Karnataka High Court
Gunawwa And Others vs The Land Tribunal, Belgaum And Others on 6 June, 2000
Equivalent citations: ILR2000KAR2055, 2000(4)KARLJ206
Author: K.R. Prasada Rao
Bench: K.R. Prasada Rao
ORDER
1. This revision petition is filed against the orders passed by the District Appellate Authority, Belgaum, dated 5-3-1990 in Appeal No. RALR. 122 of 1988 confirming the order passed by the Land Tribunal, Belgaum, dated 12-5-1988 in Case No. Majagaon. SR. 201.
2. One Appayya, father of the present revision petitioners 2 to 4 and husband of first revision petitioner, filed Form No. 7 under Section 48-A, dated 20-12-1974 under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act') before the Land Tribunal, Belgaum, claiming occupancy rights in respect of Majagaon old Sy. No. 721, new Sy. No. 315 measuring 2 acres 29 guntas and old Sy. No. 722 and new Sy. No. 316 measuring 1 acre 23 guntas. Respondent 3-the owner of the said lands contested the said proceedings denying that the said Appayya was cultivating the above said lands as a tenant. The Land Tribunal, after holding an enquiry came to the conclusion that Appayya was not cultivating the above said lands as a tenant by the notified date and rejected the said claim made by him. The Appellate Authority also dismissed the appeal filed by the legal representatives of Appayya, who are the revision petitioners herein, confirming the order of the Land Tribunal, by the impugned order dated 5-3-1990. The Appellate Authority has taken into consideration the fact that Appayya, who filed Form No. 7, has given up his claim of tenancy under the terms of compromise recorded in the suit O.S. No. 425 of 1956, on the file of Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), Belgaum, filed by respondent 3 herein for permanent injunction and admitted that respondent 3 herein was in exclusive possession of the said lands by the date of compromise decree and agreed to cultivate the lands for the next five years as "servant" of respondent 3 and came to the conclusion that Appayya was not in possession of the above said lands as a tenant by the notified date and that he continued in possession of the said lands subsequent to the date of compromise as a licensee. Incidentally, the Appellate Authority also found that the entries in the R.T.C. extracts for the year 1973-74 and earlier years do not disclose the name of Appayya as the person in possession and cultivation of the. above said lands and that there is absolutely no evidence on record to show that he paid "guthige" in respect of the above said lands either to respondent. 3 herein or to his father.
3. I have heard Sri H.R. Ananthakrishnamurthy. learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioners, Sri R.U. Goulay, learned Counsel appearing for respondent 3 and learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for respondents 1 and 2.
4. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners has vehemently argued that the Land Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority erred in relying upon the compromise decree passed in the suit O.S. No. 425 of 1956 in coming to the conclusion that possession of Appayya in respect of the above said lands by the notified date was that of a licensee but not that of a tenant and that the said compromise decree is null and void since the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the issue relating to tenancy. It is also pointed out by him that since the issue relating to tenancy raised by Appayya in that suit has been referred to "Mamlat-dar" without awaiting for the decision on that issue, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to dispose of the suit by accepting the compromise petition filed by the parties in that suit. It is also pointed by him that under the provisions of Section 70 of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 only Mamlatdar has to decide the question of tenancy and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the said question as is clarified by the provisions of Section 85 of the Act. It is further pointed out by him that when once an issue relating to tenancy has been referred to Mamlatdar for determination, the Civil Court shall stay the further proceedings in the suit and await the decision of the Mamlatdar and only on receiving the communication regarding decision of the Mamlatdar, the Civil Court shall proceed further and dispose of the suit. Since the said procedure has not been followed by the Civil Court in the above suit and the said suit was disposed of by accepting the compromise petition filed by the parties without waiting for the decision of the Mamlatdar on the issue of tenancy referred to him, he argued that the said compromise decree is null and void and the same cannot be taken into consideration in the present proceedings. He further contended that as admittedly the revision petitioners are in lawful possession and cultivation of the above said lands they come under the definition of "deemed tenant" and this fact has not been examined by the Appellate Authority as well as the Land Tribunal. According to him, it is for respondent 3 herein to prove his contention that Appayya during his lifetime and the present revision petitioners after the death of Appayya were cultivating the above said lands as his servants but not as tenants and the said burden of proof which is on respondent 3 has not been discharged by adducing any evidence and there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that Appayya was being paid any wages by respondent 3 for cultivation of the above said lands and that the entire cultivation expenses were being advanced by respondent 3. It is further contended by him that the Appellate Authority as well as the Land Tribunal have erroneously brushed aside the land revenue receipts Exs. A. 32 to A. 35 pertaining to the period prior to 1-3-1974 produced by the revision petitioners to show that Appayya was paying the assessment in respect of the above lands.
