Meghalaya High Court
Date Of Decision: 17.09.2025 vs Shri. Sunil Kumar Pandey on 17 September, 2025
Author: W. Diengdoh
Bench: W. Diengdoh
2025:MLHC:862
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MACApp. No. 1 of 2025
Date of Decision: 17.09.2025
Smti. Jenifer Dhar,
Wife of (L) Collins Warjri
Resident of Mawlai Mawroh, Shillong,
East Khasi Hills District
Meghalaya
......Appellant/Claimant
- Versus-
1. Shri. Sunil Kumar Pandey,
S/o. Shri. Moni Pandey,
R/o mandir Beltola, P.S. Basistha,
Dist - Kamrup, Guwahati, Assam.
(Owner of Vehicle No. AS01 - DD-3031)
2. Shri. Bindrabor Kharbihthiew,
S/o Shri. D. Kharmujai,
R/o Smit, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya
(Driver of Vehicle No. AS01 - DD-3030)
3. New India Assurance Company Ltd.,
Represented by Senior Divisional Manager,
Divisional Office, Dhankheti,
Opp. Bawri Mansion, Shillong - 01
East Khasi Hills District
Meghalaya.
......Respondents/Opp. Parties
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge 1 2025:MLHC:862 Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. V.K. Jindal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. I. Kharmujai, Adv.
Ms. T. Pohlong, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. P. Dey, Adv. (For R 2)
Mr. S. Dutta, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, Adv.
Ms. A. Synrem, Adv. (For R 3)
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
JUDGMENT & ORDER
1. The learned Member, Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong vide Judgment/Order dated 06.12.2024 has dismissed the claim made by the Claimant/appellant seeking compensation on account of the death of her deceased husband, (L) Collins Warjri who died as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 11.06.2014.
2. Heard Mr. V.K. Jindal, learned Sr. counsel along with Mr. I. Kharmujai and Ms. T. Pohlong learned counsels for the appellant. It is the submission of the learned Sr. counsel that the brief fact of this case is that on 11.06.2014, the deceased husband of the appellant was driving a vehicle being a Maruti Car No. ML 05-D-7379 with his friend, Mr. Preston Mylliem in the front passenger's seat. They were proceeding towards Shillong from Byrnihat on the National Highway 40, G.S. Road.
3. On reaching Nongpoh, Ri-Bhoi District at about 9:00 pm or so, one truck bearing registration number AS 01-DD-3031 driven by Mr. Bindrabor Kharbihthiew/respondent No. 2 herein, in a rash and negligent 2 2025:MLHC:862 manner, coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side of the road dashed against the vehicle driven by the deceased husband of the appellant, as a result thereof, he died on the spot and his friend was also injured consequently. The said Maruti Car was completely damaged in the said accident.
4. The learned Sr. counsel has also submitted that the matter was reported to the Nongpoh Traffic Branch and duly entered in the register as GDE No. 14 dated 11.06.2014. However, the police instead of carrying out a proper investigation, including examination or recording of statement of the said passenger of the vehicle, had registered the case as a UD Case, meaning a case of unnatural death and the Final Report (FR) was submitted on 01.07.2014.
5. The appellant on receipt of the copy of the accident information report from the Nongpoh Court, had then filed an application dated 04.11.2014 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nongpoh to direct the Superintendent of Police to register a regular criminal case against the driver of the erring truck. By order dated 06.11.2014, the learned CJM directed the Superintendent of Police to take necessary action and accordingly, Nongpoh P.S. Case No. 186(11)2014 under Section 279/337/338/427/304(A) IPC on the basis of an FIR filed on 22.11.2014 was registered. However, instead of registering a case against the driver of the truck, the police registered the case against the deceased husband of the appellant and once again the Investigating Officer (IO) filed the Final Report being FR No. 44/15 dated 31.08.2015, submits the learned Sr. counsel.3
2025:MLHC:862
6. In the meantime, the appellant as Claimant has filed an application under Section 166 read with Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation for a sum of ₹ 53,30,910/- together with interest @ 12% on account of the death of her husband in the said accident which occurred on 11.06.2014 at Nongpoh.
