Central Administrative Tribunal - Ernakulam
V Lakshmanan vs Southern Railway on 5 January, 2026
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ERNAKULAM BENCH
O.A.Nos. 180/00244/2022 and 180/00245/2022
Monday, this the 5th day of January, 2026
CORAM:
HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE K. HARIPAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE Mr. BRAJ MOHAN AGRAWAL, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER
O.A. 244/2022
V. Vijayan, Aged 63 years, S/o. M.Velayudhan Nair,
Retd Senior Clerk/Personnel Branch, Southern Railway
Divisional Office, Palakkad, Residing at
Kannen Gattil House, Venkitangu (PO),
Thrissur - 680 510 - Applicant
[By Advocate: Mr. U. Balagangadharan]
Versus
1. Union of India, Represented by The General Manager,
Southern Railway, Head Quarters Office,
Park Town, Chennai - 600 003
2. The Chief Personnel Officer/Administration,
Southern Railway, Head Quarters Office,
Park Town, Chennai - 600 003
3. The Additional Divisional Railway Manager,
Southern Railway, Divisional Office, Palakkad-678 002
4. The Senior Divisional Personnel Officer,
Southern Railway, Divisional Office, Palakkad-678 002
5. The Divisional Railway Manager, Southern Railway, Palakkad Division,
Palakkad 678 002 - Respondents
[By Advocate : Mr.Sreejith N, ACGSC]
Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30'
O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 2
O.A. 245/2022
1. V.Lakshmanan, aged 64 years, (Died),S/o. Sri. Velayudhan,
Retd Diesel Assistant, 5.Rly Palakkad Division
Residing at Door No. 193/B, Lakshminarayana Nagar,
Nanjundapuram Road, Podanur, Coimbatore - 631 024.
2. V. Raman (brother), aged 65 years,S/o. Sri. Velayudhan,
Residing at Minnamcode, Peyad,
Thiruvananthapuram, 695 573.
3. Chandrika (sister), aged 68 years, D/o. Sri. Velayudhan,
Residing at Minnamcode, Peyad, Thiruvananthapuram, 695 573.
[Applicants 2 and 3 are impleaded vide order dated 13.07.2023 in
M.A.No.612/2023]
-Applicants
[By Advocate: Mr. U. Balagangadharan]
Versus
1. Union of India, Represented by The General Manager, Southern Railway,
Head Quarters Office, Park Town, Chennai - 600 003
2. The Senior Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Southern Railways,
Divisional Office, Palakkad - 678 002
3. The Senior Divisional Electrical Engineer/OP, Southern Railways,
Divisional Office, Palakkad - 678 002
4. The Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway, Divisional
Office, Palakkad-678 002
5. The Divisional Railway Manager, Southern Railway, Palakkad Division,
Palakkad 678 002.
- Respondents
[By Advocate : Mr.Sreejith N, ACGSC]
The Original Applications having been heard on 03.11.2025, the Tribunal
on 05.01.2026 delivered the following:
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O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 3
COMMON ORDER
Justice K.Haripal, Judicial Member Since common questions are raised by the applicants whose official profile is almost identical and since they had faced same criminal proceedings and suffered punishment of dismissal of service from the respondents which was later recalled with a rider imposing 'dies non' is the core of challenge in these Original Applications and since respondents 1, 4 and 5 are the same, both these Applications were clubbed, heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
2. Applicant in O.A 244 of 2022 had started as a Khalasi in the Southern Railway on 27.02.1978. While working as Senior Clerk in the Divisional Office from 1983, a case was registered against him by the CBI, was arrested and detained in custody following which he was suspended from service on 09.04.2002. That suspension and non-enhancement of subsistence allowance was the subject matter of O.A.64/2005 before this Tribunal. During the pendency of that O.A, he was reinstated in service on 26.09.2006. Thus he remained under suspension from 09.04.2002 to 26.09.2006. Thereafter, the CBI charged the case as CC. 15/2003 before the II Additional Special Court, CBI, Coimbatore. The Court, after trial, found him guilty of various offenses and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for 4 years was fined under different Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 4 heads on 18.05.2007. Thus he was again deemed to have been suspended from service on 18.05.2007, by Annexure-A2 order dated 02.08.2007. Later, by Annexure-A3 order dated 20.09.2007 he was dismissed from service.
