Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Rajasthan State Electricity Board And ... vs Narayan Lal Meena on 1 February, 1995
Equivalent citations: (1996)IIILLJ1152RAJ, 1995(2)WLC327, 1995(1)WLN202
Author: P.K. Palli
Bench: P.K. Palli
JUDGMENT J.R. Chopra, J.
1. The learned single Judge, while deciding the writ petition of the petitioner, passed the following order:
2. "Hon'ble Shri A.K. Kathur.J. January 11, 1993.
Shri M.L. Kala. Advocate, for the petitioner. Shri R. K. Singhal, Advocate, for the respondents.
3. Mr. Singhal submits that the petitioner has already been granted relief of three-fourths of subsistence allowance during suspension. Now the grievance is regarding increment during suspension period. This court in the cases of Kan Singh v. State. (1992) 9 VVLR 882 (Raj), Ghanshyam Lal v. State. (1992) 5 WLR 751 (Raj), and Ram Babu Sharma v. State. (1992) 5 WLR 755 (Raj), has already taken the view that the incumbent during his suspension is entitled to the benefit of increment, Therefore the petitioner may also be given the increment during suspension period if it is due to him. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of."
4. In granting this relief to the petitioner, the learned single judge has placed reliance on a decision rendered in Kan Singh v. State, (supra), and two other authorities which are based on it and has allowed the benefit of increment during suspension period.
5. The contention of Mr. Gehlot, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, is that this judgment which was rendered in Kan Singh's case (supra), stands set aside by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kan Singh, (SLP (C) No. 9256 of 1989, decided on July 23, 1993).
6. The Division Bench of this Court in Kan Singh's case, (supra) held as under:
"In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that since the contract of service continues even during suspension, increment should be allowed ordinarily to be drawn unless it is withheld by a specific order. Since it is not the case of the respondents that any specific order had been passed in the instant case, withholding annual grade increment of the petitioner, the petitioner is entitled to the annual grade increments during the period of his suspension and the subsistence allowance shall be calculated accordingly."
7. When this judgment went to the Supreme Court in S.L.P., their Lordships held that the manner in which the subsistence allowance has been ordered to be enhanced by the High Court cannot be sustained and, therefore, that judgment was set aside. The order passed by the Supreme Court is as under:
"In the Supreme Court of India Civil Appellate jurisdiction Civil Appeal No. ..of 1993.
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 9256 of 1989) The State of Rajasthan and Ors., Appellants v. Kan Singh and Anr., respondents.
ORDER Leave granted.
Heard learned counsel on both sides. Having regard to the Rules governing the matter, the claim for enhancement of the subsistence allowance in the manner directed by the High Court in this case, is not sustainable. The order dated February 28, 1989, passed by the Rajasthan High Court in W.P. No. 871 of 1988 is set aside and the appeal is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
New Delhi, (sd.) CJI, July 23, 1993 (sd.) S. Mohan, J."
Mr. Geholt, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that this case if fully covered by the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court.
8. Mr. M.L. Kala, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has vehemently opposed this contention of Mr. Gehlot and submits that in the case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court it was contended that the subsistence allowance should be enhanced from 1/2 to three-fourths of the salary. The controversy of granting increment during suspension period was not at all raised and has not been decided and, therefore, that judgment passed in S.L.P. (C) No. 9256 of 1989 has no application to the facts of the present case.
9. It was contended by Mr. Kala that this case is fully covered by a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in Union of India v. K. V. Jankiraman, (1991 - II - LLJ - 570). That was a case where promotion was denied to a person in contemplation of an enquiry and even charge-sheet was not served. Their Lordships were of the view that sealed cover promotion procedure can be adopted only when charge-sheet has been served and not when the enquiry is only contemplated and no charge-sheet has been served. Nobody can be denied promotion in contemplation of an enquiry. Thus, the ratio of the decision rendered in K.V. Jankiraman 's case, (supra) which has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case in which the controversy raised is whether the suspended employees is entitled to the benefit of grant of increments during the suspension period.
10. Mr. Kala has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court rendered in Mangilal v. State of Rajasthan, [1994] WLR 511, and has invited our attention to para 6 of the judgment, wherein the learned single judge has observed as under:
"Since no charge-sheet has been served upon the petitioner, it can be said that departmental inquiry has so far not been initiated against the petitioner. When the inquiry has not been initiated, it cannot be said to be pending. Benefit of selection scale has been denied to the petitioner only in contemplation of a departmental inquiry. Inquiry which was in contemplation as early as in May, 1987, continues to be in contemplation even after lapse of almost six years. In my opinion on the basis of merely a contemplated inquiry, the petitioner could not have been denied the benefit of selection scale. In Union of India v. K. V. Jankiraman, (Supra), their Lordships have unequivocally held that on the basis of a contemplated inquiry promotion cannot be denied to any employee. Principle laid down in that case can appropriately be applied in the matter of grant of selection scale to a person like the petitioner."
11. In this case the learned single judge has placed reliance on a decision rendered in K. V. Jankiraman's case, (supra) only in regard to this fact that nobody can be denied promotion in contemplation of an enquiry and the learned single judge felt that when others who were suspended with the petitioner have been reinstated and they have been granted increments and selection scale, etc., that relief cannot be denied to the petitioner who has been serving the State as Patwari. This observation of the learned single judge has no application to the facts of the present case. Here, in the present case, it is not a case that some other persons were suspended with the petitioner in contemplation of an enquiry and have been reinstated and after reinstatement they have been granted increments and selection scale etc. Here the question that has been posed by learned counsel was whether the petitioner is entitled for grant of benefit of increments during suspension and thus the ratio of that decision has no application to the facts of the present case. There was no controversy in Kan Singh 's case, (supra) that subsistence allowed should be enhanced during the pendency of the proceedings. The decision of Kan Singh is totally based on the fact that a suspended employee is entitled to the benefit of increments and that judgment stands set aside by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) No, 9256 of 1989, and, therefore, the contention raised by Mr. Kala has no legs to stand on. Thus, the authorities cited by Mr. Kala have no application whatsoever to the facts of the present case.
12. The case is squarely covered by a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in State of Rajasthan v. Kan Singh (supra). The learned single judge has also relied on Kan Singh s case, which was decided by the Division Bench of this court and has allowed increments. When that judgment has been set aside by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, nothing else remains to be done except to set aside the order of the learned single judge and to quash it.
13. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the learned single judge is hereby set aside and it is ordered that the respondent will not be entitled for grant of increments during the suspension period.
14. The special appeal stands disposed of, accordingly on merit.