Delhi High Court
Sasumorov Enterprises Pvt Ltd vs Odeon Builders Pvt Ltd on 16 November, 2018
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2018 DEL 2110
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
Bench: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 16th November, 2018.
+ CS(COMM) 927/2016 & IA No.11845/2018 (of defendant u/O
XXXVII R-3(5) CPC)
SASUMOROV ENTERPRISES PVT LTD ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. K.S. Lather and Mr. Mukul
Lather, Advs.
Versus
ODEON BUILDERS PVT LTD ..... Defendant
Through: Mr. Karunesh Tandon, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. The application of the sole defendant for leave to defend this suit for
recovery of Rs.4,06,35,429/- filed under Order XXXVII of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is for consideration.
2. The counsel for the defendant and the counsel for the plaintiff have
been heard and the counsel for the defendant has also been heard in
rejoinder.
3. The plaintiff has instituted the suit inter alia pleading (i) that the
defendant approached the plaintiff for supply of TMT Bar (FE 500) by
placing Purchase Orders dated 6th May, 2013, 26th July, 2013 and 1st
October, 2013 on the plaintiff; (ii) that the said Purchase Orders were
placed by the defendant for the project of the defendant at Panchkula; (iii)
that pursuant to various meetings and discussions between the parties at
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 1 of 16
Panipat, Haryana, it was agreed that the plaintiff would supply the goods as
required by the defendant for the price as mentioned in the invoices raised
by the plaintiff from time to time; (iv) that the plaintiff delivered the goods
subject matter of the invoices and which goods were accepted by the
defendant, without raising a dispute as to quality, quantity or price; (v) that
the plaintiff raised invoices on the defendant (a) dated 26th May, 2013, 31st
May, 2013, 1st June, 2013, 1st June, 2013, 1st June, 2013 & 3rd June, 2013
for supplies made against Purchase Order dated 6th May, 2013; (b) dated
16th August, 2013, 16th August, 2013, 16th August, 2013, 19th August, 2013,
28th August, 2013, 28th August, 2013 & 28th August, 2013 for supplies
made against Purchase Order dated 26th July, 2013; and, (c) dated 16th
October, 2013, 16th October, 2013, 27th October, 2013 & 27th October, 2013
for supplies made against Purchase Order dated 1st October, 2013, of the
total value of Rs.2,34,77,082/-; (vi) that though the payment against the
invoices was to be made within sixty days of delivery and the defendant
was otherwise liable to pay interest @ 24% per annum but the defendant
paid only a sum of Rs.1 lakh in May, 2014; (vii) that after adjusting an
amount of Rs.28,767/- against Debit Note dated 19th August, 2013 and an
amount of Rs.2,061/- against Debit Note dated 28th August, 2013 raised by
the defendant, a principal amount of Rs.2,33,46,254/- with interest is due
from the defendant to the plaintiff; (viii) that the defendant, vide email
dated 12th September, 2014 admitted liability to the plaintiff in the sum of
Rs.2,34,46,254/-; (ix) that the defendant is also liable for interest as agreed;
(x) that as on the date of institution of the suit, besides the principal amount
of Rs.2,33,46,254/-, a sum of Rs.1,72,89,175/- was due from the defendant
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 2 of 16
to the plaintiff towards pre-suit interest @ 24% per annum i.e. a total sum
of Rs.4,06,35,429/-.
4. The suit was entertained under Order XXXVII of the CPC and
summons for appearance and on the defendant entering appearance,
summons for judgment were issued to the defendant.
5. The Part-I file, besides the plaint, contains an affidavit dated 1 st July,
2017 filed by the defendant in support of the leave to defend application,
besides the reply of the plaintiff thereto. The counsel for the defendant
during the arguments has referred to the said affidavit. However, Part-II
file containing the applications contains a separate application for leave to
defend and affidavit in support thereof. The counsel for the defendant has
explained that the defendant had earlier filed an affidavit only and was
subsequently permitted to file an application.
6. Though this is a technical default on the part of the defendant but
since the counsel for the plaintiff has not raised an objection in this regard,
the affidavit in support of the application for leave to defend in Part-I file
with reference to which the counsel for the defendant has argued, has been
considered.
