Kerala High Court
Aravindaksha Prabhu vs Shamsuddin on 20 October, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(1)KLT644
Author: R. Basant
Bench: R. Basant
ORDER R. Basant, J.
1. These revision petitions are filed by the common revision petitioner aggrieved by the orders dated 25th February 1999 in I.A. 407 of 1999 in O.S. 787 of 1997 and I.A. 406 of 1999 in O.S. 789 of 1997.
2. Those suits were filed by the revision petitioner against the respondents for specific performance of two agreements for sale and in the alternative for return of the amount paid as advance. During the pendency of the suits the matter was settled between the parties and the settlement was reported to the Court. The plaintiff, in view of the settlement, did not want to further prosecute the suits. It was in these circumstances that the plaintiff reported settlement to the Court and did not choose to prosecute the suits.
3. The Court accepted the statement of the contestants. In one suit (O.S. 787 of 1997) it was specifically endorsed that the matter is settled between the parties. It was prayed that the suit may be dismissed and half court fee may be refunded. That endorsement is made by both counsel. In the other there was only a statement made at the bar. The Court accepted the said statements and proceeded to dismiss the suits. There was no specific direction in the Judgments/Decrees to refund half court fee.
4. It is in these circumstances that the revision petitioner-filed I.A. 406 and 407 of 1999 in the two suits for a direction to refund half the court fee under Section 69 of the Kerala Court Fees Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act and for amendment of the Decree. The applications were not opposed. The fact that there was settlement of the disputes involved in both suits was not disputed. But the learned Munsiff by the impugned orders proceeded to dismiss the applications. According to the learned Munsiff a mere statement/ endorsement that the matter is settled and that the suit is not pressed is insufficient to persuade the Court to invoke its powers under Section 69 of the Act and to direct refund of half the court fee.
5. The respondents have not entered appearance. The learned Government Pleader was requested to make his submissions to assist the Courts. Arguments were heard.
6. The fact that the revision petitioner/plaintiff and the respective respondents/ defendants had settled their disputes is not disputed. The fact that the Court was apprised of such settlement is also not disputed. That the Counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant had made it clear to the Court by written endorsement in one suit and by statements made at the bar in both suits that the suits were settled is again not disputed. The court below, it appears chose to reject the prayer for refund of half the court fee on the following grounds:
(i) The disposal of the suit on the ground that the plaintiff does not want to prosecute the suit, even if based on a settlement cannot justify invocation of the powers under Section 69.
(ii) It cannot be held that the suit was decided on the admission of parties without any investigation.
7. Section 69 of the Act reads as follows:
"69. Refund in cases of compromise of when suit is decided on the admission of parties.- When a suit or appeal is compromised or when a suit is decided solely on the admission of the parties without any investigation, one half of the Court fee paid on the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties by whom the same have been paid respectively:
Provided that no refund shall be ordered where only one tenth of the amount of fee on plaint as required by Section 4 A or one third of the amount of fee on memorandum of appeal as required by Section 52 has been paid by the parties."
The expression 'compromise' used in Section 69 must be understood realistically. In Nadesan v. Dinesan (2002 (2) KLT 889) a Division Bench of this Court relied on the dictionary to understand the word "compromise". A settlement of differences by mutual concession is a compromise, it was held. The terms of the compromise are not revealed to the Court in the instant cases. But the fact remains that the parties reported to the Court that their disputes have been settled. The decision reported in 2002 (2) KLT 889 clearly lays down that it is not necessary that the Court must record the terms of the settlement or pass a Decree on the basis of such settlement. Even when the terms are not recorded and no Decree is passed in terms of the compromise, it remains that the suit is compromised and disposed of. In this view of the matter it can safely be held in the facts and circumstances of these cases that there has been compromise between the parties. The Court below appears to have entertained the erroneous impression that a suit can be reckoned as compromised for the purpose of Section 69 only when a joint statement of compromise is filed and a Decree is passed in terms of such joint compromise statement. The decision referred to above clearly shows that this impression entertained by the court below is incorrect. Refund must have been ordered on the ground that the suits were compromised by the parties.
8. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner next contends that even if it be held that the suit is not compromised, it must be held that the suit has been decided solely on the admission of the plaintiff without any investigation. I find merit in this contention also. There can be no dispute on the question that the suits have been decided. The decision in the suits is to dismiss the suit. The court has taken that decision. How was this decision arrived at? It was arrived at solely on the statement of the plaintiff that he does not want any relief. In that view of the matter, it would be absolutely correct to hold that the suit has been decided solely on the statement of the plaintiff that he does not want any relief. Of course he had further stated before the court that he was not pressing the claim because of a compromise between him and the defendant. That does not militate against the fact that the suit is decided solely on the statement of the plaintiff that he does not want any relief.
9. The question then is whether this statement of the plaintiff, who had filed the suit before the court, at a later stage against his own initial claim that he does not want any relief can be reckoned as 'admission' by the plaintiff. According to me it is enough if the word 'admission' is understood in the dictionary sense. It is not necessary to go to Section 17 of the Evidence Act to ascertain whether the statement by the plaintiff before court that he does not want any relief against the defendant is an admission or not. The plaintiff who had come to court with the suit was making a statement against his own interest that he does not want any relief in the suit. For the purpose of Section 69, according to me, that statement of the plaintiff that he does not want any relief can be reckoned as an admission. The suit is decided solely on the basis of such a statement/admission.
10. Two more questions arise. The first is whether this statement of the plaintiff can be said to be admission "of the parties". The second is whether the decision is "without any investigation". When the legislature in Section 69 used the expression "admission of the parties", evidently the plural word "parties" was used to cover the singular also. Hypothetically a joint admission by all the parties to the suit may not be impossible but certainly admission by one party also must necessarily fall within the sweep of the expression "admission of the parties". I find no merit in the argument that admission by the plaintiff alone is not sufficient and that such admission must be by all the parties. That would be against the basic tenet of interpretation that the plural expression must be understood to include the singular. Even the submission by the plaintiff that he does not want to prosecute the suit according to me, would be sufficient "admission, of the parties" within the sweep of that expression in Section 69. This objection cannot also hence be upheld.
11. Was there any investigation? This is the next question. No one has a case that the decision was on the basis of any investigation. There is dispute as to whether issues have been raised or not. I shall assume for the sake of arguments that issues have already been raised in both the suits. That framing of issues is not, by itself, investigation for the purpose of Section 69 is now trite in view of the decision in Manhoma Rubber Co. v. Union Bank of India (1987 (1) KLT 525). In these circumstances I find no merit in the contention that the decision has been rendered not "without any investigation" for the reason that issues have been framed. In view of Section 4A of the Court Fees Act as also the proviso to Section 69, there can be no doubt that even after framing of issues the balance court fee (after the initial payment of one tenth) need be paid only if the suit is not compromised. Therefore the contention that as soon as the issues are raised the entire balance court fee will have to be levied cannot obviously stand. The decisions reported in Nadesan v. Dinesan (2002 (2) KLT 889) and St. George Orthodox Cathedral v. Reetha (2002 (3) KLT 414) also support this position.
12. No specific reported precedent on this aspect has been brought to my notice by the Counsel. But a Judgment dated 27th June 1986 in A.S. 42 of 1985 where a Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Chief Justice V.S. Malimath and Justice V. Bhaskaran Nambiar invoked the powers under Section 69 to direct refund of half court fee is relied on. There is no detailed discussion on this aspect in the said decision. Half court fee was of course refunded in that appeal when the appeal was dismissed as not pressed in view of a compromise between the parties.
13. In these circumstances I am of the opinion that even in a case where the plaintiff makes a statement that he does not want any relief and gets his suit dismissed it will be a case of the suit being decided solely on the basis of the statement/admission of the plaintiff without any investigation and consequently one half of the court fee shall be liable to be refunded under Section 69 of the Act.
14. I am hence satisfied that the court below did in any view of the matter obviously err in not directing refund of half court fee in these cases. In the circumstances the impugned orders do warrant interference.
15. In the result
(a) These Revision Petitions are allowed.
(b) The impugned orders are set aside.
(c) The I.As. shall stand allowed and the court below is directed to carry out necessary amendments in the decree and refund half court fee under Section 69 of the Act to the revision petitioner in both the suits.
(d) No costs.
16. I make it clear that this common order is rendered on the basis of the submission that the entire court fee payable has already been paid. Needless to mention that the question of refund of half court fee will arise only if the entire court fee payable has already been paid.