Calcutta High Court
Md. Yeasin And Ors. vs State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 12 April, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2006(3)CHN655
Author: Asok Kumar Ganguly
Bench: Asok Kumar Ganguly, Aniruddha Bose
JUDGMENT Asok Kumar Ganguly, J.
1. Both the appeal and the application, with the consent of the parties, have been heard in full and both of them are disposed of by the following judgment.
2. This is an appeal filed by Md. Yeasin, Sk. Abdul Hanif & Sri Uttam Kumar Konar from therein a judgment and order dated 2nd August, 2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Writ Court.
3. As these appellants were not impleaded to the writ petition in which the judgment under appeal was rendered, the locus standi of these appellants was challenged by the writ petitioner on various grounds which will appear from the facts of the case.
4. The relevant facts are that these appellants filed a complaint to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Burdwan, North Sub-Division, District Burdwan alleging that the writ petitioner/respondent, Sk. Mansur Haque was running his business of M.R. Dealer of Jamar Village in Village & P.O. Jamar, P.S. Burdwan Sadar in such a way that essential commodities were not being properly distributed to the common public. It was also alleged that food materials in connection with various subsidized projects were not being properly distributed. No receipts were given in connection with the transaction in the ration shop of the writ petitioner. Persons holding B.P.L. cards were deprived and the stock of such essential commodities were not properly maintained. On the basis of such complaint, enquiries were initiated against Sk. Mansur Haque and an order of suspension dated 19th January, 2005 was passed against him by the Sub-Divisional Controller of Food & Supply, Burdwan Sadar. The said order of suspension was challenged by Sk. Mansur Haque, by filing a writ petition [W.P. No. 1389 (W) of 2005] before this Court. A learned Judge of this Court by an order dated 28th January, 2005, admitted the same but did not grant any interim order. Against such refusal of interim order an appeal was filed before the Division Bench and the Division Bench also disposed of the said appeal without interfering with the order of suspension. In the meantime, the departmental proceeding which was initiated against Sk. Mansur Haque was not completed within the time specified in Paragraph 21 of West Bengal Distribution System (Maintenance and Control) Order, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the said Order). As such Sk. Mansur Haque filed the writ petition being W. P. No. 12856 (W) of 2005 and out of which the present appeal arises. The learned Judge quashed the suspension order dated 19th January, 2005 and also the charges against the said respondent/writ petitioner.
5. On behalf of the appellants it was urged that as a result of the order which was passed in the second writ petition of Sk. Mansur Haque, the proceedings which were initiated against him on the basis of their complaint were quashed. It has been contended that the appellants have the right to see that the proceedings initiated on the basis of their complaint reach a logical end and this has been thwarted as the proceedings have been quashed in the midstream. Therefore the appellants have a legitimate grievance and they have the locus to file the appeal. It was also submitted that the appellants filed a Public Interest Litigation, inter alia, raising questions of public interest which are involved in the complaint lodged by them and also the public interest which is involved in the proper completion of the proceedings initiated against Sk. Mansur Haque. But the said public interest litigation being W.P. No. 15860 (W) of 2005 was allowed to be withdrawn by the Division Bench presided over by the Hon'ble The Chief Justice by an order dated 29th August, 2006 with the liberty to the present appellants take such steps as are available under the law.
6. In this perspective it is submitted that filing of the present appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 2nd August, 2005 is the remedy available to the present appellants under the law and that is why this appeal has been filed.
7. Challenging the locus standi of the present appellants certain judgments were cited by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent. Reliance was initially placed on the judgment in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Ors. . The question which arose in Jasbhai was whether the proprietor of a Cinema Theatre with a license for exhibiting cinematograph films is entitled to invoke ex debito justitiae the Certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court for quashing a no objection certificate in favour of a rival in trade on the ground that such no objection certificate suffers from a defect of jurisdiction.