7. The first contention of the counsel for the defendant is, that this
Court does not have territorial jurisdiction. The counsel for the defendant
has drawn attention to paras 4&5 of the plaint, where the plaintiff has
pleaded discussions with the defendant held at Panipat and the goods
supplied by the plaintiff to the defendant being delivered at Panchkula. The
counsel for the defendant has also sought to draw attention to the Purchase
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 3 of 16
Orders placed in this regard to show that the same also were not placed
from Delhi.
8. Attention of the counsel for the defendant has however been invited
to the memorandum of parties of the suit where the defendant is described
as having its registered office at New Delhi and to para 25 of the plaint
pleading so and also pleading (a) that the defendant carries on its business
from its registered office; (b) that the meetings were held between the
parties at the registered office of the defendant at New Delhi; (c) that the
balance confirmation of the defendant was issued from its registered at New
Delhi; (d) that the correspondence exchanged by the defendant with the
plaintiff was from its office at New Delhi; and, (e) that the cause of action
has accrued to the plaintiff at Delhi.
9. There is no denial of the aforesaid facts.
10. The counsel for the defendant has drawn attention to Sonic Surgical
Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 1 SCC 135, a case relating to the
jurisdiction vis-à-vis Section 17 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
On the same being pointed out to the counsel for the defendant, he states
that the provisions are pari materia and has referred to Section 17(2) of the
Consumer Protection Act, as set out in the judgment itself. However, the
same is not found to be pari materia to Section 20 of the CPC. Moreover,
the Supreme Court was not concerned with a case, where the registered
office of the respondent was situated at the place jurisdiction of which was
invoked and/or with a case where a part of cause of action had accrued at
the place of which jurisdiction was invoked.
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 4 of 16
11. The counsel for the plaintiff in response to the aforesaid argument
has referred to A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. Vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem (1989)
2 SCC 163 and has argued that the plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction
under Section 20A of the CPC.
12. The counsel for the defendant does not controvert that the registered
office of the defendant is at New Delhi.
13. Once the registered office of the defendant is at New Delhi, in my
view, the defendant cannot be entitled to leave to defend on the ground of
this Court not having territorial jurisdiction, particularly in the light of the
averments invoking territorial jurisdiction of this Court in para 25 of the
plaint. The said argument of the counsel for the defendant is found to be
mala fide, inasmuch as had the plaintiff invoked the territorial jurisdiction
either of Panchkula or of Panipat, the defendant was likely to raise
objection as to territorial jurisdiction of those Courts also. Moreover, no
prejudice is pleaded or argued to be suffered by the defendant by territorial
jurisdiction of the Court, where the registered office of the defendant is
situated, being invoked.
14. The next contention of the counsel for the defendant, to seek leave to
defend, is that the suit has been filed under Order XXXVII of the CPC on
the basis of admission contained in an email, purportedly of the defendant
and as appearing at page 45 of the Part-III file; the counsel for the
defendant has argued that the said email is addressed from Punit Bansal to
Mukesh Gupta, Deepak Garg and Deepak Bansal, who are all
employees/officers of the defendant and not addressed to the plaintiff and
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 5 of 16
the plaintiff can thus not have any claim on the basis thereof. It is also
contended that the said email is forged and fabricated and the defendant, in
the leave to defend application has denied the same. Attention in this
regard is drawn to para 7 of the affidavit aforesaid in support of application
for leave to defend pleading (I) that the signatures appearing on the account
confirmation statement appended to the email dated 12 th September, 2014
aforesaid are not of Punit Kumar Bansal, who is alleged to have sent the
email; (II) that there is no question of the Purchase Department of the
defendant sending the alleged email confirming the amount due and
payable by the defendant; (III) that the alleged email is a forged and
concocted document as is evident from the fact that though it is dated 12 th
September, 2014 but the last entry appearing in the account statement
enclosed therewith is of 27th October, 2013 and because the plaintiff, in
para 8 of the plaint has pleaded that part payment of Rs.1 lakh was made by
the defendant in the month of May, 2014; had any such email been sent on
12th September, 2014, the entry of Rs.1 lakh would be contained therein.
15. I may highlight, that the defendant has not taken the plea that the e-
mail address from which the said email has been sent is not the email
address of Punit Bansal.