3. The applicant along with other co-convicts challenged the judgment before the Madras High Court. By judgment dated 06.02.2018 the Criminal Appeal was allowed and all the convicts were found not guilty and acquitted. Thereafter, the applicant filed an appeal before the 3 rd respondent and the appeal was allowed by Annexure-A5 order dated 25.03.2021 and the Annexure-A2 order of dismissal was revoked. However, in Annexure-A5, the 3 rd respondent made clear that his period of absence from 18.05.2007, that is date of suspension till his retirement on 31.05.2018 shall be treated as dies-non; that part of Annexure-A5 order is impugned in this Original Application.
4. Similarly, the applicant in O.A 245 of 2022 had started as Khalasi on 02.05.1980. He became a Diesel Assistant on 24.01.2000. While so, he also was involved in the above stated CBI case and was placed under suspension from 10.04.2002 to 16.10.2006. He was paid subsistence allowance during the period. In C.C Nos. 14/2003 and 15/2003 of the II Additional CBI Court Coimbatore, by judgment dated 18.05.2007, he was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment. Thereafter, he was also put under deemed suspension from 18.05.2007, was dismissed from service and later, when Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 5 Criminal Appeals 457/2007 and 458/2007 filed before the Madras High Court were allowed and his conviction was reversed, Annexure-A2 order of dismissal was revoked. Here also, the period of absence was treated as 'dies non' and the challenge is against the said order of treating the period of absence as non- duty.
5. In O.A/244/2022, the following reliefs are sought by the applicant.
"i) Call for the records leading to Annexure A.5 and set aside the same to the extent it treats the period of deemed suspension as "Dies non" and also set aside Annexure A.6 in its entirety.
ii) Direct the 3rd respondent to treat the period of deemed suspension of the applicant as duty for all purposes as stated in Annexure A5 and grant all consequential benefits viz. Back wages, increments, higher grades, revision of pension, revision of DCRG, revision of CVP etc
iii) Direct the 3rd respondent to reinstate the applicant notionally in service from 6.2.2008 and grant all consequential benefits including arrears of salary, promotions from the date of promotion of immediate junior etc.
iv) Direct the 3rd respondent to revise the pension, DCRG, CVP and other retirement benefits of the applicant after reckoning the period of deemed suspension as duty for all purposes.
v) Declare that the applicant is deemed to have been reinstated in service notionally and he is entitled to be paid Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 6 back wages for the period of deemed suspension, revision of pay, revision of pension, revision of DCRG, revision of CVP and other benefits on his retirement.
Almost identical reliefs are sought by the applicant in O.A/245/2022 also.
6. During the pendency of the Original Applications, the applicant in O.A 245/2022 died on 1.10.2022 and his brother and sister who are the legal representatives have impleaded themselves as additional applicants 2 and 3, who are pursuing the Original Application.
7. Though criminal proceedings were initiated, which ultimately ended in filing charge sheet and led to their conviction and then they were dismissed from service, no parallel disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the applicants and thus according to them, they were dismissed from service only on account of the conviction entered by the criminal court. Since the High Court has reversed the finding of conviction, they are entitled to be reinstated in service with all backwages and therefore, the order treating their period of absence as 'dies non' is illegal, arbitrary and unjustifiable.
8. According to the applicants, now they stand fully exonerated, it is an a honourable acquittal from criminal charges. The prosecution failed to prove the allegations raised against them and therefore, in view of the Madras High Court Judgment reversing the order of conviction, they are entitled for full pay and allowances by virtue of Sub Rule 2 of Rule 1343 of the Indian Railway Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 7 Establishment Code.