8. The fundamental factual difference between the case in Jasbhai and present case is far too obvious to be ignored. Here the question of rival in trade is not involved. On the other hand the question involved in the present appeal is whether the present appellants who had complained against the functioning of the writ petitioner/respondent as a modified ration dealer dealing with the essential commodities has a right to see that an enquiry initiated on the basis of such complain reaches its final conclusion. The ancillary question which calls for resolution is whether the present appellants have a right to file an appeal challenging the decision of the learned Single Judge quashing the proceedings which were initiated against the writ petitioner/respondent on the basis of their complaint.
9. Even in the context of the facts in Jasbhai, as pointed out above, the learned Judges in paragraph 13 of the judgment held that the expression 'person aggrieved' denotes an elastic and to some extent an elusive concept and it has been laid down that such a concept cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact, and comprehensive definition. The learned Judges also held that the concept of "person aggrieved" and its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors, namely, contents of the statute in question, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest and the nature and character of prejudice suffered by him. In other words the learned Judge held that the concept of 'person aggrieved' depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
10. The learned Judges, after analysing the case law on the subject in paragraph 35, page 682 of the report, held that a person can be aggrieved even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. The learned Judges further held that in exceptional cases a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceeding before an authority but who has a genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceeding will be covered within the expression 'person aggrieved'. Following the aforesaid principles, it cannot be said that in the instant case the present appellants are not "persons aggrieved" since their grievances have an element of public interest in them and public interest demands that they are given the right to challenge the decision of the learned Judge of the Writ Court by filing this appeal.
11. Reliance was also placed by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent on the decision in the case of Ranjit Prasad v. Union of India . In that case the question involved was whether public interest litigation can be filed in matters involving disciplinary proceeding even against highly placed officers of Government of India. The Apex Court, if we may say so with great respect, rightly held that the disciplinary proceedings are essentially matters between employer and employee and a stranger, even a practising Advocate cannot have any interest in the same conducing disciplinary proceeding is within the exclusive domain of the employer. Therefore, the factual and legal Background in Ranjit Prasad is totally different from the present case.
12. The Apex Court in the case of Duryodhan Sahu 1998(7) SCC 713, also held that in respect of service matters, Public Interest Litigation cannot be filed.
13. On the concept of locus standi, the Supreme Court has taken a very broad view in the case of Fertilizer Corporation, Kamgar Union v. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 344. In that case the Supreme Court held that the workers have a right to initiate proceeding even under Article 32 of the Constitution, which is confined to enforcement of rights only under Part III of the Constitution, challenging the action of the company to sell redundant plants and equipments of its factory. The Supreme Court held that such proceedings are maintainable at the instance of the workers but whether the proceeding violates the rights of the workers is a different question. In Kamgar Union, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligation, it is necessary for the Court to take a broad view of the concept of locus standi. In Kamgar Union the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai (supra) and in paragraph 48 at page 356 of the report the learned Judges held that if a person has some concern deeper than that of a busy body he cannot be told off at the gates. Following the aforesaid legal principle, this Court holds that the present appellants have the locus standi to file this appeal and as such their application for leave to file appeal is allowed.
14. Now comes the question of merit. The learned Judge of the Writ Court quashed the proceedings which were initiated against the writ petitioner/respondent, inter alia, on the ground that though the show-cause notice was issued by the authorities on 22nd November, 2004 the proceedings were not completed within the stipulated period of three months from the date of serving of the notice. By way of justification for the delay it was urged by the State respondents that since the proceedings were initially challenged before the High Court, namely the order of suspension, the proceedings could not be finalized within three months. The learned Judge did not accept this plea as the learned Judge found that no interim order was passed restraining the authorities from continuing with the proceeding. The learned Judge held that admittedly the Sub-Divisional Controller did not conduct the departmental proceeding within the period of three months against the writ petitioner after serving the notice on the writ petitioner on 22nd November, 2004.