16. The counsel for the plaintiff, in reply has drawn attention to the fact
that the email aforesaid, besides being addressed to Mukesh Gupta, Deepak
Garg and Deepak Bansal who are admitted to be the employees of the
defendant, is also addressed to "me". The counsel for the plaintiff has also
drawn attention to page 106 of Part-III file being another print of the said
email, which on top also contains another email dated 26th August, 2014
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 6 of 16
sent from [email protected] to Manish Gupta, Rajesh Bansal and
Punit, enclosing therewith attachment of ledger and seeking confirmation
thereof with seal and sign. The counsel for the plaintiff has argued that the
said email was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant and in response
whereto, the email dated 12th September, 2014 was sent by the defendant.
17. Page 106 of the Part-III file also shows the email dated 12th
September, 2014 having been addressed to "me". The counsel for the
plaintiff has stated that it is evident from the use of the word "me", that the
said email has been received at email address of [email protected].
18. The counsel for the plaintiff has also drawn attention to the
Certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 filed by the
plaintiff with respect to the said email.
19. The counsel for the plaintiff has further argued that the statement of
account appended to the email dated 12th September, 2014 is for the
financial year 1st April, 2013 to 31st March, 2014 and thus the question of
the payment of Rs.1 lakh made by the defendant to the plaintiff in May,
2014 being reflected therein does not arise.
20. The counsel for the defendant, in rejoinder has argued that even
though the statement of account purportedly appended to the email is from
1st April, 2013 to 31st March, 2014, since email is dated 12th September,
2014, the same should have contained the statement till that date.
21. I am afraid, the aforesaid contention has no merit. Such confirmation
of accounts is sought, also by the clients from their Advocates, prior to
submitting the Income Tax Returns and returns under the Companies Act
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 7 of 16
and is always for the financial year and not upto date and till which date the
accounts for the subsequent period have not been closed/audited.
22. Rather, I have enquired from the counsel for the defendant, whether
the defendant has taken any plea with respect to receipt of email dated 26th
August, 2014 in response whereto the email dated 12 th September, 2014 has
been sent. At least, in the leave to defend application, no such plea has
been taken and no oral argument can be addressed with respect thereto.
23. I have also enquired from the counsel for the defendant, whether the
defendant has placed a statement of its ledger/account books along with its
leave to defend application, showing the position of the transactions with
the plaintiff which have not been disputed by the defendant in the leave to
defend application.
24. The counsel for the defendant replies in the negative.
25. Once the defendant has not disputed the transactions, amounts due
whereunder are claimed by the plaintiff, it was incumbent on the defendant
to produce its statement of account to disprove the email dated 12th
September, 2014, to show the status of the said transactions in the books of
the defendant statutorily required to be maintained. The defendant, without
producing the same, cannot be heard to contend that the statement of
account confirmation enclosed to e-mail dated 12th September, 2014 to the
plaintiff could never have been sent by the defendant and is contrary to
books of account of the defendant. The silence of the defendant in this
regard entitles the Court to, while considering the application for leave to
defend, draw adverse inference against the defendant. A defendant cannot
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 8 of 16
be permitted to convert a summary suit to a ordinary suit, by mere denial
and by contending that the onus is on the plaintiff to prove. Order XXXVII
of the CPC, if so interpreted, will defeat the legislative intent and will make
the procedure for disposal of suits of the class intended to be summarily
decided, longer rather than shorter. Order XXXVII is concerned with
commercial suits, claim wherein is based on documents. A mere denial of
the document cannot entitle the defendant to leave to defend. The
defendant, in the leave to defend application, is required to plead all
surrounding circumstances concerning the document, to create a doubt as to
authenticity of the document. If the defendant does not plead so and/or does
not produce documents which in the ordinary course of the transaction
ought to be with the defendant, leave to defend has to be refused.
26. From the addresses of the e-mail dated 12th September, 2014 also
including "me", the argument of the counsel for the defendant, of the said
e-mail being not addressed to plaintiff, falls. As far as the plea of the
defendant in the application for leave to defend, of the email having been
forged and fabricated by the plaintiff is concerned, merely because the
defendant in the application for leave to defend, without given any details
or particulars which could have been given, pleads so, cannot entitle the
defendant to leave to defend. E-mail, which is the prevalent mode of
correspondence in most of the corporate sector, has to be given the same if
not more weightage as the correspondence in physical form. Just like the
Court, on mere denial of the defendant of the communication in physical
form purporting to emanate from the defendant would not grant leave to
defend, without the defendant producing other evidence which in the
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 9 of 16
ordinary course of business ought to have been produced to negate such
communication purportedly emanating from the defendant, similarly an
email purportedly emanating from the email account of the official of the
defendant cannot be disputed by mere denial and cannot entitle the
defendant to leave to defend.
