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[Cites 46, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Hira Prasad Mishra vs Karan Singh Solanki on 13 March, 2026

IN THE COURT OF MS. SHEFALI BARNALA TANDON,
 ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE-06, NEW DELHI DISTRICT,
       PATIALA HOUSE COURT, NEW DELHI

                                    Criminal Revision No: 765/2025
                                    CNR No. DLWT01-011585/2025



In the matter of :
Hira Prasad Mishra
S/o Late Sh. Jai Narian Mishra
R/o RZ-V-3/189, Mahavir Enclave,
Gurudwara Road,
New Delhi-110045.                                ..... Revisionist

                             VERSUS
Col. (Retd.) Karan Singh Solanki
S/o Late Sh. Bharat Singh
R/o Village Nasirpur, BPO Palam,
New Delhi-110045.                                ..... Respondent

                               AND

                                    Criminal Revision No: 766/2025
                                    CNR No. DLWT01-011586/2025



In the matter of :
Mahabal Mishra
S/o Late Sh. Jai Narian Mishra
R/o House No. 86, Gali No. 2,
Vaishali Dabri, Palam Dabri Road,
New Delhi.                                       ..... Revisionist



                                                             Page 1 of 40
                              VERSUS



Col. (Retd.) Karan Singh Solanki
S/o Late Sh. Bharat Singh
R/o Village Nasirpur, BPO Palam,
New Delhi-110045.
                                                   ..... Respondent


                               AND


                                    Criminal Revision No: 113/2025
                                    CNR No. DLWT01-001172/2025




In the matter of :
Mahabal Mishra
S/o Late Sh. Jai Narian Mishra
R/o House No. 86, Gali No. 2,
Vaishali Dabri, Palam Dabri Road,
New Delhi.                                         ..... Revisionist

                             VERSUS

Col. (Retd.) Karan Singh Solanki
S/o Late Sh. Bharat Singh
R/o Village Nasirpur, BPO Palam,
New Delhi-110045.                                  ..... Respondent

                               AND


                                                           Page 2 of 40
                                    Criminal Revision No: 114/2025
                                   CNR No. DLWT01-001170/2025



In the matter of :

Hira Prasad Mishra
S/o Late Sh. Jai Narian Mishra
R/o RZ-V-3/189, Mahavir Enclave,
Gurudwara Road,
New Delhi-110045.
                                                     ..... Revisionist
                             VERSUS

Col. (Retd.) Karan Singh Solanki
S/o Late Sh. Bharat Singh
R/o Village Nasirpur, BPO Palam,
New Delhi-110045.
                                                    ..... Respondent

Date of Institution                : 28.02.2025

Date of reserving order            : 21.02.2026

Date of pronouncement              : 13.03.2026


                           ORDER

1. The present revision petitions have been preferred by the revisionist under Section 438 of BNSS/397 Cr. PC against the order dated 22.11.2024 and 10.10.2025 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Impugned Orders') passed by Ld. JMFC-01, Patiala House Court, New Delhi (herein after referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court') in Cr.

Page 3 of 40

Case No. 30875/2016 titled as Col. (Retd.) Karan Singh Solanki Vs. Mahabal Mishra & Ors. whereby charge under Section 506/465/471 IPC was directed and framed against the accused persons/revisionist herein.

2. Since, all the revision petition are connected and assail the same impugned order, the Court vide this common order decides all the aforesaid revision petitions together.

Brief facts

3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the present revision petition are that complainant/respondent No. 2 herein filed a complaint under Section 200 Cr. PC for taking cognizance of the offence under Section 420/468/471/120-B/448/451/506 IPC against the accused persons including the present revisionist stating that he along with brother and legal heirs are the owners and in possession of land admeasuring 5 Bigha and 4 Biswas comprised in Khasra No. 5/2, Village Nasirpur, New Delhi. In the year 1984, DDA acquired a land in Village-Nasirpur and its contiguous areas for the development of proposed sub-city of Dwarka. He alleged that the accused persons had an evil eye on the said land and in the year 1999-2000, the accused No. 1, who was an MLA and member of DDA, approached him and his other family members with an offer to purchase the un-acquired land to which they agreed to sell the said land to accused No. 2/Revisionist herein, who is real brother accused no. 1.

3.1 He further alleged that in the year, 2004-05, the present revisionist and his brother/co-accused persuaded him and his family Page 4 of 40 members to execute some documents of the land with the present revisionist and a cheque amounting to Rs.90 Lakhs was issued by present revisionist which was dishonoured and which resulted into cancellation of documents signed by the complainant and his other family members and the land in question was never registered in favour of present revisionist. He further alleged that on 02.05.2006, the Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of land in question, which was followed by another notification dated 05.02.2007. The complainant and his family members received notices under Section 9 & 10 of the Land Acquisition Act on 26.02.2007. Finally, an Award was made on 30.06.2008 and at that time revisionist/accused and his brother/co- accused started terrorizing him and his family members. Revisionist fraudulently obtained signatures of the complainant and his family members on certain un-registered documents despite the passing of the aforesaid Award dated 30.06.2008. The DDA took over the possession of the said land on 13.04.2009. He further alleged that revisionist and his brother/co-accused due to clout succeeded in de- notification of land of the complainant as co-accused/brother of the revisionist forged the signatures of the complainant and other persons. He further alleged that alleged Sanjeev Mittal at the behest of other accused persons mislead Hon'ble LG of Delhi, who passed the order on misleading notes/information given by him. The complainant was also threatened for which they approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for seeking protection.