15. After perusing the provision of Clause 21 of West Bengal Public Distribution System (Maintenance and Control) Order, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the said order) the learned Judge held that specific time limit has been provided in the said order for completion of the departmental proceeding so that the dealer may not suffer for an indefinite period on account of issuance of the suspension order. Learned Judge also held that the expression 'shall' in paragraph 21 of the Control Order casts a mandatory obligation upon the Sub-Divisional Controller to complete the proceeding against the dealer within the prescribed time limit of three months.
16. In view of the said reasoning the learned Single Judge quashed the departmental proceeding against the writ petitioner.
17. Now the question which falls for decision in this case is whether the time limit mentioned in Clause 21 of the said order is mandatory and whether the entire proceeding which could not be completed within the period of three months will get quashed on its own in view of Clause 21 of the said order.
18. The relevant provision of Clause 21 of the said order is set out below:
1. Penalty.--(i) If on examination of the documents and/or stocks of public distribution commodities or weighing devices, any discrepancy is detected, the Sub-Divisional Controller, Department of Food and Supplies, shall issue a notice to the concerned Dealer asking for explanation in writing for such discrepancy and may also place the dealership under suspension till the disposal of the proceedings by the Sub-Divisional Controller, Department of Food and Supplies.
(ii) On receiving the reply from the Dealer, the Sub-Divisional Controller, Department of Food and Supplies, shall give an opportunity of hearing to the Dealer and on recording the reasons, the Sub-Divisional Controller, Department of Food and Supplies may terminate the license and appointment issued to the Dealer or forfeit the security deposit of the Dealer or may pass an order for deduction of ration cards tagged with the said Dealer. The departmental proceedings drawn against the Dealer shall have to be completed by the concerned Sub-Divisional Controller, Department of Food and Supplies within three months from the date of serving notices asking for explanation.
19. This Court is of the opinion that the said period of three months is not mandatory and why this Court opines so is discussed below. It is well-settled that whether the intention of a statute is mandatory or directory cannot always be decided on the basis of the language used in the statute. In such matters "No universal rule can be laid down" as has been held by Lord Campbell, C.J. in Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner 30 LJ CH 379. At page 380 of the report the learned Chief Justice observed "It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the Statute to be construed." This view of the learned Chief Justice has been affirmed subsequently also by Lord Penzance in Howard v. Bodington 1877(2) PD 203 at page 211.
20. This principle of construction has also been accepted by the Supreme Court in H.N. Rishbud and Anr. v. State of Delhi of the report.
21. It is no doubt true that Clause 21 of the said order has been framed with the main intention to expedite the conclusion of any proceeding which is initiated against a dealer. This has been done as a proceeding against a dealer of essential commodities raises serious issues of public interest. The nature of power exercised by the Sub-Divisional Controller under Clause 21 however has two different characteristics. While monitoring the activities of M.R. dealers individually, such power which is exercised is that of a benevolent state, akin to parens patriae, where he protects the interest of the general public in getting essential supplies. At the same time, when he exercises his power against the dealers charged with irregularities, the power is circumscribed by the limitations the authorities of the "State" are subject to, while dealing with citizens' rights
22. A ration dealer acts in a way as an agent of the Government. He is always accountable to the Government for selling food items and other essential goods at a fixed price. He has to serve public interest in the very vital area of making food items available to general public. Therefore, the members of public have a vital interest to ensure that the functioning of the M.R. dealer is transparent and such functioning should be in the interest of general public. If the functioning of the dealer is suspended as a result of such proceeding, people of that particular area to which the dealer caters will suffer great inconvenience as they will have to lift rationed articles from another dealer. It is also equally a matter of public concern that a dealer against whom allegations are made should not be allowed to function. The decision as to whether a dealer should be allowed to function or not must be taken promptly as the Government has to take steps for appointing another dealer, if such decision goes negative vis-a-vis the dealer under investigation. Matters relating to distribution of food items cannot be left in a state of uncertainty for long. Expedition is of the essence in such matters. That is the main purpose behind prescribing the time limit of 3 months.
