Telangana High Court
Smt. Razia Begum And 6 Others vs Sri N. Hanumanth Reddy And Another on 14 March, 2022
Author: A.Abhishek Reddy
Bench: A.Abhishek Reddy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.ABHISHEK REDDY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1803 of 2021
ORDER:
The present Civil Revision Petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is filed by the petitioners/defendants, against the order dated 05.10.2021, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Zaheerabad, in I.A.No.29 of 2020 in O.S.No.33 of 2013 [O.S.No.36 of 2001 (OLD)].
2) The petitioners herein are the defendants in the suit viz., O.S.No.36 of 2001 (OLD) and the respondent No.1 herein is the plaintiff in that suit.
3) The parties are referred to as arrayed in the Civil Revision Petition.
4) The brief facts of the case, which are necessary for disposal of the present Civil Revision Petition, are set out below.
The petitioners herein and the respondent No.1 entered into an agreement of sale dated 29.12.1997 agreeing to sell the suit schedule property and received an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- towards advance sale consideration. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 herein has filed the suit for specific performance of said agreement of sale vide O.S.No.36 of 2001 [O.S.No.33 of 2013 (new number)]. The said suit was decreed ex parte on 08.11.2001. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 deposited the balance sale consideration on 26.09.2005 to the credit of the suit. Thereafter, seeking to set aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 08.11.2001, the petitioners herein have filed I.A.No.67 of 2013 along with an application to 2 condone the delay vide I.A.No.151 of 2008 (Old I.A.No.102 of 2006). The said Interlocutory Applications were allowed vide order dated 13.03.2013 by the Court below. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent No.1 herein filed C.R.P.Nos.1926 and 1927 of 2013 before this Hon'ble High Court, and the said Civil Revision Petitions were allowed on 19.07.2013. Aggrieved by the order passed in the said C.R.Ps., the petitioners herein have approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court and filed S.L.P. (C) Nos.35968 and 35969 of 2013. The said S.L.Ps were also dismissed on 25.07.2016 and the Review Petition filed by the petitioners herein was dismissed on 08.12.2016. Thereafter, the petitioners have filed the present I.A.No.29 of 2020 under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act') seeking to rescind the agreement of sale dated 29.12.1997 for non-deposit of the balance sale consideration within time and on other grounds. The trial Court vide the impugned order dated 05.10.2021 has dismissed the said I.A. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners have filed the present Civil Revision Petition.
5) It is pertinent to note that the trial Court while decreeing the suit filed by the respondent No.1 has not stipulated the time period within which the balance sale consideration was to be deposited by the respondent No.1 i.e., plaintiff in the suit.
6) Sri J. Prabhakar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri V.S.R. Avadhani, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has vehemently argued that the order passed by the trial Court is without any application of mind, contrary to the well established principles of law laid down by the High Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases and 3 also the provision of Section 28 of the Act. Learned Senior Counsel has stated that as the ex parte judgment and decree was passed on 08.11.2001, having regard to the provision of Section 28 of the Act and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Limitation Act'), the respondent No.1 ought to have deposited the balance sale consideration within a period of three years from the date of decree or three years after the expiry of the time mentioned in the agreement of sale dated 29.12.1997. But, the respondent No.1 took his own sweet time and deposited the balance sale consideration after more than four years from the date of obtaining the ex parte decree. Learned Senior Counsel has further stated that the trial Court, without adverting to the above factum of not depositing the balance sale consideration within the time, as stated above, has simply dismissed the I.A. filed by the petitioners under Section 28 of the Act in a mechanical and pedantic manner. That there is no proper application of the provision of Section 28 of the Act as well as the well settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Court that the deposit of the balance sale consideration should be within the time stipulated by the Court and in the absence of the same, the deposit should be within three years from the date of the decree but not as per the whims and fancies of the respondent No.1, and therefore, seeks to set aside the same.
