Gujarat High Court
Shipping Corporation Of India Ltd. vs The Master Of M.V. "Giurgeni" on 12 May, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1997)2GLR1745
JUDGMENT S.D. Dave, J.
1. Proceedings on hand call upon me to answer two Questions. They are:
(1) Whether the High Court of Gujarat, in exercise of its Admiralty Jurisdiction, has the POWER and/or JURISDICTION to order the arrest of a Sister Ship?
(2) Whether M.V. Giurgeni a Foreign Flag Vessel presently in the Port and Harbour of Kandla (Gujarat) can be said to be the Sister Ship of M.V. Kalo, which admittedly is not in Coastal Waters of the State of Gujarat or the Territorial Waters of India?
2. These Questions arise because of the filing of the Admiralty Suit, by the plaintiffs. The Shipping Corporation of India Limited, valued at Rs. 2,32,75,640-00 and the presentation of a Civil Application for the arrest of M.V. Giurgeni, the Orders of Arrest duly executed and the Notice of Motion taken out by the other side praying for the vacation of the said Orders for Want of Jurisdiction.
3. The suit by the plaintiffs is an action in Rem for, or a suit in Damages. The damages are being claimed on the basis of a tort committed on the high seas. The case of the Plaintiffs-Corporation is that, their Vessel M.V. "Vishva Yash" sailed from Mandvi on 2nd February 1997 at about 0330 hrs., laden with cargo for her destination, Port of Mangalore. A Vessel named M.V. "Kalo" owned by 2nd Defendant C.N.M. Navrom S.A., as Company duly incorporated under the laws of Romania, having their Registered office within Romania, sailed from the Port of Marmagoa on 1st February 1997 at about 1535 hrs., reportedly bound for the Port of Bedi. During the passage in the Arabian Sea on 2nd February 1997 at about 2037 hrs., the Vessel of the plaintiffs and Vessel M.V. "Kalo" collided and as a result of such a collision considerable damage was caused to the plaintiffs' Vessel, with an immediate consequence of a fire which could, eventually be brought under control on 3rd February at about 1445 hrs. According to the plaintiffs this happened inter aliabecause M.V. "Kalo" was unseaworthy, was manned by persons who were reckless and negligent, failed to maintain a proper watch and look out, negligently disregarded the applicable Collision Regulations and the basic principles of navigation, failed to give way to the plaintiffs' Vessel and ultimately recklessly and negligently steered in her way, while she was maintaining course. The plaintiffs, therefore, have said they are entitled to a maritime lien against M.V. "Kalo" and or a right in remagainst the 1st defendant M.V. "Giurgeni" as the sister ship of M.V. "Kalo" for damages and loss suffered amounting to Rs. 2,32,75,640-00, and are entitled to enforce the said maritime lien/right in rem by way of an Admiralty action in rem in this High Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction against the 1st defendant Vessel. The plaintiffs have also said in the pleadings that the 1 st defendant Vessel is in territorial waters of India and coastal territorial waters of the State of Gujarat. The plaintiffs have, therefore, prayed that the 1st Defendant Vessel be condemned in the sum of Rs. 2,32,75,640-00, along with the interest at the rate of 21% per annum. Pending the hearing and final disposal of the Suit as per the plaintiffs' prayer, the 1st Defendant Vessel in its whole be arrested. The 1st defendant Vessel has been arrested and presently is under arrest lying in the Port and Harbour of Kandla within the State of Gujarat. The concept of Sister Ship is based upon the say that M.V. Giurgeni and M.V. Kalo are the Vessels of the fleet belonging to and owned by the 2nd defendant Navrom.
4. The 1st defendant have taken out a Notice of Motion and under the captioned Civil Application, as prayer (b) have prayed for an order vacating the orders of arrest dated 25th February 1997 for Want of Jurisdiction. Prayer (a) is for the necessary orders permitting the release of the 1st defendant Vessel upon furnishing the security equivalent to the claim made in the suit without prejudice to their rights and contentions. I should hasten to say, by way of a necessary clarification that prayer (a) has not been pressed for and concentration remained earmarked for and limited to prayer (b).