5. In reply to the above submissions, the learned Counsel for the respondent 3 submitted that the compromise decree passed in O.S. No. 425 of 1956 is valid and binding on Appayya, who was the defendant in that suit and having given up the claim of tenancy by him under the terms of compromise in the said suit, it is not open to him or to his legal representatives, who are the present revision petitioners, now to contend that their possession and cultivation of the above said lands is that of tenant. He further contended that under the terms of the compromise decree passed in that suit, Appayya was put in possession of the above said lands on leave and licence to cultivate them for a period of five years as servant of respondent 3 and since he continued in possession of the said lands even after the expiry of the said period of 5 years, his possession is to be considered as unlawful and the question of treating Appayya or the present revision petitioners as "deemed tenants" in respect of the said lands does not arise. He further contended that, at any rate, the possession of the present revision petitioners in respect of the above said lands is to be treated as that of licensees, but not as tenants and it is for them to prove their claim that they have been cultivating the above said lands as tenants by paying "Guthige" to respondent 3 herein. Since they have not produced any documentary evidence to show that they paid Guthige to respondent 3 herein at any time prior to 1-3-1974, he argued that the Appellate Authority as well as the Land Tribunal were justified in coming to the conclusion that their possession in respect of the above said lands is not that of a tenant.
6. I have carefully perused the entire evidence placed on record.
7. It is the case of the revision petitioners that they are in possession and cultivation of the petition schedule lands since the year 1953-54 as tenants and the said lands were obtained by the deceased Appayya as a tenant and he was paying half share in the crops grown by way of rent to the landlord up to the year 1963 and thereafter he was paying annual rent of Rs. 300/-. It is their further case that the suit filed by the respondent 3 herein as owner - O.S. No. 147 of 1968, on the file of Munsiff, Belgaum, for permanent injunction against the deceased Appayya was dismissed and the appeal R.A. No. 105 of 1971, on the file of 2nd Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum, filed by respondent 3 against the judgment was also dismissed. To prove this fact, they produced the certified copies of the judgments marked as Exs. A. 10 and A. 2. Thereafter, respondent 3 filed suit O.S. No. 167 of 1973, on the file of Munsiff Court, Belgaum, against the deceased Appayya for recovery of possession of the petition schedule lands and the said suit is now pending. Ex. A. 3 is the certified copy of the plaint of that suit. The revision petitioners produced the notice issued by the K.E.B. marked as Exs. A. 4 and A. 5 to the deceased Appayya which are of the year 1984, K.E.B. receipts Exs. A. 6 to A. 11, which are subsequent to 1-3-1974, demand notices issued by K.E.B. Exs. A. 12 and A. 14 which are also for the period subsequent to 1-3-1974, Sugarcane Weigh bills Exs. A. 15 to A. 30 for the period subsequent to 1-3-1974 and the land revenue receipt Ex. A. 31, dated 18-3-1976, Ex. A. 32, dated 18-4-1968, Ex. A. 33, dated 5-6-1977, Ex. A. 34, dated 14-4-1966, Ex. A 35, dated 23-4-1965 and Ex. A. 36, dated 12-4-1962 to show that the deceased Appayya was in continuous possession of the petition schedule lands during all the above years. In the evidence given by the 2nd revision petitioner as A.W. 1, he admitted in the year 1956 the landlord-respondent 3 filed a suit for permanent injunction O.S. No. 425 of 1956 against the deceased Appayya and the same was compromised between the parties and claimed that even after the said compromise decree deceased Appayya continued in possession and cultivation of the schedule lands. But he denied that the landlord has paid any wages to deceased Appayya for the said cultivation of the lands. However, he admitted that the rent sent by M.O. by Appayya was refused by the landlord as evidence by M.O. coupon Ex. A. 55 and the postal receipt Ex. A. 56. According to him, before 1968 the deceased Appayya was paying rents in cash to the landlord, but the landlord never issued any receipts for the said rents paid. It is elicited in his cross-examination that the suit O.S. No. 425 of 1956 has been compromised between the deceased Appayya and the landlord as per the compromise decree Ex. B. 1 and they have not challenged the said compromise decree by filing any appeal. It is further elicited in his evidence that except for the year 1953-54 the name of deceased Appayya does not find place in any of the R.T.C. extracts for the subsequent years. It is on the basis of the above facts elicited in the cross-examination of 2nd revision petitioner, it is argued by the learned Counsel for respondent 3 that the entries in the R.T.C. extracts do not disclose that Appayya or the present revision petitioners were cultivating the schedule lands as tenants after the compromise decree was passed in the suit O.S. No. 425 of 1956. He further pointed out