27. The defendant has not filed any Certificate under Section 65B of the
Evidence Act of its employee Puneet Bansal from whose email account, the
email dated 12th September, 2014 purports to emanate. Once the defendant
was denying the email, it was incumbent upon the defendant to file
Certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act with respect to the email
account from which the email purported to emanate, to show that the said e-
mail did not emanate from that account. Section 88A of the Evidence Act
creates a presumption of the veracity of the contents of an electronic
message and which has not been rebutted by the defendant in this case.
28. If a mere denial by the defendant in a summary suit, of the written
contract as evident from e-mails on which the summary suit is based, were
to be held to require grant of leave to defend, the same will negate the
advancement in technology and the ease of doing business through
electronic communications. Supreme Court in Shafhi Mohammad Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 2 SCC 801 has held that it will be
wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new
techniques and new devices. It was further held that the threshold
admissibility of an electronic evidence cannot be ruled out on any
technicality, though reliability of electronic evidence is to be determined in
the facts and circumstances of a fact situation. The Division Bench of this
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 10 of 16
Court also, in Rakesh Kumar Vs. State 183 (2009) DLT 658 held that (i)
normal rule of leading documentary evidence is the production and proof of
the original document itself; (ii) secondary evidence of the contents of a
document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act; under Sub-
clause (d) of Section 65, secondary evidence of the contents of a document
can be led when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
(iii) computerised operating systems and support systems in the industry
cannot be moved to the Court; (iv) information is stored in those computers
on magnetic tapes (hard disc); (v) electronic record produced there from has
to be taken in the form of a print out; (vi) Section 65B(1) makes admissible
without further proof, in evidence, print out of a electronic record contained
on a magnetic media subject to the satisfaction of the conditions mentioned
in the section; (vii) Section 65B(4) provides for an alternative method to
prove electronic record by allowing the proof of the conditions set out in
Sub section (2) by means of a certificate issued by the person described in
Sub-section (4) and certifying contents in the manner set out in the sub-
section; (viii) the said sub-section makes admissible an electronic record
when certified that the contents of a computer printout are generated by a
computer satisfying the conditions of Sub-section (1), the certificate being
signed by the person described therein; (ix) additionally, irrespective of
compliance of the requirements of Section 65B, there is no bar to adducing
secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely
Sections 63 & 65. I may record that Supreme Court in Shafhi Mohammad
supra has held that requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is not
always mandatory.
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 11 of 16
29. No merit worthy of grant of leave to defend is also found in the
contention that the Purchase Department of the defendant could not have
sent the account confirmation to the plaintiff. The plaintiff as supplier of
goods would be in contact with the Purchase Department only of the
purchaser i.e. the defendant and the communication seeking confirmation of
account to the Purchase Department of the defendant and the confirmation
of account effected by the Purchase Department of the defendant is in the
normal course of business and nothing odd is found therein. It is also not
the case as aforesaid of the defendant that the account confirmation sent by
its Purchase Department is contrary to its books of accounts.
30. The next contention of the counsel for the defendant is, that the
invoices are false. Attention is drawn to the Purchase Orders produced
before this Court by the plaintiff and which contain a term "Test Report
required for above said material". It is stated that the material supplied by
the plaintiff was not accompanied with the Test Report and was thus
rejected by the defendant.
31. I have enquired from the counsel for the defendant, whether the
defendant has pleaded and proved such rejection.
32. The counsel for the defendant has drawn attention to para 6 of the
affidavit aforesaid in support of the application for leave to defend where
the defendant has pleaded (A) that the delivery shown against Bills No.4 to
10 was of different sizes of TMT Bars and was not in consonance with the
time schedule prescribed for delivery and was also not in terms of the
quantity prescribed; (B) that the falsity of the invoices is apparent as neither
the material has been delivered within the time schedule prescribed nor the
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 12 of 16
materials delivered were in consonance with the quantity required to be
delivered pursuant to the Purchase Orders; (C) that the material delivered
against the purchase order dated 26th July, 2013 was also not in consonance
with the quantity prescribed under the said order; (D) that the "bill has been
created to reach to their ill motive of extracting money on the wrongful
account from the defendant".