23. There is another aspect also. If a dealer is suspended on the basis of allegations, there is no scope for giving him subsistence allowance. An order of suspension therefore would put the dealer out of his business absolutely during the period of suspension. Therefore, the dealer suffers even in cases of unfounded allegations unless the truth is found out. In order to strike a balance between all these conflicting interests it has been provided in the said order that suspension cannot continue indefinitely. Therefore, the period of 3 months must be read in a reasonable manner. That is why Clause 21 is in two parts. The first part provides for issuing notice to the Dealer concerned asking for his explanation. This part empowers the authorities to place the Dealer under suspension.
24. The second part deals with the procedure which are to be followed on receiving the reply from the Dealer. There are also provisions for giving the Dealer an opportunity of appearing and then recording of reasons by the authorities before ordering ultimate termination of his appointment and forfeiture of security deposit or taking other penal steps. Period of 3 months has been prescribed here.
25. But the provision is silent as to what will happen if the proceedings are not completed within a period of 3 months. It is well-settled that where statute provides for consequences for non-compliance with a time limit,, in such cases it has been held that the time fixed is mandatory in character. The relevant provision of Clause 21 does not disclose any such intention. This is a feature which inclines the Court to hold the time of 3 months is not mandatory.
26. Reliance in this connection may be made to Sutherland on Statutory Construction (3rd Edition) Volume III. The learned author at page 77 of the treatise observes "The difference between mandatory and directory statutes is one of effect only. The question generally arises in a case involving a determination of rights as affected by the violation of, or omission to adhere to, statutory directions. This determination involves a decision of whether or not the violation or omission is such as to render invalid acts or proceedings pursuant to the statute, or rights, powers, privileges or immunities claimed thereunder. If the violation or omission is invalidating, the statute is mandatory; if not, it is directory."
27. Crawford on Statutory Construction (3rd Edition, Vol. III at page 104) also opined on the same lines and which is quoted:
So a mandatory statute may be defined as one whose provisions or requirements, if not complied with, will render the proceedings to which it relates illegal and void, while a directory statute is one where non-compliance will not invalidate the proceedings to which it relates.
28. Maxwell (12th Edition, Chapter 13) has thrown light on this question on a very vital angle and with a lucidity which is so characteristic of this famous treatise and which is reproduced:
But the question is in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice, and when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons, or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, such an intention is not to be attributed to the Legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded.
29. The present day demand on administrative authorities is very complex and there may be several reasons why proceedings initiated against a dealer may not be concluded within 3 months. The dealer may take recourse to legal remedies. The Court may grant interim orders. The district administration may be saddled with the burden of tackling pressing situations which arise out of emergency. The Officer concerned who is holding the proceedings may be transferred. The Dealer against whom such proceedings are held may be suffering a personal tragedy or may become seriously sick. All these and many other unforeseen contingencies may happen. To hold that just with the passing of the period of 3 months the entire proceeding becomes void is to interpret the statute, in our view, in a trifle unreasonable manner. Such interpretation goes against the intention of the provision specially when the consequences of non-completion of the proceeding within 3 months are not spelt out in the statute itself.
30. There is another way of finding out whether the statutory provision is mandatory or not. The Courts have held where negative words are used in the statute while describing a time limit normally such words are mandatory. The Supreme Court has held in M. Pentiah and Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors. that negative words are clearly prohibitory and are used as legislative device to make a statute imperative. (P. 1113 of the report)
31. Similarly in Mannalal Khetan and Ors. v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Ors. , it has been held that the provision contained in Section 108 of Companies Act, 1956 is mandatory in view of the use of negative words containing the prohibition against the transfer of shares without complying with the provisions of the Act (Para 16, page 429 of the report).
32. The same principles have been followed by Supreme Court in A.K. Roy and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. and the Court held that Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is mandatory in nature since it starts with a negative word. In coming to the said conclusion the learned Judge relied on Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn. p.263. Following the same principles the Supreme Court in the State of Bihar v. Murad All Khan held that the provision of Section 55 for Wild Life Protection Act is andatory in nature since the said section starts with the expression "no".
