000/- was to be paid as advance which was allegedly demanded, a trap was laid in the Office of the accused and the amount of Rs.6,000/- was found lying on his table. Based upon the said incident, a theory of demand and acceptance was propounded against the accused and the proceedings were instituted for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C.Act, in Special Vigilance Case No.8/2012.
4. After a full blown trial, the competent criminal Court acquitted the accused of the aforesaid offences by its order dated 30.08.2019, holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Several reasons are assigned by the competent Court while acquitting the accused of the aforesaid offences. The prosecution - Karnataka Lokayukta has called in question the said order of acquittal in the subject appeal.
4
5. Heard Sri Gurudev I. Gachchinamath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant - Karnataka Lokayukta and Sri Aravind D.Kulkarni, learned counsel representing the respondent-accused.
6. Sri Gurudev I. Gachchinamath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant - Karnataka Lokayukta would vehemently argue and contend that two witnesses namely, P.Ws.2 and 3 have supported the case of the prosecution, which would be the evidence enough to convict the accused. Merely because the complainant turned hostile, the accused could not have been acquitted of the offences alleged. He would submit that the order of the competent Court is bereft of reasons.
7. On the other hand, Sri Aravind D. Kulkarni, learned counsel for the accused would submit that the complainant turned hostile. The recovery of the currency notes is not from the hands of the accused. The theory of demand and acceptance of bribe as is required to be proved in law is not proved by the prosecution. The learned counsel would submit that the order of 5 acquittal does not warrant any interference in the light of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ganapathi Sanya Naik v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 8 SCC 309.
8. I have given my anxious consideration on the submissions of the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
9. The afore-narrated facts leading to the filing of the present appeal not being in dispute, are not reiterated. Before embarking upon the consideration of the case on its merit, it is germane to notice the scope of interference by the Appellate Court in an appeal filed against an acquittal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. The Apex Court in the case of RAMESH BABULAL DOSHI V. STATE OF GUJARAT reported in (1996) 9 SCC 225, has held as follows:
"7. Before proceeding further it will be pertinent to mention that the entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal was patently wrong for it did not at all address itself to the question as to whether the reasons which weighed 6 with the trial court for recording the order of acquittal were proper or not. Instead thereof the High Court made an independent reappraisal of the entire evidence to arrive at the above-quoted conclusions. This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then -- and then only -- reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions. In keeping with the above principles we have therefore to first ascertain whether the findings of the trial court are sustainable or not."7
Later, the Apex Court in the case of CHANDRAPPA AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, has held as follows:
"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such
as, "substantial and compelling
reasons", "good and sufficient
grounds", "very strong
circumstances", "distorted
conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.8
Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
In its latest judgment, the Apex Court in the case of MOHAN ALIAS SRINIVAS ALIAS SEENA ALIAS TAILOR SEENA Vs. 9 STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in 2021 SCC ONLINE SC 1233, has held as follows :
"23. This court, time and again has laid down the law on the scope of inquiry by an Appellate court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. We do not wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except placing reliance on a recent decision of this court in Anwar Ali v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166:
"14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179]) "20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131], Excise & Taxation Officer- cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [Excise & Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber & 10 Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665], Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501], Aruvelu [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )"
It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429], that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586], this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under:
"31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State 11 of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108]. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused.
Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under:
'10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.' 31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v.
State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320], the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the 12 question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under:
'8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v.
State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the 13 judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.' 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC 14 (Cri) 410], after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653], in para 5, this Court observed and held as under:
'5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court 15 being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused 16 person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207 : AIR 1952 SC 52]; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898 : AIR 1953 SC 122]) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.' 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305], this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule."17
Therefore, what would unmistakably emerge from a coalesce of the afore-extracted enunciation of law by the Apex Court is, merely because the Appellate Court has power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence, such power need not be exercised except for substantial and compelling reasons. The Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. One that is available as a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent, unless he is proved guilty except otherwise provided and the other is, that he wears the order of acquittal on his sleeve. Therefore, the Appellate Court will have to reverse any such acquittal only if there are very strong reasons to do so. On the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, the case at hand will have to be considered.
10. The accused when functioning as Tahsildar at Savanur Taluk, is alleged to have demanded a sum of Rs.10,000/-, out of which, as advance of Rs.6,000/- was received, at which point in time, the trap is laid. A cash of Rs.6,000/- was found on the 18 table of the accused, not with the accused. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examines 14 witnesses. PW.1 - Maruteppa is the complainant, PWs.2 and 3 - Nagappa and Jagadish are Panch witnesses. PWs.4, 5, 6, 8 and 11 were public servant,s working in different capacities in the Office of the accused. PW.7
- Shivanandappa is a hearsay witness. PW.9 - Ramappa was an Engineer. PWs.10, 12 and 13 were chemical examiners and Deputy Secretary to Government. PW.14 is the Investigating Officer in the case.
11. During the trial, the prosecution apart from examining the aforesaid witnesses, marked about 78 documents in their defense and 15 material objects. This is the frame work of evidence that was let in by the prosecution before the competent Court. The accused - respondent did not choose to examine any witness nor adduced any evidence on his behalf.