7. Accordingly, on being made party to the claim, notice was issued upon the respondent No. 3/New India Assurance Company Ltd, the owner and driver of the said truck No. AS 01-DD-3031. Only the respondent No. 3 herein as the insurer of the truck entered appearance and contested the claim, while the matter proceeded ex parte against the owner and driver of the said truck.
8. After written statement was filed, the learned Member, MACT framed 5 issues, including the issue of whether the deceased husband of the Claimant/appellant died in the said road accident which occurred on 11.06.2014 as a result of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said truck and another issue being whether the Opp. Party/New India Assurance Company Ltd. is liable for payment of compensation to the Claimant to indemnify the owner of the said truck.
9. The matter proceeded for recording of evidence before the MACT with the Claimant producing four witnesses as CW-1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively and the Opp. Party/Insurance Company also brought three of their witnesses to the stand as OPW-1, 2 and 3 respectively.
10. On completion of the recording of evidence and upon hearing the argument of the parties, the learned Member, MACT then passed the 4 2025:MLHC:862 impugned Judgment/Order dated 06.12.2024, rejecting the claim. Hence this appeal.
11. The learned Sr. counsel has submitted that from the evidence and the materials on record, what is established as factual is that an accident has occurred involving the deceased driver of the Maruti Car and the Truck, this fact was revealed by CW-2 and CW-4, both eye-witnesses to the accident. The manner in which the accident occurred was that the Maruti Car while proceeding towards Shillong, on reaching Nongpoh, the offending Truck came from the opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner while overtaking another vehicle and in the process, dashed against the said Maruti Car, killing the deceased driver on the spot and injuring the other occupant, that is, CW-2.
12. It is the further submission of the learned Sr. counsel that on appreciation of the evidence of the Claimant's witnesses as well as those of the witnesses produced by the Opp Party/Insurance Company, the learned Tribunal has come to a wrong finding by holding that the cause of the said accident was due to the negligence of the deceased driver of the Maruti Car.
13. That the evidence of CW-2, the eye-witness of the accident who was present in the car when the accident happened was disbelieved by the learned Tribunal only on the ground that in his deposition he has stated that he could not come out of the vehicle as he was badly injured, but in his cross-examination he said that he was not seriously injured nor sustained any bone injury in the accident, is not a valid and reasonable ground to discard his evidence as far as the factum of accident is concerned, submits the learned Sr. counsel. Also, another eye-witness, 5 2025:MLHC:862 CW-4 has also stated that he witnessed the accident happened and has narrated the same to the police at the hospital, but in the cross-examination, he said that he did not inform the police on that day or any other day, his evidence was discarded by the learned Tribunal on this ground alone which is not proper, asserts the learned Sr. counsel.
14. The learned Sr. counsel has also led this Court to the MVI Report filed on 13.06.2014 relating to the condition of the Truck at the time of the accident and another report dated 26.06.2014 relating to the Maruti Car. From the said reports, it was found out that as a consequence of the said accident, the front bumper and number plate of the Truck was damaged, while the condition of the Maruti Car is that it was badly damaged. This, according to the learned Sr. counsel is a clear indication that the accident was on account of a head-on collision and not that the Maruti Car had dashed the stationary Truck.
15. It is the further submission of the learned Sr. counsel that the learned Tribunal while passing the impugned judgment has failed to properly appreciate the evidence by resorting to technicalities, whereas it is well settled that in cases such as these, the decision should be based on preponderance of probabilities and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The case of Mathew Alexander v. Mohammed Shafi & Anr. reported in (2023) 13 SCC 510, para 11, 12 & 13 was referred to in support of this contention, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"11. Insofar as the claim petition filed by the appellant herein is concerned, alleged negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry and pickup van in causing the accident has to be proved. That is a matter which has to be considered on the basis 6 2025:MLHC:862 of preponderance of the possibilities and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is left to the parties in the claim petitions filed by the appellant herein or other claimants to let in their respective evidence and the burden is on them to prove negligence on the part of the driver of the Alto car, the tanker lorry or pickup van, as the case may be, in causing the accident. In such an event, the claim petition would be considered on its own merits. It is needless to observe that if the proof of negligence on the part of the drivers of the three vehicles is not established then, in that event, the claim petition will be disposed of accordingly.
