Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ratto Bai Kachhi on 19 May, 2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT,
CHIEF JUSTICE
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
WRIT APPEAL No. 1125 of 2024
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
RAMPRASAD PATEL
WITH
WRIT APPEAL No. 1023 of 2006
VIJAY KUMAR PATHAK
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
WRIT APPEAL No. 495 of 2019
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
RADHESHYAM RAIKWAR(DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
RAJKUMAR RAIKWAR AND OTHERS
WRIT APPEAL No. 764 of 2019
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
RATTO BAI KACHHI
WRIT APPEAL No. 997 of 2019
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
MANGAL PRASAD KOSHTA AND OTHERS
WRIT APPEAL No. 1333 of 2019
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH
Signing time: 19-05-2025
17:24:11
2
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
KISHANLAL
WRIT APPEAL No. 155 of 2022
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
KOMAL KEWAT AND OTHERS
WRIT APPEAL No. 726 of 2022
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
SMT. SAMUNDRI BAI
WRIT APPEAL No. 1116 of 2022
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
JAWAHAR LAL JAISWAL AND OTHERS
WRIT APPEAL No. 289 of 2024
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
KAMLA BAI(DEAD) THROUGH LRS PANDIT PATIL AND OTHERS
WRIT APPEAL No. 401 of 2024
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
CHIRANJI LAL KUMHAR
Appearance:
Shri Anubhav Jain - learned Government Advocate for appellant/State.
Shri Sanjay Agrawal - learned Senior Advocate along with Shri Arpit
Agrawal, Shri Rajmani Mishra, Shri Rajas Pohankar and Shri Rohit Raghuwansh -
learned counsel for the respondents in their respective cases.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH
Signing time: 19-05-2025
17:24:11
3
ORDER
(Reserved on: 14.05.2025) (Pronounced on : 19.05.2025) Per: Hon'ble Shri Justice Vivek Jain, Judge Except W.A.1023/2006, which is filed by the land owner, all other cases in this batch of Writ Appeals are filed by the State Govt. being aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge whereby has held the proceedings conducted against the land owners to have been abated by force of Section 3 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short hereinafter referred to as "Repeal Act") and the vesting of land held by the said land owners under the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 (for short hereinafter referred to as "Ceiling Act") has been declared null and void and abated in view of its subsequent repeal.
2.The Writ Petition filed by the land owner has been rejected which has led to filing of Writ Appeal No.1023/2006 and all other Writ Petitions filed by the land owners have been allowed which has led to filing of all other Writ Appeals. In all these cases, a common question arises that whether the possession of the land was taken over de-facto or de-jure, or at all, and even if the possession was taken de- jure, whether it was de-facto possession also or even where de-jure possession is alleged to have been taken by the State then the procedure prescribed for taking such possession, more particularly under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of Ceiling Act was followed or not and what would be the effect of such non-compliance of the procedure. These are the common issues arising in all these cases. However, for the sake of clarity and convenience, this Court would encapsulate the brief facts of each case that whether the dispute arises about taking possession at all, or taking de-jure but not de-facto possession, or whether the de-jure possession was taken Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 4 without following the procedure prescribed under the law. In case of de-jure possession, whether the procedure prescribed under Section 10(5) and 10(6) of Ceiling Act was followed or not and if not followed, then the consequences thereof.
Facts of the individual cases:-
W.A.No.1125/20243. The proceedings were conducted against the mother of original Writ Petitioner and notification of vesting under Section 10(3) of Ceiling Act was issued on 30.08.1982. The possession receipt dated 22.12.1983 stating to be receipt of ex- parte possession taken by one Sheikh Mohiuddin (Revenue Inspector) has been placed on record. There is finding of the learned Writ Court in para 7 of the impugned Order that no notice under Section 10(5) of the Ceiling Act was issued to the land holder and no valid proceedings under Section 10(6) were carried out. The Writ Petition has been allowed by the learned Writ Court.
W.A.No.1023/20064. In the present case, notification of vesting under Section 10(3) was issued on 14.03.1986 and neither any notice under Section 10(5) nor proceeding under Section 10(6) have been placed on record nor any possession receipt is on record either ex-parte or bi-parte. The original record was also produced for perusal of this Court by the learned Government Advocate as per which the Competent Authority directed the Tahsildar (Nazul) to take possession vide letter dated 22.11.1999 and the Patwari report was prepared on 27.11.1999 vide Annexure P-3 in which it is mentioned that possession is already deemed to be taken. However, no notice or receipt of possession is placed on record. Interestingly, in this case, the Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 5 land was notified in Town Development Scheme No.31 of Jabalpur Development Authority on 28.09.1984 vide Annexure P-5, which is even before the date of issuance of notification of vesting under Section 10(3) which was on 14.03.1986. In this case, the land owner had filed appeal against the declaration of land as surplus under the Ceiling Act prior to enforcement of Repeal Act and upon enforcement of Repeal Act, the appeal was closed as abated on 27.03.2000.
W.A.No.495/20195. In this case also, original record was produced for perusal of this Court by the learned Government Advocate. Initially, proceedings were initiated against mother of the original Writ Petitioner who expired during pendency of proceedings and then proceedings continued against the original petitioner. Notification under Section 10(3) was issued on 07.08.1984. A notice under Section 10(5) is stated to be issued to the petitioner on 28.05.1994 but there is no signature of receipt thereon, nor any separate proceedings under Section 10(6) were drawn. Possession receipt dated 30.09.1994 is on record which also indicates ex-parte possession to have been taken. The Writ Petition filed by the land owner has been allowed by the learned Writ Court.
W.A.No.764/20196. In this case also, original record was provided for perusal of this Court by the learned Government Advocate. Notification under Section 10(3) was issued on 28.10.1988 against original owner named Pushau who was Father-in-law of the original Writ Petitioner. Notification of vesting under Section 10(3) was issued on 28.10.1988 and possession receipt dated 29.12.1994 is placed on record which does not contain any signature of Pushau and is therefore, an ex-parte possession Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 6 receipt. No notice under Section 10(5) is available either in original record nor filed by the State either in Writ Petition or in Writ Appeal.
W.A.No.997/20197. The original Writ Petitioner was son of Nanhelal who was the original owner and against whom proceedings were conducted. Notification of vesting under Section 10(3) was issued on 207.10.1988 and an ex-parte possession proceeding is placed on record as Annexure A-3 which indicates that on 25.08.1989, the petitioner refused to sign on the possession receipt. The possession receipt itself is on record as Annexure A-4 in which the column of date is left blank and the signatures of only Revenue Officers are marked thereon.
8. In written submissions, the State Govt. has contended that the case was registered under Section 10(5) on 10.08.1989 but no copy of it has been filed. However, upon perusal of the original record, one notice under Section 10(5) is available, which is dated 28.05.1989 but it has no signature of service upon Nanhelal.
