Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Kannula Seshamma (Deceased By L. R'S.) vs M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation ... on 8 August, 1990
Equivalent citations: AIR1991AP268, 1991(1)ALT82, AIR 1991 ANDHRA PRADESH 268, (1991) 1 ANDHWR 207, (1991) 1 APLJ 170, (1991) 1 ANDH LT 82, (1991) 187 ITR 326
JUDGMENT
1. This second appeal was admitted by the learned single Judge (P.A. Choudary, J.). At the stage of admission it was referred to larger Bench as the learned single Judge felt the decision of the Division Bench in Mustafa Hussain v. Union of India, , required reconsideration, and he did so without giving any reasons in that behalf.
2. Before going into the point referred, it is necessary to indicate the procedure which should be followed by learned single Judges for reference of any matter to a Full Bench. There is no provision in the Appellate side Rules enabling a single Judge directly to refer any matter to a Full Bench. Rule 2 of the said Rules provides that if both Judges constituting the Bench agree that the determination involves a question of law, they may order that the matter or the question of law should be referred to a Full Bench. Rule 6 enacts that notwithstanding anything in the foregoing rules to the contrary, the Chief Justice may direct that any application, petition, suit, appeal or reference shall be heard by a Full Bench as defined in the rules. It has been laid down by the Full Bench judgment of this court, namely, Subbarayudu v. The State, (FB) as reiterated in Satryanarayana v. Madras Stale, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 1027 (FB) that it is not open to a single Judge of this Court to refer any matter straightway to a Full Bench. He has first to refer the matter to a Division Bench giving his reasons as to why he considers that the matter should go before a Full Bench and it will then be for the Division Bench to consider whether it is necessary to refer the matter to a Full Bench."
3. In Mustafa Hussain v. Union of India the three enactments Esso Acquisition Act, Burmah Shell Acquisition Act and Caltex Acquisition Act were held as not ultra vires under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The Division Bench after elaborate consideration of Art. 31-C and to the several provisions of the Act and its objects took the view that the provisions of Sections 5(2) and 7(3) of the aforesaid three enactments are basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the objects of the State policy. They took the view that these provisions form an integral part of the main enactments which receive protection of Art. 31-C. Then the Bench took into account every provision of the examining the policy. The Bench took the view that the Statement of Objects and Reasons shows that in implementation of the policy of progressively securing that the ownership and control of the production of nation's petroleum resources are vested in the State and are so distributed as best to subserve the common good, the Government entered into negotiation with the Oil Companies and that the provisions of the Act are protected by Art. 31-C inasmuch as they are enacted to give effect to the State Policy in Arts. 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India.
4. Before the Division Bench the provision of S. 5(2) was also specifically questioned. The Division Bench in paragraph 11 of its judgment at page 291 specifically said:
"Before we proceed further it must be made clear that these provisions do not give scope for any perpetual lease as apprehended by the learned counsel. The Corporation can exercise this option only once on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was existing on the appointed day."
5. No arguments were advanced before us by the appellants counsel to persuade us to differ from the view taken by the Division Bench. We are satisfied that the provisions of Art. 31-C protect the Act and therefore Arts. 14, 19 cannot come to the aid of the appellant.
6. For the aforesaid reasons we find no reason whatsoever to go into the validity of the S. 5(1) and (2) of Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 again. No other point arises in the second appeal. The second appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
7. Appeal dismissed.