that under the terms of the compromise decree passed in the said suit as per Ex. B. 1, deceased Appayya was put in possession of the petition schedule lands for cultivation as a servant for a period of 5 years on behalf of the landlord. It is further contended by him that though after the expiry of the said 5 years period, deceased Appayya continued in possession of the schedule lands and was cultivating the same till the notified date i.e., 1-3-1974, his possession and cultivation of the said lands during the said years is to be treated as unlawful and he cannot be considered as a "deemed tenant" in respect of the said lands by virtue of the said possession and cultivation of the lands. At this stage, it is relevant to note that even respondent 3 is not disputing the fact that Appayya was continuing in possession and cultivation of the schedule lands during his lifetime, after the expiry of 5 years period from the date of compromise decree till the notified date and that after his death the present revision petitioners are continuing in possession and cultivation of the said lands as his legal representatives. In fact, it is found that the suit O.S. No. 147 of 1968, on the file of Principal Munsiff, Belgaum, filed by respondent 3 for permanent injunction against the deceased Appayya in respect of the schedule lands has been dismissed and the said judgment has been confirmed in R.A. No. 105 of 1971. Thereafter, respondent 3 filed a suit O.S. No. 167 of 1973 for recovery of possession of the schedule lands against the deceased Appayya before the Court of Civil Judge, Belgaum, which is now pending. It is, therefore, clear that Appayya was continuing in possession and cultivation of the schedule lands even after the expiry of period of 5 years from the date of compromise decree in the suit O.S. No. 425 of 1956 till the notified date and also subsequent to the year 1974, till his death and the present revision petitioners are continuing in possession and cultivation of the said lands after his death and are in possession of the schedule lands till now. So, it must be seen whether the said possession and cultivation of the schedule lands by the deceased Appayya during the above said years during his lifetime and by the present revision petitioners after his death is to be considered as possession and cultivation on behalf of the landlord-respondent 3 and whether respondent 3 was getting the said lands cultivated by them under his personal supervision during the above said years. So far as this aspect is concerned, respondent 3 has not produced any documentary evidence to show that he was advancing the cultivation expenses to deceased Appayya or to the revision petitioners and was paying the wages to them. It is further relevant to note that under the terms of the compromise decree in O.S. No. 425 of 1956 deceased Appayya was put in possession of the schedule lands for cultivation as a servant only for a period of 5 years. There is no evidence on record to show that after the expiry of the said 5 years period, deceased Appayya continued to cultivate the schedule lands as servant of respondent 3 and that he was paid any wages for the said cultivation of the lands. Thus, the claim of the 3rd respondent that deceased Appayya cultivated the said land all these years as his servant, is not supported by the evidence on record. The further contention of respondent 3 that deceased Appayya continued as a licensee in respect of the schedule lands having taken possession of the said lands with leave and licence of respondent 3 for cultivating as a servant, also does not find support from the evidence placed on record. On the other hand, in the suit O.S. No. 161 of 1973 filed by respondent 3 in the Court of Munsiff, Belgaum, for recovery of possession of the schedule lands from deceased Appayya he alleged that deceased Appayya was in unauthorised and illegal possession and enjoyment of the lands after the expiry of five years period from the date of compromise decree. It is also alleged in the said plaint that he was put in possession of the schedule lands for a period of 5 years as servant under the terms of the compromise entered into by the parties. In view of the said specific stand taken by respondent 3 in the said suit, it is not open to him to contend that Appayya was in possession and cultivation of the schedule lands as a licensee even after the expiry of five years period from the date of compromise. Now, it must be seen whether Appayya can be considered as a "deemed tenant" in respect of the schedule lands under the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act reads as follows:
"Persons to be deemed tenants.--A person lawfully cultivating any land belong to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not-
(a) a member of the owner's family, or
(b) a servant or a hired labourer on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of owner's family, or
(c) a mortgagee in possession:
Provided that if upon an application made by the owner within one year from the appointed day-
(i) the Tribunal declares that such person is not a tenant and its decision is not reversed on appeal, or
(ii) the Tribunal refused to make such declaration but its decision is reversed on appeal.