W.A.No.155/20229. Notification under Section 10(3) regarding vesting of land was issued on 23.03.1990. Vide letter Annexure P-6 dated 17.12.2018, the authority concerned under Ceiling Act has acknowledged that no notice under Section 10(5) was issued to the land holder nor procedure under Section 10(6) was followed. In letter Annexure P-8 issued shortly thereafter on 08.8.2019, an inference has been arrived at, that proceedings under Section 10(5) was lawfully completed in the year 1991 itself. However, neither any notice under Section 10(5) nor any possession receipt is on record.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 7 W.A.No.726/202210. In this case, notification of vesting under Section 10(3) was issued on 27.12.1985. Though, the Order Annexure P-6 mentions that Section 10(5) and 10(6) were complied with, but no copy of notice was filed before the Single Bench nor original record was produced before the learned Single Bench nor before this Court in Writ Appeal. Even, no possession receipt has been placed on record. Adverse inference was drawn by the learned Single Judge against the State.
W.A.No.1116/202211. In this case, notification of vesting was issued on 07.03.1987 under Section 10(5) and an ex-parte possession receipt dated 01.11.1990 is on record as Annexure P-13. In the reply, the State did not file any copy of notice under Section 10(5) issued by the Competent Authority, however, some notices issued by the Tahsildar were filed before the learned Writ Court. These are the notices issued by the Tahsildar threatening to take over possession by use of force. However, no notice under Section 10(5) which is required to be issued by the Competent Authority under Ceiling Act has been placed on record, based on which the Tahsildar could have gone to the spot or could have requested or threatened the petitioner to deliver possession peacefully or by use of force.
W.A.No.289/202412. In this case, the original Writ Petitioner was Kamla Bai who has purchased the questioned land by sale deed Annexure P-2 dated 06.04.1977 from a third person and therefore derived title on basis of the sale deed. However, all proceedings under the Ceiling Act were conducted against Bhagwan Patil who was the husband of Kamla Bai. Even the draft statement is alleged to have been filed by Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 8 Bhagwan Patil. The vesting Order and consequent notification under Section 10(3) dated 27.11.1981 are against Bhagwan Patil. A notice under Section 10(5) dated 15.01.1982 is stated to be issued and received by Bhagwan Patil though, his signatures are alleged to be forged. However, the fact remains that all proceedings have been conducted against Bhagwan Patil. All communications, orders, notices, notifications, etc. are in the name of Bhagwan Patil whereas the land was purchased by Kamla Bai (original Writ Petitioner) in her name by Sale deed dated 06.04.1977. Therefore, in this case, there are no valid proceedings against the actual land owner. Even the ex-parte possession receipt dated 04.05.1985 and notice under Section 10(5) dated 15.01.1982 are issued to Bhagwan Patil and Section 10(5) notice is alleged to be served upon Bhagwan Patil so also addressed to Bhagwan Patil. Therefore, in this case, there have been no proceedings under Ceiling Act against the actual land owner Kamla Bai.
W.A.No.401/202413. The proceedings were originally conducted against Dal Chand who was father of original Writ Petitioner. Notification of vesting under Section 10(3) was issued on 12.02.1993 and notice under Section 10(5) was issued on 16.03.1993.However, the said notice does not bear any receipt. An ex-parte possession receipt dated 22.6.1993 is on record as Annexure R-2, but it is not preceded by any duly served notice under Section 10(5) of the Ceiling Act.
14. In this case original holder of land was one Kishan Lal and statutory appeal against declaration of land as surplus was filed by the land owner, which was rejected on the issue of limitation before the Repeal Act came into force. The said order was confirmed by High Court before Repeal and the matter had reached the Hon'ble Supreme Court before the Repeal Act was enforced. The SLP was Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 9 decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court after the Repeal Act had been enforced and the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 22/02/2005 in Civil Appeal No.1529/2000 arising out of SLP (Civil) No.16291/1999 remanded the matter back to this Court to consider the issue on merits including the issue of effect of Repeal Act. Thereafter, this Court vide order dated 16/08/2005 passed in WP No.2604/1999 directed the Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act to see whether the possession had been taken over as per law and to arrive at conclusion whether proper procedure was followed for taking over the possession at the relevant point of time, or not. It was further directed by this Court that if the possession has not been taken over in accordance with law then the whole proceedings shall stand abated against the land holder. After this order was passed in WP No.2604/1999, the Competent Authority under Ceiling Act issued the consequential order dated 30/04/2007 (Annexure P/8) holding that possession has been taken over validly which has led to filing of this writ petition.
15. In this case, notification of vesting under Section 10(3) was issued on 22/11/1986 and notice under Section 10(5) was also issued, which is stated to be served on Ashok (son of original petitioner) on 04/10/1986 and thereafter, ex-parte possession receipt was prepared on 18/08/1988.
16. In this case, therefore, though there is valid service of notice under Section 10(5) on Ashok (son of the original land owner) however, the writ petition has been allowed on the ground that the said notice under Section 10(5) has been issued by the Tahsildar, which is a finding of fact arrived at by the learned Single Judge. It is concluded by the learned Single Judge that though the said notice mentions it to be issued by the Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act, but is actually signed by the Tehsildar. This issue was not in dispute before the learned Single Judge that notice under Section 10(5) was issued by the Tahsildar.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 1017. It was the contention of the writ petitioner that as per the Ceiling Act, Section 10(5) categorically mandates that notice will be issued by the Competent Authority and Competent Authority in itself is defined under Section 2(d) as the authority authorized by the State by notification the official gazette to perform the functions of Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act. The petitioner has placed on record a notification under the aforesaid provisions issued by the State Government dated 05/10/1976 published in the MP Gazette (Extraordinary) at page 2992. As per the said notification, for Jabalpur Urban Agglomeration, the Additional Collector, Jabalpur has been notified as Competent Authority for all purposes under Section 2(d) of the Ceiling Act, 1976. The State had relied on an order dated 12/02/1979 issued by the Additional Secretary to the State Government mentioning that the Tahsildar Nazul is authorized to take over possession of the lands, which are directed to be taken possession by the Competent Authority under Section 10(5) of the Ceiling Act. Thus, the competence of the Tahsildar was defended by the State. This issue shall be decided in later part of this order.
Arguments of the parties
18. During the course of hearing, looking to the aforesaid facts which are on record, wherein the possession receipts are ex-parte. In some of the cases even no possession receipts are there. Even where ex-parte possession receipts are there, in some cases they are not preceded by notice under Section 10(5). Even where the notice under Section 10(5) is there, then the said notice has not been served upon the land owner except in WA No.1333/2019 where the said notice is served on son of the land owner. In many of the cases, even notices under Section 10(5) are not available on record.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 1119. In all of the above cases, it is not in dispute that the de-jure possession only has been taken by the State and no de-facto possession has been taken. It is undisputed that no project has been established nor any colonization has taken place on the subjected land at the instance of the State till the filing of the petition. Therefore, in all these cases it was argued by the counsel for the appellants that only de-jure possession has been taken that to it is defective as per provisions of the Ceiling Act and even the said formal de-jure paper possession is not followed by de-facto possession.