12. In this context, we could refer to judgments of this Court in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal [(1980) 3 SCC 457], wherein the plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rejected. It was observed that culpable rashness under Section 304-A IPC is more drastic than negligence under the law of torts to create liability. Similarly, in Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [(2009) 13 SCC 530] ("Bimla Devi"), it was observed that in a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal has to determine the amount of fair compensation to be granted in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of a driver of a motor vehicle. A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need not be established by the claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering the petition seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a road traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, [(2013) 10 SCC 646] which has referred to the aforesaid judgment in Bimla Devi [(2009) 13 SCC 530].
13. In that view of the matter, it is for the appellant herein to establish negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry in the petition filed by him seeking compensation on account of death of his son in the said accident. Thus, the opinion in the final report would not have a bearing on the claim petition for the aforesaid reasons. This is because the appellant herein is seeking 7 2025:MLHC:862 compensation for the death of his son in the accident which occurred on account of the negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry, causing the accident on the said date. It is further observed that in the claim petitions filed by the dependents, in respect of the other passengers in the car who died in the accident, they have to similarly establish the negligence in accordance with law."
16. In view of the evidence which has proved that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said Truck, therefore, the deceased driver of the Maruti Car/husband of the Claimant/appellant was at the receiving end of such action which has resulted in his death. Thus, the appellant/Claimant is entitled to just compensation, the calculation of which has been determined on a more or less well accepted formula, submits the learned Sr. counsel.
17. In this regard, the learned Sr. counsel has led this Court to the many judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein the mode and manner of determination of the quantum of compensation in motor vehicle accident cases has been spelt out.
18. The first case referred to in this respect is the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs) & Ors., (1994) 2 SCC 176, para 16 and 17 which reads as follows:
"16. It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally well-established. There are some cases which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage therefrom towards uncertainties of future life and award the resulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, if the deceased was, say 25 years of age at the time of 8 2025:MLHC:862 death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years virtually adopting a multiplier of 45 and even if one-third or one-fourth is deducted therefrom towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly impermissible. We are, aware that some decisions of the High Courts and of this Court as well have arrived at compensation on some such basis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle. They are merely instances of particular awards in individual cases. The proper method of computation is the multiplier method. Any departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability for the assessment of compensation. Some judgments of the High Courts have justified a departure from the multiplier method on the ground that Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 insofar as it envisages the compensation to be 'just', the statutory determination of a 'just' compensation would unshackle the exercise from any rigid formula. It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a 'just' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. We disapprove these decisions of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view. We indicate that the multiplier method is the appropriate method, a departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases.
17. The multiplier represents the number of years' purchase on which the loss of dependency is capitalised. Take for instance a case where annual loss of dependency is Rs 10,000. If a sum of Rs 1,00,000 is invested at 10% annual interest, the interest will take care of the dependency, perpetually. The multiplier in this case works out to 10. If the rate of interest is 5% per annum and not 10% then the multiplier needed to capitalise the loss of the annual dependency at Rs 10,000 would be 20. Then the multiplier, i.e., the number of years' purchase of 20 will yield the annual dependency perpetually. Then allowance to scale down the multiplier would have to be made taking into account the uncertainties of the future, the allowances for immediate lump sum payment, the period over which the dependency is to last 9 2025:MLHC:862 being shorter and the capital feed also to be spent away over the period of dependency is to last etc. Usually in English Courts the operative multiplier rarely exceeds 16 as maximum. This will come down accordingly as the age of the deceased person (or that of the dependents, whichever is higher) goes up."
19. As to the assessment of the quantum of compensation, the learned Sr. counsel has submitted that the principles and guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt) & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121 at para 18, 19, 30 and 42 was also relied upon by the appellant to say that the same is also applicable to the facts of the case herein. The same are reproduced herein as follows:
"18. Basically only three facts need to be established by the claimants for assessing compensation in the case of death:
(a) age of the deceased;
(b) income of the deceased; and
(c) the number of dependants.
