Gauhati High Court
Bhupen Kalita .......... Appellant vs State Of Assam on 5 June, 2020
Author: N. Kotiswar Singh
Bench: N. Kotiswar Singh
GAHC010241732017
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IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(THE HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND
ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
CRL. APPEAL (J) 87/2017
Bhupen Kalita .......... Appellant
VERSUS
State of Assam .......... Respondent
For the Appellant: Mr. S.K. Agarwal, Amicus Curiae
For the State: Mr. K. Gogoi, Addl. Public
Prosecutor, Assam
Dates of hearing:: 28.01.2020 and 19.02.2020
Date of judgment:: 05.06.2020
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N. KOTISWAR SINGH
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated
26.05.2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Nalbari in Special Case
No.3/2015 by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 4 of
the POCSO Act, 2012.
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2. The prosecution case was that an Ejahar was lodged by one Shri
Diganta Kalita on 28.11.2014 alleging that on 28.11.2014 at about 1.45 pm
while his niece (hereinafter referred to as the Victim/Girl Child), about 10
years was returning home from her school, on the way at the bridge of
Tarajan, the appellant accosted her by threatening with a sharp knife and
raped her. The victim on reaching her house narrated the incident to her
grandmother and to her stepmother. Thereafter, the relatives and
neighbours came to know about the incident who informed the father of the
accused but as there was no response, a village "Raijmel" (meeting) was
held that day but neither the appellant nor his guardian turned up.
Thereafter, on the next day an Ejahar was lodged. Based on the said
Ejahar, Tihu PS Case No.104/2014 under Section 341/376(i) of IPC read
with Section 4 of the POCSO Act was registered. On completion of
investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant under
Section 341/376(1) of IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
3. The appellant pleaded not guilty and accordingly, he was tried for the
aforesaid offences.
4. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses in support of
their case. The appellant did not adduce any evidence in defence.
5. Learned Sessions Judge, after considering the oral and documentary
evidences convicted the appellant under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and
sentenced him to undergo RI for 7 years and also imposed a fine of Rs.1000
and in default of payment of fine, to undergo SI for one month.
Compensation under Section 357 CrPC was also directed to be awarded in
favour of the victim.
6. In convicting the appellant, learned Sessions Judge mainly relied
upon the testimony of the prosecutrix as well as the statement made by her
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under Section 164 CrPC. Learned Sessions Judge did not find any material
inconsistency in the statements made by her before the Court and under
Section 164 CrPC and found the testimony of the victim reliable,
trustworthy. Learned Sessions Judge ignored certain minor inconsistencies
which had crept in her statement made before the court qua the statement
made under Section 164 CrPC., keeping into consideration the fact that the
prosecutrix had testified before the court after about 10 months of the
incident. The trial court did not consider such minor inconsistencies to be of
any significance to doubt the veracity of her statement.
7. As regards the defence plea, the Learned Sessions Judge did not
consider the deformity in his arm from which the appellant was said to have
been suffering from, to be of any material significance to support the plea
that he being a person with deformity could not have committed the
offence.
8. The trial court also did not believe the plea taken by the appellant
that the appellant was falsely accused of committing the aforesaid offence
because of certain land dispute with the father of the victim girlchild.
9. The trial court, accordingly, held that the prosecution had been able
to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and
convicted the appellant.
10. In the light of the evidences on record and keeping in mind the
relevant law in this regard, this Court has to examine the sustainability of
the aforesaid finding of the trial court in convicting the appellant in this
appeal.
11. Before embarking upon this exercise, it may be apposite to refer to
the relevant law in this regard.
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12. The appellant has been charged and convicted under a special penal
statute, namely the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO)
Act, 2012. It has been provided under Section 29 of the Act that when a
person is prosecuted for committing any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and
Section 9 of this Act, the Special Court shall presume that such person has
committed the said offence unless the contrary is proved. Section 30 further
provides that if any prosecution under this Act requires a culpable mental
state on the part of the accused, the court shall presume the existence of
such mental state, though the accused can rebut such a presumption, by
way of reasonable doubt and not by preponderance of probability.
13. Under normal criminal jurisprudence, the burden is cast upon the
prosecution to prove the offence alleged against an accused beyond
reasonable doubt to fasten criminal liability on the accused. However, under
the POCSO Act, which is a special statue enacted to prevent sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse of children which are heinous crimes, the
court shall presume the accused to be guilty if he is prosecuted with the
offences mentioned therein and the accused is saddled with the onus to
prove his innocence on the basis of the principle of reverse burden of proof.
Under the aforesaid Act, as provided under Sections 29 and 30, there
is a presumption that an accused charged under Sections 3,5,7 and 9 of the
aforesaid Act has committed such an offence and such an accused is
obligated to prove his innocence. The principle of presumption of innocence,
which is the norm in the criminal proceedings is no more applicable under
this Act.
14. In view of the aforesaid provision for reverse burden cast upon an
accused, the natural question which will arise, in such cases, is to what
extent the prosecution will be required to prove the charge against the
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accused. Because of the reverse burden imposed upon an accused charged
of certain offences mentioned in the Act, is the prosecution still obligated to
prove the charge against the accused beyond all reasonable doubts or is the
charge to be proved on the basis of preponderance of probability or is the
prosecution to make merely a prima facie case, since the wording of Section
29 is that once a person is prosecuted for any offence under Sections 3, 5,
7 and 9 of the Act, the Special Court shall presume that such person has
committed the said offence unless the contrary is proved ?
Accordingly, the Court has to examine the degree of the onus cast
upon the prosecution to prove the case against an accused under this Act
and the corresponding degree of onus on the part of the accused to
discharge the reverse burden of proving his innocence.
15. The answer to this, however, is not as simple as it may appear to be,
for the reason that the maxim that an accused shall be presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty and the charge must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, is part of the classical legal legacy and now so deeply
entrenched in the jurisprudence of societies governed by rule of law. In
view of the above long held legal tradition, the burden on the part of the
prosecution to prove the case against an accused under the Act and the
corresponding burden of the accused to discharge the presumption placed
upon him is to be examined.
16. In this context, it may be apposite to have a cursory view of the law
relating to presumption and burden of proof thrust upon the prosecution
and right and liability of the accused in proving his innocence.
17. Presumption of innocence is a legal principal of ancient vintage.
Under it, an accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until proven
guilty, which is the cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence cutting across
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countries based on rule of law. This maxim was made famous in the words
of Holroyd J in R vs. Hobson [(1823) 1 Lewin's CC 261] that "it is a
maxim of English law that ten guilty men should escape rather than one
innocent man should suffer", which maxim was acknowledged by the House
of Lords as the golden thread running through English criminal justice
system, subject to the defence of insanity and any other statutory
exception, in the celebrated case of Woolmington v Director of Public
Prosecutions,[1935] UKHL 1.
18. This principle is so fundamental in criminal jurisprudence that it is
explicitly acknowledged as one of the most important principles in most of
the international instruments and national laws.
Article 11(1) of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) says that "Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at
which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence".
Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) states that "Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law."
Article 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR) mandates that "Every person accused of a criminal offense has the
right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven
according to law."
So as Article 7(b) of the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights provides for, "The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
by a competent court or tribunal."
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Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union provides that, "Everyone who has been charged shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) states that, "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
Though this principle has not been explicitly mentioned in any statute
of India, unlike the national laws of Kenya, Zimbabwe, Cambodia etc. where
the principle finds specific place, it is deeply entrenched in our criminal
jurisprudence.
The courts in India, however, have also acknowledged that this
principle of presumption of innocence, is not absolute and subject to
exceptions well recognised in law and statutes as explained in
Woolmington (supra).
19. In recent times, exception to this principle has been increasingly
applied in many of the criminal laws, including in India. Under this
exception, the burden of proof gets shifted to the accused, to the extent
that in some cases the accused has to discharge the burden to prove that
he is innocent and did not commit the offence, by reversing the initial
burden of proof.
Gray, Anthony (2012), Professor of Law, University of Southern
Queensland in his article, Constitutionally Protecting the Presumption of
Innocence, University of Tasmania Law Review, 31 (1). pp. 131-152. ISSN
0082-2108 writes that,
"In recent years there has been exponential growth in the use of
so called reverse onus provisions, placing the burden of proof in an
unconventional way, particularly placing such a burden on a person
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who is accused of wrongdoing, rather than on the prosecution. Such
laws are often thought necessary because, otherwise, it might be
extremely difficult for the prosecutor to meet the required burden,
sometimes because the person accused of wrongdoing has better
access to relevant information in this regard.".
POCSO Act, is one such statute where the burden of proof of
innocence is cast upon the accused.
20. In order to discharge the burden of the prosecution under the normal
criminal jurisprudence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the prosecution has to establish both actus reus and the mens rea
and harmonious interplay between these two elements. On the other hand,
the accused in defence is to merely prove which satisfies the "prudent man"
standard by creating a reasonable doubt about the existence of one or more
necessary ingredients of the offence, which is popularly known as the
standard of preponderance of probability. For this, the accused may not
himself adduce any evidence but merely point out the lapses or
shortcomings in the prosecution narrative.
21. However, where the statute provides for presumption of guilt upon
the accused, the prosecution has to merely prove the minimal threshold,
also referred to as the basic or predicate facts, covered by the term actus
reus, and the culpability of the accused is presumed and the accused is
burdened with the responsibility to establish absence of actus reus as well
as mens rea. Failure to discharge this burden results in conviction of the
accused by presumption. The standard of proof by the accused, however, is
based on "preponderance of probability" which is of a lesser degree
requirement of "proof beyond all reasonable doubt". Thus, even if a
reasonable doubt remains about the prosecution case, failure on the part of
the accused to discharge this burden based on preponderance of probability
will result in conviction. The accused has no alternative but to testify to his
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innocence, even with the possibility of self-incriminating which may go
against the right to remain silent.
22. In our country there are numerous statutes including POCSO Act,
which have incorporated this principle of reverse burden in varying degrees.
To mention a few, Sections 35 and 54 of the Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Sections 7,11, 20 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988; Section 21 of the Prevention of Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (now repealed), Section 43-E of
the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967; Sections 118, 119, 137, 138,
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 304-B of IPC;
Sections 79 to 90A, 111-A, 113-A, 113-B, 114, 114-A of the Evidence Act
etc. provide for presumption of guilt against the accused.
23. Some such provision for reverse burden of proving innocence by the
accused had been subject to challenge as being unconstitutional as in the
case of Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act which raise presumption with
regard to the culpable mental state on the part of the accused and burden
of proof placed in this regard on the accused.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while observing that such a principle is
inconsistent with the principle of presumption of innocence, which is
invoked for the larger interest of the society, upheld the constitutionality of
the aforesaid provisions. At the same time, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
cautioned that under such situation, a heightened scrutiny test would be
necessary to be applied necessitating a higher degree of assurance to
convict an accused in view of the fundamental rights as guaranteed under
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and other international
covenants/instruments to which India is a signatory.
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It was, thus, clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing
with Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act in Noor Aga v. State of Punjab,
(2008) 16 SCC 417 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 748 that,
"40. The provision for reverse burden is not only provided for under
the special Acts like the present one but also under the general statutes
like the Penal Code. The Evidence Act provides for such a burden on an
accused in certain matters, as, for example, under Sections 113-A and
113-B thereof. Even otherwise, this Court, having regard to the factual
scenario involved in cases e.g. where the husband is said to have killed
his wife when both were in the same room, burden is shifted to the
accused. Enforcement of law, on the one hand and protection of citizen
from operation of injustice in the hands of the law enforcement
machinery, on the other, is, thus, required to be balanced. The
constitutionality of a penal provision placing burden of proof on an
accused, thus, must be tested on the anvil of the State's responsibility
to protect innocent citizens. The court must assess the importance of
the right being limited to our society and this must be weighed against
the purpose of the limitation. The purpose of the limitation is the
reason for the law or conduct which limits the right. (See S v.
Dlamini4.) While, however, saying so, we are not unmindful of serious
criticism made by the academies in this behalf.
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56. The provisions of the Act and the punishment prescribed therein
being indisputably stringent flowing from elements such as a
heightened standard for bail, absence of any provision for remissions,
specific provisions for grant of minimum sentence, enabling provisions
granting power to the court to impose fine of more than maximum
punishment of Rs 2,00,000 as also the presumption of guilt emerging
from possession of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the
extent of burden to prove the foundational facts on the prosecution i.e.
"proof beyond all reasonable doubt" would be more onerous. A
heightened scrutiny test would be necessary to be invoked. It is so
because whereas, on the one hand, the court must strive towards
giving effect to the parliamentary object and intent in the light of the
international conventions, but, on the other, it is also necessary to
uphold the individual human rights and dignity as provided for under
the UN Declaration of Human Rights by insisting upon scrupulous
compliance with the provisions of the Act for the purpose of upholding
the democratic values. It is necessary for giving effect to the concept of
"wider civilisation". The court must always remind itself that it is a well-
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settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that more serious the offence,
the stricter is the degree of proof. A higher degree of assurance, thus,
would be necessary to convict an accused. In State of Punjab v. Baldev
Singh24 it was stated: (SCC p. 199, para 28)
"28. ... It must be borne in mind that severer the punishment,
greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguards
provided in a statute are scrupulously followed."
