Patna High Court
Sudhansu Kumar Ghose And Anr. vs Land Acquisition Officer And Ors. on 20 October, 1960
Equivalent citations: AIR1961PAT150, AIR 1961 PATNA 150
Author: V. Ramaswami
Bench: V. Ramaswami
ORDER
1. In Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 586 of 1959 the case of the petitioner is that he had purchased 3 kathas 3 dhurs of land in village Lohanipur, comprised in plot No. 295, khata No. 200, tauzi No. 387, and forming Colony Plot No. 96, at a cost of Rs. 3150/- from Syed Anwar Hussain and his co-sharers by a registered sale-deed dated 23-5-1955, for the purpose of constructing a house. It appears that by a notification dated 2-2-1957, published in the Bihar Gazette, the State Government declared that the land of the petitioner along with other lands were intended to be acquired for a public purpose, namely, for construction of low-income-group houses by the People's Co-operative House Construction Society, Patna.
On 9-11-1957, the petitioner filed a claim before the Land Acquisition Officer for compensation for the acquisition of the land in question. The claim petition was heard, and on 20-10-1958, the Land Acquisition Officer made an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act and the compensation payable to the petitioner was determined to be Rs. 3586/28 nP.
A notice of the award was given to the petitioner on 1-5-1959, but the Land Acquisition Officer instead of making the payment of the compensation to the petitioner made a reference to the District Judge under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act and directed that the amount of compensation may be kept as deposit in the court of the District Judge. The order of reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer is Annexure H to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner dated 27-6-1960. In this reference it is said that there was a dispute between the petitioner on the one hand and Shri Dwarka Prasad Gupta, Shri Mahendra Prasad Lall and Bibi Uma Salma on the other with regard to the title to the property acquired and the apportionment of compensation.
The case of the petitioner is that there was no dispute with regard to title or with regard to apportionment of compensation as between the petitioner and the three persons named, and so the Land Acquisition Officer had no jurisdiction to make a reference to the Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner has obtained a rule from the High Court asking the respondents to show cause why the order of reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act should not be quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. In Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 585 of 1959 the material facts are of a similar character and the petitioner in that case, Shri Sudhanshu Kumar Ghose, has prayed for a similar relief.
3. Cause has been shown in both these cases by Learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given.
4. Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act is in the following terms :
"30 Dispute as to apportionment -- When the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of Court."
The submission of learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners in both the applications is that there was no dispute with regard to the apportionment of compensation and so the Land Acquisition Officer had no jurisdiction to make a reference to the District Judge under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act or to the order that the amount of compensation should be deposited in the Court of the District) Judge until the reference was decided.
It was further submitted by Learned Counsel that the existence of a dispute about apportionment as a question of jurisdictional fact, and if no such dispute really exists the Land Acquisition Officer has no jurisdiction to make a reference to the District Judge. In our opinion the argument put forward by learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners, is correct. In our opinion the existence of a dispute with regard to apportionment of compensation is the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference to the District Judge under the provisions of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.
The question which arises, therefore, in the present case is whether there is a dispute between the petitioners, Shri Kaushal Manmohan and Shri Sudhanshu Kumar Ghose, and the other parties mentioned in the reference, namely, Shri Dwarika Prasad Gupta, Shri Mahendra Prasad Lall and Bibi Uma Salma, with regard to the apportionment of compensation or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable. (Their Lordships considered the facts and the evidence and continued.) In our opinion there was no dispute with regard to apportionment of compensation in these cases within the meaning of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, and, therefore the Land Acquisition Officer had no jurisdiction to make a reference for the decision of the court under the terms of that section. aS we have already stated, the existence of a dispute as regards apportionment of compensation is a question of jurisdictional fact, and unless there is such a dispute existing the Land Acquisition Officer has no authority or jurisdiction to make a reference to the civil court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.
This view is supported by the decision of this Court in Chandreshwari Prasad Narain Deo v. State of Bihar, AIR 1956 Pat 104 in which the doctrine of jurisdictional fact was explained. It was pointed out by the High Court in that case that where the jurisdiction of an administrative authority depends upon a preliminary finding of fact, the High Court is entitled, in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari, to determine by its independent judgment whether or not that finding of fact is correct. A similar view has been expressed in two English authorities, Rex. v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee, (1910) 2 K B 859 and White and Collins v. Minister of Health, (1939) 2 K B 838.
5. For the reasons expressed we hold that the order of reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act in both these applications, which is Annexure H, should be quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. We also grant a writ in the nature of mandamus prohibiting the District Judge of Patna from proceeding with the hearing of these two references.
6. We accordingly allow both these applications. There will be no order as to costs.