Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs M/S Alternative For India Development ... on 14 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:24134-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No. 77 of 2025
With
I.A No.12989 of 2024
1. The State of Jharkhand, through Secretary, Information Technology,
having its office at Project Building, PO & PS-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi-
834004
2. Jharkhand Agency for Promotion of Information Technology (JAP-IT),
An Autonomous Body under Department of Information Technology & e-
governance, Government of Jharkhand registered under the Society
Registration Act, through its Chief Executive Officer, its registered office
at Engineering Hostel No.1, PO & PS-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi 834004.
......... Petitioners
Versus
M/s Alternative for India Development having its corporate office at Plot
No. 1, VGN Nagar (Iyyapathangal), PO-Kattupakkam, PS & District-
Chennai, through one of the Director, Sri K.T. Arasu, Son of K.K.
Kumaraswamy Nadar, presently residing at Albert Compound,
Pathalkudwa, P.O-G.P.O, Ranchi, P.S-Lower Bazar, District-Ranchi
.... ... Claimant/Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
-------
For the Petitioners : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General
Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III
Mr. Shreya Mishra, AC to AG
Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III
For the Respondent : Mr. M.S. Mittal, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Salona Mittal, Advocate
Mr. Yashdeep Kanhai, Advocate
Mr. Arya Vardhan Singh, Advocate
Ms. Divya Choudhary, Advocate
Ms. Amrita Singh, Advocate
---------
C.A.V on 15.07.2025 Pronounced on 14.08. 2025
Per, Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer The instant petition has been preferred for review of the order dated 21.07.2023 passed by this Court in Commercial Appeal No.7 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the judgment dated 25.06.2018 passed in Commercial (REVOC) Case No. 05 of 2017 by the learned Presiding Officer, Commercial Court, Ranchi, has not been interfered with.
2025:JHHC:24134-DB Factual Matrix
1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said part of the Arbitral Award dated 02.06.2017 passed by the learned Arbitrator, an Arbitration Case No. 01 of 2016, whereby the claimant awarded with revenue support for total number of 594 Common Service Centers as well as Supplementary Award dated 07.07.2017 as also against the rejection of the part of the counter claim and against the order dated 11.08.2017 passed in the said Arbitration Case No. 01 of 2016 by the learned Sole Arbitrator, the appellant filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 being the Commercial (REVOC) Case No. 05 of 2017 before the learned Commercial Court, Ranchi.
2. The learned Commercial Court heard the application and has passed the judgment on 25.06.2018 dismissing the said petition.
3. Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 25.06.2018 passed in Commercial (REVOC) Case No. 05 of 2017 by the learned Commercial Court, Ranchi, the Commercial Appeal being Commercial Appeal No.07 of 2018 has been preferred.
4. The Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 21.07.2023 has refused to interfere with the order dated 25.06.2018 passed in Commercial (REVOC) Case No. 05 of 2017 by the learned Commercial Court, Ranchi, against which present review petition has been preferred.
5. It needs to refer herein that against the order dated 21.07.2023 the appellant has preferred SLP being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).43925 of 2023 but the same was dismissed vide order dated 2 2025:JHHC:24134-DB 19.01.2024 by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
6. Thereafter the present review petition has been filed. Argument by the learned counsel for the State-petitioners:
7. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, the learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Jharkhand assisted by Mr. Ashutosh Anand, the learned AAG- III has taken the ground that the error has been crept up in the arbitral Award as also the order passed in a proceeding under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as also the order passed in Commercial Appeal No.7 of 2018 the order which is being sought to be reviewed by filing the instant review to the extent of calculation of amount said to be not proper.
Response of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-claimant
8. Per contra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent- claimant has vehemently opposed the prayer on merit since the instant review is barred by limitation of 429 days for which one interlocutory application being I.A No.12989 of 2024 has been filed for condonation of said delay.
9. However, he has submitted that the instant review petition is nothing but only to frustrate the execution proceeding which is pending before the competent executing Court that too, the Arbitral Award after having been affirmed up to the level of the Hon'ble Apex Court has also been acted upon by making the payment of principal amount.
10. The only dispute has been raised on behalf of the review petitioner regarding the error crept up in the calculation of the interest amount as 3 2025:JHHC:24134-DB would be evident from the order passed by the learned Scrutiny Court dated 01.07.2025. But herein altogether different grounds have been taken of wrong calculation of the entire amount as per the entitlement as has been held by the learned Arbitrator which has been taken into consideration by the Court having jurisdiction under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act as also by this Court while passing order in Commercial Appeal No. 7 of 2018 which has also been upheld by dismissal of SLP filed by the review petitioner-State.