(See also Ritesh Chakarvarti v. State of M.P.25)
(emphasis added)
4: (1999) 4 SA 623: (1999) 7BCLR 771 (CC)
24: (1999) 6 SCC 172: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080
25: (2006) 12 SCC 321: (2007) 1 SCC (Cr) 744
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court thus, clarified that the prosecution still
needs to establish the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt and as
far as the accused is concerned, he is not be burdened with the onus to
prove his innocence beyond reasonable doubt. It will suffice if he does so
based on "preponderance of probability".
Accordingly, it was held in Noor Aga (supra) as follows:
"58. Sections 35 and 54 of the Act, no doubt, raise presumptions with
regard to the culpable mental state on the part of the accused as also
place the burden of proof in this behalf on the accused; but a bare
perusal of the said provision would clearly show that presumption
would operate in the trial of the accused only in the event the
circumstances contained therein are fully satisfied. An initial burden
exists upon the prosecution and only when it stands satisfied, would the
legal burden shift. Even then, the standard of proof required for the
accused to prove his innocence is not as high as that of the
prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required to prove the guilt
of the accused on the prosecution is "beyond all reasonable doubt" but
it is "preponderance of probability" on the accused. If the prosecution
fails to prove the foundational facts so as to attract the rigours of
Section 35 of the Act, the actus reus which is possession of contraband
by the accused cannot be said to have been established."
(emphasis added)
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25. The same principle was reiterated in Mohan Lal v. State of
Punjab, (2018) 17 SCC 627, wherein it was held as follows:
"12. Unlike the general principle of criminal jurisprudence that an
accused is presumed innocent unless proved guilty, the NDPS Act
carries a reverse burden of proof under Sections 35 and 54. But that
cannot be understood to mean that the moment an allegation is made
and the FIR recites compliance with statutory procedures leading to
recovery, the burden of proof from the very inception of the
prosecution shifts to the accused, without the prosecution having to
establish or prove anything more. The presumption is rebuttable.
Section 35(2) provides that a fact can be said to have been proved if it
is established beyond reasonable doubt and not on preponderance of
probability. The stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such as Section
37, the minimum sentence of ten years, absence of any provision for
remission, do not dispense with the requirement of the prosecution to
establish a prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt after
investigation, only after which the burden of proof shall shift to the
accused. The case of the prosecution cannot be allowed to rest on a
preponderance of probabilities."
26. The aforesaid legal position was also explained in an earlier case in
Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)
1179 wherein it was observed that,
"27. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless the guilt is
proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. However,
subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of
criminal jurisprudence. For this purpose, the nature of the offence, its
seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken into consideration. The
courts must be on guard to see that merely on the application of the
presumption, the same may not lead to any injustice or mistaken
conviction. Statutes like the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for presumption of guilt if the
circumstances provided in those statutes are found to be fulfilled and
shift the burden of proof of innocence on the accused. However, such a
presumption can also be raised only when certain foundational facts are
established by the prosecution. There may be difficulty in proving a
negative fact.
(emphasis added)
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27. Referring to presumption of guilt of corruption as contemplated under
Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the Supreme Court
highlighted the necessity to prove the foundational facts beyond reasonable
doubts before the statutory presumption could come to operation as
observed in V. Sejappa v. State, (2016) 12 SCC 150 as follows:
"21. While dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some
currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it illegal
gratification and that the prosecution has a further duty to prove that
what was paid was an illegal gratification, reference can be made to the
following observation in Mukut Bihari v. State of Rajasthan8, wherein it
was held as under: (SCC pp. 645-46, para 11)
"11. The law on the issue is well settled that demand of illegal
gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the
1988 Act. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to
convict the accused, when the substantive evidence in the case is
not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or
to show that the money was taken voluntarily as bribe. Mere
receipt of amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten the
guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and
acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification, but the burden
rests on the accused to displace the statutory presumption raised
under Section 20 of the 1988 Act, by bringing on record evidence,
either direct or circumstantial, to establish with reasonable
probability, that the money was accepted by him, other than as a
motive or reward as referred to in Section 7 of the 1988 Act. While
invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, the court is
required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if
any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and
not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt.
However, before the accused is called upon to explain as to how
the amount in question was found in his possession, the
foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. The
complainant is an interested and partisan witness concerned with
the success of the trap and his evidence must be tested in the
same way as that of any other interested witness and in a proper
case the court may look for independent corroboration before
convicting the accused person."
8: (2012) 11 SCC 642
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28. Similarly, in the context of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and
Section 304-B IPC relating to dowry deaths, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed in Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N., (2004) 9 SCC 157 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
1417 that, the prosecution is obliged to prove the cruelty or harassment
before presumption can operate.
"5. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to
show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to
cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the
possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it
within the purview of the "death occurring otherwise than in
normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very
relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section
304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged
to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or
harassment and only in that case presumption operates.
Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution."
29. In the context of the presumption as provided under Section 139 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, regarding discharge of burden by an
accused under the aforesaid Act, it was also held by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 184 that to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of
proof for doing so is that of "preponderance of probability". Thus, if the
accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. It
was thus, held as below:
"27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that
has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of
the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour
of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device
to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be
remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be
better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque
is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined
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to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused
cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof.
28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses
usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is that of "preponderance of probabilities". Therefore, if the
accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about
the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution
can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence
and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to
adduce evidence of his/her own."
30. From the above decisions it is evident that before presumption in
these statutes comes to operate, certain foundational facts are proved by
the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubts. However, as regards
discharge of the onus placed upon the accused relating to presumption of
law as provided in the statutes, the standard of proof is lighter, that is, by
preponderance of probability.
31. In the context of the POCSO Act, however, there seems to be certain
lack of unanimity as to how the prosecution has to prove the case, though
the overwhelming view is that the standard of proof expected from the
prosecution is the probability or plausibility and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt, before the accused is called upon to prove his innocence.
Further, as to how the accused is to discharge his burden under the Act has
not been also clearly laid down, as to whether it should by way of proof
beyond reasonable doubt or on the basis of preponderance of probability.
The position has been compounded by the fact that Section 30(1) of the Act
requires that in any prosecution for an offence under Act which requires a
culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Special Court shall
presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the
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accused to prove the fact that he had no such culpable mental state.
Section 30(2) further provides that for the purpose of this section, a fact is
said to be proved only when the special Court believes it to exist beyond
reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a
preponderance of probability. Thus, if the defence has to prove certain facts
to dispel the presumption under Section 30(1), he has to prove that fact
beyond reasonable doubt and not on the basis of preponderance of
probability.
32. Section 29 of the POCSO Act provides that the Special Court shall
presume that the accused has committed the offence for which he is
charged under the Act, unless the contrary is proved by the accused. The
presumption, however, would operate only after the prosecution has been
able to prove the foundational facts constituting the offence against the
accused. The issue is, whether these foundational facts are to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt or by way of preponderance of probability and
what would be the degree of the corresponding burden of the accused to be
discharged to prove his innocence.
33. As discussed above, in other statutes like NDPS Act, Prevention of
Corruption Act, N.I. Act, Indian Penal Code dealing with dowry death etc.,
the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that before the accused is called
upon to discharge the burden of guilt and to prove that he is innocent, the
prosecution has to prove the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt
and not on the basis of preponderance of probability.
It has been also clarified that, while discharging his burden, the
accused is saddled with the lesser burden of proof and he can discharge the
same on the standard of preponderance of probability.
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34. The issue is whether the same principles can be also applied in the
case of offences committed under the POCSO Act?
35. In the opinion of this Court, there would be a paradigm shift in the
matter of burden of proof and the degree of proof because of the stringent
provisions of the POCSO Act. Unlike other statutes, some of which have
been already referred to above, Section 29 of the Act does not speak of
proof of any foundational fact before the Court presumes that the accused
is guilty of the offence. What Section 29 provides is that the presumption
will come into operation, as soon as a person is prosecuted for committing
or abetting or attempting to, any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of
the Act. In other words, what is required before presumption operates
under the Act is that, the person must be prosecuted.
Section 29 reads as follows:
"29. Presumption as to certain offences.--Where a person is
prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any
offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and Section 9 of this Act, the Special
Court shall presume, that such person has committed or abetted or
attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be unless the contrary
is proved."
(emphasis added)
At the same time, it would be appropriate to remember what the
expression "shall presume" means under the Evidence Act, 1872. It has
been defined under Section 4 of the Evidence Act that, "whenever it is
directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such
fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved". If we import the aforesaid
meaning of the expression "shall presume" to the POCSO Act, and as also
mentioned under the POCSO Act, it would be quite evident that, the
moment a person is prosecuted for committing the offences mentioned
18
under the Act, he shall be presumed to have committed the said offence
and the charges made against him shall be considered to have been proved.
36. It would, thus, be necessary to understand as the meaning and scope
of the word "prosecuted" used in Section 29 of the Act, which provides for
the legal presumption of guilt of the accused.
Black's Law Dictionary (6thEdn), 1990 defines the word prosecute as
follows:
"To follow-up; to carry on and action or other judicial proceeding; to
proceed against the person criminally. To prosecute and action is not
merely to commence, but includes following to an ultimate conclusion."
11th Edn, 2019 of the Black's Law Dictionary defines the word
"prosecute" as
1. To commence and carry out illegal action.
2. Institute and pursue a criminal action against a person.
The word prosecution has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary
(6th Edn) as follows:
"A criminal action; a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course
of law, before a competent tribunal, for the purpose of determining the
guilt or innocence of the person charged with crime. U.S. v. Reisinger,
128 U.S. 398, 9 S.Ct.99, 32 L.Ed. 480. The continuous following up, to
instrumental it is created by low, of a person accused of a public
offence with a steady and fixed purpose of reaching a judicial
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
11th Edn, 2019 of the Black's Law Dictionary defines the word
"prosecution" as "a criminal proceeding in which an accused is tried".
In Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 274 :
AIR 1959 SC 375 : 1959 Cri LJ 392 , referring to Maqbool Hussain v.
State of Bombay, 1953 SCR 730 : AIR 1953 SC 325 : 1953 Cri LJ
1432 , in the context of double jeopardy under Article 20 of the
19
Constitution, it was held that prosecution would mean an initiation or
starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a
judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute
which creates the offence and regulates the procedure, with the following
words:
"10. It is, therefore, necessary first to consider whether the petitioners
had really been prosecuted before the Collector of Customs, within the
meaning of Article 20(2). To "prosecute", in the special sense of law,
means, according to Webster's Dictionary, "(a) to seek to obtain,
enforce, or the like, by legal process; as, to prosecute a right or a claim
in a court of law. (b) to pursue (a person) by legal proceedings for
redress or punishment; to proceed against judicially; esp., to accuse of
some crime or breach of law, or to pursue for redress or punishment of
a crime or violation of law, in due legal form before a legal tribunal; as,
to prosecute a man for trespass, or for a riot." According to Wharton's
Law Lexicon, 14th edn., p. 810, "prosecution" means "a proceeding
either by way of indictment or information, in the criminal courts, in
order to put an offender upon his trial. In all criminal prosecutions the
King is nominally the prosecutor". This very question was discussed by
this Court in the case of Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay3 with
reference to the context in which the word "prosecution" occurred in
Article 20. In the course of the judgment, the following observations,
which apply with full force to the present case, were made:
"...and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation
or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of
law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and
regulates the procedure".
3: (1937) 2 KB 309
37. In view of the above, what one can say is that prosecution means the
proceeding instituted and carried on before court of competent jurisdiction
for determining the guilt or otherwise of a person accused of committing
the offence of which he is charged, on the basis of materials brought before
the court. The prosecution may end in conviction of the accused of such an
offence of which he is charged on the basis of the material evidence that
may be adduced before the court, if the court is convinced that the
20
adequate materials exist to prove the accusations against the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, if the court is not satisfied,
the accused will be acquitted. The conclusion as to the guilt or otherwise by
the court is to be drawn only after the trial is over, i.e., when the
prosecution comes to an end.
38. The effective trial commences before a court only after the charge-
sheet is filed on completion of the investigation and only after the court is
satisfied that there are prima facie materials or evidences before the court
to proceed with the trial. If the court does not find sufficient materials to
proceed with the trial, the court can discharge the accused at that stage.
Then it would be the termination of the prosecution or the trial. It is also to
be remembered that at the stage of charge consideration, the trial court is
not called upon to scrutinize or minutely examine the admissibility,
credibility, reliability of the evidences sought to be relied upon by the
prosecution, but to see whether there are adequate materials to proceed
against the accused. At this stage, the court is not concerned with whether
any fact is proved or not. The court merely assumes the facts to be correct
to draw the conclusion that the accused may be guilty and hence needs to
be tried. As to whether the facts constituting the offence have been proved
or not is to be considered by the court only on conclusion of the trial after
hearing the prosecution evidences and of the accused and not prior to it.