33. In so far as provisions are made imposing a public duty on certain public officials to commence a proceeding or to conclude a proceeding within a particular time, such provisions are invariably held to be directory. Reference in this connection can be made to the decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R. v. Urbanowski reported in 1976(1) All ER 679. In that case the Court held that the trial of a person committed to the Crown Court by a Magistrate's Court is to begin not later than the expiration of the prescribed period. This was held a directory provision (see page 681 of the report). This aspect of the matter has been elaborately considered by the Privy Council in the case of Wang v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue reported in 1995(1) All ER 367 in the context of Inland Revenue Ordinance. The question which came up for consideration was whether the requirement that the determination of liability should be made within a particular time is mandatory or not. Addressing the said question the Privy Council observed as follows:
When a question like the present one arises-an alleged failure to comply with a time provision-it is simpler and better to avoid these two words 'mandatory' and 'directory' and to ask two questions. The first is whether the legislature intended the. person making the determination to comply with the time provision, whether a fixed time or a reasonable time. Secondly, if so, did the legislature intend that a failure to comply with such a time provision would deprive the decision-maker of jurisdiction and render any decision which he purported to make null and void?
34. In the context of Clause 21 of the said order if these "two questions" are asked, the answer would obviously be that merely with the passing of the period of 3 months the jurisdiction to complete the proceeding is not lost, since this jurisdiction has been vested on the authorities for the performance of a public duty. In such a case to hold that any act which is done in exercise of public duty beyond the period of 3 months is void would work serious general inconvenience and injustice to those persons who have no control over those who are entrusted with the public duty. Such a construction would not promote the main object of Clause 21 which is to ensure transparency in the functioning of the dealers in food items.
35. As it has been observed earlier, the power vested on the State and its officials under Clause 21 is in the nature of jurisdiction under parens patriae. This is a jurisdiction which emanates from the inherent authority of the State to protect public interest and give protection to members of the public in an area where they need it. Therefore to hold that just on the expiry of the 3 months the entire proceeding which has been initiated against the dealer on the basis of public complaint comes to an end, would amount to an interpretation which works out injustice, inconvenience and hardship on the members of the public who have no control over the discharge of duties by the officials. In such cases it should be held that the statutory provision is directory (See Montreal Street Railway v. Normandin see AIR 1917 Privy Council 142 at p. 144.
36. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner cited a few judgments in support of his contention that time of 3 months under Clause 21 is mandatory. Reliance was placed on a Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Md. Abdus Salam v. Sub-Divisional Controller, Food & Supply, Basirhat reported in 1992(2) CHN 324. In that case an order of cancellation of Kerosene Oil dealership was passed against Abdus Salam in view of certain irregularities committed by Abdus Salam. The learned Judge set aside the cancellation order for two reasons. The first reason was that the cancellation order did not deal with the reply submitted by the Dealer. The other ground was that the time limit of 30 days given under the proviso to para 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order was held mandatory by the learned Judge and the cancellation order having been passed beyond the period of 30 days was not sustained.
37. This Court finds that para 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968 is worded differently from para 21 of the said order. Apart from that the object and purpose of the Kerosene Control Order, in my judgment, was not properly considered by the learned Judge in paragraph 5 of Abdus Salam, In coming to the conclusion that the period of 30 days is mandatory, the learned Judge mostly relied on the expression "shall", even though it is well-settled that the use of the expression is not always decisive of the intention of the statute. The intention of the statute has to be gathered from various factors. One of them being the mischief which it seeks to address. The other is the consequence, if any, which will flow from non-compliance with the statutory provision. The question of public interest which is involved in such statutory provision also escaped His Lordship's consideration. Therefore this Court finds that the decision in Abdus Salam was not rendered on correct principles and the learned Judge did not consider any authority or precedent on statutory interpretation before giving His Lordship's finding. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the judgment in Abdus Salam as a binding precedent for this Bench to follow. This Court respectfully disagrees with the interpretation of the word "shall" in paragraph 9 of Kerosene Control Order in Abdus Salam.