Page 5 of 40

3.2 After pre-summoning evidence, the revisionist was summoned and after pre- charge evidence, the charge was ordered to be framed against revisionist U/s 465/471/506 IPC. Against the said order on charge, the present revision has been filed.

Arguments addressed by revisionists

4. Assailing the impugned orders, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist submitted that the impugned orders are bad in law and passed without appreciating the provisions of law and the facts of the case; that the Ld. Trial Court passed a cryptic order which lacks material particulars which could justify the impugned order; that Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that there is a civil dispute between the complainant and revisionists over a piece of land; that Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that as per the case of the complainant/respondent herein, the complainant and other land owners accepted and executed certain documents in favour of revisionist/Hira Prasad Mishra towards purchase of the land and the revisionist had issued one cheque of Rs.90 Lakh which was dishonoured; that Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the said civil dispute has been given colors of criminality; that no prima facie case is made out against the revisionist for the offences under Section 465/471 IPC as the alleged forged documents are mere photocopies, hence, the same cannot be base for framing of charge of forgery; that Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that there is no complaint against the revisionists by other two landowners except the complainant, who is an interested party; that Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that there is bald allegation of threat Page 6 of 40 being extended to the complainant; that the agreement to sell was entered by the respondent with the revisionist in February, 2006; that complaint was filed with considerable unexplained delay of fourteen years, hence, the said offences are time barred; that the revisionists deserves to be discharged in the present matter as the charge cannot be framed on vague and bald allegations without any prima facie evidence against him.

4.1 To buttress his arguments, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist has placed reliance upon following judgments:

a. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2025 INSC 1096 (Dated 10.09.2025), has held that:
18. We are unable to accept her submission on this score too.

There is nothing on record to show the appellant had manufactured the alleged fake document which is a sine qua non to attract Section 465 IPC. In fact, the original fabricated document had not been recovered.

19. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj & Anr.; (2018) 7 SCC 581, this Court held to attract Section 464 IPC, the prosecution must establish that the accused had made the fake document. No material connecting the appellant to the making of the fake document has been adduced in the impugned charge sheet."

b. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Crl. Appeal No. 359- 360/2010 titled as Sheila Sebastian Vs. R. Jawaharaj & Anr. Etc. reported in AIR 2018 SC 2434, has held that:

"25. Keeping in view the strict interpretation of penal statute i.e., referring to rule of interpretation wherein natural inferences are Page 7 of 40 preferred, we observe that a charge of forgery cannot be imposed on a person who is not the maker of the same. As held in plethora of cases, making of a document is different than causing it to be made. As Explanation 2 to Section 464 further clarifies that, for constituting an offence under Section 464 it is imperative that a false document is made and the accused person is the maker of the same, otherwise the accused person is not liable for the offence of forgery."

c. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Crl. Appeal No. 472/2021 titled as Sanjay Kumar Rai Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in AIR 2021 Supreme Court 2351, has observed that:

"16. Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. [Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal; 5 (1979) 3 SCC 4]. Likewise, the Court has sufficient discretion to order further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be.
d. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Dilawar Babu Kurane Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2002) 2 SCC 135 , has observed that "12.......In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the Page 8 of 40 said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial [See Union of India versus Prafulla Kumar Samal & Another (1979 3 SCC 5)]."

e. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in 1979 3 SCC 5, has observed that :

"8. The scope of section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh; [1978]1 S.C.R. 287 where Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:-
"Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has Page 9 of 40 committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor pro poses to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebut ted by the defence evidence; if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial".

This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out.

9. In the case of K. P. Raghvan and Anr. Vs. M.H. Abbas and Anr. reported in [1969] 2 S.C.R. 520 this Court observed as follows:-

"No doubt a Magistrate enquiring into a case under S. 209, Cr. P.C. is not to act as a mere Post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session".
Page 10 of 40

To the same effect is the later decision of this Court in the case of Almohan Das and ors. v. State of West Bengal where Shah, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:-

"A Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment; and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit; it is the duty to discharge the accused: if there is some evidence on which a conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case".

In the aforesaid case this Court was considering the scope and ambit of section 209 of the Code of 1898.

10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:

(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out:
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be, fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied Page 11 of 40 that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on.