39. The aforesaid process of prosecution is prescribed in detail in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Code contains the comprehensive
procedure dealing with the entire processes involved in the criminal justice
system in our country, from the stage of filing of complaint before the police
station or before a court, the various stages of investigation of the case by
the investigating authority, the manner in which the investigation is to be
conducted, rights of the various stakeholders, including the accused, and on
21
completion of such investigation culminating in filing a final report whereby,
either because of lack of evidence, the case against the person initially
charged, is closed, or if there are sufficient evidences to proceed against
him, the court takes cognizance of the offence committed leading to
framing of charges against the accused for trial which may culminate either
on conviction or acquittal as the case may be. The process of ascertaining
the guilt or otherwise of an accused charged of an offence is in fact,
initiated with the framing of charges against him. If during the process of
framing of charge, it is found that there are no sufficient materials to frame
charge against the accused, he can be discharged. Otherwise, the trial will
be initiated, and it is from that stage that it can be said that the actual
prosecution effectively starts. Accordingly, it can be said that when one is
prosecuted for an offence, he is tried for the same.
40. The Criminal Procedure Code has exhaustively laid down the
procedure for trial. Chapter XVI deals with commencement of procedure
before the Magistrate once the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence
by issuing summons or warrants, as the case may be. Similarly, Chapter
XVIII deals with trial before the Court of Session after the accused person is
brought before the Court pursuant to commitment of the case. At that
stage, the Court frames the charge against the accused and if the Court
does not find sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, the
accused is discharged as provided under Section 227 CrPC. How charge is
to be framed is dealt with in detail in Chapter XVII. Chapter XVIII does
mention various stages of the criminal trial with the framing of charge
(Section 228), conviction of accused if he pleads guilty (Section 229), and if
the accused refuses to plead guilty, a date is fixed for prosecution evidence
(Section 230) and the evidence is recorded on the date fixed by the Court
(Section 231) and after recording of evidence and examination of witnesses
22
of the prosecution as well as the defence, if the Court considers that there
is no evidence that the accused has committed the offence, he shall be
entitled to be acquitted (Section 232). In short, Chapter XVIII of the CrPC
deals with actual process of prosecution which may either culminate in the
conviction or acquittal of the accused.
41. Section 31 of the POCSO Act provides that save as otherwise
provided in the Act, the provisions of the CrPC. shall apply to the
proceedings before the Special Court and for the purposes of the said
provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions.
Thus, most of the provisions of the CrPC including trial and prosecution will
be applicable in a criminal proceeding under the POCSO Act.
42. Several views, however, have been taken by various courts as to
when a prosecution can be said to commence. The following are the some
of the views.
(i) Prosecution starts with registration of FIR or complaint before
the Magistrate.
(ii) Prosecution is initiated when the Magistrate/Court takes
cognizance of the offence.
(iii) Prosecution commences with filing of charge
sheet/challan/investigation report by the police.
(iv) Prosecution commences with framing of charges by the court.
43. In this regard, it may be clarified that taking cognizance of an offence
and prosecution of an offender are two different aspects as clarified by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 as
follows,
23
"49. Cognizance of an offence and prosecution of an offender
are two different things. Section 190 of the Code empowered
taking cognizance of an offence and not to deal with offenders.
Therefore, cognizance can be taken even if offender is not
known or named when the complaint is filed or FIR registered.
Their names may transpire during investigation or afterwards."
44. Explaining the purport of filing of charge sheet, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, held that at the
time of framing charge on the basis of the records of the case, the court
merely presumes that the accused has committed an offence, but this
presumption is not presumption of law but a tentative view based on the
materials before the court for the purpose of continuing with the trial. It
was also clarified that at the stage of framing of charge, any view that that
court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of
committing an offence will be impermissible. Such a view is merely tentative
for the purpose of proceeding with the trial.
It was thus, held as follows:
"17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the
trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the
accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under
both these provisions, the court is required to consider the
"record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and,
after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or
where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it
shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the
section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that
there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the
charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of
law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the
existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to
that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction.
It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine
distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of
the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion
and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative.
Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court
should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of
24
committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible
in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
45. As to the meaning of trial, when an accused prosecuted, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court explained the same elaborately in Hardeep Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the said case overruled the view that trial commences on cognizance
being taken.
It was held that "trial" means determination of issues for adjudging
the guilt or the innocence of a person after making the person aware of
what is the case against him, and it is only at the stage of framing of the
charges that the court informs him of the same. Thus, "trial" commences
only on charges being framed.
It was, thus, held that,
"25. The stage of inquiry and trial upon cognizance being
taken of an offence, has been considered by a large number of
decisions of this Court and that it may be useful to extract the
same hereunder for proper appreciation of the stage of
invoking of the powers under Section 319 CrPC to understand
the meaning that can be attributed to the words "inquiry" and
"trial" as used under the section.
26. In Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar11, this Court held:
(AIR p. 1169, para 9)
"9. ... once cognizance has been taken by the
Magistrate, he takes cognizance of an offence and not the
offenders; once he takes cognizance of an offence it is his
duty to find out who the offenders really are and once he
comes to the conclusion that apart from the persons sent
up by the police some other persons are involved, it is his
duty to proceed against those persons. The summoning of
the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated
by his taking cognizance of an offence."
27. The stage of inquiry commences, insofar as the court is
concerned, with the filing of the charge-sheet and the
consideration of the material collected by the prosecution, that
is mentioned in the charge-sheet for the purpose of trying the
25
accused. This has to be understood in terms of Section 2(g)
CrPC, which defines an inquiry as follows:
"2. (g) „inquiry‟ means every inquiry, other than a
trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court."
28. In State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman12, this Court held
that from the stage of filing of charge-sheet to ensuring the
compliance with the provision of Section 207 CrPC, the court is
only at the stage of inquiry and no trial can be said to have
commenced. The above view has been held to be per incuriam
in Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar13, wherein this Court
while observing that Section 319(1) CrPC operates in an
ongoing inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, held that at the
stage of Section 209 CrPC, the court is neither at the stage of
inquiry nor at the stage of trial. Even at the stage of ensuring
compliance with Sections 207 and 208 CrPC, it cannot be said
that the court is at the stage of inquiry because there is no
judicial application of mind and all that the Magistrate is
required to do is to make the case ready to be heard by the
Court of Session.
29. Trial is distinct from an inquiry and must necessarily
succeed it. The purpose of the trial is to fasten
29. Trial is distinct from an inquiry and must necessarily
succeed it. The purpose of the trial is to fasten the
responsibility upon a person on the basis of facts presented
and evidence led in this behalf. In Moly v. State of Kerala14,
this Court observed that though the word "trial" is not defined
in the Code, it is clearly distinguishable from inquiry. Inquiry
must always be a forerunner to the trial.
30. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Bihar v.
Ram Naresh Pandey15 held: (AIR p. 394, para 6)
"6. ... The words „tried‟ and „trial‟ appear to have no
fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number
of sections in the Code to which our attention has been
drawn the words „tried‟ and „trial‟ have been used in the
sense of reference to a stage after the inquiry. That
meaning attaches to the words in those sections having
regard to the context in which they are used. There is no
reason why where these words are used in another
context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in
their connotation and significance. They are words which
must be considered with regard to the particular context
in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and
purpose of the provision under consideration."
(emphasis supplied)
26
31. In Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra16, this
Court held: (SCC p. 189, para 28)
"28. Once a charge is framed, the Magistrate has no
power under Section 227 or any other provision of the
Code to cancel the charge, and reverse the proceedings to
the stage of Section 253 and discharge the accused. The
trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge;
prior to it, the proceedings are only an inquiry. After the
framing of the charge if the accused pleads not guilty, the
Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial in the
manner provided in Sections 254 to 258 to a logical end."
(emphasis supplied)
32. In V.C. Shukla v. State17, this Court held: (SCC p. 126,
para 39)
"39. ... the proceedings starting with Section 238 of the
Code including any discharge or framing of charges under
Section 239 or 240 amount to a trial."
33. In Union of India v. Madan Lal Yadav18, a three-Judge
Bench while dealing with the proceedings in General Court
Martial under the provisions of the Army Act 1950, applied
legal maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua
propria (no one can take advantage of his own wrong), and
referred to various dictionary meanings of the word "trial" and
came to the conclusion: (SCC pp. 136 & 141-42, paras 19 &
27)
"19. It would, therefore, be clear that trial means act
of proving or judicial examination or determination of the
issues including its own†† jurisdiction or authority in
accordance with law or adjudging guilt or innocence of the
accused including all steps necessary thereto. The trial
commences with the performance of the first act or steps
necessary or essential to proceed with the trial.
* * *
27. Our conclusion further gets fortified by the scheme
of the trial of a criminal case under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 viz. Chapter XIV „Conditions requisite for
initiation of proceedings‟ containing Sections 190 to 210,
Chapter XVIII containing Sections 225 to 235 and dealing
with „trial before a Court of Session‟ pursuant to
committal order under Section 209 and in Chapter XIX
„trial of warrant cases by Magistrates‟ containing Sections
238 to 250, etc. It is settled law that under the said Code
trial commences the moment cognizance of the offence is
taken and process is issued to the accused for his
27
appearance, etc. Equally, at a sessions trial, the court
considers the committal order under Section 209 by the
Magistrate and proceeds further. It takes cognizance of
the offence from that stage and proceeds with the trial.
The trial begins with the taking of the cognizance of the
offence and taking further steps to conduct the trial."
(emphasis supplied)
34. In Common Cause v. Union of India19, this Court while
dealing with the issue held: (SCC p. 776, para 1)
"1. II (i) In cases of trials before the Sessions Court
the trials shall be treated to have commenced when
charges are framed under Section 228 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the cases concerned.
(ii) In cases of trials of warrant cases by Magistrates if
the cases are instituted upon police reports the trials shall
be treated to have commenced when charges are framed
under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 while in trials of warrant cases by Magistrates when
cases are instituted otherwise than on police report such
trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges
are framed against the accused concerned under Section
246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(iii) In cases of trials of summons cases by Magistrates
the trials would be considered to have commenced when
the accused who appear or are brought before the
Magistrate are asked under Section 251 whether they
plead guilty or have any defence to make."
(emphasis supplied)
35. In Raj Kishore Prasad13, this Court said that as soon as
the Prosecutor is present before the court and that court hears
the parties on framing of charges and discharge, trial is said to
have commenced and that there is no intermediate stage
between committal of case and framing of charge.
36. In Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Emperor20, a Full Bench of
the Madras High Court held that: (ILR p. 234)
"... Trial begins when the accused is charged and called
on to answer and then the question before the Court is
whether the accused is to be acquitted or convicted and
not whether the complaint is to be dismissed or the
accused discharged."
A similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court
subsequently in T. Sriramulu v. K. Veerasalingam21.
28
37. However, the Bombay High Court in Dagdu Govindshet
Wani v. Punja Vedu Wani22 referring to Sriramulu21 held:
(Bom LR p. 1191)
"... There is no doubt that the Court did take the view
that in a warrant case the trial only commences from the
framing of the charge.... But, according to my experience
of the administration of criminal justice in this Presidency,
which is not inconsiderable, the courts here have always
accepted the definition of trial which has been given in
Gomer Sirda v. Queen Empress23, that is to say, „trial‟
has always been understood to mean the proceeding
which commences when the case is called on with the
Magistrate on the Bench, the accused in the dock and the
representatives of the prosecution and defence, if the
accused be defended, present in Court for the hearing of
the case."
A similar view has been taken by the Lahore High Court in
Sahib Din v. Crown24, wherein it was held that for the
purposes of Section 350 of the Code, a trial cannot be said to
commence only when a charge is framed. The trial covers the
whole of the proceedings in a warrant case. This case was
followed in Fakhruddin v. Crown25 and in Labhsing v.
Emperor26.
38. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the
effect that as "trial" means determination of issues adjudging
the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has to be
aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the
stage of framing of the charges that the court informs him of
the same, the "trial" commences only on charges being
framed. Thus, we do not approve the view taken by the courts
that in a criminal case, trial commences on cognizance being
taken.
11 AIR 1967 SC 1167 : 1967 Cri LJ 1081
12 (1983) 2 SCC 372 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 489 : AIR 1983 SC 439
13 Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1996) 4 SCC 495 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 772 : AIR 1996 SC 1931
14 (2004) 4 SCC 584 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1348
15 AIR 1957 SC 389 : 1957 Cri LJ 567
16 (1979) 2 SCC 179 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 405 : AIR 1979 SC 94
17 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : AIR 1980 SC 962
18 (1996) 4 SCC 127 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 592
19 (1996) 6 SCC 775 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 42 : AIR 1997 SC 1539
20 ILR (1909) 32 Mad 220 : 1 IC 228
29
21 ILR (1915) 38 Mad 585
22 (1936) 38 Bom LR 1189
23 ILR (1898) 25 Cal 863
24 ILR (1922) 3 Lah 115
25 ILR (1924) 6 Lah 176
26 (1934) 35 Cri LJ 1261 (JCC)
46. It is to be noted that neither the POCSO Act nor the CrPC defines as
to the meaning of the words "prosecuted" and when a prosecution can be
said to commence. Under the circumstances, as to when a person is
prosecuted or when the prosecution commences has to be understood in
the context of the Act and the provisions of the CrPC. As discussed above, it
can be said that that a trial commences not from the date of filing of FIR or
the charge-sheet or taking of cognizance by the court but from the stage of
framing of charge. Prosecution can thus be said to commence from that
stage when the court starts applying its mind regarding the culpability of
the accused, that is, when the proper judicial consideration of the guilt or
otherwise of the accused begins.