7) Per contra, Sri D. Prakash Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of Sri S. Ravi Kumar, the learned counsel for respondent No.1, has vehemently opposed the present Civil Revision Petition and sought to sustain the impugned order. Learned Senior Counsel has 4 stated that the petitioners ought to have filed an I.A. under Section 28 of the Act way back in the year 2005 itself when the balance sale consideration was deposited by the respondent No.1 or immediately after the decree of the lower Court was passed on 08.11.2001, but not after a lapse of 16 years. That the petitioners, having lost all the way up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now cannot rely on Section 28 of the Act to frustrate the judgment and decree obtained by respondent No.1. Even if the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the period of limitation for the purpose of depositing the balance sale consideration would start from the time when the rights accrues is taken to be correct, the same would equally apply to the petitioners also and they ought to have filed the I.A. under Section 28 of the Act within a period of three years from the date of deposit of the amount by the respondent No.1, but, not after 16 years. That once the judgment and decree has become final, the question of rescinding the agreement of sale, at this point of time, does not arise, and therefore, the trial Court has rightly dismissed the I.A. filed by the petitioners. Learned Senior Counsel has further stated that the trial Court has given cogent and convincing reasons while dismissing the I.A. and there is no illegality or perversity in the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court in the impugned order warranting any interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
8) Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9) For better appreciation of the case on hand and also to decide the issue in controversy, Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act is extracted below: 5
"28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed.--
(1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require. (2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the Court--
(a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and
(b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and if the justice of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract.
(3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the Court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely:--
(a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor;
(b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease.6
(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be. (5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the Court."
10) It is also apt to note that Article 137 of the Limitation Act prescribes that the period of limitation for any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere is three years and the time from which the said period begins to run is when the right to apply accrues.
11) A perusal of the impugned order would disclose that the trial Court while deciding the I.A. has formulated the following points for determination:
"1. Whether the Petitioners are entitled for rescission of agreement for sale dated 29th December, 1997 as per the provisions of Section 28 of the Act ?
2. Whether the balance sale consideration deposited by the Respondent No.1/Plaintiff was in time or when no time is fixed and whether the Respondent No.1/Plaintiff is at liberty to deposit the amount any time till the execution of the sale deed ?
3. Whether the Petition is barred by limitation?"
12) Insofar as point Nos.1 and 2 are concerned, the said points were dealt with together by the trial Court and having regard to the fact that respondent No.1 has already deposited the balance sale consideration through a Challan dated 26.09.2005, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the same cannot be questioned by the petitioners under Section 28 of 7 the Act, as the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in the suit has become final and confirmed up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
13) Insofar as point No.3 is concerned, the trial Court has held that the petitioners ought to have filed I.A. for rescinding the agreement of sale within three years from the date of knowledge of the deposit, but, the petitioners did not do so. That the petitioners were well aware of the deposit of the balance sale consideration, as they themselves have filed the I.A. to condone the delay in filing the I.A. to aside the ex parte judgment and decree on 01.02.2006. Therefore, if the contention of the petitioners that as per Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation would start from the time when the right accrues i.e., from the date on which they have filed the I.A. seeking to set aside the ex parte decree is taken to be correct, and as the I.A to set aside the ex parte decree was filed on 01.02.2006, the said period of limitation expired by 31.03.2009. Therefore, the I.A. filed for rescinding the agreement after a period of 16 years is hit by law of limitation.
14) The crucial dates are listed below to have a quick glance.