9. According to the applicants, here, the rule of 'no work no pay' is not applicable. But the exceptional rule that 'no work yet pay' is applicable since they were dismissed from service on the basis of the finding of the Trial Court, which has been reversed by the High Court. They were remaining in compulsory waiting period not to attend the duty without any violation or without any fault on their part. Now, since they have been fully exonerated by the High Court, as provided under sub-rule 2 to Rule 3 of Rule 1342 of the IREC they are entitled to get entire backwages for the period of the deemed suspension till the date of the retirement, which happened during the proceedings.
10. According to the applicant in O.A/244/2022, even though the judgment of the High Court was rendered before his date of superannuation on 31.05.2018, the respondents took long time for consideration of the appeal, by the time, the 2nd respondent had passed the Annexure-A5 order he had retired from service. The normal date of retirement of the applicant in O.A 245 of 2022 was 30.09.2017 and he had retired during the period when the appeal was pending. According to the applicants, their period of absence from the date of deemed suspension till the actual date of superannuation cannot be treated as 'dies non' for any purpose and that is why the Original Applications Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 8 have been filed seeking the aforestated reliefs.
11. The respondents in their separate replies, which are almost on identical lines, have denied all the contentions raised in the Applications. According to them, initially both were placed under suspension after having been involved in serious criminal conspiracy and receiving money from unemployed youths promising jobs in the Railways. Thus, on the allegations of corruption, CBI had registered cases against them and two others, when they were arrested and detained in custody both were placed under suspension. Later, their orders of suspension were revoked, and on conclusion of investigation charge sheet was laid. The cases were tried by the CBI Court-II Coimbatore. The Additional District and Sessions Court, CBI found all the four accused guilty and convicted and sentenced them by judgment dated 18.05.2007 for four years rigorous imprisonment besides payment of fine. Consequently, invoking Rule 5(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, both were dismissed from service by the competent authority. Thereafter, both the applicants preferred criminal appeal before the High Court of Madras and the High Court by Annexure-A4/Annexure-A5 judgments reversed the finding of the trial court and found them not guilty and acquitted of the charges.
12. According to the respondents, in the general perspective of Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 9 criminal jurisprudence, no person is guilty unless and until the guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. This concept in the legal term is known as 'benefit of doubt'. Under this concept, an accused is considered to be acquitted by the Court if the offence has not been established, which means when the prosecution fails to provide legal evidence against accused with regard to the offence he had committed. In criminal cases, all the allegations need to be proved beyond all reasonable doubts, that an ordinary man can have. No such doubt should occur whether an accused is guilty or not. Even if slightest doubt is observed, no matter how small it is, an accused gets the benefit of that doubt. On the other hand, an 'honorable acquittal' is that even if we apply the principle of 'preponderance of probability', charges cannot be proved against the accused.
13. Further it is submitted that Annexure-A4 judgment does not show that the acquittal was honorable. On an objective reading of the judgment, it will come to light that the High Court had found that there were failings on the part of investigating agency/prosecution in adducing evidence and establishing the prosecution case. The prosecution witnesses had turned hostile. As such the High Court was compelled to conclude in favour of the accused. On an independent evaluation of the judgment, it is evident that acquittal was purely based on technical ground giving benefit of doubt on account of failure of the Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 10 prosecution to establish its case.
14. The High Court also found that there was no proper sanction to prosecute the accused which was fatal to the prosecution. Many of the witnesses had turned hostile to the prosecution and some of the witnesses like PW8, PW35 etc. did not stick to the statements given to the police during the course of investigation. So, according to the respondents, the High Court had acquitted the applicants giving them benefit of doubt.
15. Further, in OA.244/2022 it is submitted that the applicant had retired from service on 31.05.2018, that is after about four months of the date of acquittal. Still the appeal was filed after one year from the date of acquittal and nine months after the date of superannuation.