11. It has further been submitted that the review petition has purposely been filed only to frustrate the execution proceeding and that too, by taking altogether different grounds while the said grounds before the learned Executing Court was with respect to interest.
12. It has been submitted that no cause has been shown said to be sufficient to establish the ground of condonation of delay of 429 days which itself is evident from the delay condonation application particularly, at paragraph-11 which cannot be said to be sufficient cause to condone the delay that too, when Arbitral Award has been acted upon by making payment of the principal amount having raised the question of incorrectness in the calculation of the interest.
13. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-claimant has submitted that limitation in filing the appeal under section 13 (1-A) of the Commercial Act, 2015 and even accepting that the relaxation has been carved by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (2021) 6 SCC 460, but in the said 4 2025:JHHC:24134-DB judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court even after considering the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and Commercial Courts Act, has laid down the proposition that delay can be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. It has been laid down that in a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the Court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.
14. It has been submitted that the instant review petition has been filed with limitation to frustrate the execution proceeding that too, when the Award passed by the learned Tribunal has been acted upon so far it relates to disbursement of principal amount is concerned and what is being said by making the ground of review the same cannot be said to be a ground once the principal amount has been paid in favour of the appellant-claimant, rather the dispute only is with respect to quantum of interest . Therefore, the present review petition which has been filed belatedly is nothing but to frustrate the execution proceeding, therefore, the delay may not be condoned.
Analysis
15. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the ground available in the review petition as also the factual background of the present review petition.
16. It is necessary to be referred the factual aspect herein before dealing with the interlocutory application filed for condonation of delay to 5 2025:JHHC:24134-DB assess and to come to conclusion that the delay is to be condoned or not at this stage.
17. The dispute regarding the commercial transaction has been raised by the claimant, the respondent herein, which ultimately culminated into appointment of arbitrator who has given Award dated 02.06.2017, the relevant paragraph of the same is being quoted hereunder as:
Therefore on the basis of the findings and conclusion arrived upon hereinabove, my award is as follows:-
I. Respondents is awarded with Rs 9,47,706/- (Rupees Nine Lac Forty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred and Six) towards the claim made under the head of the 70% share of the amount received by the Claimant from the citizens by offering the government services plus a lump sum amount of Rs 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lac) towards the delay caused in disbursement of the said amount of the share of the State Government.
II. Respondents is awarded with right to impose non roll -out penalty for the total 6 number of CSCs for the period from 26th November 2012 (date wherein it was admitted by the Respondent in its internal CSC Review Meeting that Claimant had rolled out 594 CSCs: a copy of which has been marked as Annexure - A to the Reply of the Claimant to the Statement of Defence) to 26th June 2016 (date of termination of the MSA) in accordance with the provisions laid down under Schedule 1 of the MSA, that come to a figure of Rs. 7,84,800/-(Rupees Seven Lac Eighty Four Thousand & Eight Hundred Only).
III. After the deduction of the amounts awarded to the Respondents hereinabove as well as after deduction of the amount already paid to the Claimant by way of Revenue Support, i.e. Rs. 60,66,912 (Rupees Sixty Lac Sixty Six Thousand Nine Hundred & Twelve) for the period from October 2012 till March 2013, the Claimant is awarded with Revenue Support for the total number of 594 CSCs @ of Rs. 3284/ per CSC per month calculated from 26th November 2012 (date wherein it was admitted by the Respondent in its internal CSC Review Meeting that Claimant had rolled out 594 CSCs -a copy of which has been marked as Annexure A to the Reply of the Claimant to the Statement of Defence) to 25th June 2016 6 2025:JHHC:24134-DB (date of termination of the MSA) i.e Rs. 7,58,80,510/- (Rupees Seven Crore Fifty Eight Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred & Ten), plus the interest upon the same as per the prime lending rate of SBI for the applicable period (since the same keeps fluctuating, hence it is required to be calculated accordingly), to be calculated from November 2012 till the date of such payment is actually made to the Claimant.
The Respondent No. 2 is hereby directed to pay Rs.7,58,80,510/- (Rupees Seven Crore Fifty Eight Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred & Ten), plus the interest amount as per the Award within a period of two months.