47. In view of the above, can it be also said that prosecution under the
POCSO Act commences from the stage the charges are framed against the
accused and he is called upon to answer and defend himself? It is to be
noted that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is called upon to
examine whether the ingredients of the offence and supporting materials
exist so as to presume that the accused has committed the offence charged
and accordingly proceeded for trial. This presumption of the court that
accused has committed an offence at the time of framing of charges,
however, is not a presumption of law as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Amit Kapoor (supra) and as such this presumption, is to be
distinguished from the presumption of law as provided under Section 29 of
the Act. The presumption of the court during framing of charge is mere
30
assumption of guilt for the purpose of proceeding with the trial whereas,
presumption under Section 29 is a determinative deeming provision when
certain fact is legally presumed to be established by holding the accused
guilty of the offence charged. Thus, during the process of prosecution, at
the stage of framing of charge, the question of proving any allegation or
fact against the accused does not arise. Whether a charge or any ingredient
of the offence has been proved beyond reasonable doubt or not or by
preponderance of probability, is to be determined by the court only at the
conclusion of the trial and after taking in consideration the evidences that
may be produced by the prosecution as well as the accused.
48. The language of Section 29 of the Act is that as soon as a person is
prosecuted, the Court shall presume that the accused has committed the
offence. If Section 29 is to be literally interpreted, what would amount is
that the moment the prosecution is initiated with the framing of charge
against the accused as contemplated under Chapter XVIII of the CrPC, the
trial court shall then presume that the accused has committed such an
offence. In such an event, can it be said that, merely because certain
allegations have been made against an accused and charge has been
framed, even before the charges could be proved against him, he shall be
presumed to be guilty? In other words, can the evidences which were the
basis of framing of charge be also for drawing the presumption of guilt
under Section 29 of the Act?
49. Presumption under Section 9 being a legal presumption. If the
aforesaid literal interpretation is to be adopted, it will start operating the
moment a person is prosecuted which is understood to commence with the
framing of charges, without there being any recording of evidence, other
than the records produced by the prosecution for the purpose of framing of
charge. If it is held to be so, obviously, it will lead to serious prejudices
31
against innocent persons who may be falsely implicated merely on the basis
of the materials at the stage of framing of charge, and thus be saddled with
the onerous burden of proving himself innocent. Neither common-sense nor
law contemplates such a situation. Such a position would be untenable and
impermissible in the light of the law discussed above and will also fall foul of
the Constitution. The prosecution needs to do more than merely filing the
charge-sheet which merely indicates prima facie case against the accused.
As such, this literal interpretation is to be eschewed. Yet, at the same
time the language of the statute ought to be also given effect to, as the
statute had been specifically enacted to deal with increasing and rising
heinous crimes committed on helpless and vulnerable children. Thus, a
more pragmatic and workable meaning has to be assigned to the provision
of Section 29 of the Act.
50. It goes without saying that when a person is brought to trial, there
must be cogent material evidences against him as gathered during the
investigation, which would constitute a prima facie case against the
accused, on the basis of which the charge is framed. However, merely
because a prima facie case has been made out against the accused and the
accused is charge-sheeted, it cannot be the basis for drawing a presumption
of guilt against the accused as also held in Amit Kapoor (supra). There must
be cogent and relevant materials and evidences of a high probability
indicating commission of such crime by the accused so as to avoid any
innocent person being hauled up in a criminal trial. At the same time, if
during the trial the prosecution is able to prove the case against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, there would be no need to apply the
principle of presumption against an accused as mentioned in Section 29 of
the Act, in which event, Section 29 would become redundant, which is not
contemplated under the Act.
32
Hence, for the purpose of POCSO Act, for the presumption to come
into play, at the stage of filing of charge-sheet, a person cannot be said to
be prosecuted. It is only after the cogent evidences have been adduced by
the prosecution that the accused can be said to be prosecuted for the
purpose of invoking the legal presumption under Section 29 of the Act.
Presumption will start operating only on the conclusion of the recording of
evidence of the prosecution when the prosecution is able to make out a
highly probable case on the basis of preponderance of probability.
51. In view of the above, in the opinion of this Court, as also held by
many High Courts in this regard, before the presumption in law under
Section 29 of the Act comes into operation against an accused, the
prosecution must be able to prove the existence of certain foundational
facts in course of the trial which would satisfy a prudent man that such a
thing had indeed occurred at the instance of the accused.
52. As we continue to examine the scope of presumption under Section
29 of the Act, it will be apposite to examine as to what it meant by
presumption, in law.
As to what is presumption, has been explained in Izhar Ahmad Khan v.
Union of India, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 235 : AIR 1962 SC 1052 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ
215 as follows:
"18............The term "presumption" in its largest and most
comprehensive signification, may be defined to be an
inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the truth of
falsehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process
of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for
granted. Thus, according to Best, when the rules of evidence
provide for the raising of a rebuttable or irrebuttable
presumption, they are merely attempting to assist the judicial
mind in the matter of weighing the probative or persuasive
force of certain facts proved in relation to other facts
presumed or inferred........."
33
Further, it was held in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar, (2000) 8
SCC 382 that,
"33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of
one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the
truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a
rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be
inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the
existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court
exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical
conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle
has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is
incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to
presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the
common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in
relation to the facts of the case.
53. It is now well settled that presumption is a rule of evidence, which
has evolved and is essentially invoked to plug certain loopholes or gaps or
remove lacunae in the evidences, as also observed by the Supreme Court in
Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC
133, as follows.
"21. In judging whether a general or a particular or special
onus has been discharged, the court will not only consider the
direct effect of the oral and documentary evidence led but also
what may be indirectly inferred because certain facts have
been proved or not proved though easily capable of proof if
they existed at all which raise either a presumption of law or
of fact. Section 114 of the Evidence Act covers a wide range of
presumptions of fact which can be used by courts in the
course of administration of justice to remove lacunae in the
chain of direct evidence before it. It is, therefore, said that the
function of a presumption often is to "fill a gap" in evidence.
(emphasis added)
54. It is therefore, clear that before the Court presumes guilt of the
accused under Section 29 of the Act, some of the foundational facts which
constitute the offence must be proved, as it is only from these established
34
foundational facts that this legal presumption is to be drawn by the Court.
Presumption of guilt under the Act certainly cannot be based on presumed
facts or assumptions, but established facts only.
55. POCSO Act, unlike other statutes like NDPS Act, Prevention of
Corruption Act etc. is a special statute, providing stringent provisions as
regards the nature of offences, investigation and trial and providing for
steep penalties.
It is to be noted that it has been observed above in Noor Aga
(supra) that the more serious the offence, stricter is the degree of proof and
a higher degree of assurance would be necessary to convict an accused. It
is also the obligation of the prosecution that only genuine and plausible
cases are tried by the court. Thus, before the court presumes the guilt of
the accused, the court must be satisfied that the charges brought against
the accused are highly probable and not the product of figment of
imagination, not mere allegations without any proper foundation. There
must be cogent materials before the court to take the view that in all
probability, the accused has committed the offence.
56. It may be also kept in mind that this presumption of guilt which is
ordained by the statute must also pass the test of reasonableness under
Article 14 and justness and fairness implicit in Article 21 as observed by the
Supreme Court in Noor Aga (supra). The provisions of POCSO Act, must be
also interpreted by keeping the constitutional spirit as contained in Articles
14 and 21 as well as in various international instruments, so that under all
circumstances the accused has a right of fair trial, and at the same time
also keeping in mind the public policy for enacting such a stringent law.
57. In this regard, it may be apposite to recall the following observation
of the Supreme Court made in Noor Aga (supra),
35
"53. Dealing with the provisions of Sections 118(b) and 139 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in Krishna Janardhan
Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde17 this Court upon referring to
Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee18, opined: (Krishna
Janardhan Bhat case17, SCC pp. 65-66, paras 43-44)
"43. But, we may at the same time notice the
development of law in this area in some jurisdictions.
44. The presumption of innocence is a human right.
(See Narendra Singh v. State of M.P.19, Ranjitsing
Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra20 and
Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI21.) Article 6(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights provides:
„Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.‟
Although India is not bound by the aforementioned
Convention and as such it may not be necessary like the
countries forming European countries to bring common
law into land with the Convention, a balancing of the
accused‟s rights and the interest of the society is required
to be taken into consideration. In India, however, subject
to the statutory interdicts, the said principle forms the
basis of criminal jurisprudence. For the aforementioned
purpose the nature of the offence, seriousness as also
gravity thereof may be taken into consideration. The
courts must be on guard to see that merely on the
application of presumption as contemplated under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the same may not
lead to injustice or mistaken conviction. It is for the
aforementioned reasons that we have taken into
consideration the decisions operating in the field where
the difficulty of proving a negative has been emphasised.
It is not suggested that a negative can never be proved
but there are cases where such difficulties are faced by
the accused e.g. honest and reasonable mistake of fact.
In a recent Article The Presumption of Innocence and
Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Duty published in 2007 CLJ
(March Part) 142 it has been stated:
„In determining whether a reverse burden is
compatible with the presumption of innocence regard
should also be had to the pragmatics of proof. How
difficult would it be for the prosecution to prove guilt
without the reverse burden? How easily could an
innocent defendant discharge the reverse burden?
36
But courts will not allow these pragmatic
considerations to override the legitimate rights of the
defendant. Pragmatism will have greater sway where
the reverse burden would not pose the risk of great
injustice--where the offence is not too serious or the
reverse burden only concerns a matter incidental to
guilt. And greater weight will be given to
prosecutorial efficiency in the regulatory
environment.‟ "
The above stated principles should be applied in each
case having regard to the statutory provisions involved
therein."
17: (2008) 4 SCC 54
18: (2001) 6 SCC 16
19: (2004) 10 SCC 699
20: (2005) 5 SCC 294
21: (2007) 1 SCC 70
58. It was further held in Noor Aga (supra) that the more serious the
offence, the stricter is the degree of proof. Thus, a higher degree of
assurance, would be necessary to convict an accused.
It was thus held that,
"56. The provisions of the Act and the punishment prescribed
therein being indisputably stringent flowing from elements
such as a heightened standard for bail, absence of any
provision for remissions, specific provisions for grant of
minimum sentence, enabling provisions granting power to the
court to impose fine of more than maximum punishment of Rs
2,00,000 as also the presumption of guilt emerging from
possession of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the
extent of burden to prove the foundational facts on the
prosecution i.e. "proof beyond all reasonable doubt" would be
more onerous. A heightened scrutiny test would be necessary
to be invoked. It is so because whereas, on the one hand, the
court must strive towards giving effect to the parliamentary
object and intent in the light of the international conventions,
but, on the other, it is also necessary to uphold the individual
human rights and dignity as provided for under the UN
Declaration of Human Rights by insisting upon scrupulous
compliance with the provisions of the Act for the purpose of
upholding the democratic values. It is necessary for giving
effect to the concept of "wider civilisation". The court must
37
always remind itself that it is a well-settled principle of
criminal jurisprudence that more serious the offence, the
stricter is the degree of proof. A higher degree of assurance,
thus, would be necessary to convict an accused. In State of
Punjab v. Baldev Singh24 it was stated: (SCC p. 199, para 28)
"28. ... It must be borne in mind that severer the
punishment, greater has to be the care taken to see that
all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously
followed."
(See also Ritesh Chakarvarti v. State of M.P.25)
24: (1999) 6 SCC 172
25: (2006) 12 SCC 321
59. Thus, in the case like the present one, the prosecution, must
establish that the charges against the accused are in all probability true. At
the same time, if the prosecution has to prove the charges against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the legal presumption provided under
Section 29 of the Act will become redundant. Under the circumstances, the
legal position which emerges is that the prosecution must prove the
foundational facts, not on the basis of any prima facie materials, but based
on preponderance of probability, but falling short of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, once the prosecution has been able to establish
the foundational facts on the basis of preponderance of probability, by
virtue of Section 29 of the Act, it will then be presumed that the prosecution
has been able to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
60. It is to be remembered that the initial onus of the prosecution in any
criminal proceeding to prove the offence against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, ever remains, and never gets shifted. However, the
aforesaid onus of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable
doubt in a proceeding under POCSO Act is made easier by the statute by
drawing presumption against the accused whenever he is prosecuted for
any offence under Sections 3,5,7 and 9 of the Act, when the prosecution is
38
able to demonstrate that in all probability the accused has committed the
said offence based on certain established foundational facts. Thus, for all
practical purposes, once the prosecution is able to prove the offence against
an accused under the Act on the basis of preponderance of probability, it
shall be presumed that the prosecution has been able to establish the
charge against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.
61. It may be noted that if the prosecution has to prove the charge
against the accused beyond reasonable doubt in cases under the POCSO
Act, there would not be any need to provide for the provision of
presumption of guilt. This legal presumption of guilt has been incorporated
by the Parliament in the statute considering difficulties faced by the
investigating authorities sometimes in marshalling all the relevant evidences
in order to nail the culprit where there is otherwise overwhelming inputs
about the crime being perpetrated by the accused, but may fall short of
some evidences to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The statutory
presumption under Section 29 of the Act thus gives a cover to the
prosecution for any lacuna or deficiency it may have. But for the
presumption of guilt provided under Section 29 of the Act, the prosecution
has to prove the foundational facts against an accused on the basis of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. However, it must be also clarified that in a
proceeding under POCSO Act, such lacuna or shortcoming which may be
present in the prosecution case must not be of such a fundamental nature
which goes to the root of the prosecution case. For, in such an event,
because of lack of such important evidence or ingredient and existence of
such fundamental lacuna, it may not be even possible to establish the
charge on preponderance of probability and draw legal presumption of guilt
against the accused. The legal presumption provided under Section 29
cannot be the panacea for all the loopholes of the prosecution. The lacunae
39
or the loopholes, or the deficiency, therefore, must not be of a fundamental
nature which renders any charge untenable.