The issues to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at the loss of dependency are:
(i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income;
(ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses of the deceased; and
(iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased.
If these determinants are standardised, there will be uniformity and consistency in the decisions. There will be lesser need for detailed evidence. It will also be easier for the insurance companies to settle accident claims without delay.
19. To have uniformity and consistency, the Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by the following well settled steps:
Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand) The income of the deceased per annum should be determined. Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to 10 2025:MLHC:862 the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is considered to be the contribution to the dependant family, constitutes the multiplicand.
Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier) Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the age of the deceased.
Step 3 (Actual calculation) The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the "loss of dependency" to the family.
Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs. 5000 to Rs.10,000 may be added as loss of estate. Where the deceased is survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the range of 5000 to 10,000 should be added under the head of loss of consortium. But no amount is to be awarded under the head of pain, suffering or hardship caused to the legal heirs of the deceased.
The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if incurred) and cost of any medical treatment of the deceased before death (if incurred) should also be added.
30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependant family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependant family members exceed six.11
2025:MLHC:862
42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years."
20. Another aspect of the matter which requires consideration is the award made under the head of non-pecuniary loss, which included loss of future prospect, especially in case of the deceased husband of the appellant who lost his life at the age of 44 years and 9 months or so. Here too, the dictum in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi & Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680, para 59, 59.1-59.8 has been relied upon to show that loss of future prospects as far as the deceased husband of the appellant is concerned, taking into account his date of birth as per the calculation should be 30% of the annual income of the deceased. This apart from the other entitlements under the convention heads for loss of estate, funeral expenses etc., submits the learned Sr. counsel.
21. In view of the above, the learned Sr. counsel has also submitted that on the total amount of compensation computed, 12% p.a. simple interest must also be paid to the Claimant/appellant on behalf of the dependents of the deceased.
22. Per contra, Mr. S. Dutta, learned Sr. counsel for the respondent No. 3/New India Assurance Company Ltd. along with Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, learned counsel, in his response, he has submitted that the first argument of the learned Sr. counsel for the appellant that the respondent/Insurance 12 2025:MLHC:862 Company herein is restricted in its defence in these proceedings inasmuch as it cannot contest the case on merits until and unless the Tribunal has allowed it to do so under Section 170 of the MV Act, 1988, which according to the learned Sr. counsel is absent, as no such order has been passed allowing the Insurance Company to take on the defence of the insured, including the driver of the Truck involved in the accident, is not correct.
23. The learned Sr. counsel has then countered this argument by stating that since the New India Assurance Company Ltd. has been arrayed as a party respondent in these proceedings as well as before the learned Tribunal, then even if there is no express order under Section 170 passed, yet the Insurance Company is still empowered to take up such defence. This proposition has been laid down in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited v. Shila Datta & Ors, (2011) 10 SCC 509, para 14 and 15 where it was held that:
"14. When an insurer is impleaded as a party-respondent to the claim petition, as contrasted from merely being a noticee under Section 149(2) of the Act, its rights are significantly different. If the insurer is only a noticee, it can only raise such of those grounds as are permissible in law under Section 149(2). But if he is a party-respondent, it can raise, not only those grounds which are available under Section 149(2), but also all other grounds that are available to a person against whom a claim is made. It, therefore, follows that if a claimant impleads the insurer as a party-respondent, for whatever reason, then as such respondent, the insurer will be entitled to urge all contentions and grounds which may be available to it.
15. The Act does not require the claimants to implead the insurer as a party respondent. But if the claimants choose to implead the insurer as a party, not being a noticee under Section 149(2), the insurer can urge all grounds and not necessarily the limited 13 2025:MLHC:862 grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. If the insurer is already a respondent (having been impleaded as a party respondent), it need not seek the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act to raise grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act."
24. Coming to the merits of this appeal, the learned Sr. counsel has submitted that the accident in question has occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the deceased husband of the appellant and not because of the fault of the driver of the Truck, as such, the finding of the learned Tribunal on this issue cannot be faulted.