12. According to the prosecution, work of the complainant was pending with the accused as on the date of the alleged incident. It was for the complainant to confirm his complaint before the competent Court. The complainant turns hostile, does 19 not support the case of the prosecution and he is subjected to cross-examination. In the cross-examination also, the complainant sustains his stand that he is an illiterate and the complaint Ex.P.1 was written by somebody and not by him. This was the defect that the competent Court finds in the trial. PW.7 was a hearsay witness. He confirms that the complainant was indeed in need of Agricultural Labour Certificate as he wanted to buy a property and confirms that accused had demanded bribe. No document is placed by the prosecution on record to show that the complainant was intending to purchase a property or had infact, purchased the property for which the Agricultural Labour Certificate would become necessary. In the light of there being no documentary evidence, the hearsay evidence of PW.7 would hold no water. No fault could be found with the order impugned insofar as it declines to accept the evidence of PW.7.
13. Insofar as the pendency of the complainant's work with the accused, the testimony of PWs.10 and 11 would no doubt show that the work of the complainant was pending with the accused as on the date of the alleged incident but that was not 20 enough to drive home the alleged demand and acceptance of bribe. The process of the solution turning pink in the bottles which contained phenolphthalein would also be a pointer towards the guilt of the accused. It is the case of the prosecution that it did turn pink but collected samples at the time of the production before the competent Court were still white in colour and it had not turned pink. It is in those circumstances, the competent Court holds that the theory of demand and acceptance propounded by the prosecution does not have any semblance of proof. The observations at para Nos.19, 22 and 23 of the order impugned is germane to be noticed and is extracted for the said purpose.
"19. Seizure of demanded money from the custody of the accused is material process in the case of this nature. In the instant case, both witnesses PW.2. Nagappa and PW.3 Jagadish have supported the case of prosecution. Obviously, as per the case of prosecution, amount has not been sized from the custody of the accused. Alternatively, it has been sized on the table of the accused. I has been repeatedly noted that the complainant has not stated that he had kept the money on the table as demanded by the accused. Moreover, Investigating Officer has failed to give clear picture of the trap that office of the accused is clearly visible from the place where he was waiting for signal of shadow-witness, and he rushed to the spot after receiving signal from the shadow-witness. In other words, he deposes that office of the accused was not visible from the 21 place where he was waiting fro signal of shadow-witness. Such being the fact, how he could rushed to the office of the accused and conducted the trap process, has not been explained by the learned special Public Prosecutor. Moreover, phenolphthalein process was adopted in this case and Investigating Officer has specifically stated about colourisation of table cleaned water and table cloth into pink. But collected pink solutions in two bottles are white in colour. For this, no satisfactory answer is given by the prosecution. It may due to passage of the time. Anyhow, without expert's opinion, it cannot be accepted. With these observations, though PWs.2 and 3 have supported the prosecution case, due to hostility of the complainant and non-satisfactory process of phenolphthalein powder, it may be concluded that seizure of demand amount/Ex.P.33 has not proved by placing clear, cogent and consistent evidence.
22. It is not in dispute an amount of Rs.41,720/- was seized by the Investigating Officer during the process of investigation from the accused. Now, the accused is claiming that he being Returning officer for the election of Agricultural Products Market Committee, Savanur, was granted Rs.1,75,000/- during the year 2011, after election there was Rs.41,720/- was residue with him and he was about to deposit the same to the Government, by that time, it has been seized by the Investigating Officer. The documents produced by him corroborated his claim and there is no objections from the prosecution to release the amount to his custody.
23. In view of my observations in the preceding paras, in the instant case, pre-trap and trap proceedings have not been established by the prosecution as required under law. Moreover, demand and acceptance which is essential ingredient of the offences alleged against the accused has not been proved. Hence, prosecution fails. Against this backdrop, it is not necessary to discuss the evidence of other witnesses. Hence, I answer Point No.1 and 2 in the Negative."22
14. It is now become germane to notice the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ganapathi Sanya Naik (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering an identical issue of demand and acceptance leading to allegations under Prevention of Corruption Act, holds as follows:
"6. The State thereafter preferred an appeal before the High Court .The learned Judge in judgment dated 31.3.2003, which has been impugned before us, however set aside the acquittal and convicted the accused and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 6 months observing that Nagaraja's statement as to the recovery had been corroborated by PW4 an independent witness and that no doubt could be created in the story merely because the currency notes had not been touched by the appellant. The Court also observed that the plea of the appellant that there was no occasion for the demand of money as the necessary documents had already been prepared was not acceptable as the possibility that the documents had been prepared in anticipation of the receipt of the money, could not be ruled out. It is in these circumstances that this matter is before us by way of special leave.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We find that the view taken by the trial court was clearly possible on the evidence in the case. The Court had observed that the plea of the defence at the very initial stage was that PW-6 had serious animosity towards the appellant and that the currency notes had been put on the table by the former was a plausible explanation. It is in the evidence that the currency notes had not been touched by the appellant or recovered from his person. It is also the prosecution case that the relevant documents had been handed over to Nagaraja immediately after the money had 23 been put on the table. The argument therefore that there was no occasion to make a demand for any bribe is also plausible. We are thus of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal where the High Court's interference is in a manner circumscribed, there was no justification in upsetting the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and order the appellant's acquittal."
15. In the light of the facts obtaining in the case at hand and the reasons rendered by the competent Court acquitting the accused and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ganapathi Sanya Naik (supra), the order impugned does not suffer from any error or illegality wanting interference at the hands of this Court. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.
SD JUDGE CKK / Vb/-