Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mr. Sadhu Singh And Ors. vs Gurdev Kaur And Ors. on 1 February, 2000
Equivalent citations: (2000)126PLR510
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. This revision is directed against the order dated 28.11,1998 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Mansa. Vide the impugned order the learned Judge had dismissed an application filed by the present petitioners under Order 7 Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. The basic contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the relief claimed in the plaint, on its cumulative reading, was a relief of nullifying the registered sale deeds admittedly executed for a consideration in relation to the immovable property subject matter of the suit and as such ad valorem Court fee was payable as it was not a suit for declaration simplicitor where a Court fee of Rs. 20/- should be paid as per provisions of the Court Fee Act.
3. Notice of this petition was served upon the respondents. They were ordered to be proceeded against ex parte vide order dated 30.4.1999. Further, in the interest of justice, the case was adjourned for arguments to 29.7.1999, on that date also nobody appeared on behalf of the respondents and the case was adjourned for another date and was finally fixed for hearing today. Today also nobody appears for the respondents. As such, the petition has Been heard ex party against the respondents.
4. The learned trial Court gave the following reasons for rejecting the application of the applicant:-
"On consideration of the contentions of both the sides, I have come to the conclusion that instant suit by the respondent/plaintiffs cannot be treated to be for cancellation of sale deeds rather that is only to avoid sale deeds and wills as not to effect the rights of respondent/plaintiffs. Therefore, ad valorem Court fee on the sale price is not payable at all."
5. It is a settled principle of law that pleadings of a party must be construed and interpreted on its cumulative reading. It is the duty of the Court to lift the veil created by the use of language by a party, to find out as to what is the substantial relief claimed by the party and what should be the Court fee payable on the relief claimed. Undoubtedly, if the effect of all the sale deeds challenged by the plaintiffs, was not to nullify rights flowing there from, the plaintiffs would obviously be entitled to no relief. If the plaintiff had cleverly worded the plaint so as to avoid the expression "cancellation of documents", but have, in fact, claimed the same relief incorrectly, the Court is duty bound to treat it the relief of cancellation inbuilt in the plaint. With the help of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have gone through the contents of the plaint in detail and it is clear that liability of the plaintiffs is to pay the ad valorem Court fee and they cannot avoid the same. At this stage, it may be relevant to make a reference to a judgment of this Court in the case of Atam Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, 1998(3) RCR(Civil), 135, where the Court following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shamsher Singh Vs. Rajinder Prashad and others AIR 1973 SC 2384 and the judgment of Full Bench of this Court and Delhi High Court, held as under:-
"The suit is one for declaration which seeks a decree for declaring that a document is forged, fabricated and ineffective. As such the relief in law cannot be granted unless the court hold that the document is liable to be cancelled. Cancellation of the document in any event would be the basic and main relief which the court would have to grant even if the version stated by the plaintiff is established as pleaded. It is a settled principle of law that it is not the title or wording of the prayer which would determine the court fee payable on the relief claimed but it is the substance and manner of the plaint read together that would finally determine such an issue, the sale deed dated 26.3 1991 is a registered document. According to the defendant the title of the property is already passed to him by virtue of the registered sale deed and it is only the cancellation thereof which could divest them in law of the right accruing therefrom. The reasoning given by the learned trial Court does not appear to be well founded in view of the settled judicial principles regulating the controversy in issue. At this state, it may be appropriate to make a reference to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad and Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2384, the relevant portions of which read as under:-
"The Court in deciding the question of court-fee should look into the allegations in the plaint to see what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the court looking at the substance of the relief asked for.
xxxx xx xx xx Consequently, when the plaintiff sued for a declaration that the decree obtained by the appellant against their father was not binding on them they were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree holder from executing the decree against the mortgaged property as he was entitled to do."
6. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur, (1982)84 P.L.R. 127 while dealing with somewhat similar situation held as under:-
"xx xx that it is well settled that the Court in deciding the question of Court fee should look into the allegation made in the plaint to find out what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. Thus, in each case the court has to find out the real relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. Where the main relief is that of the cancellation of the deed, and the declaration if any, is only a surplus-age, the case would not be covered under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. Because in a suit under that clause the main relief is that of a declaration and the consequential relief is just ancillary.
xxxx xx In case the main relief in the suit is held to be that of cancellation of the sale deed, then the case is not covered by Section 7(iv)(c) and the only provision applicable is Article 1, Schedule 1 of the Act. In order to bring the case under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act the main and substantive relief should be that of a declaration and the consequential relief should be ancillary thereto. Moreover, if no consequential relief is claimed or could be claimed in the suit, then section 7(iv)(c) will not be attracted. To say in the plaint, that it be declared that the sale deed, got executed from her as a result of the fraud was void and not binding on her, does not convert the suit into one for a declaration with the consequential relief of possession so as to fall within the provision of section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. To such a suit, the only Article applicable is Article 1, Schedule I. 1970 Cur. L.J.80, 1974 Cur L.J. 71 approved. (1975)77 P.L.R. 372, (1978) 80 P.L.R. 29, (1978)80 P.L.R. 622 over-ruled."
7. In the case of Lakhpat v. Smt. Chander Kanta and Ors. (1989-1)95 P.L.R. 103: a Bench of this court took a view that where the Court holds that on the heading of the plaint it is clear that substantive relief claimed is that of cancellation of the sale deed and the mere fact that the suit is for declaration would not help the plaintiff to avoid liability of appropriate Court fee under the provisions of that Act.
8. Following the above well enunciated principles of law and applying them to the facts of the present case, I am of the considered view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The application of the petitioners should succeed, but to the limited extent that the plaint cannot be returned or rejected at this stage and the plaintiffs must pay the ad valorem Court fee in relation to the value indicated in the 3 sale deeds which are sought to be nullified by the institution of the present suit. Revision petition to that extent is allowed without any orders as to costs.
Petition stands disposed of.