5. For the purpose of noticing the contentions and the combat against them, I, for a moment would prefer to revert to, two Questions set out by me as the foremost few lines of the present Orders. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. C.A. Sundaram with learned Counsels Mr. Rambhadran and Ms. P.B. Sheth for the 1st defendant has urged that, Amiralty Jurisdiction has been exercised by Courts over the last few centuries by exercising jurisdiction in rem against the offending Vessel, but that the said Jurisdiction, regardless of its source, has never been exercised against the Sister Ship, that the concept of Sister Ship and her arrest was introduced for the first time statutorily in England under English Administration of Justice Act, 1956, that the said concept was similarly statutorily introduced in some other countries which were the members to Brussels Convention of 1952 but that India is not a signatory to the same and that too deliberately; that Indian Statute, i.e., the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, enacted after Brussels Convention of 1952, in Section 443 recognises the Jurisdiction of arrest only against the offending Ship, and that thus the legislature of India deliberately did not confer statutory power of arrest of Sister Ship.
6. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. C.A. Sundaram while concentrating upon the say of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth and Ors. v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama, Goa, has urged that the Supreme Court does not confer the Power to arrest a Sister Ship, but refers only to offending Ship, and in fact widens the scope of existing Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Courts, but never "purports to Legislate" by conferring a new jurisdiction of proceeding against the Sister Ship.
7. Learned Sr. Counsel lastly in the context urged that Admiralty Powers to be found in other Statutes can be exercised by Admiralty Courts but subject to the curtailment made by The Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. Challenging the case of the plaintiffs that Vessel M.V. Kalo at the relevant time was under a Charter to Transnav Constanta, and therefore, dispute in between the plaintiffs and the said Charterers and English Proceeding between them is in pendency and therefore, asking for the security for the release of the Vessel from 1st defendant is inequitable.
8. Learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Mukerjee for the plaintiff on the other hand has contended that Sections 443 and 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 are not the repository of Admiralty Jurisdiction, that historically damage done by a ship was and is, as an issue, part of the Admiralty Jurisdiction, but when included in the Statute, under the Admiralty Court Act, 1961 damages have been made available to all persons against all ships, that the Supreme Court in case of M.V. Elisabeth (supra) recognises the multiplicity of sources of Admiralty Jurisdiction & Powers, and says that "any attempt to confine admiralty or maritime law within the bounds of Statutes is not only unrealistic but incorrect" that Sections 443 and 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 are not in derogation of but supplemental to the Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Leontas Judgment is not in consonance with the correct reading of M.V. Elisabeth (supra) and that the existing patterns of modern shipping demand the recognition of the principle of arrest of Sister Ships, and the power of arrest which is evolving cannot be stultified.
9. I, if, amidst these rival contentions and a protracted debate full of details, prefer to express my opinion, both being concise and yet precise I must say that, provided, I come to the conclusion that the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 is not a self-contained Code, taking care of very many eventualities occurring in wide and complex shipping business and that the provisions contained in Sections 443 and 444 thereof are not the reporsitory of powers of arrest of ships and that, the Admiralty Court is either permitted or obliged to look at the international developments in the branch of Maritime Law, despite the fact that India has not adopted various Brussels Conventions, 1 must decide and answer the first question in affirmative. In that event I would not be able to order the revocation of the orders of arrest of the ship in question on the ground of lack of Jurisdiction or Power. But if I come to the other conclusion, I shall have to order the release of the Vessel saying that, I sitting as a Court in Admiralty, lack the Jurisdiction and something has been done which ought not to have been done and that the same requires rectification at my hands.