This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. "

Arguments addressed on behalf of respondent/Complainant
5. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for the respondent supporting the Impugned Order argued that there is no infirmity and illegality done by the Ld. Trial Court and has rightly passed the order on charge and framed charges accordingly against the revisionist/accused under the relevant sections, hence, no interference of this Court is required. The grounds taken by the revisionist are to be decided during trial and cannot be decided by this Court at this stage.
5.1 During the course of arguments, reliance was placed upon page 32 and 34 of the Trial Court Record, which is Ex.CW3/A (Colly.) as well as Page 62 which is request letter dated 30.09.2009 written by respondent along with co-owners of the land to the Secretary (Land), Government of NCT Delhi for de-notification of the Agricultural Land in question and argued that first accused No. 1/brother of the Page 12 of 40 revisionist got the land notified to create pressure upon the respondent and thereafter, himself got de-notified the land. 5.2 To substantiate his arguments, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist has placed reliance upon following judgments:
a. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as Kallu Mal Gupta Vs. State reported in (2000) 1 AD (Delhi) 107, has held that :
4. ....... In State of Maharashtra and others Vs. Som Nath Thapa and others , it was held that "if on the basis of materials on record a Court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a provable consequence, a case of framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Courts were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame a charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage". In Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia Vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau JT 1999 (5) 394, it was held that "it is well settled that at the stage of framing charge, the Court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. If on the basis of materials on record, the Court could come to the conclusion that the accused would have committed the offence, the Court is obliged to frame the charge and proceed to the trial".
Page 13 of 40
5. A conspectus of the above decisions makes it evident that while deciding the question of framing of charge in a criminal case, the Court is not to apply exactly the standard and test which it finally applies for determining the guilt or otherwise.

This being the initial stage of the trial, the Court is not supposed to decide whether the materials collected by the investigating agency provide sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to culminate in his conviction. What is required to be seen is whether there is strong suspicion which may lead to the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. In the case of State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, it was held that at the stage of framing charges, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the complainant produces or proposes to adduce at the trial is not to be meticulously judged. The standard of proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing charge."

b. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Akbar Hussain Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. reported in AIR (2018) SC 4314, wherein it has been held that :

"6. ..... At the time of framing the charge, the trial court has to consider the material before it by the Investigating Officer and formed a prima facie opinion thereupon as to whether it is a fit case for framing of charge under a particular provision. The standard of proof test, which is to be applied at Page 14 of 40 the final stage, in order to find out as to whether the accused is guilty or not on the basis of actual evidence produced is not to be applied at the stage of framing of the charge. Charge can be framed even when there is a strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Court, which leads the court to form a presumptive opinon as to existence of the factual ingredient constituting the offence alleged."

c. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as R. S. Nair Vs. A R Antulay & Anr. reported in (1986) 2 SCC 716, it has been held that :

""When the Court is called upon to consider whether a charge should be framed or not the question to which the Court has to address itself is whether the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution is such that, if unrebutted, it would justify the conviction of the accused and the court has, therefore, to examine the evidence as it stands without rebuttal and come to a conclusion whether on the basis of such evidence the court would convict the accused and where the offence charged against the accused is under S. 161 or S. 165 or Cl.
(a) or clause (b) or Sub-S. (1) or S.5, the court must necessarily apply the presumption under S.4 while considering whether on the basis of the unrebutted evidence which is before it the court would convict the accused.

Therefore, even for the purpose of considering whether a charge should be framed or not the presumption under S. 4 must be taken into account.

Page 15 of 40

d. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Crl. Appeal No. 1452- 1453 of 2022 titled as State through Dy. Superintedent of Police Vs. R. Soundirarasu etc. (Dated 05.09.2022), has held that :

"53. The aforestated Sections indicate that the CrPC contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Sessions under Section 227 in a case triable by it, cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three Sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. As per Section 227, the trial judge is required to discharge the accused if "the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when "the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless". The power to discharge under Section 245(1) is exercisable when "the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction.......
54. Despite the slight variation in the provisions with regard to discharge under the three pairs of Sections referred to above, the settled legal position is that the stage of framing of charge under either of these three situations, is a preliminary one and the test of "prima facie" case has to be applied -- if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.
Xxxxx Page 16 of 40
65. Thus the word 'groundless', as interpreted by this Court, means that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.
Xxxxx
69. The real test for determining whether the charge should be considered groundless under Section 239 of the CrPC is that whether the materials are such that even if unrebutted make out no case whatsoever, the accused should be discharged under Section 239 of the CrPC. The trial court will have to consider, whether the materials relied upon by the prosecution against the applicant herein for the purpose of framing of the charge, if unrebutted, make out any case at all. Xxxxx
72. The ambit and scope of exercise of power under Sections 239 and 240 of the CrPC, are therefore fairly well settled. The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be "groundless". The Section mandates that the Magistrate shall discharge the accused recording reasons, if after (i) considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173, (ii) examining the accused, if necessary, and (iii) giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, he considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, i.e., either there is no legal evidence or that the facts are such that no offence is made out at all. No detailed evaluation of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden Page 17 of 40 scales is to be undertaken at this stage - the only consideration at the stage of Section 239/240 is as to whether the allegation/charge is groundless.
73. This would not be the stage for weighing the pros and cons of all the implications of the materials, nor for sifting the materials placed by the prosecution- the exercise at this stage is to be confined to considering the police report and the documents to decide whether the allegations against the accused can be said to be "groundless".

e. Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in case titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. State of UP & Ors. reported in 2016:AHC:203032, has held that :

".....Sub-section (1) of Section 245 empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, if he considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction. Sub-section (2) of Section 245 empowers the Magistrate to discharge an accused even " at any previous stage" if for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate the charges are considered to be " groundless". In cases where the accused is not discharged, the Magistrate is required to follow the procedure under Section 246 of the Code.
Section 244 to 246 leave no manner of doubt that once the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate the prosecution has to be heard and all such evidence as is brought in support of its case recorded. The power to Page 18 of 40 discharge is also under Section 245 (1) exercisable only upon taking all of the evidence that is referred to in Section 244, so also the power to frame charges in terms of Section 246 has to be exercised on the basis of the evidence recorded under Section 244."

Relevant law on the point

6. The Court heard the arguments as advanced by revisionist, Ld. Addl. PP for the State and Ld. Counsel for the respondent No. 2/complainant and have gone through the material available on record including the Trial Court Record.

7. Section 250 and 251 of BNSS (Earlier Section 227 and 228 Cr. PC) empowers a Judge to frame charge or discharge accused for the offence. Before proceedings further, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce both sections, which reads as under:

"250. Discharge.
If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."

251. Framing of charge.

(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which--

(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial Magistrate of the Page 19 of 40 first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused within a period of sixty days from the date of first hearing on charge.

(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub- section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused present either physically or through audio-video electronic means and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried."

8. Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368, has laid down the principles on the scope of Section 227 and 228 of Cr.P.C., which read as under:

"21. On consideration of the authorities about scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C.

has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which Page 20 of 40 has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged Page 21 of 40 offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."

Impugned order

9. After analysing the material available on record, Ld. Trial Court vide impugned order dated 22.11.2024 while directing the framing of charge against the revisionist, has observed that :

"8. In the present case, the allegation regarding criminal intimidation is not supported by material facts in a meticulous sense. The details are not mentioned in a comprehensive manner. However, it is categorically mentioned and admitted that after receiving threats from the accused persons, the complainant preferred a Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 987/2011 before the Hon'ble High Court and police protection was directed for the complainant and his family. The said order forms part of the record. The validity of the documents allegedly executed by the complainant under coercion and intimidation has also been challenged in the civil suit pending between the parties. Thus, the nature of criminal intimidation is duly explicated by the complainant in the Page 22 of 40 pre-charge evidence and consequent grant of protection by the Hon'ble High Court itself lends credibility to the allegations of the complainant. At the stage of charge, the existence of grave suspicion is enough to proceed to trial and the burden is not to prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt.
9. Coming to the allegation of forgery, the documents allegedly forged form part of the record and the complainant has denied the execution thereof in unequivocal terms. Moreover, the said documents form part of the public record as they were submitted for de- notification of the subject land by the accused persons along with a letter head of accused no. 1 wherein the complainants have been termed as needy farmers and a case for de-notification has been set up. There is a clear assertion that the said documents were fabricated by the accused persons and were never executed by the complainant or his family members. The said letter head raises a link of causation between the accused no. 1 and the alleged offence and he could not be kept out of the purview of the present case, the stakes, interests and efforts of both the accused persons are intricately linked. Interestingly, there are various other documents on record which were executed by the parties involved in the case and thus, this Court may be in a position to compare the questioned and admitted signatures and writings during the appreciation of evidence. Thus, the material on record could not be termed as groundless and the overall circumstances raise a grave suspicion against the accused persons, thereby making it a fit case for trial. Furthermore, all the CWs have deposed invariably in the same direction Page 23 of 40 and have remained largely unrebutted during pre-charge evidence. Pertinently, the cross examination has not revealed anything which could render the complainant's case as groundless."

Court's Observation

10. In the backdrop of the above, it has to be now seen as to whether a, prima facie, is made out against the accused/revisionist herein for framing of charge against him for commission of the offence under Section 465/471/506/34 IPC.

11. Firstly, dealing with the aspect of forgery alleged to have been committed by the revisionist. Section 463 IPC defines 'Forgery' stating that whoever makes any false document with intent to cause damage or injury to any person or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract commits forgery. Section 464 IPC defines what is making a false document. Section 465 IPC provides 'punishment for forgery'. Section 471 IPC provides punishment for using as genuine a forged document.

12. For better understanding of offence of forgery, this Court deems it appropriate to refer judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bilar and Anr.. reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751, wherein it has been held that :

"13. The condition precedent for an offence under Sections 467 and 471 is forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). This case does Page 24 of 40 not relate to any false electronic record. Therefore, the question is whether the first accused, in executing and registering the two sale deeds purporting to sell a property (even if it is assumed that it did not belong to him), can be said to have made and executed false documents, in collusion with the other accused.

14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories:

1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed.
2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person.
3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration.