20. Looking to these factual aspects, learned counsel for the appellant/State has vehemently argued that the de-jure possession taken by the State is in itself valid and secondly, it was vehemently argued by relying on judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam Vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (2015) 5 SCC 321 that the land owners after long lapse of time, just to take benefit of Repeal Act cannot take the ground of non-compliance of provisions of Section 10(5) and Section 10(6) of the Ceiling Act. It is argued that the Repeal Act cannot become a windfall event for the erstwhile land owners whose land stood vested in the State under Section 10(3) only because some formalities under Section 10(5) & 10(6) were not completed at the relevant of time when the Ceiling Act was in existence. Therefore, heavy reliance placed on judgment in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra).
21. It is further vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the State that the earlier law in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280 stands diluted by the Supreme Court in the subsequent judgment of the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra) and the said case has been distinguished on facts and therefore, the mere defects of procedure in Section 10(5) and 10(6) cannot come to Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 12 the rescue of the erstwhile land owners whose land stood vested in the State long before.
22. An additional issue has been raised regarding delay in approaching the Writ Court by contending that the delay has to be counted from the date the vesting notification under Section 10(3) came into existence and when the ex-parte de-jure possession was taken from the land owner and they should have challenged the matter at that point of time itself and therefore, limitation is to be counted and laches have to be counted from the date of proceedings under Section 10(3) & 10(5) and not from the date of Repeal Act. It is vehemently argued that the erstwhile land owners cannot take the benefit of mere enforcement of Repeal Act in the year 1999, which has been enforced in the State of Madhya Pradesh in the year 2000, therefore, the petition suffers from delay and latches.
23. Per contra, it was vehemently argued by learned counsel for the land owners that the judgment in the case of Hari Ram (Supra) has not at all been diluted as is being wrongly projected by the learned counsel for the State. It is vehemently argued that the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra)would not apply to facts of this case as it was rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in view of the peculiar facts of that case and both the judgments i.e. Hari Ram (Supra)and Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra)have subsequently been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation Vs. Tahsildar and others reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 447 and the ratio of the case of Hari Ram (Supra) has been reiterated. Therefore, it is vehemently argued that defect of procedure under Section 10(5) and Section 10(6) cannot be condoned and it would be fatal to the case of the State.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 1324. On the question of delay it was argued by the learned counsel for the land owners that the land owners are undoubtedly entitled to seek benefit of enforcement of the Repeal Act in the year 1999, which was enforced in the State of Madhya Pradesh on 17/02/2000 and attempt by the land owners to take benefit of Repeal Act cannot be said to be unholy attempt because the intention of the Legislature in repealing the Ceiling Act, 1976 was to grant benefit to the land owners and for that purpose, Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act was enacted and if the writ petitioners seek benefit of Repeal Act which creates a saving for the erstwhile vested lands then it cannot be said to be an unholy attempt because the provision has been made by the Legislature for such cases only.
25. It was further argued by learned senior counsel for the land owners that there is no actual delay in approaching the Writ Court because immediately after the Repeal Act was passed, they moved applications under Section 4 of the Repeal Act before the Competent Authority and those applications were dealt with by the Competent Authority and rejected and therefore, immediately thereafter the writ petitions were filed before this Court, which came to be decided after a long period of time and now the matter is in Writ Appeal, therefore, it is contended that for the purpose of seeking benefit of Repeal Act, limitation would not be decisive factor to defeat the claims of the land owners. On these grounds, it was prayed to dismiss the appeals filed by the State and allow the appeal filed by the land owner in WA No.1023/2006.
26. Heard.
Consideration on the legal issues raised :-
27. In the present cases, it is clear that de-jure possession has ostensibly been taken by the State Government from the land owners in most of the cases and there Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 14 is valid vesting order under Section 10(3) prior to enforcement of Repeal Act, which came to be enforced in the State of Madhya Pradesh on 17.02.2000. However, it is not at all in dispute that no de-facto possession has been taken over on any of the land, because there is no assertion by the State that any housing project or colonization project or land development project on the land in question has been actually developed on the lands declared surplus under the Ceiling Act owned by the writ petitioners or by their predecessors. However, it has been contended before this Court by learned Government Advocate that if de-jure possession has been validly taken over and possession receipt has been prepared, though it may be ex-parte possession, then in case of open agricultural land, it is not possible for the State to place a police personnel or a guard on each and every parcel of the land and if the land owner subsequently enters in possession, then it is only possession as an encroacher and nothing else and no benefit can be derived by the encroachers.
28. The Ceiling Act was enacted in the year 1976 creating ceiling on urban holding of land and the purpose of the act was to provide for imposition of ceiling on vacant urban land and for acquisition of such land in excess of ceiling limit so as to regulate construction of buildings on such land and the matters connected therewith and also to prevent concentration of urban land in the hands of few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bring out equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations. The purpose of the Act was therefore to regulate construction of buildings in urban areas and bring about equitable distribution of land in urban areas. It was basically with an objective for better development of urban areas and to cope with the problems of housing being faced in urban agglomerations in large cities. The State was required to initiate projects for common good in such urban areas after the land stood vested in the Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 15 State and for this purpose after the land vested in the State as per Section 10(3) there was a separate procedure to take over possession under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) as and when the requirement of the land already vested arose. Mere vesting of land under Section 10(3) did not imply any deemed possession and there was a separate provision and procedure for taking over possession in terms of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Ceiling Act.
29. When the Central Government felt that the act has failed to serve the purpose for which it was enacted, then the Central Government enacted the Repeal Act, which came in force on different dates in different States. In the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Repeal Act came into force on 17.02.2000.
30. The Ceiling Act contained provisions for filing a draft statement as per Section 6 by every person holding land in excess of ceiling limit and the Competent Authority was required to prepare a draft statement in respect of person, who filed the statement under Section 6. Thereafter, disposal of objection was to take place and statement was to be served upon the land owner after disposal of objections. Upon completion of process upto stage of Section 9, then the Competent Authority was required to issue notification under Section 10(1) stating that such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned State Government and claims of all such interested persons in such land as may be made by them personally or by their agents were to be invited. Upon considering the claims of interested persons in the vacant land, notification of vesting was to be issued under Section 10(3).
31. As per Section 10(4) between the period from the date of publication of notification under Section 10(1) and till the date of publication of notification under Section 10(3) there was to be freezing of transfers of the excess vacant land Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 16 and the land use was also to be frozen. Thereafter, possession of the land was to be taken over in terms of Section 10(5) and the Competent Authority was required to issue a notice in writing to the person in possession to surrender or deliver possession to the State Government or person authorized by the State Government in this behalf within 30 days of service of notice and upon failure of the said person to comply with the notice/order under Section 10(5), the Competent Authority was authorized to take possession by use of such force as may be necessary. Upon delivery of possession, the proceedings under Section 11 regarding assessment and payment of compensation were to be initiated. The relevant Section 10 is as under:-
"10. (1) As soon as may be after the service of the statement under section 9 on the person concerned, the Competent Authority shall cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and stating that--
(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned State Government ; and
(ii) the claims of all persons interested in such vacant land may be made by them personally or by their agents giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land, to be published for the information of the general public in the Official Gazette of the State concerned and in such other manner as may be prescribed.