62. In view of the above, the proper interpretation of Section 29 of the
Act would be that, the presumption of guilt against an accused can arise not
at the time of framing of charges but only after the prosecution has been
able to establish the foundational facts by adducing evidence on the
principle of preponderance of probability that in most likelihood the accused
has committed the offence.
63. Having held that the prosecution must establish the foundational facts
on the standard of preponderance of probability and not on the basis of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, the next aspect to be considered is, what
would be the standard of proof which is expected from the accused in order
to discharge his burden against the presumption drawn against him under
Section 29 of the Act.
64. As regards this issue, there is a long line of decisions since Harbhajan
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1965) 2 SCR 235 : AIR 1966 SC 97 : 1966 Cri LJ 82
that as far as the accused is concerned where there is legal presumption of
guilt, he has to prove his innocence not on the basis of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but, on the basis of preponderance of probability.
65. If we examine Section 29 of the Act carefully, it may be noticed that
the onus placed on the accused to prove contrary to the presumption that
he is guilty of committing the offence, is somewhat akin to the burden
placed upon an accused as provided under Section 105 of the Evidence Act.
If an accused claims the benefit of any of the Exceptions provided under
Section 105 of Evidence Act, the burden of proving his plea that his case
falls under the Exceptions is on him and the onus is discharged if the
accused person succeeds "in proving a preponderance of probability".
40
In Harbhajan Singh (supra) it was held as follows:
"14. It is true that under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, if
an accused person claims the benefit of Exceptions, the
burden of proving his plea that his case falls under the
Exceptions is on the accused. But the question which often
arises and has been frequently considered by judicial decisions
is whether the nature and extent of the onus of proof placed
on an accused person who claims the benefit of an Exception
is exactly the same as the nature and extent of the onus
placed on the prosecution in a criminal case; and there is
consensus of judicial opinion in favour of the view that where
the burden of an issue lies upon the accused, he is not
required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove
his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That, no doubt, is the
test prescribed while deciding whether the prosecution has
discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused; but that
is not a test which can be applied to an accused person who
seeks to prove substantially his claim that his case falls under
an Exception. Where an accused person is called upon to
prove that his case falls under an Exception, law treats the
onus as discharged if the accused person succeeds "in proving
a preponderance of probability". As soon as the preponderance
of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution
which has still to discharge its original onus. It must be
remembered that basically, the original onus never shifts, and
the prosecution has, at all stages of the case, to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As Phipson
has observed, when the burden of an issue is upon the
accused, he is not, in general, called on to prove it beyond a
reasonable doubt or in default to incur a verdict of guilty; it is
sufficient if he succeeds in proving a preponderance of
probability, for then the burden is shifted to the prosecution
which has still to discharge its original onus that never shifts
i.e. that of establishing, on the whole case, guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The said legal position was reiterated in V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P.,
(1966) 3 SCR 736 : AIR 1966 SC 1762 : 1966 Cri LJ 1357 and Vijayee Singh v.
State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190.
In Vijayee Singh (supra) it was held as follows:
"17. We have noticed that Section 105 requires that when a
person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the
existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the
41
General Exceptions or special exception or proviso contained in
any part of the Penal Code is on him and the court shall
presume the absence of such circumstances. This presumption
is rebuttable. In Parbhoo v. Emperor6, a Full Bench of seven
Judges considered the scope of Sections 102 and 105 of the
Evidence Act. The majority agreed with the view taken by the
Full Bench in Damapala case5. In Parbhoo case6, Bajpai, J. in
his concurring judgment observed that Section 105 is stated in
two forms, that of a rule as to the burden of proof and that of
a presumption and that the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused always rests on the prosecution and never shifts and
the learned Judge further held that the doubt cast in
connection with the right of private defence must be a
reasonable doubt and if there is such a reasonable doubt, it
casts a doubt on the entire case of the prosecution and that
the result is that the accused gets a benefit of doubt. (AIR p.
421) "The presumption laid down in Section 105, Evidence
Act, might come into play but it does not follow therefrom that
the accused must be convicted even when the reasonable
doubt under the plea of the right of private defence or under
any other plea contained in the general or special exceptions
pervades the whole case." In Damapala case5 Dunkley, J.
while concurring with the majority view after discussing the law on the subject observed: (AIR p. 88) "The conclusion, therefore, is that if the court either is satisfied from the examination of the accused and the evidence adduced by him, or from circumstances appearing from the prosecution evidence, that the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the exception or exceptions pleaded has been proved, or upon a review of all the evidence is left in reasonable doubt whether such circumstances had existed or not, the accused in the case of a general exception, is entitled to be acquitted, or, in the case of a special exception, can be convicted only of a minor offence."
This case has been followed subsequently by several High Courts.
18. In K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra7, it is observed that:
"In India, as it is in England, there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused as a general rule, and it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused; to put it in other words, the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established by 42 the prosecution. But when an accused relies upon the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code or on any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the Penal Code, or in any law defining an offence, Section 105 of the Evidence Act raises a presumption against the accused and also throws a burden on him to rebut the said presumption. Under that section the court shall presume the absence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the exceptions, that is, the court shall regard the non-existence of such circumstances as proved till they are disproved... This presumption may also be rebutted by admissions made or circumstances elicited by the evidence led by the prosecution or by the combined effect of such circumstances and the evidence adduced by the accused. But the section does not in any way affect the burden that lies on the prosecution to prove all the ingredients, of the offence with which the accused is charged; that burden never shifts. The alleged conflict between the general burden which lies on the prosecution and the special burden imposed on the accused under Section 105 of the Evidence Act is more imaginary than real. Indeed, there is no conflict at all."
In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat8, it is observed: [AIR Headnote (g)] "It is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. The general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, under Section 105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the exception lies on the accused; and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of "shall presume" in Section 4 thereof, the court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the 43 presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a "prudent man". If the material placed before the court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of "prudent man", the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in Section 299 of the Penal Code."
A careful reading of these two decisions would reveal that the statement of law therein neither expressly nor impliedly overrules or is in conflict with the majority view in Parbhoo case6. However, in Rishi Kesh Singh v. State9, the question that came up for consideration before a larger Bench consisting of nine Judges was whether the dictum in Parbhoo case6 is still a good law on the ground that some of the decisions of the Supreme Court have cast a cloud of doubt. A majority of seven Judges approved the principle laid down in Parbhoo case6. The larger Bench also referred to various subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court including the Nanavati case7, Bhikari v. State of Uttar Pradesh10 and Dahyabhai case8. Beg, J., as he then was, in a separate but concurring judgment after referring to the Nanavati case7, Bhikari case10, Dahyabhai case8 and Mohar Rai and Bharath Rai case1, held that there is no conflict between what was held by the Supreme Court and the majority view taken in Parbhoo case6. After analysing the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the several above mentioned decisions, Beg, J. observed: (AIR pp. 97-98, paras 160-61) "After a close scrutiny of every part of each of the seven opinions in Parbhoo case6, I have come to the conclusion that the majority of their Lordships did not lay down anything beyond three important propositions which, if not either directly or indirectly supported by decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, have 44 not been affected in the slightest degree by these decisions. These propositions are: firstly, that no evidence appearing in the case to support the exception pleaded by the accused can be excluded altogether from consideration on the ground that the accused has not proved his plea fully; secondly, that the obligatory presumption at the end of Section 105 is necessarily lifted at least when there is enough evidence on record to justify giving the benefit of doubt to the accused on the question whether he is guilty of the offence with which he is charged; and, thirdly, if the doubt, though raised due to evidence in support of the exception pleaded, is reasonable and affects an ingredient of the offence with which the accused is charged, the accused would be entitled to an acquittal. As I read the answer of the majority in Parbhoo case6 I find it based on these three propositions which provide the ratio decidendi and this is all that needs to be clarified."
"The practical result of the three propositions stated above is that an accused‟s plea of an exception may reach one of three not sharply demarcated stages, one succeeding the other, depending upon the effect of the whole evidence in the case judged by the standard of a prudent man weighing or balancing probabilities carefully. These stages are : firstly, a lifting of the initial obligatory presumption given at the end of Section 105 of the Act; secondly, the creation of a reasonable doubt about the existence of an ingredient of the offence; and thirdly, a complete proof of the exception by "a preponderance of probability", which covers even a slight tilt of the balance of probability in favour of the accused‟s plea. The accused is not entitled to an acquittal if his plea does not get beyond the first stage. At the second stage, he becomes entitled to acquittal by obtaining a bare benefit of doubt. At the third stage, he is undoubtedly entitled to an acquittal. This, in my opinion, is the effect of the majority view in Parbhoo case6 which directly relates to first two stages only. The Supreme Court decisions have considered the last two stages so far, but the first stage has not yet been dealt with directly or separately there in any case brought to our notice."
Mathur, J., with whom five Judges agreed, while holding that ratio laid down by the majority in Parbhoo case6 is in conformity with law, however, observed that the reasoning in support of the conclusions is erroneous. Beg, J. was not 45 prepared to go to that extent. The majority speaking through Shri Mathur, J. laid down that the dictum in Parbhoo case6 which is still a good law, can, however, be modified as follows:
(AIR p. 79, para 93) "In a case in which any General Exception in the Indian Penal Code, or any special exception or proviso contained in another part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is pleaded or raised by an accused person and the evidence led in support of such plea, judged by the test of the preponderance of probability, as in a civil proceeding, fails to displace the presumption arising from Section 105 of the Evidence Act, in other words, to disprove the absence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception; but upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, including the evidence given in support of the plea based on the said exception or proviso, a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the court, as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, the accused person, shall be entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubt as to his guilt and hence to acquittal of the said offence."
1 (1968) 3 SCR 525: AIR 1968 SC 1281: 1968 Cri LJ 1479
5 AIR 1937 Rang 83: 14 Rang 666 6 AIR 1941 All 402 (FB): 1941 All LJ 619 7 1962 Supp 1 SCR 567: AIR 1962 SC 605: (1962) 1 Cri LJ 521 8 AIR 1964 SC 1563: (1964) 2 Cri LJ 472 9 AIR 1970 All 51: 1970 Cri LJ 132: 1969 All LJ 657 10 AIR 1966 SC 1: (1965) 6 SCR 194: 1966 Cri LJ 63
66. Thus, by following the above well settled legal position, it would be correct to say that in a proceeding against an accused under the POCSO Act for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act, it would suffice, if the accused is able to prove his innocence on the basis of preponderance of probability.
Yet, this principle is not absolute, in view of Section 30 of the Act, if it relates to proof relating to culpable mental state on the part of the accused, which the court may presume. The accused, if he has to prove the absence 46 of culpable mental state has to prove it beyond reasonable doubt and not based on preponderance of probability. Section 30 of the POCSO Act reads as follows:
"30. Presumption of culpable mental state.--(1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Special Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. (2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Special Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.
Explanation.--In this section, "culpable mental state" includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.
It is, thus, an exception to the general norm that the burden on the accused to prove his innocence is based on preponderance of probability. In view of Section 30(2) he has to prove on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt any fact to show non-existence of culpable mental state. One is, thus, confronted with a situation where the statute insists on the accused to prove the absence of culpable mental state, i.e., the mens rea, on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt under Section 30(2) of the Act, whereas, as per well settled legal principle, the standard of proof of denying commission of the actus reus or disproving the foundational facts by the accused or his innocence will be by the standard of preponderance of probability.
67. As we proceed further, this Court may dwell briefly upon the meaning of the expression "preponderance of probability" in contradistinction to "proof beyond reasonable doubt".
It may be noted that as mentioned under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872 " A fact is to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the 47 particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists", which clearly indicates that the Evidence Act does not insist upon absolute standard of proof. Evidence Act, also nowhere defines as to the meaning of proof beyond reasonable doubt or based on preponderance of probability, which are different standards of proof.
These standards of proof have evolved in criminal and civil jurisdictions in course of time considering the differential stakes in these proceedings. In a criminal proceeding, the stakes are higher for the defendant and involves the precious rights and liberties of the person who would lose the same if convicted of the offence charged. On the other hand, civil liability is less blameworthy and penalty, if any, is less severe.
Thus, in a criminal proceeding, where the accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, a much stricter standard of proof is required to hold a person to be guilty. However such stricter standard of proof has to be pragmatic for there cannot be any absolute proof to convict a person, but it must be a standard where there should not be any reasonable doubt about guilt of the accused and which does not mean proof beyond a shadow of doubt. Thus, this doubt must be a reasonable, a fair doubt based on reason and common-sense, nothing imaginary, trivial, or merely possible doubt and free from speculations.
In Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, (2017) 11 SCC 195 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 257, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based on reason and common sense, as follows.
"15. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. However, the burden on the prosecution is only to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt and not all doubts. Here, it is worthwhile to reproduce the observations made by Venkatachaliah, J. in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal4:
(SCC pp. 313-14, paras 25-26) 48 "25. ... Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response.
Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused person arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.
26. The concept of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately on the trained intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice." [See also Krishnan v. State5; Valson v. State of Kerala6 and Bhaskar Ramappa Madar v. State of Karnataka7]
4. (2010) 2 SCC 583 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1054
5. (2004) 11 SCC 346 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 85
6. (2003) 2 SCC 401 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 544
7. (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Awdhesh, (2008) 16 SCC 238 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 257, at page 256 observed as follows:
11. "22. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to „proof‟ is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, a learned author says [see „The Mathematics of Proof II‟: Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)]:
„The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events 49 are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other.‟
23. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.
24. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge.
While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal22."
The above position was highlighted in Krishnan v. State23, at SCC p. 63, paras 22-24.
22 (1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 928 23 (2003) 7 SCC 56 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577 50
68. Therefore, even in cases where only circumstantial evidences are available, it must be ensured that there is a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.
The principles governing circumstantial evidence was summarised in Pattu Rajan v. State of T.N., (2019) 4 SCC 771 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 354 as follows:
"31. As mentioned supra, the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution should be of a conclusive nature and they should be such as to exclude every other hypothesis except the one to be proved by the prosecution regarding the guilt of the accused. There must be a chain of evidence proving the circumstances so complete so as to not leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion of innocence of the accused. Although it is not necessary for this Court to refer to decisions concerning this legal proposition, we prefer to quote the following observations made in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra9: (SCC p. 185, paras 153-54) "153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra10 where the observations were made: (SCC p. 807, para 19) „19. ... Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between "may be" and "must be" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.‟ (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, 51 (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence."
(emphasis in original) 9 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487 10 (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033
69. In the context of a civil suit, the expression "preponderance of probability" has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court recently in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court applied the test of a prudent man who upon weighing the various probabilities finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact.
It was held that, "720. The court in a civil trial applies a standard of proof governed by a preponderance of probabilities. This standard is also described sometimes as a balance of probability or the preponderance of the evidence. Phipson on Evidence formulates the standard succinctly: If therefore, the evidence is such that the court can say "we think it more probable than not", the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not.269 In Miller v. Minister of Pensions270, Lord Denning, J. (as the Master of Rolls then was) defined the doctrine of the balance or preponderance of probabilities in the following terms: (All ER p. 373 H) "(1) ... It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the 52 evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence, "of course it is possible, but not in the least probable" the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice."
(emphasis supplied)
721. The law recognises that within the standard of preponderance of probabilities, there could be different degrees of probability. This was succinctly summarised by Denning, L.J. in Bater v. Bater271, where he formulated the principle thus: (p. 37) "... So also, in civil cases, the case must be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter."
722. The definition of the expression "proved" in Section 3 of the Evidence Act is in the following terms:
"3. ... "Proved".--A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists."
723. Proof of a fact depends upon the probability of its existence. The finding of the court must be based on:
723.1. The test of a prudent person, who acts under the supposition that a fact exists.
723.2. In the context and circumstances of a particular case.
724. Analysing this, Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane272 held: (SCC pp. 335-36, para 24) "The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at 53 the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies.
Important issues like those which affect the status of parties demand a closer scrutiny than those like the loan on a promissory note: „the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue273, CLR at p. 210‟; or as said by Lord Denning, „the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter‟. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear 274, All ER at p. 536‟. But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged."
(emphasis supplied)
725. The Court recognised that within the standard of preponderance of probabilities, the degree of probability is based on the subject-matter involved.
726. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal275, this Court observed: (SCC p. 314, para 26) "26. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge."
269 Phipson on Evidence.
270 Miller v. Minister of Pensions, (1947) 2 All ER 372 271 Bater v. Bater, 1951 P 35 (CA) 272 N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326 273 Per Dixon, J. in Wright v. Wright, (1948) 77 CLR 191 (Aust). 274 Blyth v. Blyth, 1966 AC 643 : (1966) 2 WLR 634 : (1966) 1 All ER 524 (HL) 275 State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 928 54
70. In the opinion of this Court, the aforesaid principle of preponderance of probability though explained in the context of a civil suit would be equally applicable in a criminal case also.
71. In the light of the discussions above, the following legal positions emerge in any proceeding under the POCSO Act.
(A) The prosecution has to prove the foundational facts of the offence charged against the accused, not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt, but on the basis of preponderance of probability.
(B) Accordingly, if the prosecution is not able to prove the foundational facts of the offence based on preponderance of probability, the presumption under Section 29 of the Act cannot be invoked against the accused.
(C) If the prosecution is successful in establishing the foundational facts and the presumption is raised against the accused, the accused can rebut the same either by discrediting the prosecution witnesses through cross-examination or by adducing his own evidence to demonstrate that the prosecution case is improbable based on the principle of preponderance of probability. However, if it relates to absence of culpable mental state, the accused has to prove the absence of such culpable mental state beyond reasonable doubt as provided under Section 30(2) of the Act.
(D) However, because of legal presumption against the accused, it may not suffice by merely trying to discredit the evidence of the prosecution through cross-examination, and the defence may be required to adduce evidence to dismantle the legal presumption against him and prove that he is not guilty. The accused would be 55 expected to come forward with more positive evidence to establish his innocence to negate the presumption of guilt.
72. In the backdrop of the legal position discussed above, in the present case, it has to be ascertained as to whether the "foundational facts" of the offence had been established by the prosecution on the basis of "preponderance of probability", and thereafter, it has to be seen whether the appellant had been able to discharge the reverse burden of proving his innocence on the touchstone of "preponderance of probability".
73. As this Court proceeds to examine whether the foundational facts have been proved on the basis of preponderance of probability, the Court has to first ascertain as to which are the foundational facts which are required to be established by the prosecution. For example, in a case of offence of rape punishable under Section 376 IPC, the foundational fact would be the actual sexual act perpetrated by the offender as described in the section. The other foundational fact would be that such sexual act was committed against her will or her consent and even if it was with her consent, her consent had been fraudulently obtained under the circumstances mentioned in the said Section.
74. In the present case, the appellant was charged with and convicted of penetrative sexual assault committed on the victim child as defined under Section 3 of the Act. It may be mentioned that the offences as defined under Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act also cover almost all possible aspects of the offence of sexual assault including rape as defined under Section 375 IPC. Thus, most of the principles as applicable to rape will be also applicable in the present case.
While Section 3 of the Act deals with sexual assault of lesser gravity, Section 4 deals with more serious and aggravated forms of sexual assault.
5675. As far as the present case is concerned, in view of the nature of the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has to establish the foundational fact, the actus reus, that the appellant had sexually assaulted the victim girl within the meaning of Section 3 of the POCSO Act. The appellant has been specially charged of inserting his male organ in the vagina of the victim girl. Though lack of consent of the victim girl could be another foundational fact, in the present case, it will be irrelevant as the victim girl is a child below 18 years as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act and consent of a minor girl of 18 years is no consent in the eye of law under the Act. This is in consonance with the Sixth description mentioned under Section 375 of IPC which provides that it amounts to rape if the sexual act is committed with or without her consent when the victim girl is under eighteen years of age. In the present case, there is no dispute that the age of the victim girl was below 14 years when the incident occurred.
The prosecution produced and proved the school certificate as Exhibit "X-1" in which the date of birth of the girl was recorded as 2.9.2004 to prove that the victim girl was below 14 years old at the time of occurrence. The Doctor who examined the victim girl also opined that she is below 14 years. The oral testimony of the witnesses testifies to that effect that she is about 10/11 years at the time of occurrence and thus below 18 years. The defence has not questioned her age.
76. In this context it would be important to note that, to constitute a crime, both the actus reus and mens rea must coexist. While actus reus can be demonstrated by direct or indirect evidences, mens rea, is the mental element, the knowledge, or the motiving element for commission of the offence which is generally to be inferred from the facts/evidences already established.
57Under the normal criminal jurisprudence, mens rea is another ingredient required for proving an offence. To that extent, mens rea can be also a foundational fact. But where presumption of guilt is ascribed to the accused under Section 29 and also presumption of the existence of culpable mental state under Section 30 of the Act, it may not be a foundational fact to be proved by the prosecution for the reason that after the actus reus been established by the prosecution, it would be presumed that the accused had the mens rea as well. Section 30 of the Act provides that in any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Special Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. The fact of absence of the mental state has to be proved by the accused based on "proof beyond reasonable doubt" as mentioned under Section 30(2) of the Act.
77. In the present case, to ascertain whether the aforesaid foundational fact has been established on the basis of preponderance of probability, the evidences on record have to be properly scrutinized.
78. The star witness in this case is the victim girl and in fact the conviction of the appellant is primarily based on the account of the victim girl.
The prosecutrix was examined by the Trial court to ascertain whether she could understand properly and had the capacity to testify before the court and the court after being fully satisfied with her capability to do so, proceeded to examine her.
She vividly described what the appellant had done to her on the fateful day.
58The Trial Judge took note of the demeanour of the witness while testifying before the court when she started crying, which perhaps also persuaded the court to consider her testimony to be truthful.
79. She testified that on 28.11.2014 at about 2.30 pm while she was returning from her school, on the way, she was accosted by the appellant with a knife and after gagging her mouth, forcibly brought her down under a culvert and after removing her school uniform, bit her chest.
She further testified that the appellant after removing her panty, inserted his genital on her private part, because of which, blood started oozing out from her private part. She stated that she could not shout at the time when she was sexually assaulted as her mouth was gagged. The appellant also threatened her by showing a knife not to disclose the incident to anybody or else he would stab her. After the incident, she reached her home crying and informed her grandmother about the incident to her, who in turn informed her stepmother about the said incident. She also stated that there was blood stain in her panty because of the said incident. On the next day, she was medically examined, and her statement was also recorded by the Magistrate which was exhibited before the Court.
80. During cross-examination, she stated that she used to return home alone from the School using the same route. Though she admitted that villagers use the said route, on that day, there was none in the said route. She also stated that the appellant had gagged her mouth with his hand and though she tried to escape from his clutches, she could not. She stated that at a certain distance from the culvert, there were some houses.
She also stated that at the time of the occurrence, she was studying in Class V in 694 No. Ranakuchi LP School.
5981. As mentioned above, there is no eyewitness. Apart from official witnesses, other witnesses are those to whom the victim girl had narrated her ordeal. In such circumstances, one may ask as to whether the sole testimony of the victim minor girl could be relied upon and be the foundation for conviction of the appellant.
82. As regards testimony of a minor girl it has been held that evidence of a child witness cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age, though the court would be required to scrutinise the evidence with care and caution. Further, if the evidence had withstood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in the evidence, then a conviction can be based upon such testimony alone. It has been also held that corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence and some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness, if not on material particulars, cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. It was thus held in State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar, (2002) 1 SCC 622 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 217 as follows:
"14. In the case of Panchhi v. State of U.P.1 it has been held that it cannot be said that the evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably stigmatized. It was held that it is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. It was held that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring. It is held that it is more a rule of practical wisdom than a law.
15. In the case of Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka2 it has been held that the evidence of a child witness cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age. It is held that the fact of a child witness would require the Court to scrutinise the evidence with care and caution. It is held that if the evidence is shown to have stood the test of cross- examination and there is no infirmity in the evidence, then a conviction can be based upon such testimony alone. It is held 60 that corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. It is held that some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. It is held that discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness. It is held that while appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored."
1: (1998)7 SCC 177 2: (2001)9 SCC 129
83. As regards, the law relating to conviction for the offence of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim, it has been held that the same is permissible, if the testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. In Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 598, it was held as follows:
"23. There are a series of decisions to the effect that even in cases wherein there is lack of oral corroboration to that of a prosecutrix, a conviction can be safely recorded, provided the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the „probabilities factor‟ does not render it unworthy of credence, and that as a general rule, corroboration cannot be insisted upon, except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. Vide (1) Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan2, (2) Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat3, (3) Krishan Lal v. State of Haryana4.
2: 1952 SCR 377 3: 1983 (3) SCC 217 4: 1980 (3) SCC 159 It was similarly held in State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1210, State of H.P. v. Asha Ram, (2005) 13 SCC 766 :
(2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 296.61
84. The aforesaid legal position was reiterated and summarised in the recent decision in Dola v. State of Odisha, (2018) 18 SCC 695 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 239 as follows:
"6. It is well-settled law that if the version of the prosecutrix is believed, basic truth in her evidence is ascertainable and if it is found to be credible and consistent, the same would form the basis of conviction. Corroboration is not a sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration, except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. When a grown up and married woman gives evidence on oath in court that she was raped, it is not the proper judicial approach to disbelieve her outright.
7. In this regard it would be useful to quote certain observations of this Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat2 wherein it is observed that: (SCC pp. 225- 27, paras 10-11) "10. By and large these factors are not relevant to India, and the Indian conditions. Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault on account of any such factor as has been just enlisted. The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because: (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition-bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and 62 respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition-bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband‟s family of a married woman, would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the cross-
examination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent.
11. In view of these factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to books. And when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built-in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. On principle, the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on a par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self- inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of eyewitness account of an independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the courts in the western world (obeisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of 63 the colonial hangover). We are therefore of the opinion that if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming, subject to the following qualification: Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation. Or when the "probabilities factor" is found to be out of tune."