In short, a person is said to have made a "false document", if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses."

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13. Reverting to the present case, in order to substantiate the allegations leveled against the accused persons/ revisionist, the complainant examined himself as CW-1 and deposed that he is a retired Army Officer from the Indian Army. He, his brother, cousin and nephews are the owner of their ancestral property i.e. land situated at Khasra No. 5/2, Village Nasirpur, Delhi. He further deposed that Sh. Mahabal Mishra has been the MLAs three times and member of DDA, MP from West Delhi also whereas Sh. Hira Prasad Mishra is the real brother of Sh. Mahabal Mishra. He further deposed that in the year 1999-2000, Mr. Mahabal Mishra/ accused no.1 approached them to buy their land which they declined and did not accede to his request. Thereafter, they were threatened that if this land was not sold to him at the price determined by him, he will get this land acquired. When accused No.1 was the member of the DDA, he started raising the point of acquisition of the said land in DDA meetings out of agenda points. There was a meeting held in the Raj Niwas Marg where amongst other points, accused No.1 raised the issues of acquisition of Nasirpur land and he pointed out that the land in question has already been shown to the Engineer members and Vice Chairman of the DDA and it should be acquired at the earliest.

13.1 He further deposed that Hira Prasad Mishra/accused No.2 with the instructions of accused No.1 got some papers signed from them which were unregistered in February, 2006. He further deposed that the cheque in question in respect of these papers, the land owners were dishonoured. They (CW-1 himself along with co-owners) had Page 26 of 40 obtained NOC for registration of the said land from LAC/ADM, Southwest in May, 2006. The copy of NOC is marked as Mark 'D'. As the cheques were dishonoured, registry could not be executed. He further deposed that notice for acquisition of the said land under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act were issued on 5th February, 2006 and thereafter, notice under Section 6 was issued on 2nd May, 2006 and under Section 9 & 10 was issued in the year 2006. The award of the said land was announced on 30th June, 2008 as award No. 1/2008- 2009. (Vol.) He further deposed that in the year of 2008, accused No. 2 again approached them to get some papers signed so that he can get a better deal as his brother accused No.1 is in commanding position to get the things done and he can process the things better. He further deposed that in the month of March, 2009, Accused No. 2 with the connivance of Accused No.1 started constructions of boundary wall and a room on the said land. He further deposed that some anonymous letters were written by some unknown person stating that Government Land was being grabbed. Thereafter, Deputy Commissioner and SDM got active and they got demolished the constructions area and got this land handed over to DDA on 13.04.2009.

13.2 He further deposed that on 26.03.2009, applications with his forged signatures and of Late Sh. Jagat Singh and Sh. Satbir Singh were submitted under the covering letter of accused No.1/Mr.Mahabal Mishra on the official letter head to Hon'ble LG, Delhi, Divisional Commissioner, Revenue, Secretary, Land, DDA. There are other forged applications dated 30.09.2009. On 26.09.2009, two forged Page 27 of 40 applications were addressed to the Divisional Commissioner and ADM and on 15.02.2010 & 15.04.2010, two forged applications were addressed to the ADM. He further deposed that the forged applications were forwarded under the letterhead of accused No.1 dated 26.03.2008 purported to be signed on 26.03.2008 forwarding letter was also for the same date and handed over to LG, Delhi on the same date and the LG, Delhi has put his remarks on the same date "put up for my consideration". Thereafter, the application was forwarded to DDA, Land & Building department, Vikas Bhawan for their comments. The De-notification Committee views were obtained and the DDA said 'No' to the De-notification of the said land. Then, the comments of Law and Legal were also obtained by the DDA which they also said 'No' to De-notification. A clarification was also sought from DDA as possession of the land was taken over in documents but physical possession was not taken over. The OSD to the Hon'ble LG, Delhi obtained the file from DDA and put up the extracts of the file to LG, Delhi for De-notification. The Hon'ble LG, Delhi was misled by the extracts put up by the OSD and he signed for De-notification on 30.12.2010. The Gazette Notification for De-notification of above land was issued on 18.01.2011.

13.3 He further deposed that he along with other land owners got threat of their lives and therefore, a criminal case W.P.(Crl)987/2011 was filed in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi against Accused No.1 &

2. Thereafter, he was granted police protection by PS Sagarpur. Thereafter, both accused persons filed affidavits in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that they had not given any threat and will not give any Page 28 of 40 threat in future. Hence, the case was withdrawn on 18.12.2012. He further deposed that in August, 2011, they approached Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for quashing the documents executed in February, 2006 & September, 2008 and the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi granted status quo order in respect of title and possession of the said land. He further deposed that accused No.1 filed the Defamation case against him and his son, MLA Sh. Praduman Rajput and Sh. Jagdish Mukhi, presently Hon'ble Governor of Assam. Accused No.1 has compromised with Sh. Praduman Rajput and Sh.Jagdish Mukhi, Hon'ble Governor of Assam. The case continued against him and his son and they were discharged by the court.