Such person shall not be deemed to be a tenant".
In the present case, it is found that deceased Appayya was not cultivating the schedule land as a servant or a hired labourer on wages payable in cash or kind by respondent 3 after the expiry of 5 years period from the date of compromise decree in O.S. No. 425 of 1956. Admittedly deceased Appayya or his legal representatives, who are the present revision petitioners, are not the members of the family of respondent 3. Since, it is also the admitted case of both parties that the schedule lands are in continuous possession and cultivation of deceased Appayya during his lifetime after the date of compromise decree till the notified date, and after his death in possession and cultivation of his L. Rs who are the revision petitioners, it must be seen whether the said cultivation and possession of the lands can be treated as lawful. At this stage, it is relevant to note that in the suit O.S. No. 425 of 1956 filed for permanent injunction by respondent 3 against the deceased Appayya, deceased Appayya contended that he was in possession of the said lands as a tenant. It is also an admitted fact that an issue has been raised in respect of the tenancy set up by him and the same has been referred to the competent authority Mamlatdar for its decision as required under the provisions of Section 85-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. But, without awaiting the decision of the competent authority, the said suit has been disposed of, acting upon the terms of compromise petition filed by both parties. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners that the said compromise decree is null and void since the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of tenancy and to dispose of the suit in terms of compromise petition submitted by the parties. To appreciate this contention, I find it necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of Sections 85-A and 70 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Section 85-A of the Act reads as follows:--
"If any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the "competent authority") the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination.
On receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the competent authority shall deal with and decide such issues in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall communicate its decision to the Civil Court and such Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906".
Thus, it is clear from the provisions of Section 85-A that the further proceedings in the suit shall remain stayed till the finding is received from the competent authority on the question of tenancy referred to it i for its decision and till the communication is received regarding the decision of the competent authority, the Civil Court shall not dispose of the suit. Admittedly, the said procedure has not been followed by the Court in the above suit and without awaiting the decision from the Mamlatdar, the suit has been disposed of in terms of compromise petition. Thus, it is found that the compromise decree passed in the above suit is in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 85 of the said Act. Section 85 of the said Act is extracted herein:--
"(1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or deal with by the Mamlatdar or Tribunal, a Manager, the Collector or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in appeal or revision or the State Government in exercise of their powers of control.
(2) No order of the Mamlatdar, the Tribunal, the Collector or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal or the State Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdars' Courts Act, 1906".