16. It was also submitted that Rule 1343 of IREC is applicable in case of dismissal, removal or suspension consequent to the detection of misconduct and on initiation of departmental inquiry, that is not applicable in the case of culmination of criminal proceedings or acquittal after reversing conviction.
17. It is further submitted that the criminal proceedings were initiated without the involvement of the employer. On conviction and then after acquittal by the Appellate Court, when the question of payment of backwages had arisen, the respondents had no discretion to pay full wages and allowances that the applicants could not have been treated as on duty. Therefore, they Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 11 had to be treated as on 'non-duty' and that was why the period was treated as 'dies non'. In this connection, Annexure-R1, relevant orders on Rule 1345 has also been relied on by the respondents.
18. The respondents have reiterated that it was not an honourable acquittal, but they were acquitted by granting benefit of doubt and therefore the applicants are not entitled to get backwages. In the event of not establishing the criminal charges, there cannot be any automatic reinstatement. The respondents have also relied on various authorities and submitted that the applicants are not entitled to get any relief.
19. They have taken care to give para-wise reply to the O.A. According to them, the applicants were acquitted largely on technical grounds for want of proper sanction and also there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt, they were acquitted giving the benefit of doubt. In such a circumstance, basing on the authorities it is submitted that the applicants are not entitled to get any relief as prayed for.
20. Both the applicants filed rejoinder reiterating the contentions in the O.A. They have asserted that it was a clean acquittal beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the respondents should have extended the benefit of Rule 1343 and granted them full wages for the period they were kept out of service.
Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 12
21. We heard Sri.U.Balagangadharan, learned counsel for the applicants and Sri.N.Sreejith, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents in great detail.
22. Sri.Balagangadharan has reiterated that the applicants were given an hounourable acquittal, so that, the respondents had no discretion in the matter of granting backwages. The trial court had wrongly convicted them and the High Court has found out all the lacunae in the prosecution evidence. Even though it is not stated in clear terms that it is an honourable acquittal, a reading of the judgments would indicate that the applicants deserved clean chit and that it is not an acquittal by granting benefit of doubt.
23. On the other hand, according to the learned Standing Counsel, it was a case of serious act of corruption initiated by the CBI on their own, when the accused were arrested, they were initially suspended from service, then the trial court convicted them and therefore, the respondents had no option, but to dismiss them from service. Thereafter, when the appellate judgment was produced, the earlier order of dismissal was reversed, but by the time, both of them had retired from service and still, since they did not work during the period between from 18.05.2007 till the respective dates of superannuation, the respondents have no liability to pay them backwages. So, he strongly defended the acts of the respondents in refusing them pay and Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 13 allowances for the entire period they were kept out of service.
24. It has come out that, the CBI had registered a case against the accused persons alleging offences under Section 120B read with 420 IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The precise allegation was that accused persons four in number, 'who were employees of the Indian Railway entered in a criminal conspiracy during 1995- 2002 at Erode, Bangalore, Chennai, Palakkad and other places and induced unemployed youths and received money from them promising job in Railways as Class-IV employees. In pursuance to the said conspiracy, A1 to A4 dishonestly induced 24 persons to deliver a total sum of Rs.6,54,500/- and thereby made pecuniary advantage of the corresponding sum by corrupt and illegal means abusing their official position as public servants.'
25. The CBI Special Court, after trial, found the applicants, who were accused Nos.2 and 4 respectively in the case, guilty. The applicant in O.A.244/2022, who was the 2nd accused, was found guilty under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Similarly, under Section 420 IPC, totally in eight counts, he was found guilty and sentenced to undergo rigorous Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 14 imprisonment for four years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- for each count, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, totally in four counts, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of two years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- for each count, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Similar finding was rendered in respect of applicant in O.A.245/2022 also and the punishments were identical. For both, substantial sentences were to run concurrently.