14. During cross examination, CW-1 admitted that he filed a Civil Suit No. 1972/11 against the accused persons before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and the same is now pending before Dwarka Courts. He further admitted that on 15.02.2006 and on 16.02.2006, he and other land owners of the land in question executed sale documents in favour of accused no. 2 Hira Prasad Mishra, however, denied that they executed the said documents after receiving the due consideration. He stated that they have not received the full consideration amount . He further admitted that sale documents are Ex.CW1/D2 (colly, 39 pages) and after execution of the said documents for transferring the title in favour of accused No. 2 herein, he alongwith others also applied for NOC as required under Section 8 of Delhi Land Act, 1972.

14.1 He also admitted that they officially objected against the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and they also executed general power of attorney giving the entire details Page 29 of 40 of the said acquisition process leading upto award dated 30.06.2008 and empower accused No. 2 to take such appropriate steps regarding the said acquisition process, which is Ex.CW1/D3. They did not file any criminal complaint or civil suit against accused persons from the year 2006 till 19.06.2011. (Vol.) The land was in their possession and the full consideration was not received, so they did not file any criminal complaint or civil suit. He further admitted that on 19.12.2011, accused No. 1 Mahabal Mishra filed a Defamation case bearing CC No. 35/1/2011 against him and his son and the present complaint was filed on 19.02.2013.

15. Sh. Narayan Singh was examined as CW-2 and deposed that he is owner of land bearing Khasra No. 5/2. Village Nasir Pur, Delhi and accused No. 1 called him and demanded that he should transfer the aforesaid land to him at throw away price. Accused No. 1 also threatened him that if he will not sell the land to him then he would get the land acquired as he was at that time a Member of the Delhi Development Authority. He refused to sell the land to him and thereafter, he got surveyed his aforesaid land with the assistance of Engineer, Land & Building Department, DDA and raised the issue in the meeting held at Raj Niwas with officials of DDA wherein accused No. 1 requested for acquisition of aforesaid land and other unacquired land. Thereafter, accused No. I got the Notification under Sections 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act issued and an Award was also passed. He further deposed that in the meantime, accused No. 2 contacted them and entered into agreement for purchase of the aforesaid land against the sale consideration and accused No. 2 issued two cheques Page 30 of 40 of Rs.8 Lacs each, which were bounced on presentation. He further deposed after entering into the said agreement, he obtained NOC from the Office of SDM for sale of the land in favour of accused No. 2. Since, the aforesaid two cheques got bounced, he did not execute the registered sale deed in favour of accused No. 2 . Thereafter, accused No. 2 instituted a case in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for specific performance of the agreement. He also filed a counter suit in the Court for cancellation of the documents executed in favour of accused No. 2 as the consideration had failed. Both the cases are now pending in the Courts at Dwarka after transfer from the Hon'ble Delhi High Court.

15.1 During cross examination, witness admitted that he executed agreement to sell Ex. CW-1/D-2 in favour of accused No. 2 on 15.02.2006, signed the receipt Ex. CW-1/D-2, issued possession letter Ex. CW-1/D-2, executed a Will (Ex.CW-1/D-2) and GPA (Ex.CW-1/D-2) in favour of accused No. 2. He further admitted that it is not mentioned in the payment of receipt regarding issuance of any cheque (Ex. CW-1/D-2).

15.2 During further cross-examination, CW-2 denied the suggestion that the consideration amount was paid to him in cash or that no cheque was issued as stated by him. He admitted that he has not given any complaint to the Police. (Vol. He is not the accused so why should he had given the complaint to the police). He also admitted that no evidence has been led in the civil case and neither of the accused had ever threatened him and he executed one GPA in favour of accused Heera Prasad for taking compensation.

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16. Sh. Deepak, Kanoongo, DDA, Vikas Sadan, INA was examined as CW-3, who brought the file No. F-14(130)(69 CRC DDA titled as Acquisition of Land of Village Nasirpur including noting dated 01.03.2000 and letter dated 20.06.2002 written by Sh. U. S. Jolly, Commissioner (Land Management) DDA to Sh. Prakash Kumar, Secretary, Land and Building), Govt. of NCT of Delhi and proved the same as Ex.CW3/A (Colly.)(OSR).

17. Sh. Ashish, Patwari, Land and Building Department, Vikas Bhawan, Govt. of NCT Delhi, was examined as CW-4 and proved notification dated 18.01.2011 as ExCW4/A.

18. Sh. Koshal Kumar Satija, Section Officer, LG Office, Raj Niwas Marg, Delhi examined as CW-5 and deposed that the records. i.e. minutes of meeting dated 02.05.2006, 05.02.2007 and 26.02.2007 for proposed acquisition award dated 30.06.2008 and denotification of the land in question belonging to the complainant and his family members, are not pertaining to the LG Office Record.