25. Leading this Court to the evidence of the witnesses produced by the respondent No. 3/Insurance Company before the Tribunal, the learned Sr. counsel has submitted that OPW-2 and OPW-3 were both eye- witnesses to the accident when in similar statements, they have said that on the day of the occurrence, since they are police personnel who were given Naka duty to check the vehicles at the place of occurrence, while other vehicles who were stopped obeyed, the driver of one red Maruti Car did not stop but in a rash and negligent manner went and dashed against a stationary Truck which was parked on the opposite side. Immediately, these two witnesses, rushed to the PO and informed the traffic police whereupon an Ambulance was called which came and took both the driver and the passenger to Nongpoh Civil Hospital.
26. It is the further submission of the learned Sr. counsel that the evidence of OPW-2 and OPW-3 have not been able to be controverted in the cross-examination. The OPW-3 when in his cross-examination was asked as to whether the person who was sitting beside the driver of the Maruti Car would know the manner in which the accident took place, has 14 2025:MLHC:862 answered that the said passenger was drunk, which can only mean that he was not in a position to know how the accident happened.
27. The learned Sr. counsel has again submitted that the evident as has been pointed out has revealed that the cause of the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the deceased husband of the Claimant/appellant and since he has borrowed and driven the said vehicle which belonged to one Smti. Mildoris Rajee, he has stepped into the shoes of the owner and in such a case, the Insurance Company cannot be compelled to indemnify such wrong, the provision of Section 147 (1) (b)
(i) of the MV Act, 1988 being applicable in this case. The case of Hemalata Sahu & Ors. v. Ramadhar & Anr. reported in 2000 ACJ 134, para 8, 9, 10 & 11 as well as the case of Ningamma & Anr. v. United Insurance Company Limited, (2009) 13 SCC 710, para 19, 20, 21, 24, 25 & 26 was cited to prove this point, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, has reiterated that in view of the provisions of Section 147 and 149 of the MV Act, 1988, in a case of a motor vehicle accident, the Insurance Company is contracted to indemnify only the loss incurred as against Third Party risk and not in connection with the death or injuries of the Insured/Owner of the vehicle in question.
28. The learned Sr. counsel has finally submitted that the learned Tribunal has duly considered and properly appreciated the evidence on record and has rightly come to the conclusion that since the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the deceased husband of the Claimant/appellant, therefore the Claimant is not entitled to any compensation.
152025:MLHC:862
29. This Court while considering the submission and contentions raised by the respective party herein, what is surprising is that the factum of the accident having taken place not being disputed by either of the parties, therefore, it can safely be said that the deceased driver of the Maruti Car, who was the husband of the appellant herein, died as a result of a collision which took place between the said Maruti Car and the Truck, however, the manner in which the said accident occurred was presented in a different picture by two sets of alleged eye-witnesses, those who say it was the fault of the driver of the Truck which came in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the Maruti Car and those who say that they saw the driver of the Maruti Car failing to stop at the police check post and in the process while fleeing from police presence, the car went and dashed a stationary truck which was parked on the road side.
30. At this juncture, it would be but proper to relook at the evidence on record to enable this Court to analyse the factual position as to what happened on the said day of the accident.
31. CW-2 who was present at the time when the accident occurred as he was sitting in the passenger seat of the Maruti Car has stated that "When our vehicle reached at Nongpoh Police Station I saw one truck bearing number AS-01-DD-3031 coming from the opposite direction and on the wrong side of the road by over taking another truck in a high speed dashed the Maruti car on its front side and as a result the Maruti car was pushed back and stuck in a drain...". In his cross-examination, he has reiterated that "...It is not a fact that accident has not occurred due to the rash and negligence driving of the truck bearing No. AS01 DD30031 coming from the opposite direction..."
162025:MLHC:862
32. CW-4 in his examination-in-chief has stated "That on 11.06.2014 between 8:30 PM to 9.00 PM, while I was waiting for a bus to return back to Shillong near Nongpoh PS on GS Road, at that time I saw a Motor Vehicle Accident in which one Maruti car bearing No. ML05 - D - 7379 coming from Byrnihat side was hit by a fast moving truck bearing no. AS01-DD-3031 which was coming from the Opposite direction (Shillong side) and on the wrong side of the road by overtaking another truck...". In his cross-examination, this witness has stated "It is not a fact that I was not at Nongpoh on 11.06.2014 nor did I see the accident as stated by me..."