(2) After considering the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land, made to the Competent Authority in pursuance of the notification published under sub-section (1), the Competent Authority shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit.
(3) At any time after the publication of the notification under sub-
section (1) the Competent Authority may, by notification published in the Official Gazette of the State concerned, declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the notification published under sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 17(4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3):
(i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void; and
(ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land.
(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the Competent Authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the Competent Authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
Explanation : In this section, in sub-section (1) of section 11 and in sections 14 and 23, "State Government", in relation to--
(a) any vacant land owned by the Central Government, means the Central Government;
(b) any vacant land owned by any State Government and situated in a Union territory or within the local limits of a cantonment declared as such under section 3 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924), means that State Government."
32. Thereafter, the Ceiling Act was repealed by the Repeal Act, 1999 and savings clause was laid down in Section 3 thereof to the effect that repeal of principal Act shall not affect vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of Ceiling Act, the possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or person authorized by the State Government or by the Competent Authority and it was further clarified that where any land has vested in the State Government under Section 10(3) of Ceiling Act, but possession has not been taken over by the Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 18 State Government and any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, then such land shall not be restored to the land owner unless the amount taken has been refunded to the State Government. Therefore, it is evident that land-owners could seek restoration even if they had received compensation. As per Section 4, all proceedings pending immediately before commencement of this Act stood abated, except the proceedings under Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Ceiling Act. Relevant Section 3, which is the bone of contention between the parties in the present appeal is as under :-
"3. Savings - (1) the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect-
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the Competent Authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1)of section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the contrary;
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of section 20. (2)Where-
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the Competent Authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government."
33. In the present matters, as already discussed in detail in this judgment above that undisputedly only de-jure possession has been taken by the State in many of these cases, and no de-facto possession has been taken in any of these cases. It is undisputed that no project has been established nor any colonization has taken place on the subject lands at the instance of the State till filing of the petition. The possessions receipts are on record in some of the cases, which are ex-parte Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 19 possession receipts and in some of the cases even no possession receipts are there. Even where ex-parte possession receipts are there, in some cases they are not preceded by notices under Section 10(5) and in those cases where notice under Section 10(5) is there, then the said notice was not served upon the land owners except in W.A. No.1333/2019 where the notice was served on son of the land owner. The details of these facts are mentioned in this judgment above.
34. As already narrated above, looking to these factual aspects the learned counsel for the State has vehemently argued that de-jure possession taken by the State in itself is valid and the land owners after long lapse of time just to take benefit of Repeal Act cannot take the ground of non-compliance of provisions of Section 10(5) and 10(6) of Ceiling Act and Repeal Act cannot become a windfall event for the erstwhile land owners for the lands that stood vested in the State under Section 10(3) only because some formalities under Section 10(5) and 10(6) were not completed at the relevant point of time when the Ceiling Act was in existence. Therefore, heavy reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra).
35. Except in W.A. Nos.1333/2019 and 289/2024, these arguments are relevant. Even in those two writ appeals these arguments are relevant, but in W.A. No.1333/2019 the difference is that notice under Section 10(5) was served on son of the land owner, but notice under Section 10 (5) was not issued by the Competent Authority. In W.A. No.289/2024 all the proceedings were carried out in the name of husband of land owner, though the land was owned by his wife against whom there is not a single notice or order or notification.
36. Learned counsel for the land owners have vehemently relied on the judgment of the learned Single Bench. The Single Bench has allowed the writ petitions by Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 20 relying on the judgments in the case of Hariram (supra) so also judgment of different Benches of this Court in the case of Raju Bai vs. State of M.P. and others (W.A. No.558/2016 decided on 06.7.2017) and Rohni Prasad Patel vs. State of M.P. and others reported in 2020 (2) MPLJ 404. The Single Bench has also relied on another judgment of Division Bench of this Court in State of M.P. and others vs. Thamman Chand Koshta (W.A. No.867/2015). The Single Bench has held that once the land-owners have been agitating for their rights since long and immediately after the Repeal Act has come into force, then their claims cannot be rejected on the ground of the delay.
37. In the present cases, the writ petitions were filed within a few years after the Repeal Act came into force in the year 2000 after the land owners had filed application under Section 4 of Repeal Act for declaring the earlier acquisition as abated in view of Section 3 of Repeal Act. When such applications were rejected by the Competent Authority, then the writ petitions came to be filed before this Court. In some of the cases the appeals or other challenge against vesting of land was pending at the time when the Repeal Act was enforced, therefore, it cannot be said that the present petitions suffers from fatal delay and laches, because what is claimed by the petitioners is not the initial declaration of land as surplus or excess under the Ceiling Act, 1976 as illegal, but the petitioners seek benefit of Section 3 of Repeal Act, which could be claimed by them only after 17.02.2000 when the Repeal Act was enforced in the State of Madhya Pradesh and not before that. The declaration of land as surplus under the Ceiling Act and vesting under Section 10(3) may have been valid, because the land owners may have been holding land in surplus as per the Ceiling Act, 1976, but once the Act stood repealed w.e.f. 17.02.2000 in the State of Madhya Pradesh and a window was opened for the land owners whose lands stood vested under Section 10(3), then, when the land owners Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 21 approached the authorities to take benefit of that window and thereafter, approached this Court after the Repeal Act was enforced in the State to take benefit of the Repeal Act, then the limitation or delay and laches cannot be counted from the date of the vesting orders or vesting notifications or the alleged possession proceedings.
38. There was no cause of action for the writ petitioners to have challenged the defect in possession proceedings when the Ceiling Act, 1976 was still in force because undisputedly at the relevant point of time, even if there was a defect in possession, but a valid vesting order was in place under Section 10(3), then the State authorities could always have cured the defect and initiated fresh possession proceedings under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Ceiling Act. Therefore, once Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act gave a window that the repeal shall save only those vestings under Section 10(3) of Ceiling Act, the possession of which has been taken over by the State Government, then a valid cause of action has accrued to the land owners to agitate before the authority and then before this Court with the plea that possession was not validly taken over from them and compliance of Section 10 was either not made or if made, was defective in any manner.
39. The Supreme Court in the case of Hariram (supra) had the occasion to consider all these issues in detail and it was held that Section 10(5) of the Ceiling Act speaks of possession and if de-facto possession had passed on the State Government by the deeming provision under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act, when there was no necessity of using the expression "where any land is vested"
under Section 10(5) of the Ceiling Act. Thus, it was held at once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, the State Government has necessarily to issue notice in writing under Section 10(5) to surrender and deliver possession and that provision visualizes a situation of surrender and delivery of Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 22 possession peacefully while Section 10(6) contemplates forceful dispossession, which will occur when a person fails to comply with order issued under Section 10(5). It was therefore held that requirement of giving notice/order under Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the Ceiling Act is mandatory and word "may" used therein has to be understood as "shall". The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hariram (supra) has held as under:-
"21. Let us test the meaning of the expressions "deemed to have been acquired" and "deemed to have been vested absolutely" in the above legal settings. The expressions "acquired" and "vested" are not defined under the Act. Each word, phrase or sentence that we get in a statutory provision, if not defined in the Act, then is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act. As held by this Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India [(1979) 4 SCC 573 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 92] that a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of a legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficial legislation to futility. Reference may also be made to the judgment of this Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan [(1994) 3 SCC 440 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 785] . Words and phrases, therefore, occurring in the statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner, they are associated on the context but are read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the Act.