10. One can begin with the reading of the provisions contained under Sections 443 and 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. Section 443 speaks of the power to detain foreign ship that has occasioned damage, and never says anything regarding the arrest or detaining of a sister ship, much less the Jurisdiction or Power of the Court in this respect. Section 444 spells out the authorities who may detain the ship. Do these provisions appear to be complete and self-contained? Under Section 443 there are the powers to detain a foreign ship whenever any damage has been caused to the property "belonging to the Government or to any citizen of India or a Company" by such a ship. Do I take that any other person or body of persons not falling within the quoted categories cannot approach the Admiralty Court for Orders of arrest? Do I further take that the Power of the Court is limited and circumscribed to those cases only in which damage has been caused "by the misconduct or want of skill of the master or any member of the Crew? "Should I understand that the foreign ship which has caused damage otherwise than by way of said misconduct or want of skill cannot be detained? To say "Yes" to these questions would render the power of detaining a foreign ship, meaningless and absolutely insignificant in very many cases. Such "very many cases" shall have to be contemplated, regard being had to a phenomenal growth in shipping activity, complex operational patterns, navigational magnitude and on the top of all, a wide ranging variety of need to seek redressal of the grievances before the Courts exercising Admiralty Power or Jurisdiction. If the Admiralty Courts are dissatisfied with this helpless situation, they should ask themselves certain pertinent questions, the principal and of prime importance being whether they could look to the evolved and evolving concepts in the filed of Maritime Law. In my opinion, this exercise has been done by the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth (supra).
11. The say of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth (supra) have been read and re-read by the Counsels to buttress the rival contention. It is a case in which the action in rem was based upon an alleged cause of action concerning the Carriage of Goods. The question was one of Jurisdiction. The pronouncement says that the High Court "undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction over claims relating inward and outward cargo". Let me read the reasons behind the conclusion.
12. Para 31 of M.V. Elizabeth (supra) says, "a short account of the English statutes on admiralty jurisdiction and the power exercised by the English Courts over foreign ships will be helpful in understanding the nature and extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of the Indian Courts. We shall, therefore, briefly discuss the salient features of the admiralty jurisdiction of the English Courts." The paragraphs onwards deal with the said particulars.
Para 63 in M.V. Elisabeth in material portion reads thus:
Unlike in the "civil law countries" there is no Maritime Code in England containing all aspects of maritime law. The Merchant Shipping Acts and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act contain the substantive rules, but the jurisdictional and other aspects numerous other statutes and sources. English Maritime Law is still composed of rules having their roots in statute, rules of Court and judicial doctrine of Admiralty, common law and equity.
M.V. Elisabeth in Para-64 says that, in tracing the history of admiralty law in India, it is likewise misleading and incorrect to confine it to statutes. This paragraph recites the say of Westropp, C.J. of the Bombay High Court in Bardot.
Para 66 in M.V. Elisabeth reads as under:
It is likewise within the competence of the appropriate Indian Courts to deal, in accordance with the general principles of maritime law and the applicable provisions of statutory law, with all persons and things found within their jurisdiction. The power of the Court is plenary and unlimited unless it is expressly or by necessary implication curtailed.
Para 67 in M.V. Elisabeth says that, the High Courts of India are superior Courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers. While saying so the reliance has been placed upon the Supreme Court decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, . The reliance is also placed on he say in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition, Vol. 10, para 713.
Para 70 in M.V. Elisabeth refers to Colonial Court of Admiralty Act, 1890. Analysing the expression "whether existing by virtue of any statute or otherwise", it has been said thus:
There is no reason why the words "statute or otherwise" should be no construed as to exclude the various sources from which the admiralty jurisdiction in England developed. Apart from statutes, the powers of the Court, as seen above, were derived from custom and practice and the principles developed by common law and equity as well as by the generally recognised principles of civil law developed and practised in Europe.
The paragraph proceeds:
Likewise, there is no reason why those principles should also not be drawn upon to enrich and strengthen the jurisdiction of this country, even if the jurisdiction of our Courts were to be, by compulsion of history, considered to be curtailed and dovetailed to the colonial past - a proposition which is neither correct nor consistent with our status as a sovereign republic. It is time to take a fresh look at the old precedents.
Para 75 in M.V. Elisabeth in the relevant portion reads thus:
The Courts of the country in which a foreign ship has been arrested may determine the cases according to merits, provided they are empowered to do so by the domestic law of the country or in any of the cases recognised by the International Convention relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, Brussels, 1952.