(emphasis supplied)
8. In Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe v. State of Maharashtra3, this Court reiterated that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix could be relied upon if it inspires the confidence of the Court:
(SCC p. 95, para 9)
"9. It is true that in a rape case the accused could be convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is capable of inspiring confidence in the mind of the court. If the version given by the prosecutrix is unsupported by any medical evidence or the whole surrounding circumstances are highly improbable and belie the case set up by the prosecutrix, the court shall not act on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix. The courts shall be extremely careful in accepting the sole testimony of the prosecutrix when the entire case is improbable and unlikely to happen."
9. However, as is also evident from the observations above, such reliance may be placed only if the testimony of the prosecutrix appears to be worthy of credence. In this regard, it is also relevant to note the following observations of this Court in Raju v. State of M.P.4, which read thus: (SCC p. 141, paras 10-11) "10. The aforesaid judgments† lay down the basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they 64 cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court.
11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration."
2 (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 728 3 (2006) 10 SCC 92 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 161 4 (2008) 15 SCC 133 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 751 Thus, it would be permissible to rely on the sole evidence of the prosecution to convict the appellant.
85. It may however, also be noted that as regards reliability of the sole witness, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to say the following in Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, (2003) 2 SCC 401 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 544:
10. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact.
However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the 65 testimony of a single witness. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000])"
86. In this regard, one may also note what was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277, wherein the legal position of reliability of the testimonial evidence was explained as follows:
"7. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) is neither a sound rule of law nor a rule of practice. Hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. It is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the evidence carefully and, in terms of the felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest."
It was further explained in State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587 : AIR 2009 SC 152, the Court can overlook "minor discrepancies on trivial matters" which do not affect "the core of the prosecution case." The Supreme Court, however, emphasised in State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, (2010) 12 SCC 324 : AIR 2010 SC 3071, that that "it is the duty of the Court to separate falsehood from the truth, in sifting the evidence". While doing so it be ensured that the eye-witness testimony is credible and reliable and not contradicted by other eyewitnesses or by the any medical and forensic evidence.
87. Keeping the aforesaid legal position in mind, this Court will further examine the testimony of the victim girl and whether it is corroborated by any other evidence.
88. The victim girl had made a statement under Section 164 CrPC. The Trial court did not find inconsistencies between the said statement and her 66 testimony before the court and took the view that the said statement made under 164 CrPC. corroborates her testimony. This Court also has not observed any noticeable discrepancy between these two statements which is of any significance. The statement made under Section 164 CrPC. was recorded by the Magistrate after being satisfied that she was able to understand the questions being put.
It is seen that there is no serious material inconsistency or contradiction in the oral testimony and statement given by the victim under Section 164 CrPC, though it lacks some of the details which the victim stated before the court. However, there is not much discrepancy relating to the main allegation.
89. The defence despite subjecting her to a thorough cross-examination, could not shake her testimony. In other words, her testimony remained unshaken during the trial.
In the opinion of this Court also, the testimony of the victim girl stands corroborated by the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC.
90. The I.O. of the case on spot visit of the place of occurrence of the crime, which was under the culvert, and noted that as stated by the victim girl, there was no house nearby the place of occurrence. The existence of a boiler chicken farm near the place of occurrence as mentioned by the I.O. is not much of importance for the reason, as it would not normally be inhabited. The I.O. also stated that the appellant was handicapped on his left hand. This also does not necessarily lead to any inference that the appellant was incapable of perpetrating the crime charged of, in absence of proper description of the degree of the disability.
67There was nothing in the testimony of the I.O. that could have cast any doubt on the truthfulness of the testimony of the victim girl.
91. It has been also noted that the medical report does not contradict the claim that she was sexually assaulted by the appellant.
In this regard, the statement of the medical officer Dr. Urmi Choudhury, PW1, who examined the victim girl may be considered.
She deposed that on 30.11.2014 while she was serving as Medical and Health Officer-I at SMK Civil Hospital, Nalbari, examined the victim who was about 10 years old in connection with Tihu PS Case No.104/2014 under Sections 341/376(i) IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The medical finding given by her was as follows:-
"Teeth 6/7 = 28. Height 3ft 8". Vagina, vulva - Healthy 6/7 On PV examination - Hymen found intact. Small abrasion of size .5x.5 cm, reddish in colour is present at hymen and mild spotting present at hymen. No finger can be introduced to vagina. Swab is taken from the perennial region and sent for microscopy to see sperm. After examination, no sperm is seen. Though pregnancy test of urine was given but till the submission of report the victim did not produce test report.
Doctor advised X-ray for age determination of the victim girl and from the radiologist report her age is estimated below 14 years.
Impression : No definite sign of recent sexual intercourse is seen. Small abrasion of size .5x.5 cm is seen over hymen which is reddish in colour and mild spotting seen from it. She is below 14 years of age. Ext.1 is exhibited as her report. Ext.2 is exhibited as the report of radiologist and Ext.2(1) is exhibited as the signature of Dr. Probodh Kr. Sarma, SMK Civil Hospital, Nalbari. Ext.3 is the hospital management 68 society printed from where the report of vaginal swab was written as no sperm seen. Ext.3(1) is signature of Laboratory Technician."
On cross-examination, she stated that the abrasion found in the hymen of the patient may be caused by scrapping of nail.
92. Though the doctor gave the opinion that no recent sexual activity was noticed and hymen was intact, a small abrasion of size .5x.5 cm of reddish in colour was present at hymen and there was mild spotting at hymen. It does indicate that the private part of the victim girl was manipulated, either voluntarily or non-voluntarily. This injury could have been self-inflicted as suggested during the cross examination of the doctor who opined that it could have been caused by nail scrapping. But this nail scrapping could have been also caused by the appellant while he was thrusting or attempting to thrust his male organ to the vagina of the victim girl. There may not have been full penetration of the penis but mere superficial penetration without damaging the hymen. But in the process the area of hymen could have been scratched. Thus, this injury caused has to be examined in the context of the statement of the victim girl and the plea of the appellant.
93. While the victim girl categorically states that the appellant had inserted his organ to her vagina causing bleeding, the scenario which can be visualised is that the appellant had inserted his penis to the vagina of the girl, though not fully, thus not rupturing/damaging the hymen but in the process scratching her vagina, causing blood to come out from the said small injury. This picturization is fully in consonance with and compatible with the statement made by the victim girl in her own words, based on the principle of "preponderance of probability".
6994. At this stage it may be apposite to note the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Hari Chand, (2009) 13 SCC 542 that unless the oral evidence is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, it has primacy. It was observed as follows:
"13. There was no reason for the High Court to discard the credible, cogent and trustworthy evidence of the eyewitnesses. This was certainly not a case where medical evidence was at a variance with the ocular evidence. The evidence of the eyewitnesses regarding injuries caused by the firearms is amply corroborated by the evidence of the doctor who found four firearms‟ wounds. In any event unless the oral evidence is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, it has primacy.
14. "20. Coming to the plea that the medical evidence is at variance with ocular evidence, it has to be noted that it would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses‟ account which had to be tested independently and not treated as the „variable‟ keeping the medical evidence as the „constant‟.
21. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses‟ account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses‟ account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for [their] credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the „credit‟ of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation."
95. In the opinion of this Court, the statement of the medical officer who stated during the cross examination that such abrasion found in the hymen may be caused by nail scrapping, does not distract from the fact that there 70 was injury near the hymen. Such statement which is in the nature of an expert opinion does not militate against the prosecution case. In fact, it would be quite probable that the abrasion could have been caused while the appellant was trying to insert his penis into the vagina of the girl as claimed by the victim girl. Thus, it is consistent, rather being inconsistent with the testimony of the victim girl.
96. The opinion of the medical officer that no definite sign of recent sexual intercourse was seen, does not necessarily rule out sexual assault or render the testimony of the victim girl doubtful, for the reason that to constitute the sexual assault as described in Section 3 of the POCSO Act, even superficial penetration is sufficient.
In the opinion of this Court, the medical opinion does not contradict the statement of the victim girl, rather it corroborates the same. It was certainly probable that the abrasion was caused during the sexual assault by the appellant.
97. Even otherwise also, in view of the well settled principle that the slightest degree of penetration of the penis within the vulva labia majora or the vulva or pudenda without causing any injury or with or without emission of semen or even an attempt of penetration is sufficient to constitute rape, the testimony of the victim girl cannot be doubted.
98. The appellant has been convicted under section 4 of POCSO Act which provides that whoever commits any penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
7199. As to what amounts to penetrative sexual assault has been defined under Section 3 of the POCSO Act.
Under Section 3 of the POCSO Act, a person is said to commit "penetrative sexual assault" if-
(a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or
(c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or
(d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such person or any other person.
100. The use of the words "to any extent" in Section 3(a) and (b) means that the penetration may not be necessarily deep or injurious to the private parts and even a mild or peripheral penetration will constitute penetration within the ambit of Section 3 of the POCSO Act.
101. Thus, even if there is no full penetration of the male organ into the vagina and even if it is superficial, it can amount to penetrative sexual assault within the meaning of Section 3 of the POCSO Act and punishable under Section 4 of the Act.
102. The offences described under Sections 3 and 5 of the POCSO also cover many aspects of "rape" as defined under Section 376 IPC. It is now well settled that the slightest degree of penetration of the penis within the 72 vulva labia majora or the vulva or pudenda without causing any injury or with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is sufficient to constitute rape.
As to what constitutes rape, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to a plethora of authorities, held in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 598 as follows:
" 37. We feel that it would be quite appropriate, in this context, to reproduce the opinion expressed by Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (Twenty-first Edition) at page 369 which reads thus:
"Thus to constitute the offence of rape it is not necessary that there should be complete penetration of penis with emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the law. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. In such a case the medical officer should mention the negative facts in his report, but should not give his opinion that no rape had been committed. Rape is crime and not a medical condition. Rape is a legal term and not a diagnosis to be made by the medical officer treating the victim. The only statement that can be made by the medical officer is that there is evidence of recent sexual activity. Whether the rape has occurred or not is a legal conclusion, not a medical one."
(emphasis supplied)
38. In Parikh‟s Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, the following passage is found:
"Sexual intercourse.-- In law, this term is held to mean the slightest degree of penetration of the vulva by the penis with or without emission of semen. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains."
39. In Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice (Vol. 4) at page 1356, it is stated:
"... [E]ven slight penetration is sufficient and emission is unnecessary."
40. In Halsbury‟s Statutes of England and Wales, (Fourth Edition), Volume 12, it is stated that even the slightest degree 73 of penetration is sufficient to prove sexual intercourse within the meaning of Section 44 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956. Vide (1) R. v. Hughes17; (2) R. v. Lines18 and R. v. Nicholls19.
41. See also Harris‟s Criminal Law, (Twenty-second Edition) at page 465.
42. In American Jurisprudence, it is stated that slight penetration is sufficient to complete the crime of rape. Code 263 of Penal Code of California reads thus:
"Rape; essentials -- Penetration sufficient.-- The essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of the victim of the rape. Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime."
43. The First Explanation to Section 375 of Indian Penal Code which defines „Rape‟ reads thus:
"Explanation.-- Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape."
44. In interpreting the above explanation whether complete penetration is necessary to constitute an offence of rape, various High Courts have taken a consistent view that even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape and the depth of penetration is immaterial. Reference may be made to (1) Natha v. Emperor20; (2) Abdul Majid v.
Emperor21; (3) Mst. Jantan v. Emperor22; (4) GhanashyamMisra v. State23; (5) Das Bernard v. State24. In re Anthony25 it has been held that while there must be penetration in the technical sense, the slightest penetration would be sufficient and a complete act of sexual intercourse is not at all necessary. In Gour‟sThe Penal Law of India, 6th Edn. 1955 (Vol. II), page 1678, it is observed, "Even vulval penetration has been held to be sufficient for a conviction of rape."
17: (1841) 9 C& P 752 18: (1844) 1 Car &Kir 19: (1847) 9 LTOS 179 20: (1925) 26 CrLJ 1185 21: AIR 1927 Lah 735 (2) 22: (1934) 36 Punj LR 35 23: 1957 CrLJ 469: AIR 1957 Ori 78 24: 1974 CrLJ 1098 25: AIR 1960 Mad 308 74
103. In view of the above, as even superficial penetration may amount to rape which may not necessarily involve full penetration or injury to the female sexual organ if the testimony of the victim child is credible and trustworthy, the offence of sexual assault may be established. In the present case, there is already medical evidence to the effect that there was abrasion, which is a kind of scratch and thus even if it is a very minor injury, it indicates that there was certain kind of manipulations in that region of the body. The said medical evidence, thus, corroborates the testimony of the victim girl charging the appellant of sexually assaulting her.
104. It may be also mentioned that it is well settled that where the medical evidence is in variance with the ocular evidence, if the eyewitness account is found to be reliable, such medical evidence, which is in the nature of an expert opinion could be ignored.
In this regard one may also note what the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held in State of U.P. v. Hari Chand, (2009) 13 SCC 542 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1112 as follows:
"13. There was no reason for the High Court to discard the credible, cogent and trustworthy evidence of the eyewitnesses. This was certainly not a case where medical evidence was at a variance with the ocular evidence. The evidence of the eyewitnesses regarding injuries caused by the firearms is amply corroborated by the evidence of the doctor who found four firearms‟ wounds. In any event unless the oral evidence is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, it has primacy.