24. The expression "deemed to have been acquired" used as a deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of interests because till that time the land may be either in the ownership of the person who held that vacant land or to possess such land as owner or as a tenant or as mortgagee and so on as defined under Section 2(1) of the Act. The word "vested" has not been defined in the Act, so also the word "absolutely". What is vested absolutely is only the land which is deemed to have acquired and nothing more. The word "vest" has different meaning in different context; especially when we examine the meaning of "vesting" on the basis of a statutory hypothesis of a deeming provision which Lord Hoffmann in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Zielinski Baker and Partners Ltd. [(2004) 1 WLR 707 : (2004) 2 All ER 141 (HL)] , All ER at para 11 described as "heroic piece of deeming".
25. The word "vest" or "vesting" has different meanings. Legal Glossary, published by the Official Language (Legislative) Commission, 1970 Edn. at p. 302:
"Vest.--(1) To give a person a legally fixed, immediate right or personal or future enjoyment of (an estate), to grant, endow, clothe with a particular authority, right of property, (2) To become legally vested; (TP Act) Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 23 Vesting order.--An order under statutory authority whereby property is transferred to and vested, without conveyance in some person or persons;"
26.Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.), 1990 at p. 1563:
"Vested.--Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are 'vested' when right to enjoyment present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not continue 'vested right'. Vaughn v. Nadel [228 Kan 469 : 618 P 2d 778 (1980)] . See also Accrue; Vest, and specific types of vested interests, infra."
27.Webster's Third New International Dictionary, of the English Language unabridged, Vol. III S to Z at p. 2547 defines the word "vest" as follows:
"'vest' vest ... To place or give into the possession or discretion of some person or authority [the regulation of the waterways ... to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or future enjoyment of (as an estate) (a deed that vests a title estate in the grantee and a remainder in his children)
(b) to grant, endow, or clothe with a particular authority right or property ... to put (a person) in possession of land by the feudal ceremony of investiture ... to become legally vested (normally) title to real property vests in the holder of a property executed deed.]"
28. "Vest"/"vested", therefore, may or may not include "transfer of possession", the meaning of which depends on the context in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various other related provisions.
29. What is deemed "vesting absolutely" is that "what is deemed to have acquired". In our view, there must be express words of utmost clarity to persuade a court to hold that the legislature intended to divest possession also, since the owners or holders of the vacant land are pitted against a statutory hypothesis. Possession, there is an adage is "nine points of the law".
In Beddall v. Maitland [(1881) 17 Ch D 174 : (1881-85) All ER Rep Ext 1812] Sir Edward Fry, while speaking of a statute which makes a forcible entry an indictable offence, stated as follows: (Ch D p. 188) "... This statute creates one of the great differences which exist in our law between the being in possession and the being out of possession of land, and which gave rise to the old saying that possession is nine points of the law. The effect of the statute is this, that when a man is in possession he may use force to keep out a trespasser; but, if a trespasser has gained possession, the rightful owner cannot use force to put him out, but must appeal to the law for assistance."
30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 24 the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the words "acquired" and "vested" have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de-jure possession not de-facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent.
Voluntary surrender
31. The "vesting" in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The Court in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. [(1977) 1 SCC 155], while interpreting Section 117(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 held that "vesting" is a word of slippery import and has many meanings and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The Court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan [(2000) 8 SCC 99] held as follows: (SCC p. 114, para 28) "28. ... We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a 'vesting' certain. 'To "vest", generally means to give a property in.' (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton [(1878) 4 QBD 104 (CA)] : Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn., Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorisation cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To 'vest', cannot be termed to be an executory devise. Be it noted however, that 'vested' does not necessarily and always mean 'vest in possession' but includes 'vest in interest' as well."
32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word "vesting" takes in every interest in the property including de-jure possession and, not de-facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act.
Peaceful dispossession
34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of "possession" which says that where any land is vested in the State Government under sub- section (3) of Section 10, the Competent Authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorised by the State Government.
35. If de-facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) of Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression "where any land is vested" under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) of Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 25 Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) of Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualises a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession.
Forceful dispossession
36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub- section (6) of Section 10 again speaks of "possession" which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5), the Competent Authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force--as may be necessary--can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the Competent Authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted to only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations i.e. taking possession by giving notice, that is, "peaceful dispossession" and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), then "forceful dispossession" under sub-section (6) of Section 10.
37. The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word "may" has been used therein, the word "may" in both the sub-sections has to be understood as "shall" because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word "may" has to be read as "shall".
38. The above reasoning is in consistence with the 1983 Directions which have been issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 35 of the Act. The Directions clearly indicate the procedure for taking possession of the vacant land in excess of the prescribed ceiling limit, which reads as under:
The Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession, Payment of Amount and Allied Matters) Directions, 1983 (Directions issued by the State Government under Section 35 of the 1976 Act):
"In exercise of the powers under Section 35 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976), the Governor is pleased to issue the following directions relating to the powers and duties of the Competent Authority in respect of amount referred to in Section 11 of the aforesaid Act to the person or persons entitled thereto:Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 26
1. Short title, application and commencement.--These Directions may be called the Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession, Payment of Amount and Allied Matters) Directions, 1983 (2) The provisions contained in this direction shall be subjected to the provisions of any directions or rules or orders issued by the Central Government with such directions or rules or orders. (3) They shall come into force with effect from the date of publication in the gazette.
2. Definitions.--***
3. Procedure for taking possession of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit.--(1) The Competent Authority will maintain a register in Form No. ULC-I for each case regarding which notification under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act is published in the gazette.
4. (1)*** (2) An order in Form No. ULC-II will be sent to each landholder as prescribed under sub-section (5) of Section 109 of the Act and the date of issue and service of the order will be entered in Column 8 of Form No. ULC-I. (3) On possession of the excess vacant land being taken in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act, entries will be made in a register in Form No. ULC-III and also in Column 9 of Form No. ULC-I. The Competent Authority shall in token of verification of the entries, put his signatures in Column 11 of Form No. ULC-I and Column 10 of Form No. ULC-III.
Form No. ULC-I Register of notice under Sections 10(3) and 10(5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) Sl. Sl. No. of Case Date of Land to be Date of Remarks Signature No. register of number Notification acquired taking of receipt Sl. under Village over Competent No. of Section Mohali possession Authority register of 10(3) taking possession Form No. ULC-II Notice order under Section 10(5) [See clause (2) of Direction (3)] In the court of Competent Authority ULC ..................
No. .................... Date ..................
Sri/Smt ................................... T/o ...........................
In exercise of the powers vested under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976), you are hereby informed that vide Notification No. .......... dated ..... under Section 10(1) published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette dated ......