13. Learned Counsel has urged that, this say of the Supreme Court commands that foreign ship could be arrested, provided the Indian Courts are empowered to do so by domestic law of this country or in any of the cases recognised under Brussels Convention. Further contention coming from learned Counsel in this respect is that the power to arrest a Sister Ship has not been granted under the Indian Statute and that, India not being a signatory to Brussels Convention, such power or jurisdiction cannot be assumed by the Indian Courts. But this contention coming from the learned Counsel stands repelled by the say of the Supreme Court in Para 85 in M.V. Elisabeth. The material portion in the said paragraph runs thus:
Although India has not adopted the various Brussels Convictions (See the Conventions listed above), the provisions of these Conventions are the result of international unification and development of the maritime laws of the world, and can, therefore, be regarded as the international common law or transational law rooted in and evolved out of the general principles of national laws, which, in the absence of specific statutory provisions, can be adopted and adapted by Courts to supplement and complement national statutes on the subject. In the absence of a general Maritime Code, these principles aid the Courts in filling up the lacunae in the Merchant Shipping Act and other enactments concerning shipping. "Procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities.
Para 87 in M.V. Elisabeth says:
Access to Court which is an important right vested in every citizen implies the existence of the power of the Court to render justice according to law. Where statute is silent and judicial intervention is required, Courts strive to redress grievances according to what is perceived to be principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
Thus, upon a careful reading of the say of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth, I would say that it is abundantly clear that, in the absence of a general Maritime Code the principles accepted and recognised under the International Common Law or the Brussels Convention could be resorted to. The Court in filling up the lacunae in the Merchant Shipping Act can override the procedural technicalities. This has been said by the Apex Court after recognising the fact that India has not adopted various Brussels Conventions. No signing of the Brussels Convention therefore should not block the Jurisdiction and Power of this Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction.
14. Thus, I shall have to say that the provisions contained under Section 443 and 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 cannot be said to be the respository of the powers of arrest of a foreign ship. The said Act of 1958 cannot be recognised as self-contained Code or a Code perfect in itself. Looking to the say of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth, it is clear to me that, in absence of specific statutory provisions in the Indian Statute the Court can fill up the lacunae and while doing so the regard could be had to the Brussels Conventions and known Principles of International Law under Statutes or Common Law. It is not in dispute that, now since 1956 the English Administration of Justice Act, 1956 statutorily grants the jurisdiction to the English High Courts for arrest of a sister ship. If our statutory provisions are found to be having lacuna and falling short the principle as obtainable under the Statutes of other countries recognised in the International Common Law and/or under the Brussels Convention can be made applicable by the Indian High Courts. The latter is true despite the fact that India has not adopted various Brussels Conventions.
15. A reference has been made to the orders pronounced by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in its Admiralty & Vice-Admiralty Jurisdiction in Admiralty Suit Lodging No. 3857 of 1993, dated November 9, 1993. In this case of M.T. "LEONTAS", the Bombay High Court firstly says thus:
It is not disputed before me that so far India is concerned, there is no provision in law by which a sister ship can be arrested.
The Bombay High Court (per learned Single Judge) also says that:
On a careful analysis of the Judgment of the Supreme Court, in my view, it is clear that the Supreme Court has in fact widened the Admiralty powers of this Court. But it is one thing to say that the powers of the Court has been widened in respect of matters which already fell within the jurisdiction of the Court. It is another thing to say that the law has been changed and aspects not covered earlier are brought within the jurisdiction of the Court. The first is a matter of interpretation of the various legal provisions and a matter of applying the existing powers. The second, strictly speaking, is a matter of legislation and it amounts to vesting powers which did not exits.
But even after having a careful consideration of the above said say of the High Court of Bombay in M.T. Leontas, I must maintain my humble opinion that, the say of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth (supra) would lead me to the conclusion that, this High Court exercising the Admiralty jurisdiction has the power and jurisdiction to arrest a sister ship. It should not be overlooked that the High Court of Bombay in various other suits have in fact ordered the arrest of sister ships, probably this has been done in case against the defendant No. 2 before me also. Thus, 1 can say that despite the said say of the Bombay High Court in M.T. Leontas under the order dated November 9,1993, at a later juncture on more than one occasions the High Court of Bombay has taken the view that the said Court in its Admiralty & Vice-Admiralty Jurisdiction has the power and authority to arrest a sister ship.