26. All the convicts preferred appeal before the Hon'ble High Court of Madras and the High Court, after detailed hearing, allowed the appeal mainly for three reasons. Firstly, the prosecution sanction issued by PWs 1 to 4 were not legal since they had no competency for issuing sanction. It was found that the accused being Group-C employees, the sanction order should have been issued by the General Manager, but instead, persons subordinate to the General Manager, PWs 1 to 4, had issued the same, for which at the time of issue of the sanction there was no authorisation. Thus it was found that the sanction was bad. Similarly, the Court also found that the prosecution was launched after eight years of the alleged commission of the crime.
27. On merits also, the High Court found that many of the witnesses had turned hostile to the prosecution. There were lapses in investigation also.
Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 15 PW8 and PW35, according to the High Court, should have been arrayed as accused. Naturally they had turned hostile to the prosecution and did not stick to their previous statement. Thus the High Court concluded in paragraph 29 as follow:
"29. Considering the above facts and discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs, I am of the considered opinion that the defence version cannot be said to be wholly improbable and unacceptable and all the circumstances put together, it would only lead to an irresistible conclusion that those circumstances are compatible with the innocence of the appellants. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the Trial Court calls for interference by this Court and both the appeals are liable to be allowed."
Thus the appeals were allowed and the applicants were acquitted of the charge by the appellate court.
28. The learned counsel for the applicants filed an argument note also. Besides the authorities referred in the O.A., he has also placed reliance on the decisions in Deputy Inspector General of Police and another v. S. Samuthiram [(2013) 1 SCC 598], Prabhat Ranjan Singh and another v. R.K.Kushwaha and others [(2018) 18 SCC 1], State of Punjab v. Shambhu Nath Singla [(1996) 1 SCC 296], Ajay Kumar Singh v. Flag Officer, Commanding-in- Chief and others [AIR 2016 SC 3528], Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another v. Mehar Singh [(2013) 7 SCC 685], State of Bihar and others v. Kripa Nand Singh and another [(2014) 14 SCC 375], K.N.Ranganathan and others v.
Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 16 Union of India and others [MANU/CA/0161/1994] of the Madras Bench of this Tribunal in O.A.Nos.754 and 1110 of 1993, Charan Singh v. Union of India and others [MANU/CA/0280/2015] of the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in O.A.No.328 of 2012, Binod Kumar Singh v. Coal India limited and others [MANU/JH/0840/2006] of the Jharkhand High Court, Sunil Kumar v. Food Corporation of India [2025 KHC 75] etc.
29. On the other hand, the respondents had relied on numerous authorities in the replies. They have also placed reliance on Diwesh Narayan Raizada v. Coal India Limited and others [MANU/JH/0189/2021], Munnalal Misra v. Union of India and others [MANU/MP/0109/2005] of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Ram Prasad Nayak v. State of Chhattisgarh and others [MANU/CG/0765/2025] of the Chhattisgarh High Court, State of Rajsthan and others v. Love Kush Meena [AIR 2021 SC 1610] of the Supreme Court etc.
30. The only point arising for consideration is whether the respondents were justified in denying full pay and allowances to the applicants during the period when they were dismissed from service consequent to the finding of guilt and imposition of sentence by the CBI Court, Coimbatore.
31. Though Annexure-A2 was highlighted and challenged in this proceedings, in our view, it does not make any sense because Annexure-A2 is the order of suspension from 09.04.2002 to 26.09.2006 in respect of the Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 17 applicant in O.A.244/2022 and from 10.04.2002 to 16.10.2006 in respect of the applicant in O.A.245/2022. It has become clear that the applicant in O.A.244/2022 was reinstated in service following the orders of this Tribunal in O.A.64/2005. Initially, he was given subsistence allowance at 50% which was later hiked, so that, during the pre-conviction stage he was paid subsistence allowance for the period he was kept under suspension. Similarly, in O.A.245/2022 the applicant had been under suspension from 10.04.2002 to 16.10.2006. It is the admitted case that he was paid subsistence allowance initially at 50% and then at 75% and hence there cannot be any complaint regarding the non-payment of the subsistence allowance for the period both were placed under suspension prior to imposing the order of conviction.