38. The next judgment cited on this aspect was delivered in the case of Karnal Improvement Trust v. Parkash Wanti . That was a case in respect of land acquisition proceedings. The question which came up for consideration was whether the award given by the President and not by the Tribunal is valid in view of Section 60 of Punjab Improvement Trust Act which provides for its composition and says that the Tribunal "shall consist of the President and two assessors". In that context it was held that the passing of an award provides for determination of the compensation which is a quasi-judicial exercise and which has to be done by the Tribunal as a whole and not by the President alone. So the provision of the statute is mandatory. It is thus clear that both the factual matrix and the legal issues in Karnal Improvement Trust and those in the present case are vastly different.
39. But on general principles the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 in Karnal Improvement Trust held whether the statute is mandatory or directory is to be decided on a conspectus of various factors. One of them is intention of the statute. The other question is whether any invalidating consequences have been statutorily prescribed in case of non-compliance. Questions of inconvenience and injustice which will result if the Statute is considered mandatory or directory are also relevant. The Court thus came to the conclusion "when a public duty. is imposed and statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner and within a certain time or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory". It is clear that this conclusion of the Supreme Court is directly against the contentions of the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner. Similar principles have been laid down in 1983 by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Bhagirathi Co-operative Joint Firming Society v. Howrah Zilla Parishad reported in 87 CWN 981. In that case the provisions of Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 87 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 came up for consideration. Under those provisions disputes which are referred to the arbitration under Section 86 of the Act were to be decided within 3 months from the date of receipt of such disputes by the Registrar. Sub-section (5) of Section 87 provides that if any person dealing with such dispute fails to decide the same within the aforesaid period he shall make a report to the next higher authority stating the reason for failure. The said authority may allow him such further time not exceeding 3 months for the disposal of the dispute. Interpreting these provisions the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, relying on a well-known passage from Maxwell's Interpretation of Statute (9th Edition P. 374) came to the conclusion that when public duty is imposed and the Statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner and within a certain time, those provisions may be regarded as directory. So the ratio in Karnal Improvement Trust, if properly appreciated, runs counter to the points urged by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner.
40. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the statutory provision about conclusion of the proceedings within the period of 3 months from the date of issuance of the show-cause notice cannot be held to be mandatory. The same is directory in nature. But one thing is clear that the proceedings which have been initiated should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. But the suspension of the dealer causes great inconvenience and hardship as the dealer is thrown out of his business without any subsistence during the suspension period. So the period of 3 months should be considered as mandatory so far as the continuance of suspension in connection with the proceeding is concerned. Therefore, this Court holds that the suspension of the dealer in connection with such proceedings must come to an end after a period of 3 months if within that period the proceedings are not completed. But the proceedings are not ipso facto terminated just on the expiry of the said period of 3 months but should be concluded as early as possible if not within the peirod of 3 months, but very soon thereafter.
41. Therefore the proceeding which was initiated against the writ petitioner Sk. Mansur Haque by issuance of show-cause notice dated 23rd November, 2004 must continue and be completed as early as possible but definitely by 15th July, 2006. The writ petitioner should co-operate with the authorities in the matter of conclusion of the proceedings. If the writ petitioner fails to do so or takes any unreasonable stand, the authorities may, by recording reasons, proceed exparte, if the situation so demands, The dateline given is peremptory. But the suspension order against the writ petition which has been quashed as a result of the judgment of the learned Judge of the Writ Court will remain quashed since the writ petitioner suffered suspension for more than 3 months.
42. The appeal is therefore allowed to the extent indicated above. The judgment of the learned Judge of the Writ Court dated 2nd August, 2005 is set aside subject to the exceptions indicated above.
43. No order as to costs.
44. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for. be given to the parties, after completing all the formalities.
Aniruddha Bose, J.
45. I agree.