Thus, regard being had to all what has been said above by me, the first question formulated by me, in my opinion requires to be answered and replied in Affirmative. I prefer to do so.
16. The next question arising for considering is as to whether M.V. Giurgeni can be said to be a sister ship of M.V. Kalo. Learned Counsel for the defendant No. 1 in support of the prayer in the Notice of Motion was contended that, in the facts and circumstances of the case M.V. Giurgeni cannot be said to be the sister ship of M.V. Kalo. In support of this contention the reliance has been placed upon the Bare Boat Charter Party, presented before me annexed to the affidavit filed by one Jehangir Darabshaw Shroff, the Constituted Attorney of High Seas Services S.R.L. Constanta. This affidavit says that, even assuming that this High Court has jurisdiction to arrest a sister ship, then also M.V. Giurgeni cannot be said to be a sister ship of M.V. Kalo and therefore, she cannot be arrested. The affidavit points out that, there has been a BareBoat Charter Party dated 25-1-1995 under which M/ s. Transnava, Constanta had chartered the vessel M.V. Kalo. A true copy of the Charter Party dated 25-1-1995 is annexed as Exhibit 1 to the affidavit.
17. This affidavit further says that, the affiant has been informed and that he believes that by a BareBoat Charter Party dated 27th Sept. 1994 M/s. High Seas S.R.L. have chartered the vessel M.V. Giurgeni in terms and conditions set out in the Charter Party dated 27th Sept. 1994, Exhibit-2 to the affidavit. This position has been denied under the affidavit-in-reply filed by one Mr. N. Bandyopadhyay, the Constituted Attorney of the plaintiffs, but upon a reference to two said Charter party, i.e., Exhibits 1 & 2 to the affidavit of Mr. Shroff, it becomes clear that there is the BareBoat Charter Party in respect of M.V. Kalo dated 25th January 1995 and the charterers happen to be Transnav, Constanta. The collision between M.V. Vishva Yash and M.V. Kalo allegedly had taken place on 2nd February 1996 at about 2037 hrs. Thus, I must understand that, at the relevant time there was a Charter Party in force in favour of the charterers. The Bareboat Charter Party Exhibit 2 would go to show that M.V. Giurgeni was the subject-matter of the Charter Party dated 27th September 1994 and that High Seas Services S.R.L. Constanta are the Charterers under the said Charter Party.
18. Thus, I will have to proceed under a clear apprehension that M.V. Giurgeni has been on a Charter Party in favour of High Seas Services S.R.L. Constanta, and that at the relevant time, M.V. Kalo was under a Charter Party in favour of Transnav, Constanta, the agreement in respect of Non-Lien and Indemnity in Charter Party would go to show that, "should the vessel be arrested by reason of claims or liens arising out of her operations under the Charter Party by the Charterers, the Charterers shall at their own expense take all reasonable steps to secure that within a reasonable time Vessel is released and the Charters at their own expense put up bail to secure release of the vessel".
19. Thus, I should recognise that, if a maritime claim arises when the Charter Party is in existence and the Vessel is under operation of the Charterers, it shall be the obligation of on the part of the Charterers to take necessary steps to secure the release of the Vessel within a reasonable time.
20. This is required to be read with Article 3 of International Convention relating to the arrest of Seagoing Ships signed at Brussels on May 10, 1952.I, hereinabove have said that, over & above the statutory law of this country I can definitely have a look at the Maritime Law under foreign statutes and Common Law is accepted at international level and that, I can also have a look at the Brussels Convention though India does not happen to be a signatory to the said Convention. Necessarily therefore, I shall have to read Article 3 of the said Conventions. Article 3 (Para 4) reads thus:
When in the case of a charter by demise of a ship, the charterer and not the registered owner is liable in respect of a maritime claim relating to that ship, the claimant may arrest such ship or any other ship in the ownership of the charterer by demise, subject to the provisions of this Convention, but no other ship in the ownership of the registered owner shall be liable to arrest in respect of such maritime claims.