33. OPW-2 in his examination-in-chief has stated that "In course of the vehicle checking at the highway we stopped many vehicles and everybody obeyed our signals and stopped their vehicle for checking.".
"Suddenly one red Maruti Car in a rash driving came from Byrnihat side towards Shillong and when we signal the vehicle to stop it did not stop but rushed forward and dashed a stationary truck on the opposite side.". "...I have witnessed with my own eyes and according to me the red Maruti car was at fault...".
34. OPW-3 in his deposition before the Tribunal has stated that "At the relevant time we were stopping the vehicles through that route and checking the vehicles.". "Suddenly one red Maruti vehicle going towards Shillong was stopped by us and it did not stop, the said vehicle was driven in a very rash manner and almost hit my colleague who try to stop it.".
"The said Maruti car did not stop at our signal and went forward and hit one truck which was parked on the road". "I have seen the incident with my own eyes and it was the fault of the driver of the Maruti car.".17
2025:MLHC:862
35. With conflicting evidence of both sides presenting their respective eye-witnesses, from the evidence of such eye-witnesses as have been extracted hereinabove, the witnesses on behalf of the Claimant/appellant have insisted that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Truck while the witnesses of the respondent/Insurance Company have contradicted this by saying that the accident occurred as a result of the deceased husband of the appellant had recklessly took off on being signalled to stop by the police personnel at the Naka checking and had dashed against the stationary Truck parked on the roadside.
36. The learned Tribunal has disbelieved the statement of the Claimant's witnesses particularly that of CW-2 because he said one thing in his chief and a contradictory statement in his cross-examination as regard his physical condition at the time when the accident occurred. The evidence of CW-4 was disbelieved since in his chief he has stated that he has narrated the incident to the police at Nongpoh Civil Hospital, but in his cross-examination, he denied that he has said anything to the police about the accident.
37. It must be borne in mind that what is material is to find out the factum of the accident and in this respect, the depiction of how the accident has taken place and the manner in which it had happened was stated by CW-2 and CW-4. The respondent/Insurance Company has not been able to shake the testimony of these witnesses, to say that the accident had not taken place the way they have allegedly seen it.
38. Instead, the respondent/Insurance Company has produced its own witnesses in the person of the two police personnel who were present at 18 2025:MLHC:862 the scene of the accident and who have given a different version of how the accident occurred, to say that it was the driver of the Maruti Car which went and dashed a stationary truck parked on the roadside.
39. From the above, what can be assumed is that when the accident occurred, the Maruti Car was in motion. The presence of the Truck is also evident as witnesses from both sides have testified to the same. However, if one set of witnesses have said that the truck was coming from the opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner and the other side would say that the truck was stationary, the only way for this Court to know the truth is to peruse the record and materials, particularly the statement of witnesses made in course of investigation of the criminal case connected to the FIR lodged (as directed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate), more so, if the driver of the said Truck was ever examined, his statement would then become relevant. However, such evidence is not found in these records since the same have not been placed before the Tribunal or this Court. What is available is only the Final Report, from the contents of which is found that the Police Officer who has filed the same has noted that the accident occurred when the driver of the said Maruti Car went and dashed against a Truck coming from the opposite direction and then it halted at the side of the road on impact. However, this Final Report produced as Paper Mark-E by OPW-1, the Investigating Officer cannot be relied upon as the said OPW-1 herself in her cross-examination has stated that "I also agree that the fact of ordering a reinvestigation into the case also goes to show that the FR Paper Mark-E submitted by me before the Court had been rejected". Therefore, no substantial evidence from this end was forthcoming.
192025:MLHC:862
40. The MVI report as against the said Truck has indicated that there was partial damage to the front bumper and number plate, while that of the Maruti Car shows that the vehicle was totally damaged. This can only mean that there were a head-on collision and such damage to the truck would not have happened if the said truck was parked on the side of the road.