32. Similarly, it has come out that the judgment of conviction was rendered by the CBI Court on 18.05.2007. After getting information about it, both the applicants were again placed under deemed suspension retrospectively from 18.05.2007 and then dismissed from service as provided under Rule 5(2) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. So, the impugned orders cover only the period between 18.05.2007 and the respective dates of their superannuation on 31.05.2018 and 30.09.2017 respectively. So, the question survived for consideration is whether the applicants are entitled to get full pay and allowances during the period between 18.05.2007 and the dates of their Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 18 retirement on superannuation treating it as 'on duty'.
33. As adverted to earlier, even though the applicants were involved in serious allegations of corruption, cheating etc., the respondents did not initiate any parallel disciplinary proceedings against them. Initially, they were suspended from service on being arrested by the CBI and then on entering conviction by the trial court. After the reversal of the finding by the High Court they approached the respondents and since there was no parallel disciplinary proceedings initiated against them, based on the finding of the High Court, the earlier orders dismissing them from service were revoked and they were deemed to have been re-admitted in service. But, by the time both had retired from service so that the period of absence was treated as 'dies-non', which is the subject matter of challenge.
34. After evaluating the material contentions, submissions and also documents made available before this Tribunal and also having regard to the settled principles of law laid down by the Courts, we are of the view that the applicants are not entitled to succeed.
35. Firstly, the question whether the applicants were acquitted by the High Court giving clean chit or whether they were given benefits of doubt is essentially a question of fact to be decided on evaluation of the facts and circumstances. After going through the Annexures-A4/A3 judgments of the Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 19 High Court, we are of the view that though it is not stated in explicit terms, it is clear that they were acquitted giving benefit of doubt only. It has come out that the accused were acquitted on three considerations. Firstly, the prosecution failed to produce proper sanction for prosecution. PWs 1 to 4 were the competent authority examined to prove prosecution sanction of the accused; the applicants being Group-C employees, the sanction should have been granted by the General Manager, but the orders of sanction were issued by the subordinate authorities, below that of the General Manager. At the relevant time, they were not competent enough to issue order of sanction. On such a technical ground, the High Court found that the applicants are liable to be acquitted.
36. Secondly, the High Court also noticed that there was a delay of eight years in lodging the prosecution, which was also found to be one of the grounds for acquittal.
37. The third major ground for acquittal was basing on the facts of the case. The Court found that the prosecution could not give a consistent and corroborated version. Many of the witnesses had turned hostile to the prosecution. As indicated earlier, PW8 and PW35, who should have been arrayed as accused persons, were shown as prosecution witnesses and therefore, naturally, they might not have supported the prosecution case. Thus Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 20 in the absence of a consistent and corroborated version the prosecution was bound to fail. After evaluating various circumstances, we are not convinced that it was a clean acquittal or the applicants were fully exonerated from the charges. The failures and weaknesses in the prosecution case had made them to escape from the criminal charges, which cannot be stated as an acquittal beyond doubts. As rightly stated by the learned Standing Counsel, a prosecution in criminal proceedings would be able to make out a case only if charges are proved beyond shadow of all reasonable doubts. If there is any doubt with regard to any aspect, the benefit of the same should naturally go to the accused. Here also that was what happened resulting in the acquittal of the applicants.
38. In our reading, in no stretch of imagination it could be stated that it was an honourable acquittal. The allegations were very serious. The prosecution had alleged that they had demanded and accepted huge amount of money on the promise of giving employment in the Railways. The criminal conspiracy and causes of action had spread in very many places, in different cities of South India. The prosecution could not well connect all these matters, that too after long lapses of time. So, such lacunae had facilitated the acquittal of the accused. The judgments do not give them honourable acquittal.
39. An acquittal giving benefit of doubt is not an honourable acquittal Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 21 and complete exoneration. Here, there does not require much research to say that Annexure-A4 did not contemplate a complete exoneration of the accused persons including the applicants. But that had happened due to various failures pointed out by the High Court, which do not ipso facto facilitate the applicants to get the benefit of honourable acquittal.
