Bombay High Court
Kunjilal Hanumanlala Jaiswal vs B.C. Deo on 15 July, 1977
Equivalent citations: (1978)80BOMLR599
JUDGMENT Deshmukh, J.
1. These petitions arise out of proceedings under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the State Transport Authority, Bombay, and also the appellate proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal. Since both the applications arise out of the same original proceedings, we have heard them together and this common judgment will dispose of both these petitions.
2. The facts giving rise to this dispute may now be noted. The inter-State route Nagpur-Indore via Amravati and Dharni is the subject-matter of grant of regular permit for which there were four competitors. It is not in dispute that there has been inter-State agreement between the State Governments of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. According to the terms of that agreement on the Nagpur-Indore inter-State route the primary permit is to be issued by the State Transport Authorities of Maharashtra and it is to be counter-signed by their counterpart in Madhya Pradesh.
3. Between October 1974 and December 1974 the State Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the 'S.T.A.') received four different applications. One was from the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Maharashtra State Undertaking (hereinafter referred to as 'M.S.R.T.C.'). The other was from one Kunjilal Hanumanlala Jaiswal (hereinafter referred to as 'Jaiswal'). The third was from M/s. S.H. Motor Transport Co., a partnership firm, and the fourth was from one Ramkrishna Marotirao Kolhatkar (hereinafter referred to as 'Kolhatkar'). When these applications were invited, the parties put in their claims as well as objections to other claimants. None except the four claimants entered the arena either to claim a permit or to raise the objections to the granting of permits to either of them.
4. One of the technical objections raised against the M.S.R.T.C. by the other claimants was that before applying for such a permit, the Corporation had to comply with the provisions of Section 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. This objection was disposed of in the course of two previous hearings ending on December 15, 1975. The objection was over-ruled by an order which said that non-compliance of the provisions of Section 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 does not debar the Corporation from applying altogether. However, the Corporation having subsequently complied with the provisions of Section 20 of the said Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, before the application became ripe for hearing there was no technical infirmity which stood in their way. The S.T.A. therefore decided to consider the application of the M.S.R.T.C. on merits along with others.
5. On December 15, 1975 the S.T.A. made one more query with all the four claimants and the query was this. The maximum rate which was permissible earlier not only for this route but for all routes in Maharashtra was 27 P. per stage of 6 km. or a part thereof. Services were in fact being run on the basis of that rate. The M.S.R.T.C. made some representations earlier which resulted in the State Government acceding to a higher rate of 36 P. per stage of 6 km. or a part thereof. This new rate was made effective from November 20, 1975. The S.T.A. asked all the four competitors whether they were willing to run their services at the old rate of 27 P. per stage or they want to claim any higher rate in view of the Government notification.
6. The three private operators told the S.T.A. that they were willing to operate the services at the old maximum rate of 27 P. per stage. However, on behalf of the M.S.R.T.C. the counsel stated that they would run their services if the permit is granted to them at the newly sanctioned rate of 36 P. per stage. The S.T.A. then asked the counsel to amend the petition of the Corporation to incorporate that rate. The counsel stated that it was neither necessary nor obligatory to do that as the services would be run on the basis of he new rate fixed by the Government which would be available to any operator. In view of this submission the S.T.A, decided to consider the application of M.S.R.T.C. on the footing that the application states the rate of 27 P. per stage but the actual fare that would be charged would be 36 P. per stage, if permit is granted to them.
7. After some adjournment and after hearing the parties, the S.T.A. decided the proceedings before it on January 2, 1976. By a speaking order of that day, the S.T.A. awarded a regular permit for a period of three years effective from February 1, 1976 to M/s. S.H. Motor Transport Co. and rejected the applications of the three other claimants. Aggrieved by that order, all the three other claimants filed their respective appeals Nos. 14, 15 and 16 of 1976 before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Maharashtra State, Bombay. By its order dated March 12, 1976 the Appellate Tribunal confirmed the order of the S.T.A. and dismissed all the three appeals. Being aggrieved by this order of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, Jaiswal has filed his Special Civil Application No. 1913 of 1976 and the M.S.R.T.C. have filed their Special Civil Application No. 2466 of 1976. Mr. Kolhatkar is out of the race though he is made a party by Jaiswal in his application.
8. On behalf of the two petitioners, technical objections as also objections on merits are raised and it would be appropriate to first dispose of the technical objection before we deal with the rest of the merits of the matter. So far as the M.S.R.T.C. is concerned, it is alleged that their present application for obtaining a permit is itself incompetent. Admittedly the provisions of Section 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 were not complied with by the Corporation. The present route is one which is partly situated within another State and as such the provisions of Section 20 are attracted. It becomes necessary for the Corporation to negotiate with the Government of the other State with of course the permission of the State of Maharashtra to propose the extension of the route in that State. Once that is done by the other State, the Corporation is to prepare a scheme and forward the scheme to the other Government for its consent. After such consent is received, the Corporation may with the previous approval of the State Government, the Maharashtra State Government, sanction the scheme. These are the provisions of Sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 20.
9. The opening words of Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority over the decisions of S.T. Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. The interference by the High Court is always limited. If the law is erroneously applied, the High Court will lay down the correct law and rectify the mistake. If certain factual aspects are not taken into consideration at all or evidence is so misread as to amount to non-application of mind, the High Court may again rectify the mistake. What form that rectification will take place depends upon the nature of the order which the High Court is considering. Normally, coming to certain conclusions of fact falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. The High Court when satisfied that the law has not been properly interpreted and the facts have not been properly evaluated, while pronouncing the law, would ordinarily send down the matter for reconsideration in the light of principles of law enunciated in the High Court's order.
42. When we consider the present matter from that point of, view, we are satisfied that all evidence has been taken into consideration by the authorities below and they have come to the conclusion which cannot be described as either perverse or originating in non-application of mind. It is not, therefore, possible for us to interfere with the order passed by the authorities below. This being our view both the writ petitions fail and will be dismissed. The order granting permit to M/s. S.H. Motor Transport Co. is thus confirmed.
43. Mr. Jaisinghani had applied for the amendment of Special Civil Application No. 1913 of 1976. However, he is not pressing that application. He is allowed to withdraw Civil Application No. 249 of 1977 in Special Civil Application No. 1913 of 1976.
44. We thus reject both the writ petitions and direct that each of the petitioner will pay costs in one set to respondent M/s. S.H. Motor Transport Co. The rest of the respondents will bear their respective costs.
45. At this stage Mr. Hegde for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2466 of 1976 applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which is refused.