The Article upon a plain reading says that, in case of a charter by demise of a ship (1) the charterer and not the registered owner would be liable in respect of a maritime claim relating to the ship, and that (ii) the claimant may arrest such ship or any other ship in the ownership of the charterer by demise, and that (iii) no other ship in the ownership of the registered owner shall be liable to arrest in respect of such maritime claims.
21. Upon a perusal of two bareboat Charter Party, exhibit-1 & 2 to the affidavit of Mr. J.D. Shroff, I have understood that, at the relevant time M.V. Kalo was with the charteres under a Charter party. At present M.V. Giurgeni is also with charterers under another Chapter Party. Charterers are different. Because of this M.V. Giurgeni cannot be arrested by saying that it is the sister ship M.V. Kalo which allegedly was guilty of tort on high seas. The plaintiffs could have always asked for the arrest of M.V. Kalo or any other ship of the ownership of her charterers, viz., Transnav, Constants. One more aspect of which I should not be oblivious. The Demise Charterers of the ship M.V. Kalo in the capacity of the plaintiffs, have taken out Admiralty action in rem against the ship "Vishva Yash" and certain other ships listed in the schedule attached thereto, before the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Admiralty Court. The authenticated copy of the writ dated 11th April 1997 presented before me demonstrates this. It, therefore, shall have, to be, accepted that "M.V. Kalo" was under a Demise Bareboat Charter The British Shipping Laws, Vol. 4 under the caption. "The Law of Collisions at Sea" by Kenneth C. MCGUFFIE, 1961 edition and more particularly Para 66 thereof also should be seen. It says that, where a ship is being worked by a charterer or hirer, who appoints and says the officers and crew under a Charter Party or agreement which is in effect a demise of the vessel, the owner is not liable at all for the damages, she may do, while in the possession of the charterer. Bareboat Charter party Exhibits - 1 & 2 do speak of such an arrangement.
22.I thus, feel obliged to conclude that, as "M.V. Kalo" was under a Demise Bareboat Charter, the registered owners of the said ship cannot be made liable to satisfy the maritime claim. The further conclusion would be that, when the said Vessel was under a Demise Bareboat Charter at the relevant time and when "M.V. Giurgeni" happens to be under another Demise Bareboat Charter, the latter cannot be said to be the sister ship of the former. The plaintiffs could have asked for the arrest of "M.V. Kalo" or any other ship belonging to her Charterers i.e. Transnav, Constanta. The second question formulated by me therefore requires to be answered and replied in Negative, I do so. I would add that a wrong ship has been arrested.
23. Therefore, though the first question has been answered by me in affirmative, when the second question is being answered in negative, I should sum up by saying that "M.V. Giurgeni" could not have been arrested and that" in Law and in Facts "there has been a need to revoke and/or to vacate the orders of arrest dated 25th February 1997. I, therefore, order the vacation of the above said orders of arrest, and command the release of the detained Vessel from arrest.
24. The Civil Application stands disposed of with these orders. No cost qua qua Notice of Motion.
25. The orders have been pronounced by me today on 12th May 1997. There is a plea coming from learned Sr. Counsel Mr. Mukherjee that this orders of mine should not be executed atleast for a period of two weeks, to enable them to approach the appropriate forum and to take out appropriate proceedings and to obtain suitable orders. Acceding to this prayer coming from Learned Sr. Counsel, I say that the execution and implementation of the said orders of mine shall stand stayed for a period of two weeks hereof.
Learned Counsel Ms. Sheth urges that, as the arrest of the ship has not been upheld by me, I should award something by way of damages. I am unable to agree with the prayer coming from learned Counsel. The same stands refused. I do not express any opinion regarding the merits of the contentions coming from learned Counsel Ms. Sheth and that, it would be the liberty of her clients to move the appropriate forum at the appropriate time for this relief.