18. Thereafter a supplementary Award dated 07.07.2017 has been passed by the learned Arbitrator for modification of the Award dated 02.06.2017, for ready reference the same is being quoted hereunder as:
SUPPLEMENTARY AWARD "Pursuant to the Award dated 02.06.2017, passed by the undersigned in the present case, a petition was subsequently filed on 09.06.2017 by the Claimant M/s Alternative for India Development (M/s AID), under Section 33 (1) (a) of the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, stating therein that, there has been an inadvertent typographical error at Page 15 of the Award, wherein the date 14.05.2013 has wrongly been typed as 14.05.2017, accordingly it is prayed to correct the date as 14.05.2013.
2. The Learned Government Advocate appearing for the Respondent has no objection to such a correction of the pointed out typographical error at page 15 of the Award.
3. The above typographical error is apparent on face of record and if the date is changed from 14.05.2017 to 14.05.2013 it shall not affect the merit of case of the parties, hence let necessary correction at page 15 of the Award is being made and the date be read as 14.05.2013 in place of 14.05.2017. Accordingly necessary correction is made in the Award.
4. The Claimant has further stated in the said petition that there has been an apparent calculation mistake in calculation of the amount paid to the SCA by SDA which is to be deducted from the awarded Revenue Support. In the main award under Para 37 (III), 7 2025:JHHC:24134-DB the Revenue Support payable to Claimant has been directed to be calculated from 26th November 2012 till 25th June 2016 and amount of Rs. 60,66,912/- (Rupees Sixty Lac Sixty Thousand Nine Hundred & Twelve) has been directed to be deducted as already paid to the claimant by way of Revenue Support for the period from October 2012 till March 2013. It has been pointed out by the amount of Claimant in the said petition that, an Rs.17,89,386/-
(Rupees Seventeen Lac Eighty Nine Thousand Three Hundred & Eighty Six) for the period from 1st October 2012 to 31st October 2012 and Rs. 14,91,155/- (Rupees Fourteen Lac Ninety One Thousand One Hundred & Fifty Five) for the period from 1st November 2012 to 25th November 2012 total amounting to Rs. 32,80,541/- (Rupees Thirty Two Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred & Forty One) was paid prior to 26.12.2012 that is the cut-off date and the same has been excessively deducted from the awarded amount and as such it is liable to be added back to the already awarded amount of Rs. 7,58,80,510/- (Rupees Seven Crore Fifty Eight Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred & Ten) under Para 37 (III) of the Award dated 02.06.2017.
5. That the Learned Government Advocate appearing for the Respondent could not dispute the factual calculation error which is apparent on face of the record and therefore it is rectified accordingly.
6. Therefore, considering the plain interpretation of the Award passed by me on 02.06.2017, it is visibly clear that, there has been calculation error in computation of the said Award under Para 37 (III), wherein, an additional amount has been deducted on account of already paid amount to the Claimant dedusted by way of Revenue Support and hence necessary correction is made in the computation of Award under Para 37 (III) by adding an amount Rs. 32,80,541/- (Rupees Thirty Two Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred & Forty One) which was wrongly deducted to the already awarded amount of Rs. 7,58,80,510/- (Rupees Seven Crore Fifty Eight Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred & Ten) and the awarded amount under the Para 37 (III) of the Award be read as Rs. 7,91,61,051/- (Rupees Seven Crore Nienty One Lac Sixty One Thousand & Fifty One).
7. Accordingly last portion of Para 12 and Para 37 (III) of the main Award are modified to the extent indicated above."
19. The said Award was challenged by the State by filing application 8 2025:JHHC:24134-DB under section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The said application was dismissed upholding the Award. The matter came to this Court under its appellate jurisdiction under section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 but the same has also been dismissed. The state has preferred SLP being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).43925 of 2023 but the same was dismissed vide order dated 19.01.2024 by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
20. The subject matter of the review as has been submitted by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State is that all the Common Service Centers have not been operational in one stroke and, as such the amount required to be calculation basing upon the date of operational of another Common Service Center.
21. This Court has considered the part of Award as available on record with respect to the issue of consideration of claim of the appellant for 594 Common Service Centers. No such plea was agitated on behalf of the State which is being now agitated by making the Common Service Centers as not operational. Further, while challenging the Award under the proceeding under section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act also, no such ground has been taken and even before this Court.