TABLE
Sl.No. Event Date
1) Agreement of Sale 29.12.1997
2) Registration of suit in O.S. No.33/2013 (OLD O.S. 27.06.2001
No.36/2001)
3) Judgment and Decree passed in O.S. No.33 of 08.11.2001
2013 (OLD O.S.No.36/2001)
4) Balance sale consideration deposited in Court 26.09.2005
below by Respondent No.1
5) Petition to set aside the ex parte decree passed in 01.02.2006
O.S. No.33/2013 (OLD O.S.No.36/2001)
6) Petition to set aside the ex parte decree was 13.03.2013
allowed by the trial Court
7) CRP filed against the allowing of I.A. filed to set 19.07.2013
aside the ex parte decree was allowed
8
8) Order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in 25.07.2016
S.L.P. (C) Nos.35968, 35969 of 2013 filed by
petitioners against the order of the High Court in
CRP Nos.1926 and 1927, dated 19.07.2013
9) Review order passed in S.L.P. (C) No.35968, 08.12.2016
35969 of 2013 filed by the petitioners
10) Date of filing the petition in I.A. No.29/2020 for 25.01.2020
rescinding the agreement of sale
11) The order passed by trial Court in I.A. 05.10.2021
No.29/2020
15) Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, every High Court is conferred with the power of superintendence over all the subordinate courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is not only an administrative one but judicial as well, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to the technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in writ of certiorari jurisdiction.
16) Though the power is as akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or 9 tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.
17) It is apt to cite the judgment of the Hone'ble Supreme Court Chandrasekhar Singh v. Siya Ram Singh1, wherein the three-Judge Bench summed up the position of law as under:
"(i) that the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot, in any way, be curtailed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(ii) The scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is restricted. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases, in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors;
(iii) That the power of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution;
(iv) that the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the court of appeal; the High Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, convert itself into a court of appeal."
18) Admittedly, in the instant case, the petitioners have lost all the way up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Even the Review Petition filed by the petitioners was also dismissed on 08.12.2016. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.33 of 2013 [O.S.No.36 of 2001 (OLD)], dated 08.11.2001 has become final. The petitioners have filed the present I.A only 1 (1979) 3 SCC 118 10 on 25.01.2020. Even for the sake of argument, if the contention of the petitioners that once it is found that the respondent No.1 has not deposited the balance sale consideration within the reasonable period i.e., three years from the date of decree as per Article 137 of the Limitation Act or three years from the date of paying the balance sale consideration as per the terms of the agreement of sale, is to be taken correct, the fact remains that the petitioners have approached the trial Court seeking to rescind the contract by way of I.A. on 25.01.2020 and it is not the respondent No.1 seeking to deposit the amount or that the respondent No.1 has filed a petition seeking extension of the time to deposit balance sale consideration. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the respondent No.1 had not deposited the amount within reasonable time cannot be gone into in this petition as the respondent No.1 has already deposited the same before the lower Court on 26.09.2005 itself. Having regard to the same, the period of limitation for the purpose of filing of the present I.A by the petitioners could had been firstly from the date of passing of the ex parte decree against the petitioners herein and secondly from the date of deposit of the balance sale consideration by the respondent No.1. But, the petitioners have failed to do so within 3 years from the date of the above three dates and they have filed the I.A. only on 25.01.2020 which is much beyond the period of three years from the above cause of action. The petitioners have filed the I.A. for rescinding the agreement of sale after a lapse of 16 years from the date of first accrual of their right.
11
19) The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has relied on the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following judgments, in support of his submissions:
1) VENU v. PONNUSAMY REDDIAR2,
2) PREM JEEVAN v. K.S.VENKATA RAMAN3,
3) BHUPINDER KUMAR v. ANGREJ SINGH4, and
4) CHERUKURI VENKATA RAO v. BRAHMAJOSYULA BALA GANGADHARA SARMA5, wherein at para 9, it has been held as under:
"9.Treating the petitioner's application as E.P. too does not mean automatically that since it is filed within twelve years, it ought to be ordered automatically. Can it be said that inasmuch as the decree did not prescribe the time for depositing the balance consideration, it is open to the purchaser to deposit at any time within twelve years? Can not the concept of 'reasonable period' imported in such a context" This is the question that we have to answer. On this question it is well to remember that the relief of specific performance is an equitable remedy. Indeed, the Specific Relief Act itself is based upon equity, fair play and good conscience. It has been held by the Supreme Court in H.I.Trust vs. Haridas Mundhra (1) AIR 1972, SC 1826, that the contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of a decree for specific performance, and that the contract subsists notwithstanding the passing of the decree (vide paragraph -22). The purchaser cannot, and should not be allowed to take unfair advantage of the situation. He must act with reasonable diligence. The application for execution of the sale-
deed and/or for delivery of possession, whether by way of an E.P. or an application under Section 28(3), must therefore be made within a reasonable time. What is 'reasonable time' is a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of a given case. 2 (2018) 15 SCC 254 3 2017(1) SCC 57 4 (2009) 8 SCC 766 5 1987 (2) (HC) APLJ, 114 12 No hard and fast rule can be enunciated in that behalf. However, it may be borne in mind that the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for enforcing an agreement of sale is three years from the date fixed for the purpose, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused, (Art.54). The said period must be treated as the outer limit, generally speaking. Indeed, it should be much sooner."