19. In nutshell, the case putforth by the complainant in pre-charge evidence, is that since, year 1999-2000, the revisionist and his brother/co-accused wanted to purchase land in question on throwaway prices and in order to pressurize them, initiated the acquisition of the said land by DDA. In the meanwhile, the present revisionist/accused No. 2 got executed some papers relating to the land from them in February, 2006 and they applied for NOC for registration of the said land from LAC/ADM in May, 2006. However, the cheque given towards the consideration for the said land was got dishonoured. Hence, the documents could not be registered. On 26.03.2009, Page 32 of 40 applications with forged signature of himself and other co-owner namely Late Sh. Jagat Singh and Sh.Satbir Singh was submitted by accused No. 1 to Hon'ble LG for de-notification of the said land from DDA.

20. Hence, the complainant has tried to prove that the revisionist along with his brother/accused No. 1 in order to grab their land at throwaway price, first initiated the acquisition by DDA being in power position and thereafter got executed property documents from them which could not be registered for want of consideration amount and thereafter, got the land de-notified on the basis of forged application.

21. However, during his cross examination, CW-1/Complainant admitted to have executed sale documents in favour of revisionist on 15.02.2006 and 16.02.2006 which are proved as Ex.CW1/D2 and also admitted that to apply NOC for transferring the title in favour of the revisionist as per Section 8 of Delhi Land Act, 1972, but the same could not be registered as the cheque towards the consideration was dishonoured. He also deposed that since the land was in their possession and full consideration was not received, no civil or criminal case was filed. But, he along with co-owners executed GPA in favour of revisionist for accepting award in view of execution on 30.06.2008.

22. Even, CW-2 deposed that the revisionist contacted them and entered into an agreement for purchase of land in question against sale consideration but two cheques of Rs.8 Lac each were dishonoured on presentation and therefore, he did not execute the registered sale deed in favour of the revisionist. He even stated to have filed a counter suit Page 33 of 40 for cancellation of documents executed in favour of revisionist/ accused No.2 since the consideration has been failed, to the suit preferred by the revisionist in Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for Specific Performance. Even admitted in his cross examination to have executed Agreement to Sell, Receipt, Possession Letter, Will and GPA in favour of the revisionist/accused No. 2 proved as Ex.CW1/D2 (Colly.). Even, he deposed that the revisionist/accused No. 2 did not know about acquisition of land.

23. Accordingly, CW-1 and CW-2 have nowhere stated during his examination in chief or cross examination that they were pressurized to sign/execute the sale documents in favour of the revisionist. They have also not deposed that the sale documents could not be registered for any other reason or due to their reluctance but only for want of receipt of full consideration. However, despite the consideration not fully received by them, they preferred to execute GPA in favour of revisionist/accused No. 2 for receiving the award for acquisition of the land after two years of execution of sale documents, and the revisionists were stated to be not even aware of the acquisition of land in question. These admissions do not point towards their unwillingness or coercion or any intimidation for sale of the land in question to the revisionist.

24. Now coming to the allegations of forging the signatures of the complainant and other co-owners on the applications for de- notification of the land by accused No. 1.

25. The first application dated 06.12.2007 wherein signatures are alleged to have been forged by accused No. 1 is addressed to Hon'ble Page 34 of 40 LG being signed by Sh. Jagat Singh, Sh. Satbir Singh and Sh. Karan Singh, however, the same is photocopy and the applicant Sh. Satbir Singh has not been examined on oath in the pre-charge evidence to depose that these are not his signatures in order to put it in the category of forged application. Even, the letters dated 26.03.2008 written to Divisional Commissioner, NCT of Delhi and ADM (Land), Kapashera wherein the signatures of the applicant are alleged to have been forged, are also photocopy and the same applicant Sh. Satbir Singh has not been examined as witness to depose that it is not his signatures to put it in the bracket of alleged forged applications. The other applicant Sh. Jagat Singh is stated to have expired.

26. In an offence for forgery of signatures under Section 465 IPC, the best witness to prove the forgery is the signatory himself, whose signatures are allegedly forged. If the signatory does not deny the signatures, the very foundation of allegations of forgery becomes weak. Under Section 101 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proving forgery lies upon the complainant. If the alleged signatory is not examined or cited as witness, the Court may draw an inference that the complainant has withheld the best evidence. The Court may compare the signatures under Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 but normally this is supplementary evidence and not a substitute for the testimony of the signatory.

27. In a complaint case the evidence has to be led on a higher footing at two stage i.e. firstly at the time of pre-summoning and secondly as pre-charge evidence, which stands the test of cross examination by accused persons, in order to have the authenticity Page 35 of 40 since the investigating agency is not involved to verify the authenticity of the complaint. The complainant is required to prove a prima facie case against the accused persons for framing of charge against them and the burden never shifts in criminal proceedings.

28. Reverting to the present matter, the complainant has alleged that the signatures appearing on the applications forwarded to the Hon'ble LG by accused No. 1 are forged, however, the alleged signatory namely Sh. Satbir Singh has neither been cited nor examined as witness and there is no statement on oath denying his signatures, in the pre-charge evidence recorded since this is a complaint case. Even, the alleged forged signatures of Late Sh. Jagat Singh and Sh. Satbir Singh have not been sent to FSL or any other handwriting expert for opinion that the same does not belong to the signatory.

