Punjab-Haryana High Court
Tarn Taran Co-Operative Sugar Mills ... vs Smt. Balwant Kaur on 12 September, 2000
JUDGMENT V.K. Jhanji, J.
1. This appeal is directed against order dated 4.6.1999 passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act whereby claimant (respondent herein) has been awarded a sum of Rs. 68,695/- as compensation along with six percent interest from the date of accident to be paid within two months and in case of default, appellant has been directed to pay extra interest at the rate of 9 per cent.
2. Admittedly. Niranjan Singh son of Gurmukh Singh aged 40 years, was employed by the appellant as Helper. On 27.8.1991 at 8.40 A.M. when he was doing his duty on Reverse Bafgas Carrier he was trapped in the machine and as a result, suffered grievous injuries. He was taken to Guru Nanak Dev Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries at 12.05 noon. Claimant who is mother of the deceased, filed an application under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the appellant for compensation. She contended that she be awarded a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/- as compensation along with interest and penalty. In response to notice of the claim application, appellant filed written state-
ment, in which it admitted that the deceased was employed as Helper and he died because of accident on 27.8.1991. It, however, submitted that the claim application filed by the claimant is barred by time. It also denied the allegation of the claimant that she has been visiting the management of the appellant-firm along with comrades and villagers but except for the false hopes, no compensation had been paid or released to her till date. It further denied the allegation of claimant that because of extreme poverty, illiteracy and false making process of management has resulted in delay making the claim application. Appellant denied that the cause shown by the claimant is sufficient to entertain the claim application.
3. Before the learned Commissioner under the Act, the only contention urged by the appellant was that no notice to the management was given which was required under Section 10 of the Act. It was also submitted that poverty and illiteracy cannot be said to be sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. The learned Commissioner, however, rejected both the contentions of the appellant and thus, allowed the claim application and awarded compensation to the claimant in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Hence, this appeal by the appellant.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited a judgment of this Court in Jodh Singh v. Ravinder Singh and others, 1996 (2) P.L.R. 249 to contend that poverty and illiteracy are not sufficient grounds for condoning the delay. Counsel contended that it was for the claimant to explain each and every day's delay and she having failed to do so, the learned Commissioner acted illegally in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him in condoning the delay in filing the claim application. Counsel submitted that no notice with regard to the claim application was given and, therefore, on this count as well the claim application could not have been entertained.
5. After hearing the learned counsel and going through the record, I do not find any merit in the appeal. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act deals with notice and claim. It provides that no claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given in the manner provided as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless the claim is preferred before him within two years of the occurrence of the accident or, in case of death, within two years from the date of death. Fourth proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 provides that the want of or any defect or irregularity in a notice shall not be a bar to the entertainment of a claim. If the claim is preferred in respect of the death of a workman resulting from an accident which occurred on the premises of the employer, or at any place where the workman at the time of the accident was working under the control of the employer or of any person employed by him, and the workman died on such premises or at such place, or on any premises belonging to the employer, or died without having left the vicinity of the premises or place where the accident occurred.
6. Fifth proviso provides that the Commissioner may entertain and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice has not been given, or the claim has not been preferred, in due time as provided in this sub-section, if he is satisfied that the failure so to give the notice or prefer the claim, as the case may be, was due to sufficient cause.
7. Admittedly, in the present case, the claim is in respect of death of a workman resulting from an accident that occurred on the premises of the appellant and at the time of accident, the deceased was working under its control. This being the admitted case, in view of fourth proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 10 the want of notice is not a bar to entertainment of a claim for compensation.
8. It is true that poverty and illiteracy are not sufficient grounds to condone the delay, but in the present case, these are not the only grounds on which delay was sought to be condoned. Claimant in her claim application specifically alleged that "management kept the ailing mother in false hopes for all the time together and every periodically the claimant had been visiting management along with comrades and village members but no compensation was paid or released till date". In addition thereto, she pleaded that "extreme poverty, extreme illiteracy and extreme false making process of management resulted in the delay.....". It is on consideration of the circumstances set out by the claimant for condonation of delay that the learned Commissioner condoned the delay. In may view, the learned Commissioner by taking a liberal view in the matter has not committed any illegality. Time and again, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that words "sufficient cause" under the 'aw of limitation should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. In N. Balakrishan v. M. Krishnaimtrthy, 1999(1) PLR 462, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in this context, have held :
"It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. It the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss."
In the instant case, the explanation for the delay, as set up by the claimant, was found to be satisfactory by the learned Commissioner under the Act and the discretion exercised by him in this regard being not arbitrary, I am of the view that no case for interference is made out.
Consequently, the appeal being without any merit shall stand dismissed.
9. Appeal dismissed.