20) However, the said judgments are distinguishable on facts.
21) In Venu case (referred supra), the matter pertains to execution of preliminary decree in a suit for partition after 30 years from the date of the preliminary decree. Therefore, the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
22) In Prem Jeevan case (referred supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the case where the decree holder had filed E.P. for execution of decree for Specific Performance of Agreement of Sale and had not deposited the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated by the lower Court. In that background, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"9. In absence of the said time being extended, the decree-holder could execute the decree only by making the payment of the decretal amount to the judgment-debtor or making the deposit in the court in term of the said decree. In the present case, neither the said deposit was made within the stipulated time nor extension of time was sought or granted and also no explanation has been furnished for the delay in the making of the deposit. No doubt, as contended by the learned counsel for the decree-holders, relying on judgment of this Court in Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara ((1994) 2 SCC 642), in an appropriate case the Court which passed the decree could extend the time as envisaged in the Specific Relief, 13 1963. In the present case no such steps have been taken by the decree-holders.
12. There is no doubt that the above provision permits the judgment- debtor to seek rescission of a contract and also permits extension of time by the Court but merely because rescission of contract is not sought by the judgment-debtor, does not automatically result in extension of time."
23) In Bhupinder Kumar case (referred supra), the decree holder did not pay the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated by the Court, but instead filed an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act seeking extension of time for depositing the balance sale consideration. In those circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paras 23 to 25, has held as under:
"23. ...The suit for specific performance is in the nature of a discretionary remedy and on equity, the appellant was not entitled to get the decree executed since he failed to place relevant materials about his inability to tender or deposit the decreed amount.
24. It is relevant to mention that the sale agreement was executed on 20.11.1990, the suit for specific performance was filed on 13.12.1991 and suit was decreed on 13.10.1998 stipulating that the balance sale consideration was to be paid by 13.01.1999. In fact, only after the judgment-debtor filed an application for rescission of the agreement on 28.05.2001, the application for extension of time was moved on 13.08.2001.
25. As discussed earlier, though the court has the power and discretion to extend the time for fulfilment of the contract, in the case on hand, there is neither any material to show that the appellant was having the required money nor had he tendered or deposited the same as per the terms of the decree."14
24) The above decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are distinguishable on the facts of the present case and therefore cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case.
25) Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 has relied on the following judgments of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in support of his submissions:
1) RAJENDER PERSHAD v. RAJA RATAN GOPAL (DIED) BY LRs6, wherein at para 9, it has been held as under:
"9. The affidavit filed in support of the application for recession of contract gave no room for doubt that the respondents/judgment-debtors knew of non-depositing of the amount to the credit of the suit in O.S.No.544/75 within three months of the disposal of LPA No.239/86. The date of disposal of LPA is 21.08.1996. Within three months of the disposal of the LPA would be on or before 21.11.1996. Therefore, the respondents/judgment-debtors knew of non-availability of the amounts to the credit of the suit before 21.11.1996. The cause of action has accrued to them as on 21.11.1996 for filing petition under 28 (1) of the Act. The period of limitation as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1964 is three years. Since the respondents/judgment- debtors filed the application on 04.08.2000, the same is hopelessly barred by limitation."