40. Now, turning to the applicability of Rule 1343 of the IREC, it is plainly clear that, it is applicable in the case of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and subsequent revocation of the orders of suspension, dismissal, compulsory retirement etc. That is not applicable in the case of a conviction and consequent revocation of the earlier orders passed by the disciplinary authority.
41. In this connection, the following observations of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Munnalal Mishra v. Union of India and others [MANU/MP/0109/2005] provide an eye opener.
"10. But when a Government (or Railway) servant is dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, not in pursuance or any disciplinary proceedings, but without inquiry on the ground of conviction in a criminal case, then F.R. 54, 54-A and 54-B (or Corresponding Rules 1343, 1344 and 1345 of Railway Code) would not apply. As a consequence, we will have to fall back on the general principles and Fundamental Rule No. 17 (1) which provides that no work will mean no pay. Therefore, the Government (or Railway) servant will not be entitled to any pay for the period when he was not in service. He will Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 22 be entitled to be reinstated from the date of acquittal. If he is not reinstated on acquittal, he will be entitled to pay and allowances from the date of acquittal. This position is made clear by the Supreme Court in several decisions.
10.1. In Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar, MANU/SC/0422/1997 (1996) 11 SCC 603, the Supreme Court considered a case of an employee dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a Criminal Court for his involvement in an offence under Section 302/34, IPC. Subsequently the employee was acquitted and as a consequence reinstated. The Supreme Court considered whether back wages should be paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement. The Supreme Court held thus:-
"The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages."
10.2. The question again came up for consideration in Union of India v.
Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 23 Jaipal Singh, MANU/SC/0883/2003: (2004) 1 SCC 121. The Supreme Court after expressing agreement with the view in Ranchhodji, observed thus :--
"...If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest or by department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen, the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the Trial Court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department can not in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges, a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service.... Though exception taken to that part of the order directing reinstatement can not be sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants can not be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects of considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court in so far as it directed payment of back wages are liable to be and is hereby set aside.
The respondent will be entitled to back wages from the date of acquittal and except for the purpose of denying the respondent actual payment of back wages, that period also will be counted as period of service, without any break."
42. We would like to reiterate that here the initiation of proceedings was entirely by the CBI, which was not at the instance of the employers. Therefore, the employers were bound to follow the statute since initially they were arrested by the CBI, then detained in custody, then after investigation, Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 24 charge sheets were filed, they faced trial and conviction from the trial court. On reporting the conviction only the order of dismissal was ordered. After the dismissal was reversed by the High Court, order of dismissal was reviewed in appeal, but since the applicants were kept out of service on their own volition, without at the instance of the employers, as a matter of right, the applicants cannot claim backwages which is evident from various authorities holding the field.
43. In an identical situation in the decision reported in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. The Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board [(1996) 11 SCC 603], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled on the entitlement of backwages thus:
"The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is:
whether he is entitled to back wages? It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basics of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceeding and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in his own backdrops.
Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 25 In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages......"
44. On the same lines, in State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim [(2013) 11 SCC 67], the Supreme Court has held as follows:
" ...............During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant-bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant- bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate to retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same have been granted by the appellant bank."
45. To sum up, the applicants though were acquitted from criminal charges, it was not an honourable or clean acquittal, but granting them benefit of the lacunae in the prosecution case only. Rule 1343 of IREC is not applicable in the case of the applicants. Even if the principles in Rule 1343 is borrowed, still since it was not an honourable acquittal, sub-Rule (2) is not applicable in Deepa S 2026.01.05 12:47:23+05'30' O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 26 the case. Moreover, the criminal proceedings were initiated without the involvement of the employers. So, they were removed from service, which was inevitable since they were convicted by the criminal court. Later, since the finding was reversed by the appellate court, as a necessary corollary, they were to be reinstated in service, but for their eventual retirement on superannuation. They were kept out of service due to statutory limitation, which was necessary since they were convicted by the trial court. Therefore, their reinstatement does not entitle them payment of backwages, which is for the employer to decide. Here, the respondents have considered the question in proper perspective and we do not find any reason to interfere with the orders impugned in the Original Applications.