33. I have enquired from the counsel for the defendant, whether any
notice of rejection has been pleaded and filed and whether any document
has been produced by the defendant of return of the material.
34. The counsel for the defendant, while replying in negative, states that
the delivery of the material was not accepted and the material was returned;
thus the question of rejection and/or of any document does not arise.
35. I have further enquired, whether any communication in this regard
has been sent or pleaded.
36. The answer is again in the negative.
37. The counsel for the plaintiff points out that the plaintiff, prior to the
institution of the suit, had issued a notice for winding up of the defendant
and to which no reply was given by the defendant.
38. The counsel for the plaintiff has also drawn attention to the invoices,
each of which bears the stamp/seal of the defendant along with signatures
and has contended that the said stamp/seal and signatures were obtained in
acknowledgement of receipt of goods thereunder.
39. Needless to state, the defendant in its affidavit in support of the leave
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 13 of 16
to defend application has not rendered any explanation with respect to the
said stamp/seal of the defendant on the invoices and/or the signatures
purportedly of the defendant thereon.
40. The counsel for the plaintiff has also drawn attention to C-Forms of
the total value of Rs.3,00,84,641/- and has explained that there were other
supplies also by the plaintiff to the defendant and the C-Forms, besides
relating to the subject supplies, are also of other supplies. It is contended
that on the assurance of the defendant to submit C-Form to the plaintiff, the
defendant has offered a rebate of 2% on Central Sales Tax which would
otherwise have been levied on the sales made to the defendant.
41. The counsel for the defendant has contended that the said C-Forms
were given in blank and in advance.
42. I have enquired from the counsel for the defendant, whether the
defendant, at any time made a demand in writing on the plaintiff for return
of C-Forms of the quantities which were not delivered.
43. The counsel for the defendant states that it was not required and
therefore there is no plea in that regard in the application for leave to
defend.
44. The counsel for the plaintiff, with reference to the statement of
account of the defendant for the year 1st April, 2013 to 31st March, 2014,
has also pointed out therein the debit notes aforesaid for Rs.28,767/- and
Rs.2,061/- of which adjustment has been given by the plaintiff in its claim
against the defendant.
45. The counsel for the defendant has also argued (i) that the email dated
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 14 of 16
12th September, 2014 has not been sent from the registered office but has
been sent from Haryana office of the defendant; (ii) that there was no need
for the defendant to file statement of account because it is the plea of the
defendant that whatever was due from the defendant to the plaintiff has
been paid; (iii) that the plaintiff in the plaint has not pleaded the email dated
26th August, 2014 in response to which email dated 12 th September, 2014
purports to be; and, (iv) that the Test Report was the basic requirement.
46. No other argument has been urged in support of the application for
leave to defend.
47. No merit is found in any of the arguments urged by the counsel for
the defendant for leave to defend, applying the test of IDBI Trusteeship
Services Limited Vs. Hubtown Limited (2017) 1 SCC 568. The defendant
is not found entitled to leave to defend.
48. The plaintiff is thus entitled to a decree for recovery of the principal
amount of Rs.2,33,46,254/-.
49. As far as the claim of the plaintiff for the relief of pre-suit, pendente
lite and future interest @ 24% per annum is concerned, though undoubtedly
the invoices of the plaintiff on the defendant contain a clause to the said
effect but considering the prevalent rates of interest, even qua commercial
transactions, the claim for interest @ 24% per annum is found to be
excessive. The plaintiff is found entitled to pre-suit interest @ 15% per
annum, from expiry of 60 days of the date of each of the invoices and till
the date of institution of the suit, and is awarded interest pendente lite and
future @ 9% per annum. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to costs of the
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 15 of 16
suit. Professional fee assessed at Rs.2,00,000/-.
50. Resultantly, the application of the defendant for leave to defend is
dismissed and a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendant for recovery of Rs. 2,33,46,254/- with pre-suit interest @ 15%
per annum from expiry of 60 days of the date of each of the invoices and till
the date of institution of the suit, and with interest@ 9% per annum
pendente lite and future on the principal amount. The plaintiff shall also be
entitled to costs of the suit as aforesaid.
Decree sheet be drawn up.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
NOVEMBER 16, 2018 „bs‟/pp..
CS(COMM) 927/2016 Page 16 of 16