22. The Award having been upheld upto the higher Forum and an execution case has been filed being Commercial Execution Case No. 08 of 2017.
23. The State has appeared and paid the principal amount. For payment of the interest amount an application was filed for recalculation of quantum of interest for which an order was passed on 01.07.2025 by the learned Court.
9
2025:JHHC:24134-DB
24. The learned Court has admitted the calculation made by the judgment debtor on the interest head to the tune of Rs.11,24,70,205/- and has directed the judgment debtor to make payment of the aforesaid amount within two weeks.
25. The aforesaid interest amount has not been paid and in the meanwhile, the present review petition has been filed on 08.08.2024.
26. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the State has preferred the review petition by taking absolutely a new ground of non -operational of all centers in one stock which has been filed after delay of 429 days. Therefore, this Court has to consider the issue of condonation of delay first.
27. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State has submitted that the delay may liberally be considered. He has relied upon the judgment in the case of "Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited", (supra).
28. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspects and the respective contention of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has gone through the application for condonation of delay.
29. There is no dispute about the position of law that delay can be condoned irrespective of the period of delay if the sufficient cause being shown by the party concerned.
30. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held at paragraphs 9 to 15 which read 10 2025:JHHC:24134-DB hereunder as:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and 11 2025:JHHC:24134-DB no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 :
AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution 12 2025:JHHC:24134-DB Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
31. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
32. It is thus evident from the aforesaid proposition of law that the said judgment has been passed on consideration of the issue of condonation of delay while entertaining the application under Section 5 of the 13 2025:JHHC:24134-DB Limitation Act, 1963.
33. Thus, it is evident that the aforesaid judgment has considered the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to be made applicable in a case where the delay is to be condoned depending upon the sufficient cause if shown by the concerned litigant that is the general principle of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
34. Further the "sufficient cause" will only be said to be sufficient cause if the party concerned without any negligent approach has followed the legal procedure in filing the appeal with all due diligence reference in this regard may be made to the judgment as rendered in the case of Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited"
(supra).
35. It needs to refer herein that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has been brought into force even though the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was in vogue the day when the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was enacted. But, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, there was no rigid principle has been made applicable in condoning the delay and that is the reason the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has been enacted by carving out a forum as under Section 13 of the Act 2015 thereof.
36. It is not in dispute taking into consideration the object and intent of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the intent of enactment of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 wherein the paramount consideration of the legislation is for early conclusion of the dispute, therefore, the provision has been enacted under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 that the appeal can be filed against the order passed by the 14 2025:JHHC:24134-DB concerned court within the period of 60 days without giving any stretchable time as would appear from the provision of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 which reads as under:
"13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions. - [(1) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a Commercial Court below the level of a District Judge may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Court within a period of sixty days from the date of judgment or order. (1-A) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a Commercial Court at the level of District Judge exercising original civil jurisdiction or, as the case may be, Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of sixty days from the date of the judgment or order:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this Act and section
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
37. It is evident from the provision of section that the specific stipulation is made by the statutory command that the appeal is preferred within a period of 60 days.
38. It is evident from the aforesaid object that the commercial disputes are to be read to its logical end expeditiously hence, in the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 the appeal has been mandated to be filed within a period of 60 days, by not making any provision for condoning the delay meaning thereby the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act has been taken out from the fold of Commercial Courts Act, 2015. 15
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39. Further, the aforesaid provision does not refer about the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as per the original enactment. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (Supra) has taken into consideration the aforesaid issue by taking into consideration the fact that the rigid principle of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 but the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1996 has been made applicable with all rigidity if the provision of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 will be taken into consideration.
40. Thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of "Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited" (supra) has considered the issue of applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act subject to availability of sufficient cause by answering the issue as to whether even the sufficient cause is being shown the limitation in filing the appeal is to be condoned or not.
41. The Hon'ble Apex Court, by taking into consideration the very object and intent of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 as under the relevant paragraph has considered the issue of applicability to condone the delay whereby and whereunder the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been held to be acceptable but with the condition that the same is to be applied with all circumspection in a case where there is delay if caused in filing the appeal by taking into consideration the bona fide approach of the litigant concerned and it is not in the 16 2025:JHHC:24134-DB negligent manner.