2) KANTAMANENI VEKATESWARA RAO v. MEKA VENKATESWARA RAO7, wherein at para 11, it has been held as under:
"11. The second question is when will the cause of action accrue to the defendant to file the application under Section 28(1) of the Act. It has been noticed above that the cause of action to file the 6 (2005 (1) ALD 218) 7 (1993 (2) ALT 280 (S.B.) 15 application under Section 28(1) to have the contract rescinded, accrues on the failure of the purchaser, or the lessee to pay the purchase money and other sum which the Court has ordered him to pay within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the Court may allow. In the instant case, the decree was passed on 20th April, 1977 for payment of the balance consideration. The plaintiff had time to deposit the amount within three months from that date i.e., till 20th October, 1977. The application to have the contract rescinded was not filed within three years from that date. It was filed on 8th July, 1985, i.e., after about seven years and six months. It cannot be pretended that as the plaintiffs did not correctly measure the land the application could not be filed earlier as till date the approach of the defendants has been the same. It was open to the plaintiffs to file an application before the Court for having the land measured within the said period of three months granted and deposit the amount. The reasons given for not depositing the amount is not material because once the period of limitation starts, it does not stop unless the period is saved by the provisions of the Limitation Act itself. Therefore, the application filed by the defendants to have the contract for sale rescinded, was clearly barred by limitation."
3) B.SAMBASIVA REDDY v. KAYAGURLA KONDANNA8, wherein, at paras 5 and 6, it has been held as under:
"5. In Kantamaneni Venkateswar Rao & Another v. Meka Venkateswara Rao & Another (1993 (2) ALT 480), the Court, in similar circumstances held that an application for recession of contract has to be filed within three years from the date when the right to apply for recession accrues. The learned Judge also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.R.Kunhaliumma (AIR 1977 SC 282).
6. The ratio of that judgment, in all force, applies to the facts of this case. It is not the case of the defendant that he does not know the execution of the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. He also 8 (1996 (3) ALD 918) 16 contested the Execution Petition. Therefore, the Interlocutory Application is certainly filed beyond the period of limitation and it is not maintainable. Further, the suit was already decreed. There is no appeal against the decree passed in O.S.No.364/83. In such a case, the application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be filed. The reasons given in the impugned order are not correct."
26) Another important thing that has to be seen is that the petitioners have filed the present I.A. seeking to rescind the Agreement of Sale and not the respondent No.1, who has approached the Court seeking extension of time for depositing the balance sale consideration. Once the respondent No.1 has deposited the amount in the year 2005 itself, the petitioners ought to have taken immediate steps for getting the Agreement of Sale rescinded but they did not choose to do so, for the reason best known to them. Moreover, it is not the case of the petitioners that they were not aware of the deposit of the balance sale consideration to the credit of the suit as they themselves have filed a petition seeking to set aside the ex parte decree dated 08.11.2011 passed in O.S. No.33/2013 (OLD O.S. No.36/2001). Nothing prevented them from filing a petition for rescinding the Agreement of Sale along with the petition to set aside the ex parte decree. Viewed from any angle, the I.A. filed for rescinding the Agreement of Sale is hit by laches and delay and beyond the period of limitation. There is an inordinate delay of almost 16 years from the date of accrual of right i.e., date of deposit of the balance sale consideration.
27) Having regard to the above settled legal position and also the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that an application under Section 17 28 can only be filed within three years from the date when the right to apply for recession accrues, as discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is in consonance with the provisions of the Act and also the well established principles of law, and there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
28) That insofar as the other contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners are concerned, all those are questions of fact which cannot be gone into in the present Civil Revision Petition, as the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court has already become final and therefore, the petitioners cannot agitate the validity or otherwise of the agreement of sale and whether the said agreement of sale is obtained by fraud or not, either in I.A.No.29 of 2020 or in the present Civil Revision Petition. Therefore, the said contention also cannot be dealt with by this Court in the present Civil Revision Petition.
29) The Civil Revision Petition fails, and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall also stand dismissed. No order as to costs.
________________________ A.ABHISHEK REDDY, J Date :14.03.2022 va