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 27following land has vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances as a consequence Notification under Section 10(3) published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette dated ....... Notification No. ......... dated ..... With effect from .......... you are hereby ordered to surrender or deliver the possession of the land to the Collector of the District authorised in this behalf under Notification No. 324/II-27-U.C.77 dated 9-2-1977, published in the gazette, dated 12-3-1977, within thirty days from the date of receipt of this order otherwise action under sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act will follow.
Description of vacant land
Location Khasra No. identification Area Remarks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competent Authority
...............................
...............................
No. ..................... Dated.........................
Copy forwarded to the Collector ............ with the request that action for immediate taking over of the possession of the above detailed surplus land and its proper maintenance may, kindly be taken and an intimation be given to the undersigned along with the copy of the certificate to verify.
Competent Authority ............................
.........................."
39. The abovementioned directives make it clear that sub-section (3) takes in only de- jure possession and not de-facto possession, therefore, if the landowner is not surrendering possession voluntarily under sub-section (3) of Section 10, or surrendering or delivering possession after notice, under Section 10(5) or dispossession by use of force, it cannot be said that the State Government has taken possession of the vacant land.
Effect of the Repeal Act
41. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act. The Repeal Act, 1999 has expressly repealed Act 33 of 1976. The objects and reasons of the Repeal Act have already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. The Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving clause. The question whether a right has been acquired or liability incurred under a statute before it is repealed will in each case depend on the construction of the statute and the facts of the particular case.
42. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de-facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18-3-1999. The State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the landowner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 28The State Government in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act.
40. The aforesaid judgment squarely covers the case of the writ petitioners. However, the said judgment was sought to be distinguished by learned counsel for the State only on the strength of the subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra). Learned counsel for the State has vehemently referred to the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and submitted that the fact that dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and will not obliterate the act of taking possession for the purpose of Section 3 of Repeal Act. It was further held therein that possession of the land is always a disputed question of fact that cannot be determined under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the Supreme Court, it was argued vehemently before this Court, has distinguished the case of Hariram (supra) and hence, mere defect in procedure as per Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Ceiling Act would not vitiate vesting of land and would give no cause of action to the erstwhile land owners to claim benefit of Repeal Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra) held as under:-
"10. Mr P.K. Goswamy, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, argued that actual physical possession must be proved to have been taken over by the State Government or by a person duly authorised by the State Government in that behalf or by the Competent Authority in order that the saving clause in the Repeal Act could save any action already taken under the principal Act. Possession of surplus land could, in turn, be taken only by the owner surrendering or delivering possession to the State Government or the persons duly authorised by the State Government. In the event of failure or refusal of the owner to surrender or deliver the same, possession of the surplus land could be taken forcibly also but only in accordance with the procedure prescribed. The scheme of Section 10 does not, according to Mr Goswamy, permit taking over of possession by the State Government or the authorised person or the public authority without following the procedure prescribed Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 29 under Section 10(5), namely, issuing a notice in writing to the person to surrender or deliver the same. Inasmuch as actual physical possession in the case at hand is alleged to have been taken over without following the said procedure the alleged takeover shall be deemed to be non est in the eye of the law at least for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. Relying upon the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Hari Ram [State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 583] , it was argued by Mr Goswamy that the procedure prescribed under Section 10(5) for taking physical possession of the land under Section 10(6) was mandatory and so long as the said procedure was not followed, no possession can be said to have been taken over within the meaning of Section 3 of the Repeal Act.
11. Section 3 of the Repeal Act postulates that vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, is subject to the condition that possession thereof has been taken over by the Competent Authority or by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government. The expression "possession" used in Section 3 (supra) has been interpreted to mean "actual physical possession" of the surplus land and not just possession that goes with the vesting of excess land in terms of Section 10(3) of the Act.
12. The question, however, is whether actual physical possession of the land in dispute has been taken over in the case at hand by the Competent Authority or by the State Government or an officer authorised in that behalf by the State Government.
13. The case of the appellant is that actual physical possession of the land was taken over on 7-12-1991 no matter unilaterally and without notice to the erstwhile landowner. That assertion is stoutly denied by the respondents giving rise to seriously disputed question of fact which may not be amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. But assuming that any such determination is possible even in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, what needs examination is whether the failure of the Government or the authorised officer or the Competent Authority to issue a notice to the landowners in terms of Section 10(5) would by itself mean that such dispossession is no dispossession in the eye of the law and hence insufficient to attract Section 3 of the Repeal Act. Our answer to that question is in the negative.
14. We say so because in the ordinary course actual physical possession can be taken from the person in occupation only after notice under Section 10(5) is issued to him to surrender such possession to the State Government, or the authorised officer or the Competent Authority. There is enough good sense in that procedure inasmuch as the need for using force to dispossess a person in possession should ordinarily arise only if the Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 30 person concerned refuses to cooperate and surrender or deliver possession of the lands in question. That is the rationale behind Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. But what would be the position if for any reason the Competent Authority or the Government or the authorised officer resorts to forcible dispossession of the erstwhile owner even without exploring the possibility of a voluntary surrender or delivery of such possession on demand? Could such use of force vitiate the dispossession itself or would it only amount to an irregularity that would give rise to a cause of action for the aggrieved owner or the person in possession to seek restoration only to be dispossessed again after issuing a notice to him? It is this aspect that has to an extent bothered us.
15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act. Assuming that to be the case all that it would mean is that on 7-12-1991 when the erstwhile owner was dispossessed from the land in question, he could have made a grievance based on Section 10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to him no matter he would upon such restoration once again be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver or surrender such possession. In reality therefore unless there was something that was inherently wrong so as to affect the very process of taking over such as the identity of the land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance of a similar nature going to the root of the matter hence requiring an adjudication, a person who had lost his land by reason of the same being declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not consider it worthwhile to agitate the violation of Section 10(5) for he can well understand that even when the Court may uphold his contention that the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain the land for the authorities could the very next day dispossess him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section 10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that no notice under Section 10(5) had been served upon him.
16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile landowner on 7-12-1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 31 licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure.
17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram case [State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 583] . That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram case [State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 583] considering whether the word "may" appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the Competent Authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of the law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma, erstwhile owner, had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so.
41. The aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra) as well as Hariram (supra) were recently considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Electrical Equipment (supra). It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that paragraphs 15 and 17 of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra) do not dilute the ratio of Hariram (supra) in any manner and it has been held that Hariram (supra) holds the field even on the stage and the statements of law in Hariram (supra) were held to be absolutely correct and fully enforceable and applicable to the State. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once there is no voluntary surrender for possession, then the State Government has to necessarily Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 32 issue notice in writing under Section 10(5) to surrender and deliver possession and in failure thereof it may take forcible possession under Section 10(6). It has been held conclusively that mere vesting under Section 10(3) would not confer any right on the State Government to have de-facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before the enforcement of Repeal Act and in failure thereof there was a forcible dispossession under Section 10(6). It has been held that on failure to establish any of those conditions, the land holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of Repeal Act.