14. "20. Coming to the plea that the medical evidence is at variance with ocular evidence, it has to be noted that it would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses‟ account which had to be tested independently and not treated as the „variable‟ keeping the medical evidence as the „constant‟.
21. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses‟ account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive.75
Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses‟ account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for [their] credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the „credit‟ of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation."
In the present case, as mentioned above, the medical evidence cannot be said to be in variance with the testimony of the victim girl. In fact, it corroborates the testimony of the victim girl.
105. On the other hand, the appellant had not offered any alternative scenario to explain this abrasion near the vagina. As discussed above, had this trial been under the normal criminal law, the prosecution would have been under obligation to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant was not under any obligation to lead any evidence but could have discredited the version of the prosecution from the evidences produced during cross examination by the prosecution. However, in view of the presumption of guilt of the appellant under Section 29 of the Act, it will be deemed that the charge against the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt and it was not sufficient on the part of the appellant to merely explain the evidences and circumstances. The appellant ought to have led some evidence to discredit this picturization by the prosecution and presumption of guilt. The appellant had to rebut the presumption that he committed the offence and that the facts as alleged by the prosecution did not exist, by placing materials before the court sufficient to render existence 76 of such facts and circumstances so improbable that a prudent man would not accept them. The appellant had to satisfy the standard of a "prudent man". If the materials placed before the court, such as, oral and documentary evidences, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfy the test of a "prudent man", the appellant will have discharged his burden. The appellant had to prove that the accusation of the appellant was most likely and probably not true by applying the test of preponderance of probability. The appellant also has failed to demonstrate any inconsistency or any element of doubt about the statement of the victim girl. In the opinion of this Court, the appellant had not only failed to throw any doubt on the prosecution version, but also miserably failed to prove his innocence even by applying the standard of "preponderance of probability".
106. The witnesses to whom the victim girl narrated her ordeal soon after the incident testified in the court. The contemporaneous statements of these witnesses reiterated before the trial court, though they themselves were not eyewitnesses, lends credence to the genuineness and reliability of the testimony of the victim.
107. PW8, Smt. Ratan Kalita, was the aunt of the informant Diganta Kalita (PW5), and grandmother of the victim girl. She was the first person to whom the victim girl had narrated the sexual assault by the appellant soon after she reached home after the incident. She, the PW 8 testified that on the day of the occurrence, the victim reached home after school. She was found crying and when enquired about the reason, the victim girl informed PW8 about she being raped by the appellant while coming from school by gagging her under a culvert. PW8 also gave a statement under Section 164 CrPC before the Magistrate. She was also subjected to intense cross- examination during which time she reiterated that the victim had disclosed 77 about the incident of rape when enquired from her. Thus, the testimony of PW8 that on reaching home the victim girl was crying and when enquired narrated the incident, would preclude any element of fabrication of the accusation by the victim. It indicates the spontaneity on the part of the victim girl in sharing her trauma with the PW 8 without any undue delay. Any undue delay on the part of the victim girl in informing others of the incident could have cast some doubt about the genuineness of the accusation by the girl as these witnesses were staying together in the same house.
108. Tapan Kalita, PW6, is the uncle of the victim who was informed about the incident by her aunt Ratan Kalita (PW8) on the day of occurrence. He testified that the victim girl at the time of occurrence was studying in Ranakuchi Primary School which was situated about 1 km from their house and there is a deserted place between their house and the school and the culvert under which the incident occurred was located in that deserted place. He also testified that on the next day of the occurrence, a village mel was held in which the appellant did not appear because of which his brother Diganta Kalita lodged an Ejahar.
The fact that a village mel was held would also obviate any plan to falsely implicate the accused. It would be very unusual that most of the villagers would be falsely led into believing in such a serious charge made against the appellant, if the same was not true. At the same time, it would be also most unlikely that the victim girl or her family would make such a reprehensible act to be made public, if the same had not really occurred putting her dignity and self-respect at stake without any apparent motive.
It may be noted from the evidence of the father of the victim girl (PW9) that he was away from the village and came to the village only in the 78 evening of the day of the incident which also makes any attempt to falsely implicate the appellant most unlikely.
109. Thus, the probability of the victim girl making a false accusation in public seems to be less than probability of the appellant being falsely accused under the circumstances as indicated in the case records. It is also not the case of the appellant that they knew each other, and she had made this allegation for some ulterior motive. In fact, the victim girl says in her testimony that she does not know him. Thus, making such a scandalous allegation against an unknown person seems to be most unlikely.
110. Sarat Kalita, PW9, is the father of the victim who stated that his daughter, the victim was 13 years as on 1/11/2016. On the day of occurrence, when he was returning home at around 8 pm, he noticed a huge gathering at the village Namghar and on enquiry, he was informed that the appellant had violated the victim and people had gathered to take a decision. He then enquired from his daughter who told him about commission of rape by the appellant. PW9 admitted during the cross examination that the left hand of the appellant was deformed. However, this admission does not make any dent on the prosecution case. It was not made out by the defence either during the cross examination or by adducing evidence that the deformity was of such nature that it was almost impossible or not plausible on the part of the appellant to have used force to sexually assault the child.
111. Diganta Kalita, PW 5, is the informant and uncle of the victim who testified about the victim being a student of No. 694 Ranakuchi LP School and that she was aged about 10 years at the time of occurrence. He stated that when he came home at around 4 p.m. on the day of occurrence, his sister-in-law Smt. Fulmati Kalita (PW 2) and his aunt Ratan Kalita (PW 8) 79 informed him about the rape of the victim girl by the appellant. He enquired from the appellant about the incident, but the appellant denied the allegation. He then took the victim girl near the appellant and in his presence, she narrated about the rape under the culvert.
Nothing has been brought out in course of the cross examination to indicate that he was falsely implicating the appellant.
112. The other witness examined was Phani Kalita, PW4, who stated that on the day of occurrence, the victim informed him about the incident.
He denied that there was any land dispute between the appellant and the victim's family.
113. Jogen Barman, who was examined as PW 7 stated that he also came to know about the incident on being told by the victim. He also admitted during cross-examination that one hand of the appellant was slightly deformed. However, it was not made out by the defence during the cross examination that the deformity was of such nature that the appellant could not have forcefully sexually assaulted the child.
114. Rubi Kalita, PW10, was the aunt of the victim who also came to know about the incident after being told by the victim and her evidence may not be of much importance to the prosecution case.
115. It may be observed that though most of the aforesaid witnesses were not eyewitnesses, they came to know of the incident soon after the incident was brought on record. The fact that they came to know of the incident very soon on the same day would be inconsistent with the plea of the appellant that the charge was false and a concocted one. The fact that there was a village gathering to discuss the incident is also indicative of the spontaneity of the indignation of the villagers and had the accusation been 80 really false, there ought to have been some protestations from the appellant and/or his other family members, which was absent.
116. Of course, this Court has noted that the weapon associated with the crime, the knife, was not seized nor the blood-stained panty of the victim. However, this shortcoming in the investigation and deficiency in the prosecution case does not in any way lessen the credibility of the statement of the victim girl.
Certainly, if these had been recovered and produced during the trial, these would have strengthened the prosecution case more but the absence of these does not dent or vitiate the prosecution case.
117. It is now settled that failure on the part of the investigating agency to recover weapon of crime may not be fatal if the injury is proved. [See Chand Khan v. State of U.P., (1995) 5 SCC 448 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 915, Ram Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 12 SCC 339].
118. We may also recall what the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1402 that defect in the investigation by itself does not vitiate the prosecution's case, as follows:
"55. There may be highly defective investigation in a case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse by the IO and whether due to such lapse any benefit should be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the 81 prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. (Vide Chandrakant Luxman v. State of Maharashtra31, Karnel Singh v. State of M.P.32, Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar33, Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar34, State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy35, Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh36, Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat37 and Ram Bali v. State of U.P.38) 31 (1974) 3 SCC 626 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 116 : AIR 1974 SC 220 32 (1995) 5 SCC 518 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 977 33 (1998) 4 SCC 517 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1085 : AIR 1998 SC 1850 34 (1999) 2 SCC 126 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 104 35 (1999) 8 SCC 715 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 61 : AIR 2000 SC 185 36 (2003) 2 SCC 518 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 641 37 (2002) 3 SCC 57 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 519 38 (2004) 10 SCC 598 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2045
119. In the facts of the case as discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that failure on the part of the prosecution to seize the knife or the panty does not necessarily undermine the credible evidence of the victim girl that she was sexually assaulted by the appellant. It may be also noted that the knife was not used to cause any injury on the body of the victim girl but was used to frighten the girl, thus it was not a weapon of crime in the immediate sense, though it was used indirectly to facilitate the commission of the offence of sexual assault. The claim of the victim girl that she was frightened into submission has not been discredited by the appellant either by discrediting the evidence of the victim girl or by adducing evidence in this regard by the appellant. Notably, the appellant 82 has not raised any issue about the non-seizure of the knife, or the panty worn by the victim girl. As discussed above, since the proof required from the prosecution is on the basis of preponderance of probability, in view of the testimony of the victim girl, which has not been shaken and other corroborating evidences, this lapse on the part of the prosecution cannot be said to be fatal.
The existence of abrasion near the hymen of the victim girl is a medical evidence corroborating the statement of the victim girl. The mere opinion of the medical officer that it could have been caused by scratching of nail does not in any way contradict the testimony of the victim.
The only plea of the appellant in defence based on his statement made under Section 313 CrPC. was that he was innocent and was handicapped with one of his hands and that he was falsely implicated because of certain land dispute with the father of the victim. There is no evidence as to the nature of the land dispute suggested by the appellant. If there was really a land dispute, more details of the same ought to have been brought on record. However, apart from his statement made under Section 313 CrPC., the appellant had not adduced any evidence to bolster his case. In the opinion of this Court, a greater burden was cast upon him to demonstrate that he was not guilty by meeting the standard of preponderance of probabilities, in view of presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, which provides that the Special Court shall presume that the accused who has been charged of committing any offence mentioned in the Section has committed the same, unless the contrary is proved.
120. Because of the legal presumption of guilt of the accused under Section 29 of the POCSO Act and language used, a much heavier burden was placed on the appellant to discharge this burden. It was thus 83 incumbent upon the appellant to prove to the contrary that he did not commit the offence charged. In the facts and circumstances of the case this proof cannot be by merely casting a doubt on the prosecution case. He must prove by adducing cogent and reliable evidences. But the appellant did not adduce any evidence in support of his plea that he was suffering from such an extremely high degree of handicap that he could not have committed the said crime. He also did not adduce any evidence to show any prior enmity relating to land dispute because of which he claims to have been falsely implicated. In the opinion of this Court, merely stating that he was deformed in one of arms and suggesting that there was certain land dispute, in absence of more positive evidences, there are not sufficient to discharge this burden cast on him by the statute.
121. As far as the age of the victim girl is concerned, there are evidences, both oral and documentary to the effect that she was below 14 years and the defence has not raised any issue about it and as such, there is no difficulty in holding that the victim girl was a child within the meaning of Section 2 (d) of the POCSO Act and as such there is no irregularity about the prosecution of the appellant under the Act.
122. There cannot be a straitjacket formula applicable to all criminal cases. Each case has to be judged based on the evidences obtaining under the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is ultimately the fine sense of justice and proper appreciation of evidences strewn across the entire spectrum of the case and by taking a holistic view under the circumstances as revealed in the case that the court has to arrive at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused.
Having discussed the evidences on record as mentioned above in the light of the relevant law, this Court is also satisfied that the prosecution has 84 been able to establish the foundational facts based on preponderance of probability.
The fact that the victim was a child within the meaning of the Act has been proved by both oral evidences of the victim girl (PW 3), other witnesses, viz., PW 1, PW 4, PW 5, PW 6 and documentary evidences, the school certificate as well as the medical report.
The fact that the victim girl was sexually assaulted has been proved by her testimony which has been found to be reliable and corroborated by oral accounts and medical report as discussed above.
123. It may be observed that once the prosecution has been able to establish the foundational facts based on preponderance of probability, by virtue of the legal presumption under Section 29 of the Act, the prosecution can be said to have proved the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in the light of the evidences available but the appellant failed to prove his innocence.
The conclusion that the charge against the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, is based on the establishment of the foundational facts or the actus reus on the basis of preponderance of probability by the prosecution bolstered by the legal presumption provided under Section 29 of the Act. In other words, it is this legal presumption under Section 29 of the Act, applied on the proved foundational facts, which has metamorphosised and crystalized the proof of commission of the offence by the appellant on the basis of preponderance of probability, to proof beyond reasonable doubt. The cardinal principle of criminal law that the charge against an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to convict him ever remains and cannot be diluted and this has been accomplished in the present case with the aid of legal presumption under Section 29 of the Act 85 applied on the established foundational facts based on preponderance of probability.
124. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, this Court also holds that the charge against the appellant has been proved as to convict him under the POCSO Act and the appellant failed to discharge the reverse burden of proving his innocence.
125. Resultantly, the impugned judgment order dated 26.05.2017 is upheld and this appeal is dismissed as devoid of merit.
126. Trial court records be remitted to the concerned court.
Sd/- N. Kotiswar Singh JUDGE Comparing Assistant