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Karnataka High Court

Master B.K. Raghu S/O. Keshava S. Naik ... vs The Karnataka Secondary Education ... on 25 July, 2007

Equivalent citations: AIR2007KANT186, ILR2007KAR3656, 2008(1)KARLJ68, AIR 2007 KARNATAKA 186, 2007 (5) AIR KAR R 433, (2007) ILR (KANT) 3651, (2008) 1 KANT LJ 68

Author: B.S. Patil

Bench: B.S. Patil

ORDER
 

B.S. Patil, J.
 

1. Learned Additional Government Advocate is directed to take notice for respondents 1 and 2.

2. In this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 06.07.2007 passed by the Commissioner, Karnataka Secondary Education Examination Board, Bangalore. By the impugned order, the Commissioner has declined to condone the deficiency of attendance of the petitioner in his studies in SSLC.

3. Petitioner had approached this Court on an earlier occasion. By order dated 26.06.2007 passed in W.P. No. 7515/2007 this Court directed the Competent Authority to consider the case of the petitioner strictly in accordance with Regulation 37(3) of the Karnataka Secondary Education Examination Board First Regulations, 1966 (for short 'the Regulations'). In the said order passed by this Court, it was made clear that the provisions contained in Regulation 37(2) and 37(3) of the Regulations would show that they do not place any fetters on the power of the Board to condone the deficiency in attendance even beyond 30 days. As, such a discretion was vested in the Board which was required to be exercised in a reasonable manner depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is in pursuance to the said order that the respondent-authority has passed the order impugned in this writ petition. As the Authority has refused to condone the deficiency of attendance by exercising the powers under Regulations 37, it becomes necessary to refer to the relevant Regulations 37(2) and 37(3), which is extracted as under,-

37.(2) Where the attendance put in by a school candidate is less then seventy-five per cent of the total number of working days in the X Standard class,-

(i) The Head of the recognised High School may condone deficiency in attendance of such number of days not exceeding fifteen days of the deficiency; and
(ii) Where the deficiency exceeds fifteen days, but does not exceed thirty days, the Head of the recognised High School shall forward cases of such deficiency for condonation by the Chairman and in cases where the deficiency exceeds thirty days, the names of candidates shall be reported to the Chairman with details regarding the deficiency.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding clause, the Board may in respect of a candidate or class of candidates condone deficiency of attendance either by general or special order upto such percentage of the working days as the Board may decide after considering the circumstances of any case and for reasons to be recorded in uniting.

4. In the light of Regulation 37 (3), if the impugned order is examined, it discloses that out of 210 working days, the petitioner-student attended classes only for 42 days. Although his plea before the Authority was that he was suffering from ill-health that prevented him from attending the classes, the respondent, upon examination of the relevant factors has come to the conclusion that in view of the inadequacy of the attendance, the petitioner was not able to get the expected training to acquire the required knowledge intended in the scheme of the studies. The quality of education and learning, in the opinion of the Authority, could not he sacrificed merely because of some unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner which prevented him from attending the classes.

5. Though this case presents hard and difficult facts looking from the point of view of the student, I do not find any arbitrary or illegal approach in the respondent-Authority in declining to condone the absence of almost 116 days in pursuing the studies in SSLC. Regulation 37(3) of the Regulations no doubt vests in the Authority a discretion to condone the deficiency of attendance either by a general or special order up to such percentage of the working days as the Board may decide after considering the circumstances of a case and for reasons to be recorded in writing. The authority has applied its mind and has recorded its reasons stating that if absence of 116 days was condoned, it would result in sacrificing the quality of training, knowledge, learning values and discipline that a student is expected to acquire in the SSLC class. It is in this background that the authority has declined to condone the deficiency of attendance by exercising its discretion.

6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that having accepted the ground of ill-health urged by the petitioner for his absence, it was not open for the Authorities to decline the request made and the rejection of the request in the circumstances tantamounts to arbitrary exercise of powers. If this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, it would mean that even if a student does not attend a single class on account of his ill-health in SSLC his case has to be considered and he will be entitled for condonation of the deficiency in attendance. Such an approach would be detrimental to the essential requirement that a student has to necessarily undergo the requisite training to acquire the knowledge, learning values and the discipline in the prescribed manner by attending the classes. Benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations cannot be a substitute for the legal requirement If the authority has in its discretion come to the conclusion that 116 days of absence was too long a period to be condoned and if condoned it would result in sacrificing the interest of the academic standards, this Court cannot substitute the discretion exercised by the Authorities only because a sympathetic view was permissible in a given ease. Therefore, in my considered view, as the order impugned does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record and as the discretion exercised is not arbitrary or unreasonable, there is no scope for interference in the writ jurisdiction. Hence, the petition is dismissed.

Government Advocate is permitted to file memo of appearance within six weeks.