42. It has also been held that if the land owner remains in physical possession after enforcement of Repeal Act, then irrespective of his land being declared surplus and revenue entry being made in favour of the State, he will not be divested of his rights and even if compensation has been received by him he shall remain entitled to claim the benefit upon refund of compensation, provided he is in actual physical possession. There has to be a de-jure possession taken by complying with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Ceiling Act and apart from that there must be actual physical possession of the State on the land on the date of enforcement of Repeal Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.P. Electrical Equipment (supra) has considered the relevant issues in paragraphs 32 to 40 and summarized its conclusions in para 41 by holding in the following manner:-
"32. We should now look into the decision of this Court in the case of State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (2015) 5 SCC 321. A cursory reading of this decision may at the first blush create an impression that the dictum as laid in Hari Ram (supra) has been diluted.
33. We quote few relevant paras of the said judgment as under:--
"14. We say so because in the ordinary course actual physical possession can be taken from the person in occupation only after notice under Section 10(5) is issued to him to surrender such possession to the State Government, or the authorised officer or the competent authority. There is enough good sense in that procedure Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 33 inasmuch as the need for using force to dispossess a person in possession should ordinarily arise only if the person concerned refuses to cooperate and surrender or deliver possession of the lands in question. That is the rationale behind Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. But what would be the position if for any reason the competent authority or the Government or the authorised officer resorts to forcible dispossession of the erstwhile owner even without exploring the possibility of a voluntary surrender or delivery of such possession on demand. Could such use of force vitiate the dispossession itself or would it only amount to an irregularity that would give rise to a cause of action for the aggrieved owner or the person in possession to seek restoration only to be dispossessed again after issuing a notice to him. It is this aspect that has to an extent bothered us.
15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act. Assuming that to be the case all that it would mean is that on 7th December, 1991 when the erstwhile owner was dispossessed from the land in question, he could have made a grievance based on Section 10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to him no matter he would upon such restoration once again be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver or surrender such possession. In reality therefore unless there was something that was inherently wrong so as to affect the very process of taking over such as the identity of the land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance of a similar nature going to the root of the matter hence requiring an adjudication, a person who had lost his land by reason of the same being declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not consider it worthwhile to agitate the violation of Section 10(5) for he can well understand that even when the Court may uphold his contention that the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain the land for the authorities could the very next day dispossess him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section 10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that no notice under Section 10(5) had been served upon him.
16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 34 Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure.
17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram's case (supra). That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram's case (supra) considering whether the word 'may' appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so."
(Emphasis supplied)
34. We have supplied emphasis on paras 15 and 17 of Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra) referred to above, for the purpose of highlighting that Hari Ram (supra) has not been diluted in any manner. We are of the firm view that Hari Ram (supra) holds the field even as on date. The statements of law in Hari Ram (supra) are absolutely correct.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 3535. If two decisions of this Court appear inconsistent with each other, the High Courts are not to follow one and overlook the other, but should try to reconcile and respect them both and the only way to do so is to adopt the wise suggestion of Lord Halsbury given in Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A.C. 495 and reiterated by the Privy Council in Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Commr. of Income Tax, Lahore AIR 1940 PC 230:
"...... every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions, which may be found there, are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed or qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found." and follow that decision whose facts appear more in accord with those of the case at hand.
36. The "vesting" in sub-section (3) of section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. This Court in Maharaj Singh v. State of UP, (1977) 1 SCC 155 : (1977) 1 SCR 1072, while interpreting section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 held that "vesting" is a word of slippery import and has many meaning and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. This Court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (Dead) by L.Rs., (2000) 8 SCC 99, held as follows:--
"We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a "vesting" certain. "To vest, generally means to give a property in." (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorization cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To "vest", cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that "vested." does not necessarily and always mean "vest in possession" but includes "vest in interest" as well."
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 talks of "possession" which says where any landis vested in the State Government under subsection (3) of Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 3638. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) to Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression "where any land is vested." under sub- section (5) to Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub- section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act, 1976 early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under subsection (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession.
39. The mere vesting of the land under subsection (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.03.1999. State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under subsection (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub- section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the landowner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999. In the case on hand, the State Government has in our considered view not been able to establish any of those situations and hence the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the appellant herein is entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999.
40. The effect of Repeal Act, 1999 is further clear. If the landowner remains in physical possession, then irrespective of his land being declared surplus and/or entry being made in favour of the State in revenue records, he will not be divested of his rights. Even if compensation is received that also will not dis-entitle him to claim the benefit if compensation is refunded, provided he is in actual physical possession. Payment of compensation has no co-relation with the taking of actual physical possession as with the vesting land compensation becomes payable which can be paid without taking actual physical possession.
41. The propositions of law governing the issue of possession in context with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) respectively of the Act, 1976 read with Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 may be summed up thus:
[1] The Repeal Act, 1999 clearly talks about the possession being taken under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976, as the case may be.
[2] It is a statutory obligation on the part of the Competent Authority or the State to take possession strictly as permitted in law.Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 37
[3] In case the possession is purported to have been taken under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 the Court is still obliged to look into whether "taking of such possession" is valid or invalidated on any of the considerations in law.
[4] The possession envisaged under Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 is de-facto and not de-jure only.
[5] The mere vesting of "land declared surplus" under the Act without resuming "de-facto possession" is of no consequence and the land holder is entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999. [6] The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 respectively is mandatory. Although the word "may" has been used therein, yet the word "may" in both the sub-sections should be understood as "shall" because a Court is obliged to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from the failure to implement the requirement.
[7] The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de- facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18th March 1999.
[8] The State has to establish by cogent evidence on record that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (6) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10.
43. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court also took note of the fact that in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra), land was sold long ago and the purchasers had unsuccessfully challenged the vesting of land and after the challenge made by the purchasers failed, then legal heirs of original land owners stepped in to make challenge, hence, it was held that the original land owners are deemed to have waived their right and accepted the action of the State. In A.P. Electrical Equipment (supra), the Supreme Court also took note of the usual argument raised by the State in such type of cases, that question of possession is a disputed question of fact. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that having regard to the material on record if the case of the State Government has been falsified, then such material can be considered by the Court. It has been held that where the Court is satisfied that the facts are disputed by the State only to create a ground for Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 38 rejection of writ petition, then the writ court is competent to reject such contention and investigate the disputed facts and records its findings, if there is sufficient material available before the Court. It has been held that there is no rigid proposition that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India disputed questions of fact cannot at all the looked into by the Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held as under:-
"48. Normally, the disputed questions of fact are not investigated or adjudicated by a writ court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But the mere existence of the disputed question of fact, by itself, does not take away the jurisdiction of this writ court in granting appropriate relief to the petitioner. In a case where the Court is satisfied, like the one on hand, that the facts are disputed by the State merely to create a ground for the rejection of the writ petition on the ground of disputed questions of fact, it is the duty of the writ court to reject such contention and to investigate the disputed facts and record its finding if the particular facts of the case, like the one at hand, was required in the interest of justice.