41. Even if the version of the witnesses of the respondent/Insurance Company is to be accepted, then another question will arise, that is, if at all the said truck was parked on the roadside, as was asserted by OPW-3, for a vehicle parked on the road side, parking lights which blinks has to switch on, which was not done so, as the truck emitted only half light, then there was negligent conduct by the driver of the said Truck.
42. Therefore, the fact that the driver of the Maruti Car went and dashed against the stationary Truck resulting in the said accident, the same can only mean one thing, that there was contributory negligence on the part of the drivers of both the vehicles involved. This conclusion is arrived at by considering all possible scenarios of how the accident occurred and on the basis of preponderance of probability, as was pointed out in the case of Mathew Alexander (supra). The percentage of contributory negligence, according to this Court shall be calculated at 50% each.
43. Coming to the next issue, that is, what would be the amount of fair compensation due to the Claimant/appellant, the application of the multiplier method for the calculation of compensation in case of death in a motor vehicle accident has been a widely accepted formula, for which in the case of General Manager, Kerela State Road Transport Corporation 20 2025:MLHC:862 (supra) at para 16 and 17 as relied upon by the learned Sr. counsel for the appellant is found relevant.
44. As to what is required to be established by the Claimant for assessment of compensation in the case of death, reference by the appellant to the case of Sarla Verma (Smt) & Ors. (supra) is also found relevant.
45. Coming to the particulars of the deceased as given by CW-3 Shri. Winninstar Kharlyngdoh who represented the office of the PHE Department (Sewerage and Drainage Division), this witness has stated that the deceased during his lifetime has joined service as a Sectional Assistant and in all likelihood before his superannuation he would have been promoted to the post of Junior Engineer. This witness has also produced the service book and service record of the deceased, husband of the appellant wherein his date of birth was listed as 29.09.1969. At the time of his death, he was drawing a salary of ₹ 26,949/-, he was survived by his wife/the appellant, one daughter and two minor sons.
46. On the basis of the above, the total compensation due and payable to the Claimant would be 50% of the amount calculated as under:
Monthly income of the deceased ₹ 26,949/- (rounded off as ₹ 27,000/-) Annual income of the deceased ₹ 27,000/- x 12 = ₹ 3,24,000/-21
2025:MLHC:862 Add 30% of ₹ 3,24,000/- as future ₹ 92,220/- (₹ 3,24,000 prospects + ₹ 92,220 = ₹ 4,16,220/-) Less 1/3 of the annual income ₹ 1,37,406/-
deducted as expenses, the deceased
would have incurred towards his
welfare during his lifetime
Net annual income ₹ 4,16,220 - ₹ 1,37,406
= ₹ 2,78,814/-
Multiplied by 13 x 2,78,814/- ₹ 36,24,582/-
multiplier determined as per the table
of the Second Schedule, the age of the
deceased being 19 at the time of his
death.
Add funeral expenses ₹ 15,000/-
Add Loss of estate ₹ 15,000/-
Add Loss of Consortium ₹ 50,000/-
Total ₹ 37,04,582/-
47. As to the rate of interest, considering the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard and taking into account the prevalent rate of interest, this Court is inclined to allow interest @ 7% p.a. on the above total amount, payable from the date of filing of the claim petition.22
2025:MLHC:862
48. It may be mentioned that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the owner and driver of the truck in question have been issued notice by the appellant herein however, only the respondent No. 2 (driver) has appeared through learned counsel, Mr. P. Dey, who, in his submission has endorsed the submission made by the learned Sr. counsel for the respondent No. 3/Insurance Company.
49. In the final analysis, this Court hereby sets aside and quash the impugned judgment/order dated 06.12.2024 and the Claimant/appellant is directed to be paid compensation for the amount of ₹ 37,04,582/- together with interest aforesaid. However, since there is contributory negligence of 50% on the part of the deceased/husband of the appellant, therefore the respondent No. 3/New India Assurance Company Ltd. is hereby directed to make payment of compensation to the appellant calculated at 50% of the said amount of ₹ 37,04,582/- together with interest @ 7% p.a. to be paid within 2(two) months from the date of this order.
50. In view of the above, this appeal is hereby disposed of. No costs.
51. Records of the MACT to be sent back.
Judge Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR Date: 2025.09.17 17:52:16 IST 23