42. This Court since has referred the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (supra) wherein the prayer for condonation of delay of 131 days was there for which explanation was furnished of file pushing and administrative exigency; further while refusing to condone the delay of 75 days due to the procedural approval and the ground since the appellant is a public entity under the Energy Department of the State Government the delay caused in filing the appeal has been said to be bona fide and as such deserves to be condoned but such explanation, does not find the same as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Even the delay of 200 days in filing the appeal was refused to be condoned while passing order in S.L.P. (C) No. 18079 of 2020, for ready reference, relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted herein: -
"53. However, the matter does not end here. The question still arises as to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of limitation. At one extreme, we have the judgment in N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] which does not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other extreme, we have an open-ended provision in which any amount of delay can be condoned, provided sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two extremes that we have to steer a middle course.
58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression "sufficient cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression "sufficient 17 2025:JHHC:24134-DB cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. ...........................................
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.
64. Coming to the facts of the appeals before us, in the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 665 of 2021, the impugned judgment of the High Court of Bombay, dated 17-12-2020 [State of Maharashtra v. Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 10453] , has found that the Government of Maharashtra had not approached the court bona fide, as follows : (Borse Brothers case [State of Maharashtra v. Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 10453] , SCC OnLine Bom para
7) "7. I have carefully gone through the papers. There can be no doubt in view of the documentary evidence in the form of copy of the application tendered by the advocate representing the applicant for obtaining a certified copy (Ext. R-1) that in fact, after pronouncement of the judgment and order in the proceeding under Section 34 of the Act, the advocate concerned had applied for certified copy on 14-5-2019. The endorsement further reads that it was to be handed over to Mr A.D. Patil of the Irrigation Department, Dhule, who is a staff from the office of the applicant. The further endorsements also clearly show that the certified copy was ready and was to be delivered on 27-5- 2019. Inspite of such a stand and document, the applicant has not controverted this or has not come up with any other stand touching this aspect. It is therefore apparent that the applicant is not coming to the Court with clean hands even while seeking the discretionary 18 2025:JHHC:24134-DB relief of condonation of delay.
66. In the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 15278 of 2020, the impugned judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 27-1- 2020 [M.P. Poorv Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. v. Swastik Wires, 2020 SCC OnLine MP 3003] relies upon Consolidated Engg. [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] and thereby states that the judgment of this Court in N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] would not apply. The judgment of the High Court is wholly incorrect inasmuch as Consolidated Engg. [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] was a judgment which applied the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and had nothing to do with the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] was a direct judgment which applied the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and then held that no condonation of delay could take place beyond 120 days. The High Court was bound to follow N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] , as on the date of the judgment of the High Court, N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] was a judgment of the two learned Judges of the Supreme Court binding upon the High Court by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution. On this score, the impugned judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside.
67. That apart, on the facts of this appeal, there is a long delay of 75 days beyond the period of 60 days provided by the Commercial Courts Act. Despite the fact that a certified copy of the District Court's judgment was obtained by the respondent on 27-4-2019, the appeal was filed only on 9-9-2019, the explanation for delay being: "2. That, the certified copy of the order dated 1-4-2013 was received by the appellant on 27-4- 2019. Thereafter the matter was placed before the CGM purchase MPPKVVCL for the compliance of the order. The same was then sent to the law officer, MPPKVVCL for opinion.
3. That after taking opinion for appeal, and approval of the authorities concerned, the officer-in-charge was appointed vide order dated 23-7-2019.
19
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4. That, thereafter due to bulky records of the case and for procurement of the necessary documents some delay has been caused however, the appeal has been prepared and filed pursuant to the same and further delay.
5. That due to the aforesaid procedural approval and since the appellant is a public entity formed under the Energy Department of the State Government, the delay caused in filing the appeal is bona fide and which deserve[s] to be condoned."
68. This explanation falls woefully short of making out any sufficient cause. This appeal is therefore allowed and the condonation of delay is set aside on this score also.
69. In the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 18079 of 2020, there is a huge delay of 227 days in filing the appeal, and a 200-day delay in refiling. The facts of this case also show that there was no sufficient cause whatsoever to condone such a long delay. The impugned judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 15-10- 2019 [Union of India v. Associated Construction Co., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10797] cannot be faulted on this score and this appeal is consequently dismissed."
43. Therefore, object of expeditious disposal of the commercial disputes has been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited" (Supra) as per the paragraphs which have been referred hereinabove wherein also the object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has been taken into consideration based upon that the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition that although the Section 5 of the Limitation Act has limited applicability under the statutory provision as contained in the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 but conferring discretionary power to the concerned court in the rarest of rare case to condone the delay of a very shorter period depending upon the sufficient cause as also if there is no 20 2025:JHHC:24134-DB negligent approach of the party concerned.
44. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the paragraph-63 of the said judgment has laid down that the condonation of delay in exception is to be taken into consideration by seeing the conduct of the party whether the party has acted bona fide or in a negligent manner, if the bona fide is there, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the Court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that other side of the picture that the opposite party may have acquired both equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.
45. The reference of the aforesaid judgment is necessary even in the present situation, since, we are sitting in the review and not in the appeal. This Court has dismissed the appeal way back on 21.07.2023 against which a Special Leave Petition was filed being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).43925 of 2023 which was also dismissed on 19.01.2024. Thereafter, the present review petition has been filed on 08.08.2024.
46. The review petition has also to be filed within the period of 30 days which has been admitted by the learned Advocate General also, but it has been filed after a delay of 429 days from the date of passing of the judgment by this Court in Commercial Appeal No.7 of 2018.
47. We have considered the instant interlocutory application to asses the cause as to whether the cause is said to be sufficient or not. Only in paragrapoh-11 the cause has been shown, i.e., the delay has been caused since the document of the case was in scattered manner, there is no separate legal section and any how JAP-IT provided the relevant documents to his counsel and after going through the records, review 21 2025:JHHC:24134-DB petition prepared and the same was sent for approval on 04.08.2024 and after approval it has been filed on 08.08.2024. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
"7. That after passing the order dated 19-01-2024 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and communicated to the concerned department l.e. Jharkhand Agency for Promotion of Information Techonology (JAP-IT), headed and runs under the guidance of Chief Executive Officer, who was transferred on 26-02-2024, hence he could not take any steps in this matter.
8. That after Joining of another C.E.O in JAP-IT on 06-03-2024 and then on 14-03-2024 history with the present status of running case of Execution in Civil Court, Ranchi send to Secretary, Department of Information Technology & e-Governance, Government of Jharkhand for the necessary directions.
9. That the directions from the department came on 09-04-2024 to JAP-IT for placing the case before Hon'ble High Court, hence from 20-01-2024 to 09-04-2024, l.e., further about 81 days could not be taken any steps to file Review Petition, before the Hon'ble High Court at Ranchi.
10. That the petitioners/JAP-IT at first appointed a government pleader for taking steps before the Learned Commercial Execution Court at Civil Court Ranchi and on 13th June 2024, JAP-IT engaged another counsel for filing the Review Petition before the Hon'ble High Court.
11. That the related documents of the said case was in scattered manner, as because, there is no separate legal section and any how JAP-IT provided the relevant documents to his counsel and after going through the records, Review Petition prepared and the same was sent for approval on 04-08-2024 and after approval it has been filed on 08-08-2024"
48. As has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited" (supra) that the bona fide approach of the parties to be taken into consideration for the purpose of even condoning the delay but in exception and if the conduct of the party is so negligent the delay is not to be condoned 22 2025:JHHC:24134-DB taking into consideration the interest of the other side.
49. This Court applying the said observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph no.63 in the case of "Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited" (supra) and adverting to the reason shown in paragraphs of the application for condonation of delay which has been referred as hereinabove, wherein it has been stated that even the file has not been kept in arranged manner rather it was in scattered manner and in collecting the file the period of 429 days has been consumed as per the explanation furnished therein.
50. It is considered view of this Court that the cause as furnished in the said Interlocutory Application cause cannot be said to be a sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the delay considering the said reason to be a bona fide rather it is to be considered as a negligent approach of the party.
51. This Court, therefore, is of the view that applying the principle laid by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited" (supra) the explanation which has been furnished in condoning the delay is not fit to be considered to be sufficient cause to condone the delay of 429 days as an exception.
52. Accordingly, the said interlocutory application being I.A No.12989 of 2024 stands dismissed.
53. In consequence thereof, the instant review petition also stands dismissed and disposed of as such.
54. The factual aspect of the case which has been referred hereinabove is not for the purpose of consideration of the issue on merit, since, 23 2025:JHHC:24134-DB before entering into the merit the application filed for condonation of delay is to be considered and the said factual aspect has only been for the reproduction of the fact available on record and not for the purpose of merit.
55. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I agree.
(Rajesh Kumar, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.) Sudhir Dated: 14 /8/2025 Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi AFR 24