49. There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to indicate that the High Court in the proceedings, like the one on hand, is debarred from holding such an inquiry. The proposition that a petition under Article 226 must be rejected simply on the ground that it cannot be decided without determining the disputed question of fact is not warranted by any provisions of law nor by any decision of this Court. A rigid application of such proposition or to treat such proposition as an inflexible rule of law or of discretion will necessarily make the provisions of Article 226 wholly illusory and ineffective more particularly Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976 respectively. Obviously, the High Court must avoid such consequences.
53. Thus, it would all depend on the nature of the question of fact. In other words, what is exactly, that the writ court needs to determine so as to arrive at the right decision. If the only issue, that revolves around the entire debate is one relating to actual taking over of the physical possession of the excess land under the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 respectively, then in such circumstances, the writ court has no other option but to go into the factual aspects and take an appropriate decision in that regard. The issue of possession, by itself, will not become a disputed question of fact. If all that has been said by the State is to be accepted as a gospel truth Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 39 and nothing shown by the landowner is to be looked into on the ground that a writ court cannot go into disputed questions of fact, then the same may lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.
54. We are of the considered opinion that the issue as regards taking over of the actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 could be said to be a mixed question of law and fact and not just a question of fact. Mixed question of law and fact refers to a question which depends on both law and fact for its solution. In resolving a mixed question of law and fact, a reviewing court must adjudicate the facts of the case and decide relevant legal issues at the same time. Mixed questions of law and fact are defined "as questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is resolved and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated". [Bausch & Lomb v. United States C.I.T. 166, 169 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997]
56. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the Division Bench of the High Court committed an egregious error in interfering with a very well considered and well-reasoned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. There was no good reason for the Division Bench to interfere with the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge.
57. In the result, both the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is hereby set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is affirmed and restored."
44. In view of the above, once it is duly established that there has been no compliance of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Ceiling Act inasmuch as the notices under Section 10(5) were either not issued or if issued, were not served or were issued in the name of some other person, who was not the land owner like in W.A. No.289/2024 and further more the possession receipts are not available in all the cases and wherever they are available, then they speak about ex-parte possession, then there is nothing in these matters, which disentitles the writ petitioners from benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act in the light of judgment of the Hon'ble Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 40 Supreme Court in the case of Hariram (supra) and A.P. Electrical Equipment (supra).
45. In W.A. No.1333/2019 some distinguishing factors are there, which need to be separately dealt with. In the said case, the order under Section 10(5) was admittedly issued and served upon the son of the land owner, though the land owner has denied such service. However, it is undisputed that the order under Section 10(5) was issued by the Tahsildar, though the notified Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act was Additional Collector as per notification dated 05.10.1976, which reads as under:-
"Notification No.4720-VIII-76, dated the 5th October 1976 - In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of Section 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (No.33 of 1976), the State Government hereby authorizes the officers mentioned in column (2) of the Table below to perform the functions of the Competent Authority under the said Act for the urban agglomerations specified in the corresponding entries in column (3) of the said Table:-
Table S.No. Officers Urban Agglomerations (1) (2) (3) 1 Collector, Bhopal ... Bhopal Urban Agglomeration 2 Additional Collector, Gwalior ...
Gwalior Urban Agglomeration 3 Collector, Ujjain ...
Ujjain Urban Agglomeration 4 Additional Collector, Indore ...
Indore Urban Agglomeration 5 Additional Collector, Jabalpur ...
Jabalpur Urban Agglomeration 6 Collector, Durg ...
Durg-Bhilainagar Urban Agglomeration 7 Additional Collector, Raipur ... Raipur Urban Agglomeration.
[Published in M.P. Rajpatra (Asadharan) dated 05.10.1976 page 2992.]"
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 4146. The aforesaid fact was not disputed by the State that order under Section 10(5) has not been issued by the notified Competent Authority, but it was countered on the ground of an order dated 12.02.1979 issued by the State Government, whereby Tahsildar Nazul was authorized and the order under Section 10(5) in the present case is admittedly signed by Tahsildar Nazul. The order dated 12.02.1979 is as under:-
**e/;izns'k 'kklu Hkwifjeki ,oa cUnkscLr foHkkx dzekad 1054@1921@u0ew0lh078 Hkksiky fnukad 12 Qjojh] 79 vkns'k jkT; 'kklu us fu.kZ; fy;k gS fd uxj Hkwfe lhek (lhek) ,oa fofu;eu vf/kfu;e 1976 dh /kkjk 10(5) ds vUrxZr l{ke vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk 'kklu esa vftZr ,oa oSf"Br Hkwfe dk vkf/kiR; 'kklu dh vksj ls ysus gsrq oLrh lewgksa esa inLFk rglhynkj (utwy) dks izkf/kd`r fd;k tk;s A rnuqlkj e0iz0 ds lkrksa uxj cLr lewgksa (bUnkSj] mTtSu] Hkksiky] tcyiqj] jk;iqj ,oa nqxZ) esa inLFk rglhynkj (utwy) dks mijksDrkuqlkj vftZr Hkwfe dks 'kklu dh vksj ls vkf/kiR;
esa ysus gsrq vf/kd`r fd;k tkrk gS A e0iz0 ds jkT;iky ds uke ls rFkk vkns'kkuqlkjA**
47. The expression Competent Authority is defined under Section 2(d) of the Ceiling Act as under:-
"2(d) "Competent Authority" means any person or authority authorised by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to perform the functions of the Competent Authority under this Act for such area as may be specified in the notification and different persons or authorities may be authorised to perform different functions;"
48. The Notification dated 05.10.1976 is a notification under Section 2(d) under which Additional Collector has been notified as Competent Authority. Further as per Section 10(5) the order has to be issued by the Competent Authority and none else. If Section 10(5) is minutely read, then it is evident that the Competent Authority has to issue a notice in writing under this provision to deliver the possession of the land to the State Government or to the person authorized by the State Government. The subsequent order of the State Government dated Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 19-05-2025 17:24:11 42 12.02.1979 authorizes the Tahsildar (Nazul) to receive possession in pursuance of order under Section 10(5). Thus, by a conjoint reading of Notification dated 05.10.1976 and the order dated 12.02.1979, it is evident that it will be the Competent Authority, who will issue notice/order under Section 10(5) and only thereupon the Tahsildar Nazul would be authorized to take over the possession of the land. However, in the present case, undisputedly the notice/order under Section 10(5) had also been signed by the Tahsildar Nazul, which cannot be said to be a notice/order issued under authority of law. Therefore, in our considered opinion the leaned Single Judge has correctly discarded the said notice under Section 10(5) as having been issued by an incompetent Authority i.e. the Tahsildar Nazul and rightly allowed the writ petition.
49. In view of the aforesaid, Writ Appeal No.1023/2006 filed by the land owner is allowed. All other writ appeals have been filed by the State, and the same are dismissed by affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge. It is held that the writ petitioners are entitled to benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and the vesting orders issued under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act are hit by Section 3 of the Repeal Act.
50. Let the revenue record be corrected accordingly within a period of two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order.
51. In the above terms, the Writ Appeals are disposed off.
(SURESH KUMAR KAIT) (VIVEK JAIN)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
Veni/RS/rj
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH
Signing time: 19-05-2025
17:24:11