Madras High Court
S. Velmurugan, Chairman, Committee Of ... vs The Registrar Of Co-Operative ... on 8 October, 2002
Author: Prabha Sridevan
Bench: Prabha Sridevan
ORDER Prabha Sridevan, J.
1. The petitioners are members of the Board of Directors of the Pondicherry Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd(PCMPU). They were superseded by the impugned order dated 6.9.2002. According to them, they are the duly elected members of the Pondicherry Co-op. Milk Producers Union Ltd., and the term of office is a period of three years from 1.1.2001 to 22.1.2003.
2. On 6.9.2002, they were served with the impugned order, superseding the elected Board of the Union and appointing the second respondent herein as a Special Officer for a period of three months with a direction to conduct a fresh election for the Committee.
3. In Para.7 to 16 of the impugned order, the first respondent has enumerated the grounds, which, according to him, are the grounds for issuing the impugned order.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the impugned order is mala fide and there was no justification for passing this order superseding the Committee without giving notice. Section 83(1)(a) of the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act 1972 (Act in short) was referred to, which gives the Registrar, the power to dissolve the Committee "after giving the Committee an opportunity of making its representations". This opportunity was not given. The impugned order subverts the democratic nature of the Committee. The allegations in the impugned order referred to incidents that had occurred in the past and therefore there is no warrant or justification for subperseding the Committee emergently.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners would also submit that though the appellate remedy is there, the petitioners are entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction, since the impugned order has been issued in violation of the principles of natural justice. When an illegal order, which is arbitrary, has been passed prejudicial to the interest of the members of the Co-operative Committee, the same should be set aside.
6. The learned Government Pleader for Pondicherry submitted that while there is no gain saying the fact that under Section 83(1) of the Act, the Committee is entitled to an opportunity of making its representations. Section 83(9) clearly states that it is not necessary to give an opportunity to the Committee where the Registrar 'is of the opinion that it is not reasonably practicable to do so'. It was submitted that it was not as if the democratic process has been scuttled, since the impugned order itself provides for election within a period of three months from the date of the Special Officer assuming charge.
7. According to the learned Government Pleader, there were very serious allegations regarding the working of the Union, the supply of milk, wasteful expenditure etc., and therefore there was justification for the Registrar to invoke the powers under Section 83(9). Section 140 of the Act which deals with appeals was pointed out. It was submitted that the powers of the Tribunal, which is the appellate authority, viz., the District Court, is so wide. It takes within its ambit the powers to grant such interlocutory orders, as may be necessary and the power to award costs and also all the powers of a Civil Court vide Section 145 of the Act. Therefore, the petitioners have a very adequate remedy and if their grievance is justified, they can get redressal before the Tribunal.
8. In support of the above contention, the learned Government Pleader cited two authorities. V.AMMAINATHAN PRESIDENT BOARD OF DIRECTORS THE PONDICHERRY STATE, CO-OPERATIVE UNION LTD., VS. THE UNION OF INDIA UNION TERRITORY OF PONDICHERRY (1990(2) M.L.J. 143) was a matter that arose under the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act. It was held therein that unless the Court is satisfied that an alternative remedy is not efficacious or dilatory or ineffective to give the relief, this Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that case the respondent also took the stand that the committee had become defunct. This reason and the fact that one member of the Board invoked the writ jurisdiction and the other filed an appeal, persuaded the Court not to exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9. The other decision cited was JOINT REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, MADRAS AND OTHERS VS. P.S.RAJAGOPAL NAIDU, GOVINDARAJULU AND OTHERS (1970 Supreme Court 992) which arose after the Madras Co-operative Societies Act at 53/61. In that case, the Supreme Court held that:
"The High Court cannot act as an Appellate Court and re-appraise and re-examine the relevant facts and circumstances which led to the making of the order of supersession under Section 72, Madras Co-operative Societies Act as if the matter before it had been brought by way of appeal"
10. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was absolutely no basis for invoking the power under Section 83(9), the records were called for. The records show that the Dairy Development Officer had placed before the authorities some irregularities. Notice had been issued under Section 33 of the Act. After perusing these notings and the documentary evidence the Registrar was pleased to note down as follows:
"The following irregularities were noticed against the functioning of the said Committee:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the said Committee is not functioning properly in accordance with the provisions of the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and Rules there under and the bye-laws of the said Union, and willfully disobeyed the instructions/directions issued by this department.
11. I am satisfied that there is no other go except to dissolve the said committee, under Section 83 of the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act, 1972,
12. Due to urgency to set right the unfair means of management, besides apprehension of tampering of records of the said Union, I am satisfied to dispense with the service of notice u/s.83(9) of the said Act."
11. The files prima facie show that the Registrar has recorded his satisfaction that there was a necessity to dispense with the service of notice and to proceed with the matter. Though, the decision cited in AIR 1970 Supreme Court arose out of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, the Supreme Court had clearly stated that the High Court cannot reappraise and re-examine the relevant facts and circumstances which led to the making of the order of supersession under Section 72, Madras Co-operative Societies Act, as if, the matter before it had been brought by way of appeal. So it will not be proper to sit in appeal over 'the satisfaction'. In this case, if any observation is made regarding the merits of the order, it would affect the proceedings before the Appellate Authority.
12. The Act provides for a very adequate appellate remedy and it is not as if the petitioners cannot seek interlocutory orders or such orders as the petitioners may require in the interest of justice.
13. In these circumstances, I do not think it is proper to permit the petitioners to avoid the appellate remedy and seek interference by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that even while the writ petition was pending, the Special Officer had taken certain decisions, which would show the unbridled power vested in the Special Officer.
15. To provide safeguard against such apprehension, the Special Officer is directed to take assistance of the ex officio members of the Board, who shall advise him. This will be in accordance with Section 83(2), which gives the Registrar, the power to appoint an Advisory Board consisting of not more than 5 members to advise the Special Officer in such matters as may be specified by him. The directions regarding the appointment of the Advisory Board shall take effect from Friday 11.10.2002.
16. In these circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed, the petitioners have the liberty to go before the Appellate Authority and raise all the objections including the fact that the necessity to invoke Section 83(9), does not exist in the instant case. The petitioners are given four weeks time to move the appellate authority. Any observations of this Court shall not in any way hamper the appellate authority in arriving at an independent decision, in accordance with law. No costs. Consequently, connected W.M.P. is closed.