29. In the absence of testimonies of the persons, whose signatures are alleged to have been forged by revisionists or expert opinion, the complainant is presumed to withheld the best possible evidence and an adverse interference under Section 114 illustration (g) of Indian Evidence Act is drawn against him.

30. Further, with regard to forged signatures of the complainant, it has not been the case of the complainant that he never applied for de- notification of the land and he admitted specifically during his cross examination that they officially objected against the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. In common parlance, the statement that they (complainant and co-owners) officially objected to the notification means that they approached the concerned authorities in writing, which means that they filed an application for Page 36 of 40 de-notification. The complainant cannot blow hot and cold at the same time by stating that that he officially objected against the notification qua the land in question but he never filed any application before any authority and his signatures are forged on the same.

31. Even, the alleged forged applications brought on record are only photocopies and the witnesses summoned for the record have not produced the original applications. The complainant summoned the record from LG Office but CW-5 has categorically stated that it does not pertain to LG Office Record. Hence, the original alleged forged documents are not available, even at the place they are alleged to have been filed.

32. At this stage, reliance is placed upon judgment relied by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist(s) in Jupally L. Reddy (Supra), wherein similar question came up before Hon'ble Apex Court that in the absence of original fabricated document, nothing has come on record from the manufacturing of alleged fake document, which is sine qua non to attract Section 465 IPC.

33. Even, the copy of the applications purported to be forged by revisionists has been sent to the revisionist/accused No. 1 Mahabal Mishra, as mentioned in the application itself. Hence, there seems no occasion for him to forge the said applications for pursuing de- notification of the land. Moreso, the present compliant has been filed in the year 2013 and as per the summoned record by the complainant himself proved as Ex.CW4/A, the land in question was de-notified on 18.01.2011. But, thereafter also no police complaint or case was filed till the time defamation case was filed by revisionist/accused No. 1.

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Admittedly, numerous litigations are pending before the parties regarding the present property dispute.

34. With respect to charge under Section 506 IPC, the only statement made by the complainant as CW-1 is that he along with co- owners of the land got threat of their lives. Ld. Trial Court observed in the impugned order that though the allegations regarding criminal intimidation is not supported by the material facts in a meticulous sense and details are not mentioned in a comprehensive manner, but since the respondent approached the Hon'ble High Court for police protection lends credibility to the allegation of the complainant.

35. As per record, the respondent No. 2/complainant approached Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for protection but the proceedings were withdrawn by him on statement of revisionists. Moreover, CW-2 Sh. Narayan Singh, one of the Co-owner has empathically deposed on oath during his cross examination that "It is correct that neither of the accused ever threatened him".

36. Furthermore, the law is well settled on this aspect as held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled Amitabh Adhar & Anr. Vs. NCT of Delhi & Anr. reported in 2000 Crl.LJ 4772, wherein it has been observed that :

"......The threats alleged to have been given to the complainant Ms. 'B' by the petitioners do not fall within the definition of criminal intimidation inasmuch as the complainant has nowhere stated that the threats given by the petitioners caused an alarm to her. It is well settled that mere threat is no offence."
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37. The specific dates or duration of such threats have not been mentioned in the evidence led by the complainant. Even CW-1/Complainant nowhere stated in pre-charge evidence in the present matter that the threats alleged to have been given caused alarm to him. The alarm cannot be presumed by the Court only by approaching the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi when litigations are already admittedly pending between the parties and the respondent No. 2/Complainant is not a common man but retired Colonel from Indian Army.

38. Now considering the totality of present facts and circumstances of the case in hand, this Court is guided by the decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Md. Ibrahim Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in 2010 AIR SCW 405, wherein it has observed that :

"This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. But at the same, it should be noted that several disputes of a civil nature may also contain the ingredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences, even if they also amount to civil disputes. [See: G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [2000 (2) SCC 636] and Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. [2006 (6) SCC 736]."
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Conclusion

39. In light of aforesaid discussion and applying the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Superior Courts in the cases referred by the Court as well as by the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that Ld. Trial Court erred in passing the i mpugned orders as the material and evidence available on record does not even disclose prima facie case against the revisionists under Section 465/471/506 read with Section 34 IPC in the absence of basic ingredients of the offences for which impugned order has been passed. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 22.11.2024 and 10.10.2025 are hereby set aside. Both revisionist persons stand discharged in the present matter as no offence is made out against them and hence, the present complaint is also dismissed being devoid of any merits.

40. The trial Court record along with the copy of this order be sent back to the learned Trial Court.

41. The files of these revision petitions be consigned to record room after due compliance.

Pronounced in the open
Court on 13.03.2026                          (Shefali Barnala Tandon)
                                           Additional Sessions Judge -06,
                                              NDD, PHC, New Delhi

It is to certify that this order contains 40 pages and each page bears the signatures of the undersigned.

(Shefali Barnala Tandon) Additional Sessions Judge -06, NDD, PHC, New Delhi Page 40 of 40