It is, therefore, clear from the above provision that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy which is required to be settled by Mamlatdar. Since under the terms of the compromise decree passed in the above suit by the Court, the Court accepted one of the terms of the compromise that deceased Appayya, who was the defendant in that suit has given up his claim of tenancy, it is clear that the Civil Court has disposed of the said suit in terms of the said compromise holding that deceased Appayya was not the tenant of the said lands though it has no jurisdiction to decide the said question. Section 70 of the Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Mamlatdar to decide whether the person is a tenant or protected tenant in respect of the lands which are under his cultivation. Thus in view of the above provision of the Act, it is clear that the compromise decree passed by the Civil Court in the above suit deciding the question of tenancy in terms of compromise is null and void. I, therefore, agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners that the said compromise decree is to be ignored for the purpose of deciding the question whether possession and cultivation of the petition schedule lands by the deceased Appayya by the notified date was that of a tenant or not and whether he was in lawful possession and cultivation of the said lands. So, on the basis of the terms of the said compromise decree which is found to be null and void, it cannot be concluded that possession and cultivation of the schedule lands by the deceased Appayya till the notified date was on behalf of the owner-respondent 3 as his servant or as a licensee under the leave and licence granted in his favour by respondent 3. If the said compromise decree is excluded from the consideration, there is absolutely no material on record to hold that possession and cultivation of deceased Appayya in respect of the schedule lands was unlawful or as that of a servant. This important aspect of the matter has been totally ignored by the Appellate Authority as well as the Land Tribunal in the orders passed by them. In a decision of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v Chatnan Paswan, it was held that:--
"It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured by consent of parties".
Since it is found that the compromise decree passed in the above suit by the Civil Court is without jurisdiction and is a nullity its invalidity could be set up by the revision petitioners in the present proceedings. I, therefore, find that the Appellate Authority and the Land Tribunal have erred in acting upon the terms of the said compromise decree which was passed by the Civil Court is without jurisdiction, which is a nullity. There is one more aspect of the case to be taken into consideration in the present case Section 3(2) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Amended Act, 1974 makes its clear that:--
"Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Civil Court, the Tribunal constituted under Section 48 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,. 1961 shall enquire into any claim for registration as occupant made by a person who was a tenant within the meaning of the said Act immediately prior to 1st March, 1974 and who by reason of any such judgment, decree or order has subsequent to the said date been dispossessed of the land of which he was a tenant or is anyway precluded from pleading this tenancy, and direct, if the merits of the case so warrant, that such person be registered, subject to the other provisions of the said Act, as occupant of such land".
So, notwithstanding anything contained the above said compromise decree passed by the Civil Court, which is found to be a nullity, the Tribunal ought to have independently decided the question whether deceased Appayya was in lawful possession of the petition schedule lands and whether he was a tenant within the meaning of the Act by the notified date. But, on a perusal of the orders passed by the competent authority and the Land Tribunal, in the instant case, it is found that they have decided the matter mainly relying upon the compromise decree passed in the above suit and have not kept in mind the procedure to be followed under the amended provisions of Section 3(2) of the Act while deciding the said question. Apart from the said compromise decree which is found to be nullity, there is no material on record to prove that deceased Appayya was in possession and cultivation of the schedule lands till the notified date as a servant of respondent 3. There is also nothing on record to show that his possession and cultivation of the said lands was unlawful. On the other hand, as it is found that he was allowed to pay even the land revenue and K.E.B. charges pertaining to the said lands and the suit filed by respondent 3 for permanent injunction against him has been dismissed on merits it must be taken that his possession of the suit lands till the notified date was lawful possession. The burden of proof, which is on the respondent 3 to prove that the deceased Appayya was cultivating the schedule lands as his servant or that he was in unlawful possession of the said lands, has not been discharged by him by producing any documentary evidence such as documents evidencing payment of cultivation expenses by him to the deceased Appayya for cultivation of the said lands on his behalf or receipts evidencing payment of wages to deceased Appayya for cultivation of the lands as a hired labourer or servant. Though he mainly relied upon the entries in the R.T.C. extracts to show that the name of deceased Appayya is not found in the said entries except for the year 1953-54, the said fact, in my view, does not assume any importance when possession and cultivation of the said lands by deceased Appayya even after the date of compromise decree in the