Resultanty, both the Original Applications are dismissed. No costs.
(Dated, this the 5th January, 2026)
Mr. BRAJ MOHAN AGRAWAL JUSTICE K.HARIPAL
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER
ds
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O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 27
List of Annexures
O.A.244/2022
Annexure A.1: A true copy of the order No.J/P227/V.V dated 26.09.2006
issued by 4th respondent
Annexure Α.2: A true copy of the order No.CON/J/V/482(V.V) dated
02.08.2007 issued by 4th 21 respondent
Annexure A.3: A true copy of the order No.CON/J/V/482(VV) dated
20.9.2007 issued by 3rd respondent
Annexure A.4: A true copy of judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of
Madras in Crl. 458/2007 dated 6.2.2018
Annexure A.5: A true copy of the order of the second respondent-appellate
authority No. P(A)89/2018/90 dated 25.3.2021
Annexure A.6: A true copy of the Memorandum No.CON/J/V/482 dated
23.6.2021 issued by the 4th respondent.
Annexure A.7: A true copy of relevant pages of Paragraph 1343 and 1344 of
IREM
Annexure A.8: A true copy of the RBE Order NO. 127/85 dated 29.4.1985
Annexure A.9 : A true copy of letter No. CON/J/V/482/Court dated
15.5.2018 issued by DPO, Palakkad
Annexure A.10 : A true copy of letter No.CON/J/V/482/VV dated 26.12.2018 issued by DPO, Palakkad Annexure A.11 : A true copy of comparative/concordance table of the old and new rule in IREC Annexure A.12 : True copy of the letter 29.03.2018 submitted by the applicant to the 3rd respondent.
Annexure A.13 : True copy of the Memorandum No.
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O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 28
M/XP/227/DBS/NGO/A/06 dated 07.05.2012 issued by the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner, RPF, Chennai.
Annexure R1- True copy of the relevant extract of the Rule 1345 Indian Railway Establishment Code.
O.A.245/2022 Annexure A1- A true copy of Order No. VO/SPE/MAS/1/2002 dated 9.4.2002 issued by the by General Manager (Vigilance). Annexure A2- A true copy of penalty advice No.CON/J/V/482(VL) dated 25.9.2007 issued by the 2nd respondent.
Annexure A3- A true copy of judgement of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in Crl.A 457/2007 dated 5.3.2012.
Annexure A4- A true copy of judgment of the Hon'ble High court of Madras in Crl A 456/07 dated 6.2.2018.
Annexure A5- A true copy of order No. CON/J/V/483/VL (Pt) dated 9.7.2021 issued by the third respondent.
Annexure A6- A true copy of Memorandum No. CON/J/V/482/VL(Pt) dated 14/9/21 issued by the 4th respondent.
Annexure A7- A true copy of Memorandum No. J/P 535/V/PR/Court cases dated 18.1.22 issued by the 4th respondent.
Annexure A.8- A true copy of relevant pages of IREM viz. Paragraph 1343 and 1344 of IREM.
Annexure A9- A true copy of RBE 127/85 No. E(D&A)84RG 6-26 dated 29.4.1985.
Annexure A10- A true copy of the letter No. CON/J/V/482/Court dated 15.5.2018 issued by DPO Palakkad.
Annexure A11- A true copy of the comparative/Concordance table of the
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O.A.Nos.244 and 245 of 2022 29
old and new rules in IREC.
Annexure MA 1- A true copy of death certificate dated 12.10.2022
Annexure MA 2- A true copy of legal heirship certificate No. 75608909 dated
11.02.2023
Annexure R1- True copy of the relevant extract of the Rule 1345 Indian
Railway Establishment Code.
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