suit O.S. No. 425 of 1956 till the notified date is clearly established and when the said fact is even admitted by respondent 3, who filed suit O.S. No. 161 of 1973 in the Court of Civil Judge, Belgaum, for recovery of possession against him which is still pending. The fact that deceased Appayya sent the rental amount by money order as per Ex. A. 55 and the postal receipt Ex. A. 56 in the year 1968 to respondent 3 itself shows that he was cultivating the said lands as the tenant but not as a servant. Though respondent 3 produced some documentary evidence in the form of receipts Exs. P. 7 and P. 8 and nowkarnama Ex. B. 3 which are the years 1951 to 1954 to show that the deceased Appayya was cultivating the lands as his servant during the said period and he was being paid coolie wages, he did not produce any documentary evidence to show that during the subsequent years, either in the year 1974 or during any of the previous years after 1955 he was cultivating the said lands as his servant and that he was being paid coolie wages. So he must be considered as a "deemed tenant" as defined under the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that during subsequent years deceased Appayya was cultivating the schedule lands as the servant of respondent 3 herein. It is also relevant to note at this stage that in the judgment of suit O.S. No. 147 of 1968 filed by respondent 3 herein against the deceased Appayya marked as Ex. A. 1, it is observed that "if the defendant (Appayya) was servant of the plaintiff (respondent 3) herein, then there was no necessity for him to pay assessment of the suit lands. Further, no receipts have been produced by the plaintiffs having paid the rent to the defendant for the Oil Engine purchased by him and installed in the plaintiffs well. All these facts clearly go to prove that the defendant had continued as the tenant of the plaintiff and not as servant as contended by the plaintiffs Advocate. It is clear from the evidence of P.W. 1 that plaintiff has no agricultural establishment. There is no oral or documentary evidence to show that the defendant has delivered possession of the suit lands of the plaintiff after the expiry of 5 years fixed under the terms of the compromise decree Ex. B. 1". Thus, the Civil Court also came to the conclusion in the above suit that Appayya was not cultivating the schedule lands as a servant and dismissed the suit for permanent injunction filed by respondent 3 herein. In an earlier decision of this Court in Venkatappa Ningappa v State of Karnataka and Others, it was held that:
"Where under an agreement of hired labour petitioner was cultivating the land, in the absence of personal supervision of the owner over the cultivation (who was residing 120 miles away) of the land, the petitioner's cultivation by hired labour and petitioner would be a deemed tenant under Section 4(b). If the ingredient or element of personal cultivation is lacking in the case of a so-called cultivation by hired labour, it will inevitably lead to the conclusion that it is not a case of hired labour but of a deemed tenant.
The rights of the tenant are protected in spite of the fact that he entered into an agreement with the owner for sale of the land to him, when the provisions of Section 39(2) of the Act have not been complied with".
In the instant case also, as there is nothing on record to prove the claim of respondent 3 herein that he was cultivating the schedule lands by engaging Appayya as the hired labourer paying his wages during the relevant years prior to 1-3-1974, the said cultivation of the lands by Appayya does not amount to cultivation by hired labour and he would be a "deemed tenant" under Section 4 of the Act. Since the Civil Court also held in the above referred suit O.S. No. 147 of 1968 that respondent 3 was not at all in possession of the petition schedule lands by the date of filing his suit in the year 1968 and that the cultivation of the above said lands by Appaiab was not as a servant of respondent 3 herein, it can no longer be contended by respondent 3 herein that he was getting the schedule lands cultivated by engaging Appayya as a servant under his personal supervision. Thus, the presumptive value attached to the entries in the R.T.C. extract stands rebutted in the present case by the above referred material placed on record and the circumstances of the case. Since it is found that the Appellate Authority as well as the Land Tribunal have misdirected themselves by mainly relying upon the terms of the compromise decree passed in O.S. No. 425 of 1956 ignoring the relevant provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and the fact that the Civil Court acted without jurisdiction in deciding the question of tenancy in terms of the compromise decree and that the said judgment and decree passed is a nullity in coming to the conclusion that Appayya was cultivating the schedule lands as a servant of respondent 3 herein and that his possession was not lawful, it must be held that the said orders suffer from illegality. The Appellate Authority as well as the Land Tribunal have also ignored the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974 that the question of tenancy is to be independently decided by the Land Tribunal notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Civil Court.
8. For the above reasons, this revision petition is allowed setting aside the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 5-3-1990 as well as the order passed by the Land Tribunal, Belgaum, dated 12-5-1988 and granting occupancy rights in favour of the revision petitioners in respect of the petition schedule lands in Majagaon old Sy. No. 721, new Sy. No. 315 measuring 2 acres 29 guntas and old Sy. No. 722 and new Sy. No. 316 measuring 1 acre 23 guntas of Majagaon Village, Belgaum Taluk, Belgaum. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.